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THE INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL OF ETHICS

OCTOBER, 1920

MORALITY AS COERCION OR PERSUASION.

M. C. OTTO.

HUMANITY owes a debt to the man who carries a proposition to its logical conclusion. Even in those cases where the demonstration collapses at last through the force of its own logic, this very failure is gain. We have learned at least, if the attempted proof is thoroughgoing, that a certain proposition cannot be established in a certain way. As a classic instance we have the philosopher Hume's contention that the world is a constellation of psychological atoms, and the mind a swarm of impressions and ideas. Hume's famous *Treatise* is not rendered valueless when it has been shown to harbor numerous fallacies, or, when, upon turning to his speculations they appear to us, as he confesses they did very often to him himself, "so cold and strained and ridiculous" that we cannot find it in our hearts to enter into them any further. One thing, at all events, is made clear by Hume's original, comprehensive, and luminous failure,—that scepticism is philosophical suicide.

This reflection is occasioned by the reading of Professor McGilvary's brilliant discussion entitled, "The Warfare of Moral Ideals."[1] The thesis is the one defended by Thrasymachus in Plato's *Republic*—that might makes right; but Professor McGilvary comes to the support of this thesis with such exceptional dialectical skill, such acquaintance with the psychology of men and events, such clarity, grace, and vigor of style that the argument gets a new authority.

[1] *Hibbert Journal*, vol. xiv, No. 1, p. 48 ff.

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Moreover, the wide acceptance of the Darwinian hypothesis that survival is the symbol of fitness in biology has biased the modern mind in favor of the conception that moral ideals merely represent survival in the field of conduct. And the war through which we have just passed has given powerful endorsement to this view. We were led to believe that in a national crisis everyday moral sentiments may be more honored in the breach than in the observance. Victory seemed to depend upon laying aside a moral attitude slowly acquired, and substituting for it a more primitive, because a more virile, warlike temper. Not only so. Leaders who appealed to our sense of right and justice when there was danger of defeat appeared to lose interest in moral considerations once victory was assured. Some have gone so far as frankly to justify the exploitation of a people's moral convictions by those more directly responsible for national success. As a result of these and other influences the doctrine that right is whatever the stronger can force the weaker to accept has been lifted to a new level of cogency. Ever increasing numbers of aggressive people are disposed to look upon conduct as a problem of what can be "put over," while less aggressive spirits are tempted to voice their disillusion in the words of Euripides:

> O miserable virtue! thou art but a word,
> And I have been following thee as a real thing!

The issue raised in Professor McGilvary's paper was therefore never so timely as at present. Even those who repudiate the doctrine that right is merely another name for might owe a special debt to this straightforward defence of that view. For "whoever is anxious," as Mill said, "that a discussion should go to the bottom of a subject, must rejoice to see the opposite side of the question worthily presented." If there ever was a time to deal superficially with morality that time is clearly not now. We are threatened with the radical reconstruction of our most fundamental conceptions of life. Nor is it any longer

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possible to frighten and coerce the mass of men by formal logic or divine revelation. Unless we are prepared to trust the outcome of so momentous an issue to the elemental emotions of men and women we shall need to face the situation frankly and fully. We shall need to back this question into a corner and demand an unambiguous answer. If morality is the last great superstition, if life is in reality a regardless struggle for survival, let the brutal truth be public. The very sternness of the fact may redeem the situation. If, on the other hand, a morality of genuine authority, and life as something more than ill-disguised warfare are intellectually defensible, the gain will be great. A way will then have been found out of our present uncertainty, not to say hypocrisy, and there will be no further occasion for apologizing to our intellect for the desire to live a good life. Indeed, intelligence will be recognized as the foundation of goodness.

Professor McGilvary's argument reduced to its bare outline, to what William James would have called its fighting weight, comes to something like this:[2]

The history of ethics has been largely that of attempts to set forth some incontrovertible principle or principles which must be used to decide in the individual case what is moral and what is immoral. The number of these principles has been great. It would seem that where so many principles are put forward, each alleged to be beyond peradventure, but each conflicting with the others, the natural conclusion should be that there are no infallible principles, and that morality is relative. Professor McGilvary does not propose to disprove the absoluteness of morality. It is, he says, a very wise man—or a fool—who *knows* that there is no Absolute. We are uncertain. Most of us can do no more than wonder with varying degrees of credulity or incredulity, of interest or indifference. But however

[2] Although quotation marks are omitted, this summary is for the most part in Professor McGilvary's own forceful language.

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great may be our uncertainty regarding eternal ethical truth, we are compelled to act. Professor McGilvary intends to show only that we can make right and wrong out of such materials as are at our disposal and can very well make shift with the result.

Coming to the central problem of relativistic morality—the question of a moral standard—Professor McGilvary proceeds to lay bare the method by which the conflict among moral ideals is resolved. His answer is indicated, he says, in the title of his paper. It is always a matter of warfare. The adjudication of differences between moral ideals is the result of an actual fight eventuating in the victory of one ideal over another. Where appearances point to a contrary conclusion, the standard by which the difference is settled is itself one which has come to be accepted because of its victory in a previous contest.

For proof Professor McGilvary appeals to history. When the government first took the control of criminal law into its own hands public sentiment was against the usurpation. It was the strength of the Crown as compared with the growing weakness of the clan that gave victory to the principle of State control. The will of the stronger formed the basis of the new justice. In the course of time ideas of what was right were moulded upon the practice which had come to prevail, and what a short time before was fought as an intolerable infringement is now regarded by most people as a self-evidencing right. So too of negro slavery in America. Here certain differences in political and economic practices gave use to divergent ideals in North and South. How was the question of the rightness or wrongness of slavery settled? By force of arms. Slavery was proved to be wrong, are Professor McGilvary's words, because its advocates did not prove to be strong. Might made right. So of any number of instances that could be recited to point the same moral.

Two qualifications must be kept in mind. Professor McGilvary admits that the doctrine is "a damnable heresy" if too limited in time. The triumph of a cause by

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force of arms does not decide the issue immediately but gradually. It must also be noted that the weapons used in moral warfare are not all carnal. In the moral armory we find, along with material instruments, tools of another temper. Every virile moral judgment is such a weapon; so are praise and blame, and punishment forged by an alloy of condemnation and force. At first men act instinctively in morality as elsewhere. They believe that an act is really right or wrong, actually deserving of praise or punishment. But the sophisticated man sees that moral approbation and disapprobation are means used for the protection of one's ideals and the annihilation of their rivals; that they are weapons of warfare.

The moral to be drawn from the relativity of the moral ideal, says Professor McGilvary in his concluding paragraph, is to keep the fountains of desire ever flowing. As each individual stream of desires flows forward it will be joined by other streams and the mingled waters will with ever more majestic sweep press forward till at last they reach the ocean, from which again will be drawn waters to feed new springs whose turn it will be to keep the ocean full.

The purpose of the discussion which follows is in no sense to challenge the relativity of morality. On that point I am glad to express my complete accord with Professor McGilvary. I am the more happy to do so since it was Professor McGilvary who, as my teacher, first introduced me to the conception. For this, which I now regard as the most pregnant idea gained in my university course, I shall always be deeply indebted to him. Not an absolute morality, then, not a morality based upon eternal and immutable ethical truth, shall be contended for. On the contrary, in my judgment, the head and front of Professor McGilvary's offending is that his position is absolutistic. It seems to me that Professor McGilvary is fully justified in holding that "where so many principles are put forward, each alleged to be beyond peradventure, but each conflict-

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ing with the others, the natural conclusion would seem to be that there are no infallible principles, and that morality is relative." And I accept this conclusion with hope rather than with fear, because I too believe that "however it may be with the Absolute and his standards, we mortals, having no natural access thereunto, can make right and wrong out of such materials as are at our disposal and can very well make shift with the result."

But here the way divides. According to Professor McGilvary the rejection of an absolute moral standard leaves us with nothing but might to adjudicate between ideals. When ideals conflict, the only recourse is to fight it out. "What diverges from our standards," he says, "is wrong—when measured by these standards; and it is false modesty not to insist on our standards because forsooth there are other standards which have the same footing in the world as ours." Since the issue between ideals is determined *by the issue*, it is cowardly, so he argues, not to do one's utmost that one's ideals triumph over all opposed to them. I am unable to agree that this is the necessary deduction from the relativity of morality. I see no reason, either logical or psychological, why the issue between conflicting ideals should be decided by each side closing its eyes to all ideals but its own. Why not invite the ideals to a conference, instead of compelling them to stand aside while their champions determine which can break the other's head? The claim that morality is relative does not mean that no appeal is possible or desirable beyond the immediacy of desires. It simply means that morality is not formal, abstract, unrelated to the concrete wants and purposes of men. Relative morality is related morality. We can, to be sure, make it the servant of aggressiveness if we will. But to take the position that this is the only course open to us is to repudiate the relativity of morality and to turn absolutist. Of this, more in a moment.

Professor McGilvary, as we have seen, supports his contention by the appeal to history. There are at least two

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difficulties connected with proving a case by generalizations from history: one is the danger of oversimplifying the circumstances of the point in dispute, and another is the possibility of finding equally good historical evidence for diametrically opposite conclusions. The complexity of life and the mortality of events force the historian to rest his case upon a few facts selected from the mass of more or less relevant data, while the rest of us select from his selection. Thus in the argument based on changes in legal procedure Professor McGilvary's treatment makes it difficult to estimate the force of his proof or even to discover the exact nature of his position. He appears to say that it was "the strength of the Crown" or "the will of the stronger" and nothing more, that formed the basis of the new justice; but again, that it was the "victory of the Crown, by whatever means gained, and with whatever allies, that resulted in the newer conception of justice in criminal law." It makes a difference which is intended. Excluding the "allies" enormously oversimplifies the facts, while including them endangers the doctrine that justice is the will of the stronger. The use made of the illustration gives the reader an entirely erroneous impression of how the change took place. One gets the impression that a powerful Crown took hold of the situation at the blood-feud stage, and, against public opinion, established the practice which is now regarded by most people as a self-evidencing right. The actual process, however, was in no sense so simple as that. Criminal law had developed through a series of stages,—blood money, compurgation, ordeal, etc.,—each aiming at the securing of more even-handed justice than the appeal to combat could secure, before a powerful Crown took a hand. And even if each step in this process were shown to have involved an appeal to force, the general trend of the process was the elimination of force as the decisive factor. This would seem to show the presence of another agent besides might. As well attempt to account for America's participation in the recent war without counting in a deep yearning for world-

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peace and a deep hatred of militarism as to attempt to account for the change in question without counting in the desire for a more equitable method of trial.

Similarly of the slavery illustration. "Slavery was proved to be wrong," we are told, "because its advocates did not prove to be strong." This again is most convincing when not too closely associated with the intricacies of the actual situation. Let us admit, for the moment, that but for the Civil War slavery would still be regarded as right in America. It is now generally agreed that the greatest single factor in bringing about the war was what in a blanket-term we may call the abolition movement, or the organized sense of the wrongness of slavery. It was this which kept irritating the South and kept rolling up anti-slavery sentiment in the North, until finally outraged feelings on both sides made war unavoidable. What logical justification is there for ignoring this factor? What ground is there for taking the position that this sense of the wrongness of negro slavery, which forced the gun into the soldier's hand, had nothing to do with outlawing slavery in the United States; that the sole causal factor was the soldier with the gun in his hand? It is just this persistent tendency in writers to abstract particular causal factors from a complicated causal background, and to make them alone responsible for social changes, which has led many people to look upon history as a less exciting kind of fiction.

Suppose, however, that according to these cases it were established that might makes right, it is easy to show by a different selection of examples, that might has no such power. Between 1772 and 1795 Poland was three times partitioned among her neighbors Austria, Russia, and Prussia. Frederick the Great frankly admitted that this was an act of brigandage, and the judgment of mankind has never disputed him. In 1842 Great Britain, by an act of war, fastened the opium habit upon the Chinese people in order to provide a profitable market for the opium of India. Englishmen still blush at the memory of the Opium War. In 1846 the United States fought a bril-

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liantly successful war against helpless Mexico. The present judgment of informed Americans, as represented by the practically unanimous verdict of American historians, still condemns this war as one of pure aggression. The English bombardment of Copenhagen, the settlements of the Congress of Vienna, the Belgian behavior in the Congo, the treatment of Ireland by the English are a few other illustrations of the same sort from modern history alone. Moral approval apparently does not follow the flag. According to these examples it would appear that Professor McGilvary's claim is the precise contrary of the truth. Might may settle the issue of rightness for the time being, but not, as he claims, in the long run. Might may make right as long as the passions are in the saddle which warfare always calls to the front, but ultimately it can no more determine the moral quality of the result of its employment that a child can have the moon by reaching for it.

In a way Professor McGilvary may be said to have anticipated both these objections,—the first, by the contention that where some standard besides might seems to have had a part in the settlement, this standard itself came to be accepted as the result of a previous fight; the second, in these words: "If we, looking back upon the course of history, decline to acknowledge that in any particular case might was right, it is because another might *has* meanwhile arisen and brought our sentiments into accord with its sway." But this invitation to an infinite regress is in effect a begging of the question, since the very point in dispute is precisely whether our sentiments of right are in every case the product of an antecedent might.

In spite of what has just been said I confess that the argument appears to have a good deal of force. Perhaps the difficulty is that the word "might" vacillates in meaning. Of course, if we use the word might for all those forces, whatever they may be, which co-operate in bringing about a change in moral outlook (and that at times appears to be what Professor McGilvary has in mind), then might is indeed responsible for the moral ideals a people may from

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time to time espouse. But in that case the word has become symbol for so much that it has lost all distinctive meaning and, what is of most importance in this connection, has lost the specific meaning which gives and has given the 'might is right' doctrine its unique character among moral theories. To persuade another to give up his ideal for yours or for a compromise-ideal in which both his and yours find partial, since they cannot both find full realization, requires power, or, if one wishes so to speak, the exercise of might. Still, persuasion is one thing and coercion is another. In the former case the compelling power is exercised by the ideal itself (however much skill may be required to set the ideal off to advantage), while in the latter case the compelling power is exercised by something external to the ideal. In the one case the ideal functions significantly and in the other case it does not. I find it impossible to read history in such wise as to convince myself that the expanding character of life, the capacity of men to envisage and to care for a wider and wider circle of ideals and for more and more refined ideals is the result, except indirectly, of the ability of the strong, the clever, the regardless to force their desires upon the rest. There is something in the face of aspiring humanity which may not be left out of account, though impossible of nice definition and perhaps ultimately unknowable. Undoubtedly a hint of it might have been detected in the eyes of our rudest ancestors, as sometimes its presence appears to be suggested in the behavior of our yet more backward relatives in the animal kingdom. It has flowered, as far as our knowledge goes, in human intelligence, in man's ability to imagine a fairer life than the immediately experienced one and in his skill gradually to translate the vision into fact. In my judgment it is to this rather than to physical strength or mental cleverness that moral progress is due.

It is not, however, my purpose to appraise the historical accuracy of the proof offered for the doctrine. For I as-

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sume that the paper under consideration is intended as a philosophical rather than a sociological discussion; that it aims to establish a theory of the nature of right and wrong rather than to consider how moral ideals rise and fall. I assume this in spite of the fact that the two points of view are not discriminated in this instance, as they generally are not by those who argue that might makes right. My justification is that only by avoiding the confusion of issue which grows out of the failure to make this distinction are we enabled to get to the heart of the question. Let it be granted that "the ideals of the victor gradually become the ideals of the vanquished," and that "the very descendants of those who were loudest in asserting the right of the eventually doomed cause look back upon the conflict as one for a mistaken principle." (The living are under the necessity and have the capacity to adjust themselves to the inevitable and the dead have no vote.) Let it be granted that might has not only played a large rôle in moral history (which it would be folly to deny), but the only rôle (which is by no means clear). Is that the end of the story?

This question brings us face to face with the real issue—the nature and function of morality as conceived by those who contend that might makes right. It also brings us back to the point already touched upon, namely, the inherent absolutism of this position. At first blush, to be sure, nothing appears more obvious than the relativity of the morality contended for. Not only does Professor McGilvary, for example, attack the proposition that morality implies an immutable standard, but he avows relative morality, and defends it against the charge that such morality necessarily leads to disastrous consequences. Yet what Professor McGilvary really does is to substitute one form of absolutism for another. In place of an eternal, immutable ethical truth we now have an indefinite number of impulses, aims, purposes, ideals, each absolute in its own right. If they are relative to some accepted scheme of life, if they were subservient to a good set up after a sur-

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vey of the situation in which they arose, then an adjustment might be attempted in harmony with this scheme or good. In that case we might agree that a way would have to be found to eliminate some desires, modify some, and give free play to others. Professor McGilvary makes it clear that this is not his position. Opposing ideals are, as far as possible, to be counted out. He disapproves of the person who would hesitate to push the claims of his own desires regardless of others and approves of him who has no such scruples. The reason for this is that there is no ideal to which other ideals may be called upon to surrender their prerogatives. All ideals, as he tells us, are on the same footing. In other words, because each desire is absolute nothing remains but might to adjudicate between them. Consequently, the method of settling issues between opposing ideals is also absolute or fixed. It must necessarily be warfare. Even the plan to adjust such conflicts peacefully would be compelled to win its way, and to maintain itself, by force of arms.

It seems, then, that this theory can scarcely claim to be relativistic. Can it claim to be moral? This is worthy of fuller consideration. As has been intimated, Professor McGilvary is more consistent than is customary. More consistent, for instance, than Treitschke. Treitschke taught that between nations there was no right but might. The only consideration for a nation was how best to advance its own interests, regardless of the consequences to other nations. All intermediate means and ends were justified if they enhanced the national glory. Within a nation, on the other hand, might did not make right. Here morality demanded the fullest possible co-operation of man with man and the most complete self-surrender to the common good. The foes of this double-standard morality have roundly denounced it as wily sophistry. It was not sophistry. It was poor logic. In the case of an individual or an organization of individuals, Treitschke believed in an absolute standard of right and wrong modeled after Kant's categorical imperative, which he admired

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almost as much as Kant himself did. In the case of nations, however, he was convinced that no such standard existed, and consequently, in the case of conflicts of interest between nations Treitschke could see no alternative but an appeal to force. But this amounted to saying (and the Treitschkian philosophy has long been so interpreted) that between nations there can be no question of right and wrong but only one of expediency and power. Professor McGilvary is a better logician. He properly sees no ground for applying the criterion to one set of ideals and not to another. Accordingly he applies to all conflicts of interests between man and man the doctrine that Treitschke applied to international conflicts only.

Now the warfare doctrine applied in this thoroughgoing fashion would seem to abrogate morality altogether, just as its application to international situations abrogates morality in that field. Professor McGilvary is right in contending that the denial of *absoluteness* in moral standards is not a denial of morality altogether; but his theory is the rejection of *all* standards. Obviously the appeal to force can only show who is strong, not who is wrong. To determine who is wrong some standard must be agreed upon which balances the ideals over against each other. To try out the fighting qualities of those who champion the ideals is simply to turn one's back upon the merits of the case. Occasions may arise when, under existing conditions, human nature will not permit the conflict to be decided in any other way, but the question is whether this is to be regarded as a temporary breakdown of the moral economy or its normal functioning. Warfare morality makes it the latter. Life simply *is* a war of each against all and all against each, and that is the end of the matter. In my judgment Hobbes was correct,—in such a state the terms right and wrong have no meaning. Under such conditions there is but one commandment, however it may be glossed over or refined:

> lay on Macduff;
> And damn'd be him that first cries 'Hold, enough!'

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That this is the consequence of what Huxley called "the gladiatorial theory of existence" would be obvious but for the interesting and significant fact that mankind believes morality to be something quite different. However vague the conception may be, however practice may fall short of profession, men and women acknowledge some sort of an ideal order superior in authority to things as they are. The language of every people is stocked with terms that reflect this faith. And this screens the warfare morality from being seen in its nakedness. For (a) it leads the advocates of this philosophy to employ ideas and terms which disguise its real significance, and (b) it prevents the reader from appreciating the full consequences of the doctrine. Take as an instance, Professor McGilvary's statement that the weapons of moral warfare are not all carnal. "Every virile moral judgment," he says, "is itself such a weapon. . . . The moral judgment injects poison into the words it lets fly. It does not describe—it damns." Significant words when read in the light of the common faith just referred to; but what do they mean in a system where right is a name for might? In such a system is there anything specific for carnal to mean? It should be noted that Professor McGilvary's position is not that of Callicles in ancient or Carlyle and Nietzsche in modern times. The supremacy of the ideals of the stronger or the hero or the superman does not mean victory for what is really ethically best. His theory is that of Thrasymachus or Llano, that the interest of the stronger is exactly what right means. In such a system moral judgments are confessedly (as with Professor McGilvary) or else by implication "powerful insidious means of gaining victory for our ideals," and nothing more. Yet if this were generally recognized, they would lose their moral character and with it their potency. A moral judgment is compelling just because it is believed to be a *moral* judgment, and not simply a smoke barrage under cover of which the moralizer aims to advance his own interests. By availing itself of the terminology of a rival theory, warfare morality induces

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a state of mind in the reader which has long been associated with this terminology, and so receives credit for being what it is not.

Or, take the use of the term 'right.' What is the meaning of this word in the phrase 'might makes right'? In everyday speech, right has a specific connotation by virtue of its relation to an ideal order set over against nature. Possibly there is no justification for a moral philosophy of this kind. Yet it is beyond question that this much at least is what right means in the popular and even the cultivated mind. It is this which gives the word its peculiar significance in morality as distinguished, let us say, from its use in law. In the warfare morality right can of course have no such reference. 'Might makes right' means in plain English, that there is no *right* at all; that what we call by that name is absolutely nothing more than a mode of behavior which the stronger, by virtue of his strength, has been able to force upon the weaker. But by saying 'might makes *right*,' rather than 'right is a fiction,' a quality is imported from a rival system which gives the doctrine a moral flavor. Thus the illusion is fostered that morality still lives. Let the reader not be deceived by this delicate odor of sanctity; it is the perfume of a floral offering placed upon the bier of deceased morality in memory of long association.

Conditions are analogous as regards the practical consequences of warfare morality. As things are now, one of the most vital socializing forces is the widespread conviction that ruthless self-assertion is wrong. Conceding that this altruistic motive is often mixed with unconscious and sometimes with conscious self-seeking, it yet represents a genuine and positive force for the spread of mutual good will. I am not suggesting that this is the most desirable way of securing good will, but only that it does in fact accomplish this result. Now replace this conviction by the belief that it is a sign of weakness to consider the other man; that anything that can win its way is right, while wrong is a synonym of defeat, and is it not obvious that

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the foundation of morality is gone? In the recent controversy between the coal operators and miners, a Pennsylvania attorney who had helped to naturalize many of the miners, published a long plea to them. "I know you want to do what is right," he said. "That is why I appeal to you in this crisis." He then went on to show them how wrong it was to strike under the circumstances. The various statements made by the federal government and the labor leaders were likewise full of appeals to justice, fair play, honor, right, wrong, etc. Suppose these terms to be recognized as so much psychological ammunition in the warfare of antagonistic ideals. In that case, life would degenerate to the plane of international diplomacy, and all ethical appeals would become, what they are in international circles, scraps of verbiage that "give to airy nothing a local habitation and a name."

This is not the end of the matter. The logic of the doctrine pushes us a step further than Professor McGilvary's discussion takes us. Conflicts between ideals are not limited to the two spheres just considered. They also take place in the life of the individual. Each individual is himself the theatre of conflicting desires. As we all know, some of life's deepest tragedies grow out of this type of conflict. If might makes right in the case of all other ideals, the same formula must be applicable here. The development of character is then no longer a problem in adjustment, "the finest of the fine arts," but consists in satisfying the strongest impulse. There may be an outcry at first due to previous habits of life, as in the case of other conflicts. Eventually, however, those aspects of the self which supported ideals that turned out to be doomed will either be buried or will adapt themselves to the change. Thus in time personality will be shaped in conformity with the successively triumphant impulses, and the result must be regarded as morally right. Taken together with the outcome of the doctrine when applied to the other situations considered it should be unnecessary to repeat that such a moral philosophy leaves nothing for the word moral to connote.

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I would not be understood to argue that warfare morality is logically indefensible because it subverts morality. There is nothing I should so gladly part with as a morality that cannot stand exposure to the air and light of truth. I wish simply to make the point that the 'might is right' doctrine does, as a matter of fact, render all moral ideas meaningless. And I wish to make this point not only or even primarily to call attention to the logical inconsistency of the doctrine (although it must be regarded as a serious defect in the theory that it can maintain its position only if some form of the moral philosophy it aims to subvert remains in force; that it can make out a case theoretically provided the doctrine is generally rejected in practice) but to raise the question whether the surrender of absolutistic morality does necessarily lead to the surrender of all morality.

Well, then, is the elimination of morality the only alternative open to one who believes that "however it may be with the Absolute and his standards, we mortals, having no natural access thereunto, can make right and wrong out of such materials as are at our disposal and can very well make shift with the result"? Clearly not, if morality is relative to men's purposes. By whose compulsion must we define life in conformity with the so-called law of animal existence? Nor are we compelled to perpetuate the existing hybrid of sentimentalism and superstition—so often called the only possible morality—which makes it permissible (just as warfare morality does) for those who accidentally enjoy a strategic advantage not only to extract the full pound of flesh from the less fortunate, but to masquerade as superior beings by virtue of so doing. Why overlook the important word 'make'? We can *make* right and wrong out of the materials at our disposal. And we can make them in such wise that scrutiny enriches their meaning rather than dissipates it altogether. It is only necessary to stop thinking of morality as something that *is*, and to think of it as something that *may be*.

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The way out is indicated by what we constantly do in the conflicts we have just been considering—the conflicts in the bosom of the individual. When an individual settles a conflict of his own ideals, he certainly does not ordinarily let the various desires fight it out. There is often a struggle, and sometimes a particular impulse does a good deal of pushing and slugging, but, as a rule, the individual aims at an adjustment in which the various desires involved shall have consideration. The pressure of the community, his own 'larger' good, a 'remoter' good, any or all of these, and other considerations still may be brought in to check the force of immediate desire. That is to say, intelligence enters to adjust the conflict in the interest of a more comprehensive whole. And this is accomplished through the creation of a new goal in which the ideals in conflict have some sort of proportionate representation. This is the unique function of intelligence in crises of this sort. All that is necessary (and of course we have done it repeatedly) is to extend this method to conflicts between the ideals of different individuals, groups, and nations. The fallacy at the heart of warfare morality is this: it is taken for granted that intelligence has nothing to do with the selection of ends or ideals. The supposed function of intelligence is solely to guide men in the attainment of what they happen most to want. It has nothing to do with determining what is wanted. Intelligence is a kind of corporation lawyer for a captain of desire. It would not be impossible to show, if space permitted, that the natural history of intelligence shows that this is a quite erroneous conception. The function of intelligence has been to find a way out of conflicts by creating a new end in which the conflicting elements could find some manner of adjustment. Since a dogmatic statement must suffice, let it be that the essence of morality consists in just this application of creative intelligence to the warfare of ideals.

It is striking that this was thought to be the function of morality by the very man who did more than perhaps anyone else to convince the world that struggle for exist-

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ence is the rule of animal life. "Social Progress," said Huxley in the well-known Romanes Lecture for 1893, "means a checking of the cosmic process at every step and the substitution for it of another, which may be called the ethical process; the end of which is not the survival of those who may happen to be fittest, in respect of the whole conditions which exist, but of those who are ethically the best. . . . The practice of that which is ethically best —what we call goodness or virtue—involves a course of conduct which, in all respects, is opposed to that which leads to success in the cosmic struggle for existence. In place of ruthless self-assertion it demands self-restraint; in place of thrusting aside, or treading down, all competitors, it requires that the individual shall not merely respect, but shall help his fellows; its influence is directed, not so much to the survival of the fittest, as to the fitting of as many as possible to survive." But as in the case of the recent war, so in the battle over Darwinism, it was those who were in actual touch with the realities of the conflict who kept their heads. So we have from one of the foremost pioneers of evolutionary biology a clean cut rejection of "evolutionary ethics," while many of the generation of thinkers who experienced only the echoes of the great battle went mad with the idea of applying ultra-Darwinian philosophy to every phase and feature of life. It is from this madness that the coming generations must be saved. The youth of all lands must be led to see a better possibility; must be set on fire to invent the instruments of its actualization; must be assured the opportunity of securing the necessary moral, intellectual, and bodily equipment.

This is not a simple task, but it is a glorious one, and not impossible. "It may seem an audacious proposal," to turn to Huxley once more, "thus to pit the microcosm against the macrocosm and to set man to subdue nature to his higher ends. . . ." And yet, "fragile reed as he may be, man," as Pascal says, "is a thinking reed: there lies within him a fund of energy, operating intelligently and so far akin to that which pervades the universe that it

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is competent to influence and to modify the cosmic process. In virtue of his intelligence, the dwarf bends the Titan to his will. . . ." Who can review without emotion the long list of man's discoveries and inventions or contemplate unmoved his triumph over all manner of material and social disaster? Nor has man been powerless to change his inheritance from savagery. "The intelligence which has converted the brother of the wolf into the faithful guardian of the flock," not only "ought to be able to do something towards curbing the instincts of savagery in civilized man," but has done so. Savages persist, and may be found even among the best families, but human nature is no longer savage. Except where galling, hopeless conditions of life, too long endured, lead at last to a violent outburst, a course of training, under experts, is required to revive on a large scale the emotional complex characteristic of the ape and tiger stage of human development. And we have not reached the end. We keep forgetting (though we know it well enough) that a human being, in his formative period, is not a simple affair; that he represents a variety of potential saints and sinners. We know, too, that environment is a big factor in determining which characteristics shall atrophy and which shall develop and consolidate as the matured person. And we know that among the most powerful determinants is the moral atmosphere which the developing character breathes. Let him breathe good will toward men and he becomes one person; let him breathe distrust of men and he becomes another person. "Who is to fight for *my* ideals," asks Professor McGilvary, "but myself and those who share them with me"? No one, of course—if life is viewed as a fight of everybody against everybody else. But view life as a joint endeavor to realize the richest possible total of ideals for everyone and the answer is very different. It then becomes not only rational but good sportsmanship to endeavor to realize one's own ideals in such manner that a like realization of opposing ideals is not made impossible.

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Here, then, is the answer to the contention that might makes right: we will not have it so. We will *make* morality to be something different. Since in morality our chief concern is not a description of things as they are but the realization of things as we would they might be, we will define right and wrong in accordance with the end we seek. And since the end we seek is the completest life for every human being, we will make morality the great instrument for the achievement of that end. Consequently we will say that to act morally is to aim at such an adjustment of conflicting ideals as will secure the greatest proportionate satisfaction of the ideals involved, and to act immorally is to close one's heart to ideals antagonistic to one's own when the two conflict. We will say, Adjustment makes Right. We will then aim to make such adjustments among the ideals relevant to the conflicts arising in the nearer as well as the more remote affairs of life, and will train youth in this philosophy by having them develop in an environment where the exercise of this spirit is called for. And all the while we will more and more draw upon the inventive genuis of men to create the necessary social apparatus for its wider and profounder application. All this is not a simple matter, but it is a perfectly feasible program. And eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor hath it entered into the heart of man what the joy and glory of life may become when we cease to think of morality as conformity to some absolute transcendental standard or to the law of the animal world but accept it as something to be created out of the impulses and desires of men through the application of creative intelligence to the conflicts of ideals.

This principle of adjustment is of course far from novel. That is the hopeful thing about the situation. We have applied it again and again and are now applying it in small things and in great. There is no absolute standard in games,—yet the rules are not made in the process of the game by the stronger forcing his desires upon the weaker player. Tentative rules are mutually agreed upon, and victory according to these rules determines who wins.

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Where 'might' interferes with this arrangement we call it unclean sport. There is no absolute legal code,—yet the most powerful of the contestants does not instruct the judge and jury and compel a decision in his favor. A legal code and a legal procedure, intended to do justice to the merits of the case, have gradually been evolved and the decision handed down in conformity with these establishes which contestant had the superior claim. Where it is suspected that might makes right in the law court, we talk of the perversion of justice and begin to fear for the stability of the commonwealth. The same principle has been applied in the establishment of commissions and arbitration boards of various kinds, in disputes between labor and capital, in conflicts between nations. Indeed the history of civilization may be said to be, more than anything else, the record of a struggle to substitute settlement by conciliation for settlement by coercion in one after another sphere of our common life. In testimony of this, social discoveries, quite as wonderful as the great discoveries of science, mark the progress of the centuries from the earliest recorded society to the present. And if there have been periods of retrogression in the direction of savagery—as there have been—this has by no means demonstrated the superiority of coercion over conciliation, but only that good will, estranged for the time being from intelligence, was unable to become incarnate in practical form. It has been the failure to invent the means of adjustment that has led to the use of force. The progeny of reforms resulting from the union of good will and intelligence is enormous, and few people will deny (to adapt James's words) that a vastly greater total number of ideals finds shelter in our civilized society than in the older savage ways.

While the discovery of the means of adjusting conflicting claims has served to enrich life by contributing to the solution of the problem underlying conflicts, evidence is abundant that the warfare method has failed in just this respect. The slavery question, cited by Professor McGilvary to prove his contention, is a good case in point. He

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says that the Civil War settled the question of slavery. It would have been more correct to say that it abolished slavery. Settlement of the slavery question is another matter. That involved the race problem, which was the heart of the slavery problem. It was dread of the freed negro that blocked the early emancipation movements in the South. An indication of this feeling, and at the same time an attempt to deal with the situation rationally, was the organization of the African Colonization Society whose purpose was to remove the freed negroes to their original African home. The same sentiment found expression in a letter written by Madison near the close of his life. He wished he might have the power of magic. He would exercise it in turning all negroes white, and thus the slavery question would be solved in a day. Jefferson, too, would have been glad to see general emancipation but for the race aspect of the problem. "As it is," he said, "we have the wolf by the ears, and we can neither hold him, nor safely let him go. Justice is in one scale, and self-preservation in the other." Even at the outbreak of the Civil War, the best judgment of the South, as represented by such men as Lee, recognized slavery as a great evil, but because of the fact of race and color, insisted that sudden emancipation would not solve but complicate the situation. Moreover, by that time slavery had almost burned itself out with progressive soil exhaustion, which would shortly have compelled some form of gradual emancipation.

The Civil War suddenly and violently abolished slavery. But the race problem remained. And the spirit engendered by the war refused to be satisfied with anything short of the social and political equality of black and white. Not even Lincoln, much as he wished to move slowly, could more than moderate the war-hatred of such men as Thaddeus Stevens. The North, flushed with victory, forced upon the South the problem of race equality, with the result that southern feeling toward the negro, which hitherto had been one of benevolent paternalism, was changed to the antipathy of fear. After but ten years of

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"reconstruction" the North was compelled to recognize that the spirit of might could not solve the negro problem. It retired, leaving the negroes in the hands of a South alienated from them. We enjoy to-day the heritage of this application of warfare morality: the Jim Crow cars, the Grandfather clauses, the lynchings, the race riots, and most serious of all—the militant negro. In short, the race problem, which was the real problem underlying slavery, far from being settled by the war was made more acute than ever. The South still has its wolf by the ears, and a wolf excited to ferocity.

One consideration in conclusion. Whatever may be the case with Professor McGilvary's moral philosophy as a whole, his emphasis upon self-realization as against the inhibition of desires appears to me sound and most important. Self-respect, not self-denial, is the greatest force available to those who are concerned for a more worthy social state. It is not less regard for self we need, but more. The only question is what kind of self is to be respected. Must it necessarily be the self that finds its realization in a mode of life which makes self-realization more difficult if not impossible for others? May it not be the self whose progressive development makes possible the increasing expansion of increasing numbers of other selves? A man in the heat of conflict may rule out consideration of all ideals opposed to his own and those of his group and act as if in a moral vacuum because, for the time being, the moral order has gone to pieces. But the man who proposes to act morally, or the moral philosopher who is a relativist has no such liberty. To him *all* ideals are valuable, just because they are some one's ideals. Accordingly, if all of them are not realizable, as in this world they are not, and if no one ideal can be used as a standard, he will aim at an adjustment which sacrifies the least number. He will say with William James: The one unconditional commandment is "that we should seek incessantly, with fear and trembling, so to vote and act as to bring about the very largest total universe of good which we can see."

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And he will give his active approval to every experiment calculated to discover the means of arriving at this goal in the concrete issues of life. The contention of the paper has not been that no ideal must go down. It is recognized that many must go down. The argument has aimed to show that the fundamental problem of morality is to secure the richest total of satisfied desire; that this end is defeated by the encouragement of a free for all fight among desires; and that the application of intelligence to conflicts, with the deliberate purpose of bringing all relevant ideals into the field of sympathetic appreciation and arriving at an adjustment which gives due weight to each of the conflicting ideals, promises a far better issue than warfare. "With a little more patience," as Stevenson said, "and a little less temper, a gentler and wiser method might be found in almost every case; and the knot that was cut by some fine heady quarrel-scene . . . might yet have been unwoven by the hand of sympathy." Working in this spirit we may yet redeem man from baseness and misery and glorify the insignificant speck in space we call the earth.

M. C. Otto.

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THE MOTIVES OF THE SOLDIER.

T. H. PROCTER.

THE estimation of motives is proverbially difficult. The result is more often a revelation of the judge than of the judged. When the subject is the British soldier this difficulty is greatly increased, since it is part of his code never to parade his deeper feelings. The really patriotic don't mention it. It isn't done.

To illustrate how little reliance can be placed on the soldier's own account of his motives, I may mention the case of one of my own relatives. This boy assured me most earnestly and with every appearance of sincerity that he did not want to join up but that he was compelled to do so because he could not face the other fellows in the office. Yet this same boy, having failed to pass the eyesight test, kept on trying at different recruiting depots until he had learned the letters on the card by heart and was accepted after the fifth attempt. If the motive he gave me had been the true one, he could have gone back to his office after the first rejection.

It is very easy to overlook the deeper motives. On the other hand, much nonsense has been written about patriotism. The sentimental view, that everyone who joined up was a high-souled patriot, is not true. This article is an attempt, based upon my experience in the British army, to estimate the part played by each factor in the complex of motives. It is an attempt to answer carefully three questions:

1. What made men join up?
2. What sustained them during the long war?
3. What is the effect of the war upon the soldier?

The answer to the first of these questions contains a judgment on ordinary human nature in ordinary civil society. The case of England is extraordinarily interesting since it is the only one of the belligerent nations that

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lends itself to a study of motivation. It must be remembered that pre-war England was a liberal democracy of the non-military type. It is true that we had a small professional army but it was composed, in the main, of the very adventurous and the industrially inefficient. The mass of the people were but little interested in it. We had also a Territorial force which came somewhat nearer to the people but this was recruited for home defence only and we had such faith in our navy that we were but little influenced by fear of invasion. The idea of war was foreign to our lives. The fact that for a couple of years we did not resort to conscription makes it possible for us to study the reactions of the various classes of individuals to the emergency and upon this study to base a judgment of the effect of modern civilization.

Once having joined up the recruit entered upon a new society and was subject to new influences. The original impulse often died away or was supplanted by new motives. As the war dragged on from month to month, it demanded ever greater endurance. What sustained the soldier? This section leads us to the study of the army's morale.

And now after all this strange experience the soldier has returned to civil life. In what ways is he altered? Viewed from this standpoint is war good or bad? This question does not, perhaps, come within the scope of my title, but it is one in which everybody is interested.

I. Why Men Joined Up.

We must first attempt a classification of the main motives that actuated the men who answered the call to the colors. Of course, every conceivable motive was present, from the loftiest patriotism down to the desire to get away from a nagging wife. We shall deal only with the more important. These we shall classify under three heads.

First come the *Submoral Impulses*. Under this heading are included all those who joined up from motives that contained no reference to any question of right or wrong, no reference to any imperative, no reference beyond the

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individual himself. They are those who obeyed simple impulses, not bothering about the merits of the war or abstract patriotism or the duty of the individual to the state. They joined up because they wanted to.

The first of these impulses was the sheer love of fighting for its own sake. There still exist men who are born scrappers. They have the temperament of the parent of the little girl who came running up to the outskirts of a gathering street crowd breathlessly asking "Please is there going to be a fight 'cos if there is, father wants to be in it." Even towards the end of the war one occasionally met a man,—usually young,—who, in spite of all hardship and perhaps a couple of wounds, positively revelled in fighting.

Then there is the element of romance, in which I include the love of adventure (as distinct from love of fighting), the desire to get away from humdrum surroundings, to travel in foreign lands, to live in the open, to wear a uniform and march with the band. The men in this class did not visualize war except as an opportunity to break the chains that bound them to ordinary conventional life. War meant a change at least.

Then there were others actuated by hatred of the enemy,—at this stage a racial dislike that had nothing to do with the merits of this particular war. This primitive hatred is to be distinguished from the more complicated hatred that developed later, as the result of the stories of atrocities. It was as blind and unmoral as the hatred in clan feuds.

Lastly, under this heading should be placed all those who joined up under the influence of mass excitement, the examples of the phenomena of crowd psychology. They had no conscious motive at all. Everybody was joining up, so they let themselves be borne along by the current.

Next we have to consider the second main class—the *Moral Motives*, the cases in which action depended upon reference to some "ought" or other. The dominant factor here was the realization that the individual is subordinate to some larger reality and the determination of action

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through this realization. My impression is that these men formed a well-marked and quite distinct class representing a more complex development. Their motive was conscious and intellectual; their action was thought out. Generally speaking, the separation between duty and inclination was complete enough to have satisfied the most rigid Kantian. They did not want to join up, no primary impulses urged them. They did not love fighting, cared nothing for the glamour of war, often were quite well-disposed towards the Germans and were too accustomed to independent criticism to yield readily to the sway of the crowd.

They may be divided into two sub-classes,—those who believed in the rightness of the war and those who did not.

Those who believed in the war may be graded according to the grounds of their belief. The simplest were those who thought anything England did to be right just because England did it. Next came those who thought the war justified because England's self-interest was involved, including the aggressive who saw in the war a chance to destroy a trade rival or to capture German colonies, and the defensive who were moved by the undesirability of Germany's gaining too much power or the danger of enemy occupation of the French coasts. Next came altruistic motives,—the justification of the war because we desired nothing for ourselves, but fought to save France and restore Belgium or,—more abstractly, to vindicate the sacredness of treaties. Finally, there was pure humanitarianism, the motive of those who believed this was a war to end war, who joined up to fight the devil with his own weapons. They were concerned not so much with gaining a national victory or even with the restoration of Belgium as they were with saving all mankind, including the Germans, from the scourge of militarism.

In all these, the individual conscience and the national conscience were at one. The intellectual process contained just the general judgment that it was right for the

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nation to fight and then an activating judgment that "I, John Jones, ought to do my bit."

There were, however, others who did not believe in the rightness of the war. Pacifism was much more widely spread in pre-war England than the number of Conscientious Objectors would indicate. Of course, much of it was the rather contemptible kind that soon succumbed, even though rebelliously, to the first application of compulsion. But that is by no means the whole story. One of the extraordinary things about the war is the large numbers of really conscientious pacifists, who, whilst preserving to the end their condemnation of war, enlisted, not from compulsion but from motives that can rightly be called moral.

There were two such motives. One was the feeling that a man ought to enter into the brotherhood of suffering. These men could not endure the sight of a world in agony and stand aloof from it. The implied judgment might be expressed in the formula "Even though war is wrong, I ought to suffer because every one else is suffering." This was the less exalted of the two motives that determined the pacifist to lay aside his philosophy. It is quite true that there seems to be something ignoble in standing aside from a universal calamity but, with their intellectual attitude towards war, they had the choice of participating in the world's pain either by taking upon themselves the physical suffering of the soldier or else by becoming active opponents of the war and enduring the no less intense suffering that fell to the lot of the Conscientious Objector who stood out for his principles. I cannot help feeling that the latter course would have been for them the more logical—and probably the more difficult.

The others joined because they did not think they had earned the right to be pacifists in war time. They had been convinced in theory that war is wrong, but had never actively opposed it. Their decision rested on the judgment "Evil must be overcome either by moral or by physical means. This war has come upon us because men, myself included, have not actively fought evil with moral

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weapons. Since I share the guilt, I must share the consequences."

We now come to the third large class—those who joined up because they were compelled to do so by some external agency. Such compulsion was exercised first by social influences, and afterwards through direct conscription. It affected men who were not impelled to enlist and those in whom moral motives were not sufficiently strong to overcome the counter-motives.

Social compulsion was just as much force as was conscription. In the second year of the war it reached extraordinary intensity. Women went around bestowing white feathers upon all men of military age not in uniform. Employers dismissed men who would not join up. Society placed its ban upon them. Orators, newspapers and posters united in stigmatizing them as cowards and slackers until all but the most insensitive were driven into the ranks. It came in part from the soldiers—one of the very first effects that a uniform has upon the soul of its wearer is to generate in him a fierce, irrational desire to see everyone else in khaki. Parents who had lost sons were particularly vehement—naturally so. The older men, the women and those who were exempt were humanly anxious that everyone else should defend the country. It was a blind, cruel, indiscriminating, sometimes altogether shameful method of compulsion. As a result it was difficult to retain even the most indispensable in civil service. However, it accomplished its purpose. Men very often told me they volunteered because they were cowards.

It is quite untrue, therefore, to class all those who joined up before the enforcement of the conscription acts as volunteers and patriots. On the other hand, there were possibly some who were conscripted who are entitled to be called volunteers. They were the men who refused to volunteer because they believed in conscription as the only fair method of raising an army. They were really willing to go but would not, so long as the law allowed slackers to escape.

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In this large class of the unwilling we can distinguish various grades. Some were patriots of a weak sort who only needed the support of public opinion to make them act. Others lacked imagination and needed the personal aspect of the situation brought home to them, someone to say "Thou art the man." Still others had patriotism but it was not not strong enough to outweigh their private claims and responsibilities. All these may be called the semi-patriotic. Then there were the temperamentally timid who shrank from the danger of war; the æsthetes who hated the messiness of the whole business, the semi-pacifists who were intellectually opposed to war but not willing to suffer for their principles and finally, the utterly insensitive and individualistic.

In all these cases (except that of the semi-pacifists) there was no question of the rightness of the war. They all accepted that but neither inclination nor moral motive was present in a degree sufficiently strong to make them act. Compulsion supplied the place of the absent realization of duty. The motive that decided the question was simply *fear*—a fear that overbalanced whatever other fears they may have had.

I suggest that it would be possible to obtain an objective estimate of the part played by each of these motives—an estimate as accurate as can ever be obtained in questions of this sort. The war passed through fairly well defined stages and at each of these stages a different motive operated. It was as if the English people had been sifted through a series of sieves with different sized meshes, and thus sorted into classes. In order of time men joined up pretty much in the same order in which I have listed the various motives. The submoral impulses gave the quickest results, then the moral judgments and finally fear. If it were possible to obtain the recruiting figures month by month, it would be possible by a careful study of them to estimate, with no small degree of objectivity, the number of men influenced by each class of motives.

It is impossible for me to obtain such figures. Conse-

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quently my own estimate is a matter of opinion only. I place them in the following order of importance:

1. Fear.
2. Altruistic motives.
3. Humanitarianism.
4. Attraction.

This means that in my judgment modern civilization of the liberal pre-war English type tends to diminish the importance of primitive impulses, develops a certain amount of morality of varying degrees of exaltation, but, in the last resort, has to rely mainly upon compulsion. Those who were impelled by love of fighting, by the glamour of romance or by primitive hatred are few in number. All education, the influence of trade, religion, art and morality tend to annihilate these simpler motives. The same forces increase the resistance to mass excitement. This fact is often bewailed but I do not think it need cause any alarm. I do not believe that these people made the best fighters. Their motives did not survive very long in the stress of modern warfare. The scrap-lover soon had his bellyful, the romance seeker was early disillusioned by the reality. The German theory of keeping primitive blood-lust artificially alive by student duels and its English equivalent of encouraging the more brutal forms of prize fighting, are both fundamentally wrong. These survivals are definitely bad for the citizen in peace time and of no great value in war when the war is not of the short and sharp variety. Of course, I must not be understood to be advocating the desirability of a cotton-wool training. The kind of hardness that enables men to take cold water baths, endure hunger and fatigue, indulge in sports, fight nature and overcome it, is good and can co-exist along with lofty idealism and great refinement. But that is quite a different thing from the artificial and deliberate brutalizing advocated by some people of the type of German who in pre-war days delighted in the sheer lust of blood or who laid aside ordinary decent table-manners through fear that civilization might make him too refined for the purposes of war.

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A much more serious indictment arises from the relatively small part played by moral motives. At the stage of development in which the war surprised us, there is evidence of a wide difference in the effectiveness of the various moral motives. The least effective was the self-interest variety. The Jingo spirit, my country right or wrong, was definitely dying. If the war had been frankly represented to the nation as being for the sole advantage of England, not many would have enlisted voluntarily. The moral people would not have fought to destroy a trade-rival or to annex German East Africa. Even in Germany, with its traditions of militarism, and its habit of conscription, the war had to be presented to the people as a war for Kultur and for the good of humanity as a whole. Certainly the people of England had never been trained to regard morality as beginning and ending in the British Empire. Consequently, the type of patriotism that did not look beyond the good of the Empire for its motive was little in evidence. On the contrary, we rather delighted in the thought that we stood to lose all and to gain nothing. This was not hypocrisy. However willing we may be to accept any little extra territorial responsibilities that the world thrusts upon us now that the war is over, I repeat that, in those days, self-interested patriotism had a very small share in determining our action. A qualification must be added to this judgment if "war for defence" is classed as self-interested patriotism but it seems to me, that "defence" is simply fear of being killed by the enemy,—in which case it scarcely belongs among the moral motives at all—or else it is the defence of something such as Kultur or Freedom, which we justify on the ground of its value to the whole world. In this latter case it is no longer rightly "self interest."

Much more important were the altruistic and chivalrous motives. We might have entered the war as a matter of policy even if Germany had never invaded Belgium but we should have been a nation split from top to bottom. Nearly all the moral people would have been opposed to it.

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It was wonderful to see how quickly the strong opposition which grew up in the first few days of the war, disappeared when the Germans reached the Belgian frontier. This seems to me proof that, with those who were determined by moral considerations at all, it was the altruistic rather than the egoistic aspects that moved them. Moral people would not fight willingly for English interests, but they responded readily to the appeal of Belgium.

The wider and more abstract humanitarianism, expressed in the slogan "The war to end war," was of less importance as a separate motive. It was, however, a very powerful reinforcement of the other motives. It represented the war as something constructive. In spite of the sacrifice, it was worth while, if only our children could be saved from a like horror.

But the largest class, by far, is that in which the determining motive was fear. The moral standard of pre-war England was exceedingly high but, unfortunately, all too few were influenced by it. I cannot give definite figures, but I have the impression that at least half of the total British army was conscripted. To this we must add the regular professional army and the Territorials (who had no choice in the matter) and the very large number who were driven in by social compulsion. We must remember that this was not an unpopular war; no government in history had more nearly united support. Yet in spite of the general conviction that the war was justified, there was a very wide-spread absence of a patriotism strong enough to make men realize their personal duty in the matter. Whatever the underlying cause may be—economic conditions, wrong education, decay of religion—the fact remains that a large majority of the nation's citizens of military age, had to be compelled to fight.

II. Motivation in the Army.

We have now to consider the motives of the soldier in the army. What are the spiritual elements (as distinct from such factors as food, clothing, recreation, etc.) of an army's morale.

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Viewed at close quarters, war is such a hideous thing, it imposes such great strains upon human nature, that the motives that animate the recruit are not always sufficient to sustain him throughout the course of the war. Of the three classes of motives listed in the former section, the most lasting were the moral motives. I have already stated that glamour soon leads to disillusionment, that in modern warfare, the lure of fighting rarely survives long. Naturally those who joined through compulsion need some reinforcement to make them stick. Even the patriotic at times doubt their patriotism and the cause for which they are fighting.

The army cares very little for the motives that make men join up. It relies upon its power to make men over again by its own process. This process is summed up in the word "discipline." One lesson of the war is that discipline is effective in making good soldiers out of the most unpromising material.

How successfully this can be done is seen in the heroism of the regular army in the retreat from Mons. This army was by no means composed of the best elements of the nation—at least, not of those whom we judged best by peace-time standards. Yet the memory of the fight they fought will live through all time. In the new army too, heroism was the commonest thing in the world. Their endurance was incredible. I remember dressing the wounds of one man who had three or four bullets in him. When I had finished, he asked me to look at his back. I was amazed to find that he had a huge carbuncle as large as the palm of my hand, with a hole in the centre into which I could have put my finger. It was situated right between his shoulder-blades, just where the whole weight of his pack rested upon it. He had marched four days and gone through three days hard fighting with his heavy pack pressing down on this inflamed carbuncle. He could have gone sick but he didn't. He bore the excruciating pain of it rather than feel that he had deserted at a critical time. Such heroism, such ability to bear pain is uniquely the product of discipline.

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Discipline may be defined as the process of merging the individual will into the general will of the army. The recruit enters into an altogether different society in which his own individuality has very little value. Previous attainments count for nothing, his whole past life is blotted out. He is simply raw material on which the army has to work. I well remember the suddenness of my own induction into this society. Having scrambled into uniform with my puttees more or less wound, I was ushered along with eight others into the presence of the Commanding Officer to take the oath. I thought him a very pleasant gentleman. He chatted with us quite amiably for a while. Then he made us stand in line, straightened our front with actions as gentle as a father uses to his child, explained the meaning of the position of attention, and finally asked us mildly if we were quite sure we knew what to do. Then suddenly and in awful voice he yelled out, "Squad—'shun." The pleasant gentleman had disappeared. We were now soldiers. A few minutes later my eyes were being damned by the Sergeant. From this time on, we ceased to live as we had lived before. We were new creatures.

The personality of the army soon becomes more real to the recruit than his own soul. Everyone who has done a route march must have felt this. The column winds along the road as a single living creature of which each soldier is only a cell with no volition of his own. You do not control your own direction or your own pace. Even your legs are not your own. One common impulse regulates the rhythmic rise and fall of your boots. The life of the creature is outside of you and of every other individual. Later when on the home stretch, the unaccustomed harness bites into your shoulders, your rifle turns to lead and your boots hurt like fury, you are carried on in spite of yourself. And thus as part of the column you endure fatigue that would kill you if suffered alone.

The whole army training is designed for this one purpose of merging the individual into the mass. Of course, the development of the body, management of rifle and bayonet,

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the learning of evolutions are all subsidiary objects but the main object, shown in the manner in which everything is done, is the subduing of your personality, the substitution of an outside will for your own volition.

Discipline is a very different thing from leadership. Leadership acknowledges the individual's will and seeks to enlist its co-operation. Discipline makes no such acknowledgement. It imposes its commands upon you. Discipline has nothing to do with the personality of the officer. It relies upon the personality of the army. If a squad of men hesitated over a dirty or dangerous job and the Sergeant in charge should pull off his coat and set the example, it would be good leadership but very bad discipline and the Sergeant a very bad Sergeant. The good N. C. O. would evoke the whole paraphernalia of escorts, guard-rooms and court martials so that his men would realize that it was not he, personally, who issued commands but the army. The whole authority of the army is present in every order given, even if it speaks through the mouth of a one-stripe corporal.

This is carried down to the smallest detail of life. Hours of rising, eating, sleeping are all regulated, the clothes that one wears, the way one stands, even the attending of church —all are regulated. There are countless ways in which one is reminded of the dread reality of the super-personal Being to which one must subject oneself.

The negative side of discipline is fear. You submit because there is no alternative—or rather because you are more afraid of the alternative than of what lies before you. This is ground into you during your period of training by the wholly disproportionate punishments meted out for small offences and, when in battle, you have always in the background of your consciousness the knowledge that there is no choice for you except that between the possibility of a bullet if you go forward and the certainty of a bullet if you go back.

This was frankly and brutally expressed in the definition of discipline I heard given by a Major-General. "Disci-

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pline means," he said, "giving your men such a hell of a time when they are behind the lines that when they face the enemy they are glad to go over the top and get shot."

This would perhaps, be a perfectly satisfactory definition if the object of war was to drive your men to suicide. Of course the object is not to get your own men shot but to enable them to shoot the enemy, even if there is danger in so doing. Discipline that relied solely on fear would be bad discipline and most men in high command, unlike my Major-General, recognize that.

At the same time, I contend that fear plays a much larger part in the motivation of the soldier than in the life of the civilian. It would be untrue to say that fear is the foundation of civil society. The foundation of society is in mutual co-operation. Most of us are content to abide by the laws of the state since we feel that they express our own volition. Our personality and that of the State are voluntarily fused. That fact is more important than the policeman. In the army it is different. No one accepts all the regulations of the army life voluntarily. Its purposes are for the most part foreign to those of its members and contrary to the deepest of our instincts. It calls on the soldier for endurance, brutality, heroism and hatred altogether beyond his capacity as an individual. It imposes itself upon him from without and always makes him conscious of the dire penalties that await the disobedient.

The positive element in discipline is esprit de corps, which is the acceptance of these external motives as one's own—the more or less willing fusion of the individual in the mass.

At the lowest stage, the word "willing" is too strong to apply. It implies a process that is much too conscious. This lowest stage is the formation of the habit of making automatic reactions to external stimuli. This is one of the main objects of training. All drill seeks to establish these automatic reactions. In a sense all army life is drill. It is organized in every detail to train the soldier to function unconsciously in response to the will of the army.

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Next we have the development of regimental spirit and local patriotism. Before the war it was a recognized part of English military theory, that full use should be made of all local associations. The Territorials were organized on a geographical basis so that a man should be with others from his own part of the country, and thus visualize the land he fought for as the district in which he was brought up. Famous regiments like the Guards developed regimental spirit through their historical traditions and by all sorts of quirks and frills added to the standard drill manual. They clung jealously to any special decorations or variations of uniform that symbolized regimental history—for example, the Welsh Fusiliers still wear a black silk flash at the back of the collar, a vestige of the days when expensive uniforms needed protection from greasy pigtails.

In raising the new armies an effort was made to form homogeneous units composed of men from the same class, or having some interest in common—such as the Pal's Battalion, the Sportsmen's and Miner's Battalions—but in the course of the war, this principle had to be abandoned. Men had to be moved freely from one unit to another. Sometimes, owing to severe casualties, almost the entire personnel of a unit would be changed in the course of a few weeks. Yet in spite of this, regimental loyalty did play an important part. It was astonishing to note how quickly these secondary loyalties would arise in any good unit. Yet is it not surprising when one remembers how real the super-personal life of the army is to its individual members. This esprit de corps was just the awakening of a soul in the mass.

Army loyalty was less important than these particularized forms. The army as a whole was too big and too dread to evoke positive sentiments in most men. It was the army that punished, the army that held the individual in its grip. One did not love the army. But it was possible to love a battalion or a regiment, to identify oneself with its purposes. to feel proud of its achievement, —and, still more strongly, to feel the shame that clung to

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the name of a division that had broken. When the commanding officer passed sentence in the guard room, he was not the colonel of the regiment so much as the involuntary and impersonal instrument through which the army acted. But when, on the other hand, his presence inspired his men to superhuman endurance then he was *their* colonel, the personification of the regiment.

When the process of merging the individual into the mass has been completed, the question is no longer the motivation of the individual soldier but the motivation of the army as a whole. But before entering into this there are two motives to be mentioned that can rightly be classed as individual—firstly, the instinctive anger that makes you want to shoot back at the fellow who is trying to pot you, the blind fury that seizes a man when he sees his friends killed and mutilated, and secondly, all that is included in the word comradeship. Every observer of the soldier has been struck by the wonder of this comradeship. I call it "individualistic" because it is only indirectly the product of discipline. It differs from esprit de corps as love of one's fellows differs from love of God. It is not so much voluntary surrender to the over-personal soul as the interaction and intermingling of the cells that compose the organism. It was born through sharing in common experiences. Included in this term is the desire to be as good as the next man, the impulse to stand by one's pals and not let them down, the fear of their contempt, the impulse to aid the overburdened, to share one's goods with the less fortunate, to protect a friend in danger and, perhaps most of all, sympathy with a fellow victim of fate. No adequate account of the soldier's motives can be given without emphasis upon this factor.

Turning to the over-individual motives, I would emphasize belief in the cause and the emotion of hatred as the essential elements.

Hatred was deliberately inculcated and this, rather than love of country, was the affective element in the mass psychology. Killing Germans is a nasty, repulsive busi-

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ness and the connection between hatred and killing is more direct than that between patriotism and killing. We were lectured on the duty of killing Germans. They were devils, every one of them. Stories of atrocities were propagated until the whole army, and indeed the whole nation behind it, was aflame with indiscriminate hatred of everything German. The curious fact is that this hatred was not an individual but an army emotion. I am aware that this is the language of mysticism but I know of no other way in which to report the fact as it presents itself to me. Of course, the hatred was felt by individuals but it bore no relation to the individual personality. I have met comparatively few soldiers who, as individuals, hated the Germans. Indeed, left to themselves, they were only too ready to fraternize with the individual enemy. In any set of circumstances when Thomas Atkins could approximate to his old civilian self, the hatred died down and in its place arose the recognition of "Jerry" as a fellow victim of fate. He became almost a comrade. As an instance of this, I may mention that when the English prisoners were returned from Germany, the War Office detailed a number of them to act as Guards for the German prisoners in England. Naturally most people thought, either with fear or rejoicing, that they would be vindicative, that they would "get a bit of their own back" and that the prisoners in their charge would have a rough time of it. I have been told by the prisoners themselves that precisely the opposite was the case. These men were more considerate than their old guards who were often older men who had never been to the front. As an individual, the British soldier simply had not it in him to be vindicative. But in the mass it was quite different. The British army hated the German army with a blind, furious, killing hatred.

The final important factor was belief in the cause. In the last analysis all morale rested on this. Again this was super-individual. In different individual minds the cause was variously represented—the salvation of civilization, honor of the country, will of God, defence of freedom, etc.,

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etc. I do not know of any formula that would embrace all the objects of the war as they were present in individual minds. Perhaps the nearest is the negative formulation, the conviction that they were not being "sold." Also in individual minds, there were all degrees of belief, from ardent passion down to scarcely-veiled cynicism. But the army as a whole believed that it was fighting for something and that this something was worth the sacrifice. It believed this intensely. If it had ceased to believe it, morale would have broken down. In a short war and a sporting war, this belief would not be so important but in a war that is long drawn out to an unimagined climax of horror, it stands at last revealed as the very foundation of morale.

Thus in the last resort we are brought face to face with an ideal as the final and most important element in the soldier's motivation—an ideal vaguely apprehended, existing in no single consciousness, seen from various individual standpoints yet, for all that, more real than danger and more valuable than life.

When a man goes over the top he loses all personal consciousness and all individual volition. The agonizing wait is over and he rushes forward under the release of all the pent-up emotion. He is filled with crowd-hatred and makes blindly for his enemy. The habitual reactions set up in the course of his training direct his movements. He sees red and so does his job. Afterwards he remembers nothing save a general impression of horror. But in the long hours when he must remain inactive under bombardment, or when cold and hungry he lies awake in a muddy trench or rat-ridden dugout, then it is the cause that sustains him. As the war drags out its weary length until the strain becomes almost too much for flesh and blood to bear, it is this belief that decides between defeat and victory.

III. The Effects of War on the Soldier.

We are still too close to the war to estimate its effects accurately. It is easy enough to list the effects but hard

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to say which are permanent and which are the results of reaction. There is, for instance, a marked loss of idealism, a general feeling of disillusionment. Time alone can tell whether this is more than the swing of the pendulum. Once again, I can only give general impressions carefully sifted.

People who sentimentalize about war, impress me as failing to realize just what war is. War is the business of killing. The question is not whether it is good for men to have physical training such as the army gives, nor whether it is good for men to face hardship and learn through it the joy of comradeship, nor whether it is good for men to lead the simple life. All these are accidentals of war. The real question is whether men are better or worse for having been compelled to kill their fellows.

Let us start with the fact that the essence of war is killing. The army was organized for that one end. It developed our bodies, not because it cared much about our health, but so that we might be strong enough to kill Germans. It took care of the wounded not primarily to save them pain, but to patch them up and send them back to kill more Germans. It provided religion, not because it cared about our souls, but because religion can be a very powerful incentive to killing Germans. And so on throughout the long list of its various activities. They are all for the same object—to kill Germans.

In the business of killing Germans, incidentally we ourselves were exposed to death, in fact, almost certain to meet it. That fact was impressed on our minds by seeing our comrades blown to bits. I was struck by the number of men I met who were certain that they would be killed. Death was very near and very real. Only we had to kill as many Germans as possible before it was our turn to "go west."

Let us deal with the more superficial effects first. The physical training was good but unfortunately, not a permanent good. Once back in civil life, most of us let the new muscle degenerate into fat and our last state is worse

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than the first. I do not think the general physical standard and general health of pre-war conscript Germany was anything to boast of. The desirability of physical training is not a good argument for universal training since the army does not care a rap for physical development, except for its own purposes.

It was a good thing to endure hardship and to get back to physical life, though here again, even when we were in the army, we accepted gladly all the comforts we could get and we have acquired no permanent taste for bully beef or army stew. Most of us are glad to sleep again in a real bed. Still we have learned how much we can do without and we face the world with a cheerful confidence born of the knowledge that we can hardly be worse off in the future.

There are certain army virtues like punctuality, neatness and cleanliness that are also among the things that do not abide. They were imposed upon us externally and we sloughed them off with the uniform. Perhaps we were not caught sufficiently young and not held long enough. But on the other hand, those who praise war because it instils these virtues, fail to reckon with the phenomenon of reaction. I have recently talked with an old soldier who joined the old army as a boy and for seven years was trained in the habit of scrupulous neatness. He was apologizing for not being shaved. His explanation was that he had had so much of that kind of thing in the army, that now he was free to do as he liked, he had a most decided objection to doing all the things he had been made to do.

The most precious thing of all was the army comradeship, the general fusion of classes. But I am afraid that this too, is rapidly passing away. Post-war England shows little evidence of its being a permanent influence in national life. Perhaps I am unduly pessimistic about this but it is remarkable how quickly the heroes of the trenches have again become "the lower classes." The number of strikes and labor disputes does not encourage the belief that the war has brought about greater solidarity.

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It was a good thing to come into vivid contact with a reality greater than ourselves. We shall, perhaps, never quite lose the effect of this and can never be quite as individualistic. We know now that we are not the biggest thing in God's universe. Perhaps we could have learned this in other ways and at less cost. At the same time I do not think there is any sign of religious revival even when religion is interpreted as being distinct from the churches. So far as organized religion is concerned it has lost its hold upon us. The army church parade has done that. And besides we don't *feel* like it. The church services are not exciting enough. It takes something to interest us these days. More serious than this, is that we do not recognize the cause for which we fought as being God and, now that we are no longer in the army, we are not so sure about the cause anyhow. The blind fate that flung us into the mess and mashed us all up together—that surely was not the will of God. The bottom has fallen out of the Universe. The whole business was so futile and so mad. And it may happen again. We have not been driven to God. We are no longer sure that there is one. We believe in Fate, however, and have learned to be resigned to it—not loving it but joking about it.

You may say it was a good thing to be brought face to face with reality. I'm not so sure about that either. With the primitive and the inevitable, perhaps, but, after all, is the primitive and the inevitable the more real? Was the aboriginal mess in which we lived more real than the civilization we had built for ourselves? Is the wattle hut more real than the Gothic cathedral? Is the savage more real than the primitive man? If that kind of reality is good, it would be better for us to emigrate to the Balkans where they have it in plenty.

Of certain effects I have no doubt that they are bad but am hopeful that they will not be lasting. Army life in wartime is an alternation of relatively long periods of horrible boredom and short periods of super-excitement. We were "fed up to the back teeth" with inactivity and then lived a

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lifetime of excitement in the space of a few hours. As a result we find it hard to resettle in civil life. We have lost habits of industry. We have degenerated in mind and soul. Nothing excites us, our nerves refuse to be excited any more. We are as bored as a man who has seen the Temple of Karnak is when a friend shows him the town postoffice. I met very few men in the army who kept up their interest in things. We didn't want to talk, we didn't want to read, we hated writing letters, we could not trouble to form real friendships. Nearly every theatre in London during the war and the year following staged only musical comedy. There has been a great increase in periodicals of the "Tit Bits" type. Our whole cry is for something light and frothy.

We are drained emotionally. It is not so much that we are hardened as that we have exhausted our capacity to feel. What does another little sorrow matter in a world that has seen so much of it.

We are more responsive to mass impulses, to shout with the crowd and rush with the crowd. We no longer think deeply nor do we care for the subtle distinctions that are the very being of Truth. We had no use for independent thought in the army and we have lost the power to judge for ourselves. We have become accustomed to the fact that the lie is a recognized weapon of warfare, only we call it "propaganda."

The general result is that we are left with a horrible numbness of mind and soul. Let us hope it is only reaction.

To return to the deeper question. War is the business of killing. In order to make the average man fit for his job the army has to remould him. It is a very narrow and well-defined purpose. The mould is so narrow that we have to be forced into it and a good deal has to be trimmed off us to make us fit.

There is a narrowing of view point. Humanitarianism becomes contracted into partisan patriotism. All virtues are defined with reference to the ability to kill Germans. Anything that interferes with that is vice, anything that

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furthers it is virtue. This nationalization of virtue is, in my opinion, one of the worst effects of war and a great moral loss.

There is a deliberate brutalizing. This means narrowing the modern man down to the primitive savage instincts and stripping him of all refined æsthetic and delicate sentiments, that might interfere with the killing business—including pity and imaginative sympathy. This begins early in the training process. You are brought face to face with a straw-stuffed sack. A sharp and ugly bayonet is put into your hand. You are carefully impressed with the fact that the sack represents a German. The white spot in the centre is his liver. It is your business to drive the sharp and ugly bayonet into his liver. To make it more realistic, you have to rush at him with a whoop and emit fearful grunts as you drive it home, twist it round and draw it out again. Naturally you don't like it. You think that the German has a sensitive liver like your own and that perhaps he feels it. You think that perhaps he might be a quite decent, rather serious-minded sort of chap like those you knew in your student days. Perhaps he has a wife and children depending on him. Perhaps you are sending him to meet God with his soul unprepared. But bless your life, you soon get over all that sort of squeamishness. Your soul is fed on red, raw meat. The sergeant helps a good deal too. In a little while you forget all about the nerves of his liver and his wife and children and his immortal soul. The mere sack becomes a real German to you. You lunge and twist with a will, rather priding yourself on the neat way in which you hit the spot. Indeed you become so accustomed to it that when you meet the enemy the real German is just a straw-stuffed sack—merely that and nothing more.

You have got over your squeamishness. Yes, but it is just that "squeamishness," that recognition that the other fellow is also a man, which is religion, brotherhood, morality and civilization.

And it is not only the German's life that is cheapened.

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Your own counts for little enough. Nine of you march down from the Headquarters to the training camp—a bank director, a sheep farmer from Australia, a cattleman from Argentine, a student, a lawyer, an author and a musician. You are all distinct individuals. In about a week you are all alike. You have lost your former interests and associations and all that meant life to you. Your very name becomes a number. Your appetite remains, your ability to feel fatigue, and your sex impulses. You are de-personalized, reduced to your primitive elements, to the lowest common denominator. You go eventually to the front where nasty people shoot at you. It is quite on the cards that you will "stop one." You know that so far as the army is concerned you exist only as one of so many millions of effective rifles. That's all you are. You know that all you have hoped for and striven to be is of less value than one inch of ground that might possibly be gained. Everybody else's life is worth just as much as your own. You are in it; whether you like it or not you can't get out. Your officer would have no compunction about shooting you if you tried.

This, I think, is the real effect of war on the individual—it cheapens life. And the result—well, what's the use of anything except what pleasure you can snatch out of the moment. There is not much use in being good if you are going to be killed next week. You might as well have a bit of a fling while you have the chance. It is folly to bother about anything but the pleasures of the senses. In the face of death all values are reduced to that.

You are reduced to the primitive. But again I would urge—the primitive is not the real and not the good. The progress of civilization is founded on the rising value of the individual life. War is the direct opposite of civilization and the direct opposite of morality. It is impossible that we can have gone through this experience and be quite the same after it. My general verdict on war is that it leaves us infinitely poorer morally. So far from its being a spiritual uplift it is exactly the reverse.

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It is evil—almost unmitigated evil. In certain circumstances it may not be the worst imaginable evil. It may even be a necessary evil.

But for heaven's sake, don't let us call it good.

T. H. PROCTER.

WILLIAMS COLLEGE.

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PLATO AND THE JUDGE OF CONDUCT.

RUPERT CLENDON LODGE.

TO the enquiry, Who is the judge in ethical questions according to Plato, two diverse answers are given in the history of Platonism. For Shaftesbury, as for the Cambridge Platonists, it is plain that every man has a moral "sense," and thus *every man* is the judge, according to their reading of Plato. For later Platonism (*e.g.*, at the present day) it is almost axiomatic that *only the philosopher* is the judge of conduct, according to the Platonic dialogues. These two viewpoints, as commonly understood by their advocates, cannot both be true, and it may be that both are false. It is the object of the present paper to re-open the question, and find out, if possible, precisely who is entitled, according to Plato's express teaching, to pass judgment upon questions of conduct.

In the dialogues themselves, we find a number of replies: (1) Everyone, (2) The many, (3) The interlocutor, (4) The good man (just man, man of character and moral education, *etc.*), (5) The experienced man, (6) The wise man, (7) The philosopher (dialectician, man of knowledge, understanding, or reason), (8) The legislator or guardian. Under these eight heads is concentrated all the evidence relative to the question, and it should be possible, by proceeding inductively and taking somewhat in detail the various answers grouped under each head, eventually to arrive at a point where the general Platonic answer to the main question—if there *is* any such general question and general answer—can be formulated and verified. Such somewhat detailed examination with the hope of discovering the general outlines of the Platonic position on this question, is the aim of the present paper.

1. *Everyone.* In the first place, it is frequently stated, sometimes by Socrates, sometimes by his interlocutors, that some form of moral sense is universal, that "every-

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one" is rightly regarded as a judge in matters of conduct. Just what is the Platonic attitude on this point? Stated negatively, Plato seems to mean that moral judgment is not a matter for a few technical experts. It does not require a long apprenticeship or elaborate specialized education, such as is necessary to acquire sound judgment in architecture, shipbuilding, *etc.* It is not a prerogative of noble birth and social position, and is entirely independent of economic status. More positively, a moral sense is strictly universal. Every citizen possesses it, and, like language, it is an attribute of humanity as such. We all have the root of the matter in us, an "eye of the soul," a sense of honor and justice. We all foster its development, in our contemporaries and especially in the rising generation, by word and deed, by public law, and by all the devices of a general, non-technical education. Absence of such a sense of honor and justice is unnatural, pathological, the worst of diseases, a sign of subnormality, an insanity indicating a state of mind less than human, a "lie in the soul" abhorred alike of men and Gods.[1]

As evidence that moral judgment is not a matter for experts, the practise of the Athenian assembly is adduced—where experts are consulted on technical questions, but on questions of general policy *any* citizen is given a hearing. In support of the contention that moral judgment is not the product of a specialized system of education, emphasis is again and again laid upon the fact that men like Themistocles, Pericles, and Thucydides—like Lord Chesterfield in more modern times—failed signally in pedagogic experiments upon their sons or friends among the rising generation. Finally it is urged that universality of this sense of honor and justice is a *sine qua non* of civilized life. Men simply could not live together in cities, could not form a true community, unless they could at least trust one another, and it is a Divine law that the subnormal or mor-

[1] Cf. *Protag.* 319 D ff., *Lach.* 194 D ff., *Crito* 47 C–D, *Euthyd.* 287 A, *Rep.* 518 C etc., *Laws* 863 E f., 950 B–C.

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ally diseased, if hopelessly incurable, should be put to death.[2]

In saying, then, that everyone is a judge in matters of conduct, Plato means that we all have the root of the matter in us. He does not mean that our judgment is infallible, or that it is fully developed in each one of us. Differences of moral opinion are only too glaring, in his eyes, and on the question of development of moral judgment, it is one of the main points in dispute between him and the sophists, whether the ordinary institutions of Greek life are capable of developing reliable moral judgment—whether supplemented or not by the services of a professional tutor—or whether a new method of reflection. the liberal, non-technical art of Dialectic, is not essential to the development of a judgment which shall rise above the contradictions, perplexities, and blindness of everyday, conventional morality.

2. *The many.* That the "many"—*i.e.*, the numerical majority—should be regarded by Plato as judges in ethical questions, may seem strange to the reader who has derived from the dialogues the impression that Plato is an intellectual aristocrat who looks down with snobbish superiority upon democratic tendencies of all sorts. And it remains true that he by no means accepts their judgments as final. But a careful examination of the evidence shows that, while often dissenting from their conclusions, he by no means denies them the right and the capacity to judge questions of conduct. Their judgment may not, perhaps, rise much above the level of conventional morality, and may thus come into conflict with his own more highly reflective ethical beliefs, but on the whole it is not the moral judgment of the many, as such, of which he disapproves, but rather the noise and exaggeration with which it tends to be accompanied in the general assemblies, and the unreasoning violence with which decisions superficially arrived

[2] Cf. *Gorg.* 525 B–D, *Polit.* 302 A–B, 308 E f., *Soph.* 227 D f., *Tim.* 86 B f., *Laws* 957 E.

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at are carried out. It is, in other words, the unreasoning and conservative, anti-progressive tendencies of the many, to which the philosopher takes exception. It is not that they judge, but that they so soon cease to judge and proceed at once to hasty action, that he finds worthy of censure—not that they judge, but that they do not judge more.[3] It is, in fact, an essential element in his social philosophy that the many should be regarded as capable of recognizing ethical truth when they meet with it, and his one hope for the salvation of society is that the many should come to appreciate the value of a "good pilot," and trust themselves to the rule of the philosopher-king—a contingency which he regards as by no means impossible. It is, in fact, the social duty of the philosopher who has seen the vision, to return to the cave and educate his less well educated brethren—the many, or at any rate the best of the many. The many, then, are judges in ethical questions, though not, of course, final judges.

How does this position compare with the statement that "everyone" is a judge in such questions? There is, of course, no contradiction. "Everyone" meant, as we saw, any and every normal human being, as such. "The many" means a group of such individuals contributing towards the formation of a group-judgment, and the group-judgment which these individuals form in their various assemblies, whether professional or political, or simply at the gymnasium or theater, would seem to constitute an advance upon the isolated judgments of the same individuals apart from society.[4] At the same time, it is plain that for further advance Plato expects the many to rise superior to the methods of the theater, the club, or the political assembly. The highest degree of enlightenment is hardly to be looked for in such circumstances.

3. *The interlocutor.* In the third place, it is universally assumed in the dialogues that in the discussion of philo-

[3] Cf. *Rep.* 492 A ff., *Laws* 569 Af., 964 D.
[4] Cf. *Protag.* 319 D.

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sophical questions in general, and of ethical questions in particular, one or both of the parties to the discussion possess sufficient judgment to give some kind of decision. At times, this is even stated explicitly, especially in passages where the method itself is under discussion. But it is throughout assumed, not only that one of the parties to the discussion is competent to give some sort of answer, but also that the interlocutor is capable of examining the validity of such answers, when given. This too is frequently recognized explicitly. This capacity of the interlocutor does not seem to be confined to the specific respondent in the discussion, but extends to the bystanders also, whether these in turn take some part in the discussion and thus become respondents—as especially in the *Protagoras*, *Gorgias*, and *Republic*—or whether they remain silent and appreciative listeners who subsequently repeat the whole dialogue at which they were present without taking active part. It is possible also that this capacity is intended to extend to readers of the dialogues, who also in some sort take part in the discussions.[5]

From this brief review of the question, it looks as though under the head of "interlocutor" is included everyone-who-takes-part-in-ethical-discussions. Does Plato's position here differ at all from his position when he regards everyone without qualification as a judge, or when he regards the many as judges?

In answer to this question we must at once recognize that there are at least certain differences of emphasis. In the unqualified statement that everyone is a judge, stress is laid upon the non-technical character of the moral judgment and upon its social value in cementing the bonds of civic life. In saying that the many are judges, stress is laid upon certain characteristics of Greek public life, and upon the unfavorable nature of such conditions for developing the very highest type of judgment. In saying that the interlocutor is a judge, we pass at once into a different

[5] As suggested by Bonitz (*Platonische Studien*).

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sphere of discourse. Stress is laid here upon the characteristic standards of truth-as-reached-by-two-investigators-working-together—*i.e.*, upon sincere introspection, upon analysis and gradual synthesis, upon consistency and systematic coherence. Socrates *ex professo* does not know the true answer to his questions, but he has a grasp upon the demands of scientific method and can proceed, with the co-operation of his interlocutor, to extend the intellectual context of a given answer and examine the consistency of the statement considered in its wider implications, following the argument whithersoever it may lead. From the point of view, then, of emphasis and immediate context, to say that everyone is a judge, or that the many are judges, is different from saying that the interlocutor is a judge. But from a point of view which enables us to see further than questions of immediate emphasis, there is no doubt a fundamental unity underlying the three different-appearing positions. Everyone has a moral sense, and it is by becoming an interlocutor—*i.e.*, by taking part in ethical discussions which go a little further than mere acceptance of tradition or convention, and which are free from the irrational elements which attend a public debate on political issues—that he developes this moral sense. There is no doubt that practically everyone is regarded by Plato as a possible interlocutor. In none of these cases, however, is the immediately resulting judgment regarded by Plato as in any sense final. The interlocutor is capable of judging, capable—at least in many cases—of becoming a good judge. But just because he is an interlocutor and is capable of this development, it does not follow that he has already completed the process of becoming and has already, in some sense, summed it to infinity.

4. *The good man.* The man of good moral character is always regarded by Plato as a judge whose decisions in matters of conduct are peculiarly trustworthy. It is a principle in the production of such a character that, when young, the good man has undergone no contamination from personal participation in evil. For evil-doing warps

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the judgment and gives it a pathological twist. The honorable mind which is to form a healthy judgment must be free from everything pathological, and will be formed upon the pattern of honesty. As Plato expresses it, such a character has in itself the pattern of honesty—*i. e.*, is a personification of the moral standard—and the judgments of such a character result from the direct and immediate application of the moral standard. Hence their accuracy and trustworthiness. In all forms of pleasure, in all forms of art, in all questions of education, and generally in all questions of moral values, his judgment is to be accepted. The man of good moral character is the measure of all things. What he judges to be good, *is* good, and what he judges to be evil, *is* evil. His judgments, unlike those of the ordinary man, are in no sense capricious or subjective. They are objective—in touch with reality—and are through and through rational.

How does the good man compare, as a judge, with the cases previously considered? Like "everyone" and "the many," he has, of course, a sense of right and wrong. But unlike them, he is utterly uncontaminated, entirely free from any taint of evil which might warp his judgment and obscure his moral vision. He represents human nature at its best, as it can be and as, under a proper system of education, it should be, always true to itself and always in vital contact with the reality of things. As compared with "the interlocutor," it may be said that the good man takes peculiar pleasure in philosophical discussions and is peculiarly convinced of their value. He may, in fact, be regarded as an interlocutor with an especially fine character. The emphasis, however, is usually upon his moral, rather than upon his intellectual characteristics, and he would not *necessarily* be regarded as a speculative philosopher, but rather as a good citizen. He is, however, always in close sympathy with speculative philosophy.

5. *The experienced man.* On the necessity of a practical experience of men for the judge whose decisions are to be regarded as mature, Plato is very definite. An idealistic

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education and environment may plant correct sentiments, true taste, and thoroughly moral habits of thought and action. But these alone are insufficient to fit a man to give judgments in matters of conduct—at least in a way which could be regarded as in some sense final. Youthful enthusiasts trained in idealistic habits of thought are the easiest people in the world to deceive, and, without practical knowledge of the world and worldly ways, the graduate of the seminary is apt to make very false judgments in matters of conduct.[6] The ideal judge can thus not possibly be a very young man. Experience—usually referred to by Plato as the experience of a long life, the experience which comes with years—gradually gives us the eye to see rightly, an appreciation of the facts of life and of the limitations of theory. It is an experience essentially cognitive in character, containing, as it does, a study and understanding of evil and all forms of vice—subjects which must receive a purely external and objective investigation, if they are not to creep into the mind and poison the judgment.

How does this compare with the previously considered case? The judgment of worldly experience does not always agree with the judgment of the man of moral character, as no one knows better than Plato, and the two are frequently contrasted—usually to the discredit of "experience." There are, in fact, *two* kinds of experience recognized by Plato, and it is only one of these which is of value for moral judgment. There is, on the one hand, the practical experience which sharpens the wits and opens the eyes, but is pre-eminently non-moral—if not immoral—in character. This is the experience of the legal trickster, of the seeker after immoderate wealth, of the devotee of power infinite who, with all his experiences, is the most miserable of mortals. For experience of this kind, Plato has nothing but condemnation, touched sometimes with pity, and it is only with this kind of experience that the

[6] *Rep.* 408 D f., 538 C f., *Laws* 951 A f., cf. *Epist.* 322 D–E.

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judgment of the man of moral character comes into sharp conflict. On the other hand, there is the late ripening experience of the moral man himself, the man who has within himself the true standard and the correct moral sentiments. He makes practical mistakes at first, no doubt, but it is this man, and no other, to whom experience gives the eye to see rightly. The judge, then, of whom Plato here approves, is the moral man, or man of character, with practical experience superadded.

6. *The wise man.* Just what does Plato understand by the wise man, as a judge in problems of conduct? He means in the first place, the well-balanced man, the man whose nature represents a harmonious balance of its various elements—the various instinctive and emotional impulses—under the rule of reason. The concept of the wise man thus corresponds, in large measure, to the concept of the man of moral education, whose ways of thinking and acting have been organized along ethical lines, but with this difference, that here rather more stress is laid upon the element of reason, intelligence, insight, calculation, scientific method. The conception here is something like Bishop Butler's conception of the enlightened self-interest which deliberates dispassionately in a cool hour upon the plan of life. The wise man is pre-eminently reasonable and prudent. He takes counsel for the good of the *whole* self—not merely for the strictly rational side of our nature[7]—and takes care to maintain the harmonious and well-balanced condition of the mind which is the effect of justice, and thus leads directly to the securing of that rational satisfaction which is true happiness.

In the second place, wisdom involves rational deliberation, with all which this implies. The wise man is "good in counsel," and good counsel can be given only in respect of things concerning which the counselor has accurate knowledge—something more than mere opinion. This

[7] Plato is no ascetic. Cf. *Phaedo* 64 D–E, 67 A, *Phaedr.* 256 C–D, *Rep.* 571 E–572 A, *Laws* 648 A ff.

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does not, however, mean that the wise man is a narrow specialist, in the sense in which a technical expert is a specialist. His is the knowledge which advises, not about some particular thing as such, but about the life-plan or policy of the man as a whole, or—in political life—of the State as a whole. For this purpose, however, it is necessary to know what is for the true interest of the whole and for each of the parts or elements or factions within the whole. In the light of this well-developed sense of values, the wise man develops a certain unswerving singleness of aim, in a way which is typically Platonic.

In the third place, the element of "reason," which is so especially characteristic of wisdom, is regarded as Divine—*i.e.*, as non-materialistic and metaphysical—and is to be developed, not by habit and bodily *askesis*, but by dialectic alone. The concept of the wise man here tends to pass over into the concept of the dialectician.

The wise man, then, is essentially reasonable, sees life whole, and plans for it as a whole. He is no blind opportunist, but has a single well-thought-out plan, in accordance with the nature of the universe in general. This plan, however, is not static, but can be applied in a plastic way to the changing detail of life so characteristic of Fourth Century Greece. As compared with the man of moral character, the wise man is more speculative, but not less ethical. As compared with the man of experience, he is more consciously scientific and methodical, though not less mature in judgment. He is a man of high moral character who is also experienced and has developed the Divine light of reason within him by becoming an interlocutor, a philosophical participant in discussing the fundamental values. The end-goal of his development, and typical form into which the concept is always tending to pass in Plato's hands, is that of the philosopher-king, the personality which unites dialectical ability with practical power in a political sense.

7. *The philosopher.* In stating that the philosopher is a judge in matters of conduct, Plato draws a somewhat sharp

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distinction between the actual and the ideal. He emphatically does not mean that the actual votaries of philosophy in his own time—composed, as he believed, largely of men who had strayed into philosophy from other pursuits, and without much natural aptitude or sound training—are to be regarded as authorities in ethics. It is rather the ideal philosopher—a definite construction of his own—whom he has in mind, and there can be no doubt that, as constructed by Plato, the ideal philosopher and the ideal judge in matters of conduct ultimately coincide in all respects. Born under conditions eugenically ideal, of ideally perfect physique and ideally perfect mental and moral qualities, educated in an ideally perfect environment and with due attention to the requirements of practical experience as well as of intellectual development, the resulting dialectician studies the most perfect methods of solving philosophical problems, until he has penetrated to the utmost bounds of the *mundus intelligibilis* and has grasped the unhypothetical first principle of things, the Idea of Good, which is at once the *ratio cognoscentis*, the *ratio cognoscendi*, and the *ratio essendi*, and explicitly transcends the world of existence. From this absolute or final viewpoint, human problems fall into their proper perspective and are judged by the spectator of all time and existence with impartial and unerring accuracy. The instrument of his thought is pure reason, liberated once for all from the misleading influences of instinct, sense-perception, and emotion, and with his new powers of division, classification, and deduction, the dialectician, remaining always within the sphere of pure thought, can reach adequate solutions of any and every question which can arise. His judgments are final, for he sees as God sees, and has an adequate grasp upon the nature of ultimate reality.

How does the philosopher, as a judge, compare with the cases previously considered? Like "everyone," he has, of course, the normal human sense of honor and justice, but unlike everyone, he has received an exceptionally liberal education, designed especially to free him from the mis-

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leading influences of instinct, emotion, and prejudices of all sorts, and to turn the eye of the soul towards the light, so that it will see freely and fully. Like "the many," he has all the advantages which can be derived from social intercourse, but unlike them, *his* social experiences, being derived from a highly select group of peculiarly valuable associates, are peculiarly valuable, and are free from the meannesses and degrading prejudices which resulted in the general levelling down of characters and ideals in the democracy of Plato's own time.

Again, the philosopher is an "interlocutor," but a peculiarly well developed interlocutor, a genuine dialectician, no amateur, but a finished master in this most liberal of all arts, with all the natural ability and all the training which the mind of Plato can imagine as helpful. Again, the philosopher has a moral character of the very highest order, partly natural, partly developed by a system of training which selects, by special tests, only the very finest characters for the higher reaches of education. He has practical experience equal to the practical experience of any other citizen, and superior in value, for some men get more out of their experiences than others, and he is already such a man as to extract, from his experiences, the utmost possible value. Again, he is wise, with a well-balanced character which is organized, not according to chance or caprice, but according to a single principle which is identical with the principle of value in the universe—the Idea of Good. Finally, he is more than wise in a merely practical sense; for he fully understands the principle which underlies his own character no less than the universe, and possesses the finest speculative insight also.

In a word, the concept of the philosopher sums up all that is valuable in the other cases considered, and carries those elements of value still further, grounding them in their principle, which the philosopher apprehends in a way which raises him almost beyond the highest levels attainable by humanity. He represents the Platonic conception of the Super-man, and remains the supreme ideal of Greek philosophy.

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8. *The legislator.* Who is the legislator, whom Plato regards as a judge in matters of conduct? Like the philosopher, he is an ideal construction of Plato's own. He is, in fact, the philosopher himself, when, the highest vision having been attained, he sets himself, from a sense of duty, to rule the State and to educate the most promising of the younger generation so that they, too, in their turn may become guardians. As a guardian and ruler of the State, he makes laws, and, in the form of legislative enactments, expresses his own moral judgments, with special adaptations to meet the special type of case considered. Thus expressed in the form of laws, his judgments are not final in any static or absolute sense, for they are special applications of general principles to a concrete and admittedly imperfect stage of social evolution. As social evolution of itself brings about new conditions, his judgments—the written laws—will become out of date, and the new generation of law-givers and guardians, acting in his spirit and with the same grasp of principle, will make adjustments to fit the new conditions. These laws, being the standard in accordance with which the censor in matters of art, and the judge in his law-court, render their decisions, sufficiently indicate that the speculative philosopher, when he turns his attention to matters of government and administration, becomes a judge and an inspiration to judges, in a very literal sense. In fine, the guardian or legislator sums up all that is of importance in the characters previously considered, and gives out, in the form of administrative and legal decisions, his judgments on matters of conduct. He is the philosopher become practical.

Summary. To sum up, then, the results of our inquiry: We have seen that, while at first sight there appeared to be no less than eight groups of candidates for the position of judge in matters of conduct, yet, when we examine the cases more closely, there is a certain unity underlying all eight groups. Every normal human being has at least the *Anlage* for moral judgment, and indeed a little more

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than the Anlage. Social and political intercourse, co-operation in the work of the army, the law-courts, religion, the theater, and the various other institutions of Greek social life, develop the moral sense in a way which, so far as it goes, is genuine and valuable. Practical experience of all sorts, when it is the experience of a man of fundamentally sound character, develops this sense to a much higher degree. Add to these qualities a certain type of intellectual education—by dialectical discussion—and we have the wise man, who, with yet further and more intensive intellectual training, passes over into the philsospher. Finally, the philosopher as ruler gives laws to his State and expresses his moral judgments in a way which is most helpful to his country as well as to himself. There is something of philosophy in every normal human being. Environmental stimulus and dialectical training will bring this out and develop it. This is the principle of unity which entitles members of each one of the eight groups to the position of judge-in-matters-of-conduct. So far as their judgment is philosophical, so far it is valuable.

It might easily be inferred from the above treatment, that every normal human being without exception is capable of developing into a philosopher-king—as though it were purely a matter of the appropriate social and educational milieu. This is, however, far from being the case. Men are born unequal. Some belong to the copper class, others to the silver class. Very few belong by birth to the golden class, and extremely few can pass into it by especial merit from one of the lower classes. And not only is birth —*i.e.*, natural capacity—in favor of small numbers. When it comes to the philosophical education, a still more rigidly selective process takes place. Development is strictly continuous, it is true; but only for those who actually develop. At every step of the educational ladder, psychological tests are applied, and out of the select few who begin, there are very few indeed who reach the higher rungs. Wise men are very few, and of philosophers com-

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petent to rule, Plato hardly counts on very many, even in his ideal State.[8]

Our conclusion, then, must be that for Plato, while every normal human being without exception is competent to give some sort of judgment on ethical questions, the judge in the fullest sense of the word is the philosopher, and more particularly the philosopher who has definitely devoted himself to tasks of administration, the guardian or philosopher-king. That is to say, the two answers given to the question. Who is the moral judge? *viz.* (1) every one, and (2) only the philosopher—are partly correct and —at least as ordinarily understood—partly incorrect. The true answer, from the Platonic standpoint, has been sufficiently indicated.

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[8] Plato usually speaks of the *full* guardians as being very few in number, though of the "auxiliaries," in a city presumably of about 5,040 citizens (*Laws* 737 D, though cf. *Rep.* 423 B–D), there must have been at least 1,000—including both men and women—who succeeded in reaching the middle rungs of the educational ladder (*Rep.* 423 A).

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HAS MYSTICISM A MORAL VALUE?

RUTH M. GORDON.

DURING the last few years, especially since the beginning of the war, there has been a reawakened interest in Mysticism. Perhaps it comes as the culmination of the anti-intellectualism which rose as a protest against the aridity of logical quibbling, and the barren wastes of the materialism and agnosticism of the previous age. Mysticism comes as a way of escape from the world—hence its appeal to the turbulent world of to-day—it springs from the longing to pierce the veil of the invisible. In this respect alone it is akin to Spiritualism, for whereas the motive of the latter is doubt seeking evidence, in Mysticism it is belief. Moreover, the mystic is in search solely for union with Reality, the Absolute Spirit, God, not for communications with those who have died.

"The mystical consciousness," says Evelyn Underhill, "has the power of lifting those who possess it to a plane of reality which no struggle, no cruelty can disturb, of conferring a certitude which no catastrophe can wreck."[1]

I.

First let us see what Mysticism is. The definitions are many and varied. Pfleiderer tells us that "Mysticism is the immediate feeling of the unity of the self with God. . . . the endeavor to fix the immediateness of the life in God as such, as abstracted from all intervening helps and channels whatsoever."[2]

Seth says "The thought that is most intensely present with the mystic is that of a supreme, all-pervading and indwelling Power, in whom all things are one . . . God ceases to be an object and becomes an experience.[3]

[1] Evelyn Underhill, *Practical Mysticism*, p. ix.
[2] Quoted by W. K. Fleming, *Mysticism in Christianity*, p. 3.
[3] Quoted by W. R. Inge, *Christian Mysticism*, p. 339.

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For Cousin it consists in "substituting direct inspiration for indirect, ecstasy for reason, rapture for philosophy."[4] Vaughan, the author of "Hours with the Mystics," gives us the rather bitter statement that "Mysticism is that form of error which mistakes for a Divine manifestation the operation of a merely human faculty."[5]

Leaving aside Vaughan's cryptic remark, we see that the mystic claims to gain not by mediate knowledge, but by immediate intuition, a grasp on the central Reality of the universe; to get into touch with the Absolute Spirit, and finally to gain union with this Reality. This communication may be in the simple form of the "prayer of quiet"' of which Saint Teresa speaks, and Julian of Norwich when she says that "prayer oneth the soul to God," or it may be union through ecstasies, and raptures in which the individual's identity is completely absorbed.

Perhaps one of the most satisfactory definitions is that of Miss Underhill: "Mysticism is the art of union with Reality. The mystic is a person who has attained that union in greater or less degree; or who aims at and believes in such attainments."[6]

The complete union, however, comes only after a long period of training for the mystic—"The Ascent of Mount Carmel," or "The Dark Night of the Soul," as Saint John of the Cross calls it,—a time during which he is abstracting his soul from the world, and making it ready for this union with the Divine.

The initial step is that technically known as "Purgation," in which the senses are brought under control; where "Brother Ass," as Saint Francis called the body, is subjugated. This may be a simple act of renunciation, as in the case of Brother Lawrence for whom the purification consisted "all in one hearty renunciation of everything which we are sensible does not lead us to God,[7] or it may

[4] *Ibid*, p. 349.
[5] *Ibid*, p. 347.
[6] Evelyn Underhill, *op. cit.*, p. 3.
[7] Brother Lawrence, *The Practice of the Presence of God*, p. 20.

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be the horrifying tortures of Henry Suso, or the "Dark Night of the Soul" of Saint John of the Cross, for whom the way to union is a series of "blindings," first of the senses, then of the understanding. "The first night," he tells us, "wherein the soul is purified or detached, will be of the senses, subjecting them to the spirit. The other is that night or spiritual purgation wherein the soul is purified and detached in the spirit, and which subdues and disposes it for union with God . . . the first night, or purgation is bitter and terrible to sense. The second is not to be compared with it for it is much more awful to the spirit."[8]

The second stage, "Illumination" or "Contemplation," is characterized by "insight," and by a prevailing optimism in most instances. This is the state of which the Second Brother speaks in Jacopone da Todi's "Dialogue Between Two Brothers in Religion:"

> "Brother, I find the Cross all garlanded
> And with its blossoms do I wreathe my head;
> It wounds me not;—nay, I am comforted;
> The Cross is all delight and joy to me."[9]

The individual is strengthened by his contact with the Divine, but the distinguishing mark of this period as contrasted with the last stage, is that in the former the individual still regards himself as other than that with which he craves union. Brother Lawrence, for example, in his "Practice of the Presence of God," always differentiates between the Presence which he feels and his individual self. So it is also with Julian of Norwich. This is the type of mysticism with which we are most familiar, and with which we associate the poetry and romantic glamor.

In the last stage, the "Unitive" period, the individual loses his identity and becomes one with his Goal.

"I am thinking of what the soul was then (in union) doing," says Saint Teresa. "Our Lord said to me: "It

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[8] Saint John of the Cross, *The Dark Night of the Soul*, Bk. I, 8, 1 and 2.

[9] Jacopone da Todi, *Lauda*, LXXV, (trans. by Mrs. Theodore Beck).

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undoes itself utterly, My daughter, in order that it may give itself more and more to Me: it is not itself that then lives, it is I. As it cannot comprehend what it understands not by understanding."[10]

All sense of individual personality has gone—the individual has become completely absorbed. This state, strangely enough, seems to be accompanied with pain: the soul being unable to bear so much of the Divine. This is what Jacopone da Todi means in his "Dialogue of the Differences in the Contemplation of the Cross," when the First Brother says:[11]

> "Ah thou art warmed, but I am in the Fire,
> Thine the delight, and mine the flaming Pyre;
> I cannot breathe within this furnace dire!
> Thou has not entered there, It burns not thee.
>
> "Brother, thou breathest the perfume of the Wine
> But I have drunk It, and no strength of mine
> Can bear the onslaught of that Must Divine
> That ruthless, ceaseth not to torture me."

So again Saint Teresa says: "Rapture leaves behind a certain strange detachment also, which we can never inflict of ourselves, nor remove when once it has come . . . even now I have that sweetness (of the earlier stage) occasionally; but it is the pain of which I speak that is the most frequent and the most common. . . . In this communication the desire grows, so also does the bitterness of that loneliness wherein the soul beholds itself, suffering a pain so sharp and piercing that, in the very loneliness in which it dwells, it may literally say of itself . . . 'Vigilavi, et factus sum sicut passer solitarius in tecto." . . . The soul is tormented also because the pain has increased so much that it seeks solitude no longer, as it did before, nor companionship, unless it be that of those to whom it may make its complaint. . . . It seems also to be a safer state, because it is the way of the cross; and in-

[10] *Life of Saint Teresa by Herself* (Ed. by Benedict Zimmerman, O. C. D.), Chap. XVIII, 18.

[11] Jacopone da Todi, *op. cit.*

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volves, in my opinion, a joy of exceeding worth because the state of the body in it is only pain. It is the soul that suffers and exults alone in that joy and contentment which suffering supplies."[12]

Mysticism is not limited to any one country or religion. India has always followed the mystic way. The Mohammedan world gives us the Sûfis; we find it in Pythagoras, in Plato, and in Plotinus we get the culmination of pagan mysticism. Moreover, the influence of the Neo-Platonists upon Christian Mysticism cannot be overestimated. Philo represents the combination of Jewish-Greek Mysticism, and from China we get Lao-Tze, with his doctrine of Tao which is higher than reason.

"The Reason that can be reasoned is not the eternal Reason," he says. "The name that can be named is not the eternal Name. The Unnameable is of heaven and earth the beginning."[13]

But for each race and each religion, Mysticism takes a slightly different form, although the essentials are the same. The Mysticism of the Buddhist is pessimistic: he becomes will-less that he may be absorbed into Nothingness; the aim of the Christian mystic, however, is to destroy his own will in order to be one with the Divine Will. The mystics of Spain and Italy are far more emotional, more intense, than those of England.

It is, however, the Mysticism of Christianity which chiefly concerns us, and the point is whether Christian Mysticism has a value for the world of to-day.

II.

Professor Hocking has said in *The Meaning of God in Human Experience* that religion is "fertile rather than useful."[14] Accordingly, it might seem that we were adopting an anomalous attitude toward Mysticism, when we examine its salient features in order to determine its value.

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[12] St. Teresa, *op. cit.*, Chap. XX, 10–19.

[13] *The Canon of Reason and Virtue* (Trans. by Dr. Paul Carus), p. 73.

[14] W. E. Hocking, *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*, Chap. II.

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We are constantly told that the world of to-day is overestimating utilitarianism. However, the trouble is not so much that we of to-day overemphasize utility as that, for some, the scale of value has descended to the overestimation of that which is *materially* useful or valuable; we judge things in respect to the money or success which they bring in their train. But that is restricting value to a very narrow sense. And fertility is a form of utility. The only distinction in regard to utility is one of standards—of higher and lower values; of the difference between "long-run and short-run practicality."

Bosanquet would have us believe, however, that religion is something entirely beyond the narrow confines of ethics; something *other than* morality.[15] Here we are reminded of the mystic who said that he had "left the virtues behind." Hence, just as the artist sometimes claims that morality has no right to judge art, so the mystic who claims to be an expert in religious experience, may say that morality has no right to judge Mysticism. Nevertheless, whether one agrees with Bosanquet that religion is apart from morality, or feels religion to be morality at its highest, the moralist, as Professor Perry has said, "is charged with defining and applying the principles which determine the good of interests *on the whole;* and while his conclusions can never replace those of the expert within a special field, they will always possess authority to overrule them."[16] The moralist has a right to judge any interest on its moral grounds; he is justified in trying to ascertain what, if anything, the mystics have to offer us which is of value, provided only that we mean value in the broad sense.

Of course Mysticism has changed from that of the middle ages; to-day the mystic does not follow the gruesome example of Suso, of abstaining from bathing for sixteen years, or of plunging his hands into burning lime, like Saint Rose of Lima. If an individual were to behave in such a manner to-day, he would probably be taken with all speed

[15] Cf. Bernard Bosanquet, *Some Suggestions in Ethics.*

[16] R. B. Perry, *The Moral Economy*, p. 176 (Italics mine).

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to a Psychopathic Hospital for observation. The modern mystic feels that the world can supply him with evil, without his inventing exquisite tortures. Moreover, standards of value have so completely changed, that actions which in the twelfth or thirteenth century led a man to be revered as a saint would make him to be pitied as insane or deranged, in the twentieth. We of the present are appalled at the attitude of even such a charming saint as Francis of Assisi toward the "little pearls of sanctity."

"The East wind has replaced the discipline," says Francis Thompson, "dyspepsia, the hair-shirt. Either may inflict a more sensitive agony than a lusty anchorite suffered from lashing himself to blood."[17]

Even Henry Suso awoke to the fact that the tortures which the world and one's fellow-men can inflict upon anyone who, like himself, is sensitive, are far more painful than even his most ghastly self-inflicted physical agonies. It is true that the ascetic mystic is more logical, however, for if, as the mystics claim, evil makes for the perfection of the individual, we should court all the evil possible, not omitting the self-inflicted variety. However that may be, asceticism is chiefly a product of the middle ages, and now exists only in rare instances, as in the "Penitentes" of Mexico. Leaving it aside, therefore, we nevertheless find certain facts to be true of Mysticism in general.

First of all, the chief aim of the mystic is union with Reality. And because of the fact that it is his own soul which is to be united, the mystic falls into what might be termed a *moral* "ego-centric predicament." He is turned in upon himself; his whole state is subjective. His thoughts, to be sure, are occupied with God, but with God in relation to himself. With God in relation to the world in general, he has little or nothing to say.

"An anchoress ought not to have anything that draweth her heart outward," says the "Ancren Riwle,"[18] and Saint John of the Cross, assures us that "He who is detached

[17] Francis Thompson, *Health and Holiness*, pp. 21–23.

[18] *The Ancren Riwle*, p. 49.

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from creatures is not molested during prayer or otherwise, and so, without losing his time he gains easily great spiritual treasures."[19]

Perhaps there is a lesson here for us of to-day. We are overstrenuous; we stress the social rather than the individual side of religion. As Father Tyrell has said, we want to go about doing good, but we like that kind of doing good which requires a great deal of going about. The mystic, then, would have us turn away from the world and meditate in solitude; he would have us believe that religion is chiefly a relation of the individual to God, with the relation of man to man as secondary. Nevertheless, from this ego-centric attitude follow certain corollaries. First, there is the danger that mystical experiences may be merely a way of escape from the trials of the world. Miss Underhill says that these experiences administer "to the human spirit not—as some suppose—a soothing draught, but the most powerful of stimulants."[20] However, we observe that the more the individuals indulge in extreme mystical experiences, the less stimulating power they receive. Miss Underhill, herself, distinguishes between the earlier and the later experiences of both Catherine of Siena and Catherine of Genoa.[21]

Then there is the further peril of treating other human beings not as ends, but as means to the end of one's own salvation. "I began to live," says Brother Lawrence, "as if there was none other but He and I in the world." Consequently, we are told of his attitude toward the world: "He was so far from wondering at them (the miseries and sins he heard of daily) that on the contrary he was surprised that there were not more considering the malice sinners were capable of; that for his part he prayed for them, but knowing that God could remedy the mischiefs they did when He pleased, he gave himself no farther trouble."[22]

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[19] Saint John of the Cross, *The Ascent of Mt. Carmel*, Bk. III, ix, 4.

[20] Evelyn Underhill, *Practical Mysticism*, p. ix.

[21] Evelyn Underhill, *Mysticism*, p. 432.

[22] Brother Lawrence, *The Practice of the Presence of God*, pp. 11 and 28.

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To be sure, the mystics are often noted for their good works, as, for example, Saint Catherine of Genoa, but they seem to use the good works as a means to an end. In their awful encounters with lepers, it would seem not that they thought their disgusting actions greatly helped the lepers, but that these actions exhibited the proper humility on their part. So with Catherine's kissing of the "pestiferous woman." The sick, the poor, the sinners, were for them opportunities for acquiring virtue.

The Blessed Angela of Foligno exhibits this extreme self-centered attitude in a much more appalling light than the indifference of Brother Lawrence. "In that time," she tells us, "and by God's will there died my mother who was a great hindrance unto me in following the way of God: my husband died likewise, and in a short time there also died all my children. And because I had commenced to follow the aforesaid Way and had prayed God that he would rid me of them, I had great consolation on their deaths, albeit I did feel some grief."[23] Let us hope that the Blessed Angela did not carry out in this instance the doctrine that "Heaven helps those who help themselves"!

Another danger arising from his ego-centric attitude, is that of a feeling of superiority on the part of the mystic, because of the subjective and esoteric quality of his experience. Too often he is lifted up from those around him with the result that he comes back merely with a consescending manner towards his fellow-men. He assumes that irritating "air of wisdom" which is never a characteristic of the truly wise; he becomes egotistic about his own piety and, paradoxical as it may seem, about his own humility.

On her return to the monastery after her serious illness, Saint Teresa tells us naïvely, "I went to confession most frequently, spoke much about God, and in such a way as to edify everyone; and they all marvelled at the patience which our Lord gave me—for if it had not come from the hand of His Majesty, it seemed impossible to endure so

[23] *The Blessed Angela of Foligno*, Chap. IX, p. 5.

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great an affliction with so great joy. It was a great thing for me to have had the grace of prayer which God had wrought in me; it made me understand what it is to love Him."[24]

Another corollary to this moral "ego-centric predicament" in which the mystic finds himself, is that his separation from his fellow-men may lead to morbidity. No one exhibits more, perhaps, this darkness and blankness of the wholly introspective life than Saint John of the Cross. "The Dark Night of the Soul," and "The Ascent of Mount Carmel," are filled with descriptions of the miseries through which the tortured soul has to pass. There is something intensely pitiful about these books, with the insight they give us into the mental anguish of the man himself.

"Nevertheless," he says, "because of the excessive pain it (the soul) endures, and the great uncertainties of relief, it imagines now, as the prophet says, that its calamities will never come to an end. . . . Besides, the soul derives no consolation now in the advice that may be given it, or from its spiritual director, because of the loneliness and desolation of this dark night. . . . For as it is so filled with and overwhelmed by its sense of these evils whereby it discerns so clearly its own misery, it imagines that its spiritual director, not seeing that which itself sees and feels, speaks as he does without comprehending its state, and instead of being comforted, it is pained anew, for it considers that his counsel cannot relieve its misery. . . . Moreover, the soul can do so little in this state; like a prisoner in a gloomy dungeon, bound hand and foot, it cannot stir, neither can it see or feel any relief either from above or below until the spirit is softened, humbled, and purified."[25]

Secondly, the mystic lays his emphasis on the emotions rather than the intellect. Mystical experiences are beyond the power or comprehension of the understanding; the

[24] Saint Teresa, *op. cit.*, Chap. VI, 4.

[25] St. John of the Cross, *The Dark Night of the Soul*, Bk. II, vii, 3, 4, 5.

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intellect is regarded by the mystic as simply an unruly member which must be subdued. Here again, the mystic confines the use of his intellect to the analysis and the recording of *his own* feelings, of which he is usually an acute observer.

Even the "philosophical" mystics disparage the intellect as a way to light, and content themselves with reverberating phrases, such as Plotinus' oft-quoted φυγὴ μόνου πρὸς μόνον. Moreover, like all true mystics, they delight in using capital letters. Even the layman has a definite conception of what is meant by "reality" or "love," but "Reality," and "Love" for the very reason that they are supposed to mean more than the former, defy analysis, and look more impressive.

> "Science is vain, and knowledge but a cheat:
> He who by learning's skill
> Would hold Thee at his will
> His heart shall never taste Thy savour sweet—"

so sings Jacopone da Todi.[26]

Modern philosophy, with its trend toward anti-intellectualism, has come to the defence of the mystic here, and has agreed that only by intuition can we arrive at that reality for which we seek. The mystic is more logical in that he claims his experience is incomprehensible to the understanding. He does not attempt, as does the anti-intellectualist, to set forth "Reality" by means of concepts, when concepts are supposed to misrepresent and distort it.

Of course it is well for us to be reminded that "beyond all we know there is a vast region that we do not know." This is what James has in mind when he attacks "vicious intellectualism." But the truly wise have always known this. Socrates tells us that he was wise because he knew that he knew nothing; Huxley, that he "sat down before facts like a little child."

It is so much easier to feel than it is to think, that the mystic is apt to allow pleasant-sounding phrases to warm the cockles of his heart, without enquiring whether these

[26] Jacopone da Todi *Lauda*, LXXXI.

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phrases represent a reality or not. We are told of Brother Lawrence that "he spent the hours appointed for private prayer in thinking of God . . . rather by devout sentiments than by studied reasonings and elaborate meditations," and that he said "we ought to make a great difference between the acts of the understanding and those of the will; that the first were comparatively of little value, and the others all."[27]

The mystic undoubtedly demonstrates to us the vast power of love, but sometimes he also demonstrates to what folly or real mawkishness love can descend, when it is uncontrolled by reason, and unaccompanied by a sense of humor, which very few mystics seem to possess.

"Suffering from a headache," we are told of Saint Gertrude, "she sought to relieve herself by holding certain odoriferous substances in her mouth, when the Lord appeared to her to lean over towards her lovingly, and to find comfort Himself in these odors. After having gently breathed them in, He arose, and said with a gratified air to the Saints, as if contented with what He had done: 'See the new present which my betrothed has given Me!'"[28]

It is this uncontrolled emotionalism of Mysticism which is responsible for so much of the hysteria which often accompanies it. Mysticism has a particular appeal for those of a high-strung, emotional nature, and, for that reason, it leads to emotional excesses. The particular form of the emotion depends upon the temperament of the individual, or he may alternate from exalted to dejected moods: from ecstacy to "dryness," or absolute despair.

Of Brother John of Alvernia, one of the Franciscans, we are told: "The love of God kindled in him such sweetness of grace, that not being able to remain still to endure such sweetness, he would get up, and as one drunken in spirit, would run, now through the garden, now through the wood, now through the church, according as the flame and the ardour of the spirit drave him." Once, his heart was so

[27] Brother Lawrence, *op. cit.*, pp. 16 and 24.

[28] Quoted by William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 345.

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kindled with the fire of love that it lasted for three years, but after this came the opposite extreme: "whereby Brother John remained without the light and love of God, and altogether disconsolate and afflicted, and distressed. For the which cause, being in such anguish, he went through the wood running hither and thither, calling with cries and tears, and sighs on the beloved spouse of his soul who had hidden himself and gone away from him . . . but in no place and in no manner could he find this sweet Jesu again, nor taste again those sweet spiritual draughts of the love of Jesu Christ, as he had been wont. And this tribulation endured for many days."[29]

This emotional despair is quite distinct, however, from the morbidity of introspection which we saw in Saint John of the Cross, who would have accused Brother John of Alvernia of "spiritual gluttony."

Acute physical evidence of hysteria, as in Saint Catherine of Genoa's inability to eat anything at times, save the sacrament, and the "burning sense" of the Divine Love, of which so many of the mystics speak, may accompany the emotional state. To hysteria, also, we might ascribe Saint Catherine of Siena's "engagement ring," or the jewels which Saint Teresa saw on the cross of her rosary after the vision in which the Lord touched it.

III.

In reviewing the facts of Mysticism, we are lead to certain conclusions as to its results.

First, although it is well for us to be reminded of the value of occasional solitude and contemplation, and of the personal as well as the social side of religion, Mysticism tends to be desocializing: it calls the individual away from the world, and focuses his thoughts upon himself. It makes him regard his fellow-men either as incidents, or as means to his own salvation. Whatever "love" he has for others in the world is purely impersonal. The mystic makes a complete contrast between the love of God and the love of one's fellow-men.

[29] *The Little Flowers of Saint Francis*, p. 148 and 149.

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"We ought to love our friends, but without encroaching upon the love of God, which must be the chief," says Brother Lawrence.[30]

It is because of this cleavage that Professor Hocking offers a suggestion in his "theory of alternation," similar to that of the *Theologia Germanica* as to the "two eyes of the soul." "God and the world I maintain," he says, "must be worked in with one another forever: forever they must be pursued in alternation. . . . With the idea of God one loves the world; and then with the idea of the world one loves God again, and the two loves, or ambitions are of one substance, though they involve alternations in the history of the will."[31]

But, as the *Theologia Germanica* quite rightly points out, such alternation is practically impossible. "If the soul shall see with the right eye into eternity, then the left eye must close itself and refrain from working, and be as though it were dead. For if the left eye be fulfilling its office toward outward things, that is, holding converse with time and the creatures, then must the right eye be hindered in its working; that is, in its contemplation. Therefore, whosoever will have the one must let the other go; for, 'no man can serve two masters.'"[32]

Moreover, as the mystic nears his goal, alternation becomes more and more of a physical impossibility. He is "wholly rapt away," and returns not with renewed strength as at first, but with weakened powers.

But the necessity for alternation seems false and unnatural; love is something which does not have to alternate; which should not alternate if it is profound and sincere. A man does not have to alternate from his love for his wife to his love for his child. His love includes both, and the two affections are mutually inclusive. So the man who truly loves God does not therefore have to cease tem-

[30] Brother Lawrence, *op. cit.*, p. 51.
[31] W. E. Hocking, *op. cit.*, pp. 407 and 424.
[32] *Theologia Germanica*, p. 20.

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porarily from loving his fellow-men, or vice versa, and to be beaten back and forth between these two loves or ambitions like a shuttlecock. They are, as Professor Hocking says, "of one substance," but for that very reason, there is no need of alternation, or of the detached, impersonal love toward other human-beings, because of one's love for God. The two should be mutually inclusive.

Another arbitrary distinction which the mystic makes is that between being and doing. "A third lesson in valuation the mystics bring home to us," says John Wright Buckham, "the superiority of *being* above *having* or *doing*."[22]

Now whether one is a "Behaviorist," or not, it would seem certain that speech and action are the only keys which we have to mental states, and of these two, action is by far the more reliable. It is quite fair to make the distinction between being and saying, or doing and saying, but if a man is a saint, this will appear in his actions, and if his actions are saintly, the probability is that he is a saint. "By their fruits shall ye know them." Doing is simply the natural outlet of being, and a man's actions, especially at crucial moments, are the best index to his character. The stress of "being" as something quite apart from doing, leads once more to that overemphasizing of self to which the mystic is so prone.

Secondly, the self which is the result of the mystic way, is a narrow, exclusive one even if it escapes being "pathological." This is partly due to the unconscious egoism of the wholly subjective attitude of Mysticism; the complete breaking away from the world. Interests, affections, desires, all go to make up the self, and with each stifling of interest, the self narrows in its range. When you have succeeded in passing through the "Dark Night of the Soul," or building up the "Interior Castle," you may have got rid of all earthly desires, you may have curbed the unruly intellect, but what have you left? Something which is strangely akin to the blankness of Stoic ἀπαθία.

[22] John Wright Buckham, *Mysticism in Modern Life*, p. 186.

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It is a state of emptiness which is anything but beneficial to the world in general, and which compresses rather than extends the individual's own powers.

Thirdly, Mysticism makes no place for progress. It has no interest in the sciences, or any learning, even when it does not openly disparage them. It is not at all melioristic in tone, since it regards the world as a sort of purgatory, and the only evils which the mystic proposes to eradicate are what he considers his sins. Here, as always, Mysticism is subjective.

"I do not pray that you may be delivered from your troubles," writes Brother Lawrence to the Reverend Mother, "but I pray God earnestly that He would give you strength and patience to bear them as long as He pleases. . . . They who trust in sickness as coming from the hand of God, as the effect of His mercy, and the means which He employs for their salvation, commonly find in it great sweetness and sensible consolation."[34]

Thus Mysticism, when it is logical, adopts a purely "laissez-faire" attitude toward evil in the external world. There is no room in its scheme for the conquest of nature through mind; there is no vision of banishing evil from the world;—simply the salvation of the individual soul, and since tribulation is necessary for this salvation, why try to wipe it out, or to improve conditions?

Whatever value Mysticism has for the world comes in its second stage, the "illuminative" period, before the individual is wholly rapt away—when he still maintains his own personality, his poise, and when his experiences seem to strengthen not detract from his vitality. The rationalist may object to the methods and the theories of the mystic, but provided that the latter is not dogmatic about his experiences, if these experiences do renew his vitality, and if he can keep from establishing a false barrier between the love of God, and the love of his fellow-men, the rationalist must admit that Mysticism at this stage,

[34] Brother Lawrence, *op. cit.*, pp. 51 and 52.

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may have a value for individuals of specific temperament. But it would seem that the value is wholly dependent upon the strength of the intellect and will of the individual to prevent his Mysticism from unbalancing him and of thereby rendering him valueless. The reason that Mysticism at this stage may have a value is the very fact that the individual's intellect and will have not yet become subdued entirely.

However, the fact that the more deeply a man follows the mystic way, the more useless he becomes, shows that the value of Mysticism is doubtful. In its last stage with its will-lessness and blankness, or its hysterical emotionalism, it would seem to be a loss rather than a gain.

"The faculties of the soul now retain only the power of occupying themselves wholly with God," says Saint Teresa, "not one of them ventures to stir, neither can we move one of them, without making great efforts to distract ourselves. The understanding is utterly powerless here; the soul longs to send forth words of praise, but it has no control over itself. . . . The flowers are already opening; they are beginning to send forth their fragrance."[35]

"Well, what were its (the vision of the Sacred Heart) good fruits for Margaret Mary's life?" queries James in speaking of "La Bienheureuse Marguerite Marie," who has just been canonized, I believe. "Apparently little else but sufferings and prayers and absences of mind and swoons and ecstasies. She became increasingly useless about the convent. . . . Amiable and good, but so feeble of intellectual outlook that it would be too much to expect of us . . . to feel anything but an indulgent pity for the kind of saintship which she embodies."[36]

Elsewhere, James has said that "a saint in ecstasy is as motionless, and irresponsive, and one-idea'd as a melancholiac."[37] In other words he is so completely absorbed in his own feelings, that everything else fades from his mind,

[35] St. Teresa, *op. cit.*, Chap. XVI, 4.
[36] William James, *op. cit.*, p. 344.
[37] *Talks to Teachers*, p. 220.

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and when he spends the greater part of his time in this way, his value for the world has ceased.

But while Mysticism may have a value for certain individuals at its second stage, logically, if the mystic remains there, he is a failure as a mystic, in that he has not attained the "unitive" stage which is his goal.

Professor Buckham warns mystics to guard against "excesses"[38] but in so doing, he is admitting that Mysticism needs to be curbed, because the "unitive" stage which is the goal of Mysticism is a state of "excess."

Lastly, Mysticism gives us a God indifferent, as James says, "to everything but adulation, and full of partiality for his individual favorites,"[39] because of the "me and God" attitude of the individual who has forgotten that "whereas for other religions only God and a man are necessary, Christianity requires God and two men, because of its emphasis on the relation of man to man."

To-day, more than ever before, men and women need a faith which does not unbalance them, which does not destroy personality but develops it, and enlarges its scope, and which combined with reason, will equip them to go forth into the world of action.

RUTH M. GORDON.

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[38] John Wright Buckham, *Mysticism and Modern Life*, pp. 103–105.

[39] William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 346.

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MORALE AND MORALS.

HENRY T. SECRIST.

THE commanding officer of one of the training camps during the war said to me that he was not concerned with the morals of his men but he would not stand having a man in the United States uniform drunk and he would use every means in his power to prevent it. The language of the statement was adorned with the customary army emphasis and has to be toned down to suit peace-time tastes. But the feeling of the officer was very strong. He was also an officer of the regular army. There was no intimation that he would want his position kept secret. Besides he acted on what he said. His own morals were good. He and those under him were noticeably concerned with keeping drunkenness out of the uniforms and with many other practices and habits which interfered with the discipline and efficiency and the appearance of the soldiers. Many of these things would generally be counted within the region of morals, but as morals they had no influence with the commandant. It was as matters of morale that he was interested in them and not as matters of morals.

There was, and doubtless is, this distinction between morale and morals. Morale won its place in the army and navy. It had a standing of its own. Officers who came to believe in the many influences within and without the camps which helped to create morale among the men would have resented the idea that they were deciding and enforcing ideas and rules of right and wrong. And there were features of morale which plainly did not touch morals. Confidence in the ability of their leaders, the sense of certain skill in tactics and in the handling of arms, had a place in creating the spirit which was commonly known as morale. The need of morale was so generally recognized that morale officers were appointed. And the word itself gained such an honorable distinction that a department has been created.

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There should be no hesitation in accepting it as the same thing even though the department is called "The Recreational and Educational Department." The army need not be shy of the word morale, even if it does sound like morals, for morale had won its own standing, with its own separate authority. This recognition of the place of morale in the estimation of military leaders and the practical applications of it are features of the war which have as yet hardly received the attention they deserve. Morale, under whatever term one chooses to put it, had its place in keeping the service men "fit," and it too helped to "win the war."

There are, however, certain inevitable associations which link morals with morale, both in the army and out of it. Some confusion arose in the minds of people who had accepted rules and standards of morals which were not admitted by those who aim only to cultivate morale. Many good people were often shocked by what was allowed to pass and there is little wonder. They could not make the distinction and were surprised that no determined efforts were made to eliminate practices which to them had always been regarded as wrong. Their traditional morals received a terrible shock. Others yielded reluctantly on account of the war, which made an excuse for almost anything, and put it down to the credit of temporary necessity. It has done many persons good to have to re-examine these matters of right and wrong, of temporary necessity, of the connection of morale and morals. They have had a chance to grow. And this does not mean that morale has won out over morals and has established a law which is superior to the moral law. Indeed there is where there is a rub.

What is to be the effect after the war? What already? Things have not always come out as it was anticipated they might. It is certain that morals and morale in civil life must have close connections. It is of much importance that the men returning to civil life get back to the essential of the moral code even if some of the

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traditional ideas must be modified. Morale may add a distinct element in national, community and domestic affairs but it must not set up an authority above the moral law. The highest test is still that of right and wrong. But we shall be missing a great force in all these ways if we do not carry over into them the compelling power of morale. The morale of the community as well as its morals may, with promise of gain in social efficiency, be considered and means adopted to foster it.

The surprise and confusion which came during the war to some orthodox believers or purists in morals were in a measure justified. The case of drink and drunkenness is directly to the point. To many this had been largely in the region of morals. In the army that phase of the question was not even considered. The officer did not want his men to get drunk because it unfitted them for doing what they were there to do. He wanted them to drill, to be relied on, to become exact and skilful, to occupy their places in the ranks; and drinking tended to hinder all this efficiency of the good soldier. So not only was the five mile zone ordered nationally but every effort was made to hinder the illegal and private means of getting liquor to soldiers. National war prohibition was justified from the standpoint of morale. The man under the influence of liquor could not do his duty in the service. The drunk soldier or sailor was absurd, intolerable, a pitiable spectacle in uniform. This feeling was very general during the training period, with the incentive of the French front in prospect. In certain camps it became an uncommon thing to see a staggering soldier and one such was quickly put to the sobering off process. The military officers often asked the civil authorities to turn any offenders over to them and they would be treated in the strict military way. If one prefers he can lift even this case up into the highest morals by saying that it was not right for a man to get drunk or to be allowed to have intoxicants when this interfered with his duty in preparing to defend righteousness, liberty and justice in the world. But practically the question of the

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right or wrong of getting drunk or of having or handling liquor did not enter, and morals had nothing to do with it. Morale on its own initiative and authority decided against drink.

The case of venereal disease is hardly different. This had a very direct relation to the army as it was being trained and kept fit for effective action. There were doubtless some officers of rank who considered this one of the inevitable accompaniments of war and an army or navy. Such were far more numerous at the beginning of the American war period than later. It is possible that the coming into the army of so many civilians who brought a different standard had something to do with a change of idea and habit. Anyhow there were those who believed that the habits which produced venereal diseases were not necessary and, under the circumstances of the high idealism of the American war motive, were inexcusable. Where a strong fighting force was being built up, to allow an increase of these diseases was a military error. It was morale which insisted that not only should everything possible be done to do away with these diseases when they were brought in from civil life, as most of them were brought, but that vigorous means should be used to prevent the enticements about the camps which had been the usual accompaniments of army life. What was done in this direction is a story yet to be told. It is startling in its significance.

There were some medical officers who joined morals with morale in dealing with the men who had these diseases. A patient being treated in a hospital for a venereal disease told the doctor that he was in much pain. The Major Doctor's reply was that he ought to be in pain. As the patient was a big, strong man who should have been out in the ranks instead of in bed it is impossible to tell whether the "ought" of the doctor had relation to the military or the moral law. In that case the two were probably combined. The standard of the service demanded well men and the medical department of the army joined with many other forces outside the camps to maintain the bearing

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and efficiency of the soldiers as well as to protect the community. At least so it was in some of the American training camps. Just where to place the willingness of some military officers to assist civil officers and citizens in detecting and punishing soldiers who offended against the community by betraying innocent girls is difficult to decide, but such cases, to the great credit of the army, have been known. The law of morale could not get wholly away from the moral law.

In language the soldier and sailor, the men and the officers, offended seriously in the ears of the traditional believer, who places swearing in the list of moral evils. For swear the army and navy certainly did, It seemed impossible to resist the oath. There have been some philosophical explanations published as to why soldiers and sailors swear, but they seem rather far fetched. The best explanation is that they simply do it and that they generally do not mean to be bad in doing it. It is contagious, and under the special circumstances of close association of men, it becomes accepted. It is possible that it may be thought to increase morale. But that good men take to the habit and find it hard to break would be admitted by many who have been in the service or close to it. However that may be, the severity of judgment against those who take sacred names in vain, as measured by the standards of ordinary intercourse, was somewhat lessened.

To many there came a conflict between morals and morale in associated war work where dancing was concerned. There were some who did not yield to the demand of the soldier and sailor for dancing and clung to their conviction that dancing is at all times and under all circumstances bad. There were at least a few such who would not have any part in providing dancing themselves who yet frankly admitted that dancing in the times when off duty was not only harmless but to be commended. There were others who never thought that dancing was in itself wrong. And there were some few converts who frankly admitted that it was a good thing to allow the men to

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dance under wise regulations and careful control. These were not at all trivial matters for those involved. The necessities of the situation and the inherited feeling against all dancing brought a real conflict in some minds and there was many a twinge of conscience. Certain organizations saw plainly that the men would rather dance than do anything else. Nothing in the way of diversion, so necessary to morale, so pleased the large number of them. For these people provided places and girls for dances where the men from the camps and stations could meet decent girls and dance with them under proper chaperonage, without harm to either the men or the girls. The effort was made to offset the objectionable dances where harm would come through bad management, such dances as were bad from the standpoints of both morals and morale. A woman who was at the head of an organization which did not regularly believe in dancing openly confessed that she would face the facts of the situation and would help to provide dances that would help to please the men and would tend to save them from much worse things. And if morale was made up partly in keeping the men interested and contented and if wholesome associations were an antidote to vice, it is clear that dancing had a vindication in its connections with morals as well as with morale.

Just what can be said for gambling in the army and navy is not so certain. No one who knew about things near at hand could deny its prevalence. The rule against it was not enforced. It could hardly be said in defence of it that it built up morale. It may have occupied some idle hours. In the period when men in camps were under hard discipline and the eyes of the men were on the French front money was an insignificant matter and the gambling became merely a game or a pastime and the wrong of the money involved was not so conspicuous as it would be under normal conditions. But there were certain aspects of the matter where the moralist has the arguments in his favor and can make out a case against morale. And the many boys who learned to gamble in the camps

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may not easily escape the dangerous clutches of the practice when back in civil life. Even those who were not sticklers for strictness in army customs and were willing to grant many concessions on account of the difficult circumstances, especially if the morale of the fighting force could be kept up, failed to see any gain from almost universal gambling and were ready to acknowledge that the wrong against morals was a serious one.

But it was only in certain restricted views as to moral practices that there was any conflict between morale and morals. Whether the officer felt any responsibility for the morals of his men or not, in building up their morale he was actually engaged in strengthening the characters of the men by encouraging moral actions. And in this he was aided by the tremendous power of the war motive as well as by the authority of his official position. Sound men generally and in the end made the best contributions to the fighting force. It must be acknowledged that many men who had not been counted moral rallied under the pervading impulse, assisted by the strict regulations, and became some of the most dependable of their companies. And in some cases it was first this response to the appeal of morale which saved them finally to a continued moral life. The two factors were mixed in a most wholesome way and aided each other.

A valuable comparison along this same line is to be found in the motives and methods of those organizations closely attached to the war service and commonly known as welfare organizations. In some of these the aim doubtless was to make or keep the men good in the moral sense. But in others and to some extent in most of them the purpose was to work in the direction of morale, to fit the men to fight in their cause, and to equip them as good soldiers. This was done by keeping them in normal relations with life and thus maintaining their ideals and their good spirits. Entertainments, hospitality, personal service and all such extraneous efforts of societies and citizens were in the main directed toward the morale of the men rather than toward

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their moral welfare. It was the general conviction of such workers that good habits and high ideals not only did not hinder soldierly power and bearing but actually and considerably added to it. And not many will doubt that this was the peculiar American idea. That it proved to be so no one who knows will doubt.

In the period of demobilization the moral element may have become more pronounced. But even then to rally the spirit of the returning men was a supreme necessity; and to keep up the inevitable declining morale was the best means of getting them back safely into community life.

In this work there were two distinct aims and methods. One would let the soldier have anything he should want. What matter the character of the entertainment? Let the men have anything that will please and divert them. And some rather low types were allowed to pass under this superficial idea. Some of the shows furnished lacked even common decency. This was supposed to build up morale. But it did not do it. The other type of organization or worker knew that we must take the men where they were or we would not take them at all. They were not concerned with making the men directly either moral or religious. They furnished shows that were bright and attractive. They gave some of the best music, but the kind that had force and movement in it. And the effect was to leave the men with at least a wholesome taste. It kept the men near enough to the moral ideal and habit to have a wholesome mind. It was significant that soldiers preferred, as expressed by their own vote, the movies of the western life stories to the stories with lewd suggestions or with sickly sentimentality. What made at the same time for morale and morals was the picture of life that had strength and action in it.

Now in after-war conditions there is something to be gained from this tried out experience with the working of morale and morals. Army and navy morale has something to give to social relations. The civic morale must be kept up. The forces that create a strong and united spirit

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must be found. The moral workers will do well to take account of the forces of morale. Certain practices that are innocent may be permitted and encouraged because they create interest, occupy well the dangerous idle hour and so make for the safety of a strong morale in the city or state. Some things that have been regarded wholly or mainly as moral and have as such been urged as a public obligation may be shifted to community or national morale. We may say of habits that while we are not to judge of them morally, they weaken the public service, keep men from useful employment and generally lower the morale of the people. So they must be forbidden. And as there must be alert interest for the safety of the state we shall contrive means toward this end. That requires attention to both the great convictions of purpose and order and also careful regard for the small, pleasing things that amount to so much in making morale, simply because all men and women are human.

Those, indeed, whose business it is to deal directly with the bases of morals will in their various ways see to it that the foundations are made secure. They will insist on obedience to the moral law as such. They will cultivate respect for it and let it be known that nothing can supplant duty. The churches and societies have a big job on their hands. And because it is so big they may welcome the re-enforcements that come from morale. And when all join in the national and community life, where there are inevitable differences as to right and wrong, we may well lay hold of morale to aid in winning out for safety and progress. And in such morale, as also in morals, it is clear that mere private whims have no place and must be surrendered. What we are trying to build up is the morale of the American civil forces. If we can have these strengthened by connection with the moral motives and obligations we can go unwearied to the world's civil forces and so add to them as to insure victory for the ideal which is at the heart of both morals and morale.

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THE ETHICS OF THE WAGES AND PROFIT SYSTEM.

EUGENE W. LYMAN.

ONE has the feeling that a discussion of this subject is likely to be regarded, in many circles, as an act either of impiety or frivolity. Is it not impiety to call in question a system with which all the goods of life are bound up? Are we not forgetting the rock from which we were hewn, the pit from which we were digged, when we turn scrutinizingly upon the system upon which both production and philanthropy depend? Or, if the examination of such a matter does not produce a kind of ceremonial defilement, is it not a frivolous undertaking, for the reason that the wages and profit system is the outworking of natural law? Might not one as well compare gravitation with levitation from the standpoint of value as to compare the wages and profit system with any alternative from the standpoint of ethics?

Now foreign as such attitudes are to the philosopher, they should not be ignored by any who aspire to the philosophic mind. For it is the direct business of the philosopher to counteract these attitudes. In this matter the philosophic mind must become missionary. More important to the philosopher than the maintenance of any economic system, or the establishment of some new system, is the persistent examination of any and every economic system from the standpoint of ethics. And the purpose to secure such a persistent examination the philosopher is bound to seek to propagate as widely as possible among his fellowmen.

I.

But what is the wages and profit system which ethics must summon before it for review? Obviously in attempting to answer this preliminary question it is only the main

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structural lines of that system with which we are concerned, rather than any of its accessory ornaments or blemishes—such as munificent philanthropies or illegal profiteering. But there are two ways of getting at these main structural lines, to each of which we must give some attention.

The one way is to go back to certain elementary instances of the economic process—the fisherman in his dugout, or the solitary laborer cultivating "no-rent" land—and to find in these the needed simplification of our present confusing industrial situation, and the needed principles for its interpretation. The economic order, according to this procedure, is like an old colonial house which has been disfigured by all sorts of "L's" and lean-tos attached by willful or thoughtless inheritors of the place, but whose main lines are excellent, and which, therefore, requires only to have the clutter of disfiguring additions removed and replaced by a few broad piazzas to be a commodious and beautiful dwelling.

The other way of getting at the structural lines of the wages and profit system assumes that the modern developments of the economic process—trusts, labor unions, banking systems, and the interweaving of the foreign policies of governments and of business syndicates with each other—that these developments involve principles which in important respects are different from those that entered into the economic process in previous stages, and which yet are only very unclearly connected with the earlier principles. According to this assumption the economic process is like the buildings of an expanding industrial plant, each one of which is more extensive and substantial than the last—the architectural problem being whether the building in which the business started is still valuable, and if so, how it should be related to the new parts of the plant.

Now for reasons that will be brought out a little farther on we must tentatively follow both these ways of defining the wages and profit system. According to the method of defining by going back to simpler forms this system is the

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organization of production and distribution through the free contracting together of capital and labor, the motive of labor being wages and the motive of capital being profits—profits being the net income of the sale of products after wages and other expenses have been paid. The operation of this system, moreover, is held to reveal the working of a natural law by which social well-being is guarded and promoted. This law results from free competition—laborer competing with laborer for wages, laborer competing with himself by increasing his skill and effort so as to get higher wages, capital competing with capital for labor, and capital competing with capital for markets. The result of this law will be the organization of production so that more and more society secures the services it wants, and so that the income of production tends to get distributed in such a manner as to give each unit of capital and labor what it produces. Thus the result of the wages and profit system is ethical, both from the individual and the social point of view. Yet this ethical result comes about without any need for either the individual or society to aim at it—simply by natural law. The most that society needs to do is not to interfere with the working of this law, nor to allow the individual to interfere with it. Hence the *laissez faire* theory of government is the counterpart of the wages and profit system in this more elementary form. Thus Adam Smith writes: "All systems either of preference or restraint . . . being . . . completely taken away, the obvious and simple system of natural liberty establishes itself of its own accord. Every man, as long as he does not violate the laws of justice, is left perfectly free to pursue his own interest in his own way, and to bring both his industry and capital into competition with those of any other man, or order of men."[1] And even when this law is interfered with Adam Smith thinks it tends to assert itself and to secure comparative justice. "In the political body," he says, "the wisdom of nature has fortunately made

[1] *Wealth of Nations* (ed. by J. E. T. Rogers, 2nd ed.), Vol. II, p. 272.

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ample provision for remedying many of the bad effects of the folly and injustice of man; in the same manner as is done in the natural body for remedying those of his sloth and intemperance."[2]

Now in spite of all the enormous changes that have come about in our economic situation through the introduction of machinery and the consequent organization of capital by itself, labor by capital, and labor by labor, the main structural lines of our present wages and profit system are held by most of its defenders to be such as this earlier theory portrayed. The changes of theory which are deemed necessary are such as will simply restore and amplify the old colonial dwelling. The word "profits," it is true, acquires, with most writers who take the view mentioned, a much more specialized meaning. A portion of what we have loosely called profits is now assigned to "wages of management," and a larger portion is, of course, more accurately spoken of as interest, so that the term "profits" becomes reserved for the surplus income beyond these other items. But the same natural law presides over the economic process. Thus Professor John B. Clark teaches that, in what he terms "a static society," labor gets what it produces and capital gets what it produces according to natural law. This natural law is that, under free competition, production will expand, adding more units of capital or labor, up to the margin where profit ceases and loss begins. What is produced by adding the final unit of capital or of labor will have to be all paid over to that unit. But if labor or capital can be gotten at that rate, nobody will pay any more. Thus labor and capital tend to get what they produce and only that. So Professor Seager says that "The law regulating the division of the product between labor and capital for a society in a state of normal equilibrium is . . . that each receives the share it produces." The earnings of the capital goods "at the margin of indifference will fix the general rate of interest," and "the

[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 259.

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determination of the earnings of marginal workmen will serve indirectly to determine the wages of all."[3] The presupposition here, too, of course, is that there be "free, all-sided competition."

The most interesting thing about this interpretation of the economic process is that profits in the more special sense disappear when the static society or the normal equilibrium is reached. All the income of society is distributed as interest and wages—including wages of management. And yet in our actual society, which is more or less dynamic, profits are conceived to play an all-important rôle. For "Profits cause competition that secures to labor its product," says Professor Clark; "but competition tends to annihilate that profit and to make the pay of labor equal to the product of the final unit of it."[4] And the same can be said of the service that profits render to capital. Profits, thus, are the John the Baptist of the ideal economic order —in spite of the fact that they so little conduce to asceticism—for they are always saying to wages and interest, "You must increase, but I must decrease." And without profits the Messianic age of complete economic justice, in which there are no profits, will never dawn.

But one may say: If actual society is not static but dynamic, in what sense can this natural law of final productivity be relied upon to secure economic justice? And anyway, what is the meaning of a law that is always being suspended? Professor Clark replies that the law is dominant in the dynamic society too, and always tending to get itself enforced. He uses the figure of the ocean. "There has never been a moment," he says, "in the history of the stormiest seas, when the dominant forces that controlled them were not those which, if left entirely alone, would reduce their waters to a static condition. . . . With all the movements that winds and tides produce, these influences are still the dominant ones. The ocean does not leave its bed, and the depth of it does not greatly change.

[3] *Principles of Economics*, p. 279.
[4] *Distribution*, p. 179.

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The surface, considering its size, shows only trifling irregularities."[5] And so he affirms: "As real as gravitation is the force that draws the actual pay of men *toward* a standard that is set by the final productivity law. This law is universal and permanent: everywhere it will outlive the local and changeful influences that modify its operation. We are to get what we produce—such is the dominant rule of life."[6]

But now we must turn for a moment to the other way of defining the wages and profit system—that which begins with that system as it is in actual operation to-day, and which, therefore, is more inclined to leave open the question whether its main structural lines are the same as those of the system under simpler conditions, or whether perhaps those earlier lines have been obliterated.

We need not turn to the Marxian or the Syndicalist for this characterization of the wages and profit system, for it can be obtained from that system's friends.

"As business is now organized," Professor Seager writes, "the leading rôle is played by the enterpriser. From his point of view all the shares in distribution, except his own profit, are expenses of production. . . . From the viewpoint of motive, the first claim that must be considered is that of the enterpriser himself. . . . If we call the minimum profit necessary to induce him to continue to serve industrial society in his enterpriser capacity his wages of management, we may say that from the enterpriser's own standpoint this is the most important of the shares into which the annual money income must regularly be divided. In addition to the wages of management to which he is entitled, the enterpriser, who is the risk-bearer as well as the manager of the enterprise, may receive an additional profit or incur a loss."[7] In further explanation of wages of management Seager says: "Such earnings are not necessarily small. 'Bare wages of management' may

[5] *Op. cit.*, p. 402.
[6] *Op. cit.*, p. 180.
[7] *Op. cit.*, pp. 173, 4.

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mean anything from the one dollar a day or less of the itinerant pedler to the $50,000 a year or more of the highly successful business man. The point to be emphasized is that the same explanation that accounts for wages or salaries accounts also for the wages of management currently received by enterprisers of the same grade of capacity."[8]

The reason why the enterpriser has the leading rôle in modern business thus appears to be twofold. He is the manager of the business, and he is the risk-bearer. Now this latter aspect needs especial attention, for it is in connection with it that profits in the stricter sense of the term get their economic and ethical interpretation. Says Professor Seager: "When an industrial society is progressing and in each period there is more wealth to be divided among the sharers in distribution than in the preceding period, a large part of the increase will appear temporarily as extra profits going to its enterprisers. In the same way, when an industrial society is retrogressing the loss will fall first upon the enterprisers. . . . But whether the net balance happens to be above or below the wages of management, competition among enterprisers themselves is a force which tends constantly to make their gains correspond to bare wages. . . . Thus, however large profits or losses may be at any given time, they are always in the process of extinction—always, that is, unless monopoly influences intervene and prevent the forces of competition from accomplishing their work of elimination."[9]

Monopoly thus appears as a means for preventing the elimination of profits—a means which the enterpriser himself devises, thereby the more fully justifying his name. But the preservation of profits by monopoly takes place through the elimination of risk, and it is as risk-bearer that the profits are supposed rightfully to accrue to the enterpriser.

We now begin to see how far the structural lines of the

[8] *Op. cit.*, p. 177.
[9] *Op. cit.*, pp. 211–212.

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simpler economic process have been changed in the present organization of production. Profits are the motive of the enterpriser as risk-bearer, which, as initiator or expander of business, is his more essential rôle. Profits, therefore, are the driving force in economic progress. But the law that each gets only what he produces becomes effective only so far as profits are eliminated. Thus the elimination of the driving force of economic progress is the condition on which economic justice depends. But on the other hand, in order to preserve profits which are the motive for the enterpriser's peculiar contribution to production, namely, risk-bearing, the enterpriser is impelled to eliminate risk through monopoly. Thus the perpetuation of the chief motive for economic progress leads to the suspension of the ethical justification of that motive.

Two large features of the economic process, therefore, tend to suspend the principles on which that process in its simpler form was held to depend. These features are: the dynamic character of society and the tendency towards monopoly, and these two features tend towards the perpetuation of profits, whereas it is on the elimination of profits that economic justice depends.

There is one more large feature of the economic process, recognized by Seager, which seriously complicates the working of the natural law that, on the simplified scheme, is relied on to secure economic justice. This additional complicating feature is "the unequal opportunities of workers." "Full weight," Seager says, "must also be given to the fact that, as industrial society is now organized, 'pull' is often more important than 'push' in helping a man to get on in the world. Competition is fairly effective as a means of eliminating the unfit, but complete equality of opportunity rarely prevails in the selection of those who are to be given a trial. Influence enables some to step without effort into important positions, which others, even better fitted for them, can only rise to, if at all, after long and painful struggle. The differences of the earnings of different workers in actual industrial society are due to

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these considerations nearly, if not quite, as much as to the more narrowly economic influences."[10]

But Seager finds, further, that these inequalities of opportunity tend to perpetuate themselves. For with a low standard of living only meager educational opportunities are possible, or desired even, and without adequate educational opportunities one enters the competitive race handicapped to an indefinite amount. As Seager puts it: "The persistence of differences in industrial capacities among individuals is due chiefly to differences in educational opportunities which are due in turn to standards of living." Thus, according to some of the friends of the wages and profit system, that system has a strong infusion of economic determinism in it.

Now this inequality of opportunity must work to keep the final productivity of labor low. And if, by hypothesis, final productivity is the measure of wages, it must tend to keep all wages too low, and so to keep—perhaps, interest—but certainly profits—too high. Thus the profits of the enterpriser are bound up with the perpetuation of inequalities of opportunity for labor.

II.

We have dwelt too long, perhaps, upon this twofold characterization of the wages and profit system, but the recognition of these two aspects of that system as it is thought of by its defenders seems necessary for discussing its ethical bearings. And it permits me now to state a series of propositions that I hope to justify by some further exposition. These propositions are as follows: (1) The ethics most commonly appealed to as justifying the wages and profits system is the ethics of the original interpretation of that system, and this ethics, though relatively justified, rests upon a psychological fallacy which vitiates it for present day thought. (2) The wages and profit system as it now exists so far differs from its simpler forms that the

[10] *Op. cit.*, p. 249.

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attempt to transfer to it the earlier justification involves an ethical fallacy as well as the continuance of the psychological fallacy. (3) The complete abandonment of the earlier economic ethics runs the risk of abandoning the ethical standpoint altogether.

The ethics of the earlier economic theory is, as we already have seen, that of a free competition of self-interests which works out social justice by natural law. The beauty of this ethical theory is that no one need ever trouble to keep it in mind. Self-interest, if not interfered with, will take care of itself and of social justice too. In the economic world one gets social justice by forgetting it. The fallacy here is the well-known fallacy of composition—in this case the fallacy of expecting to get a social result without a social motive. The error of supposing that you can have this harmonious working together of a multitude of self-interests, in which no self-interest is suppressed, is that the self-interests naturally tend to suppress each other. This fallacy has been too often exposed for us to need to dwell upon it here. It is clear to us, of course, that man has other motives than those of self-interest. Did not Adam Smith himself base his theory of moral sentiments on sympathy? And it is clear also that the social motives, if they are to have the proper influence, must be cultivated. Of course none of the modern successors of Adam Smith ignores these facts. But they all do seem to persist in abstracting the economic world from the other spheres of human activity and assuming that in that world self-interest is the only motive to be reckoned with.

Now unfortunately any fallacy thoroughly insisted upon becomes a half-truth. By insisting that self-interest is the only motive to be considered in determining the laws of the economic world, one tends actually to segregate the economic world from social motives. However much social motives may be fostered by the school or the church, if the economic world is interpreted, and actually run, on the theory that self-interest is the only economic motive, the economic world becomes a powerful school for anti-

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social motives. We, therefore, can only escape the damaging effect of this fallacy, which makes itself into a half-truth, by deliberately seeking to socialize the motives operative in the economic world itself. And by this I mean, not simply in a general way to socialize the individuals that make up the economic world, but to recognize the productive value of social motives throughout all sections of the economic process.

But I have said that the older economic ethics was relatively justified. This is because it was democratic in character. It was the ethics of a democratic individualism rather than of a socialized democracy, but still it was democratic. It presupposed that all would have equal opportunity when governmental interference and the privileges of hereditary castes were done away with, and it expected that each would come to his best in the economic world, except as he failed through his own fault. In any case each would get his just deserts. This democracy was much too optimistic and absent-minded—too optimistic because it assumed that when ancient oppressive institutions were done away with "nature" would take care of the rest; and absent-minded because as a middle class movement it forgot the proletariat. But it was a fine ploughshare for breaking up the cake of custom and bringing much fallow ground in human society under cultivation.

And the economic order in which this individualistic democratic ethics has been the presiding genius of course has much to say for itself. Professor Tufts writes on this point: "Individualism can make out a strong case in respect to several of the ethical qualities which are demanded: viz., efficiency in production of goods, stimulation of active and forceful character, promotion of freedom and responsibility, encouragement to wide diversification of occupation and thus of services, and, finally, the supply of society with the kind of goods that society wants."[11] Of course individualistic democracy cannot claim the sole

[11] *Cf. Ethics*, Dewey and Tufts, p. 527.

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credit for the enormous advances of modern production, for as Tufts adds, science and education have also been leading factors in the matter. But I believe we should agree with him that individualistic democracy in turn has had an important share of the result to its credit. But this only gives the more point to the query whether greater and more consistent ethical results might not be secured by socializing the democratic principle in its application to the economic world.

But now we must pass to the second proposition. I think perhaps the first section of our discussion has sufficiently shown that the principal ethical justification employed for the wages and profit system as it now operates is still this older economic ethics. For however it may be recognized that the socialized individual is indispensable to modern society in general, still in economics self-interest is the motive almost exclusively dealt with by the friends of the present system, and for the regulation of self-interest natural law is their main reliance. Most of these thinkers of course would look to the state to regulate monopoly, and Professor Seager lays great stress on free education of a thorough and extended kind to remove inequalities of opportunity. But all leave profits to be regulated by natural law under free competition.

The main thing now is to point out, on the basis of what already has been said of the wages and profit system as it now operates, that it is aristocratic, if not autocratic, in principle, and hence that there is an ethical fallacy in looking to that system to vindicate itself on a democratic basis. By an "ethical fallacy" I do not mean simply the contradiction of expecting democracy from aristocracy. I mean the failure by reason of a formal democracy and an inherited democratic theory, to perceive, that the system as it now is organized can be justified only on an aristocratic basis.

The enterpriser, we are told, plays the leading rôle in modern business, and his rôle involves, on the one hand management, for which he receives wages, and on the other hand the risk-bearing due to his initiative, for which he

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receives profits. Now these profits are the result of the dynamic character of society.[12] The enterpriser, therefore, tends to reap the benefits of the dynamic character of society. Now the alleged law of wages and interest works only in so far as profits are eliminated. Thus the enterpriser is a privileged party in the economic scheme, and one whose function, so far as it is determined by profits, lies outside the sphere of economic justice.

Of course, in theory, any one can be an enterpriser instead of a wage earner, a lender, or a simple manager. Anyone can at least turn to peddling—though if all turned enterprisers after this fashion the situation would resemble the island whose inhabitants were said to eke out a modest living by taking in each other's washing. But with our modern methods of trust organization the real enterprisers grow fewer and fewer. Marx was wrong, of course, in supposing that capital would follow the centripetal tendency to the exclusion of the centrifugal. The motive of interest from investment is certainly very widespread in our land. But if we substitute "*enterpriser rôle*" and "*profits*" for capital and interest, his forecast would not seem to be far wrong.

But, we are told, the enterprisers compete for profits with their fellows of the same capacity. This is far from enough to restore anything like a principle of democratic control. For the level at which the enterpriser competes is by no means determined solely by his own capacity, since below it lies a whole hierarchy of the inequalities of opportunity already mentioned. But once more we are told that the risks he must take involve a principle of control. This, however, is also far from adequate as a restraint. For the risks may be passed on to the wage earner by discharging him or laying him off; they may be

[12] Professor Seager mentions as the most important changes which occur and the principal causes of competitive profits: (1) price fluctuations; (2) introduction of novelties; (3) improvements in methods of production; (4) variations in climate or other natural conditions; (5) the exploitation of new lands and natural resources; and (6) modification in the rates of remuneration of other factors in production.

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passed on to the investor by omitting dividends; they may be passed on to the public by limiting output.

Thus by segregating the rôle of enterpriser and allocating all the profits to those playing this rôle the modern economic process has built up within itself an irresponsible power, which, however wisely it may be exercised in many cases, can claim no justification on the principles of democracy. The hands stretched out to receive the blessings of society may seem to be the horny palms of labor or the kid-gloved hands of the coupon cutter, but the persuasive voice is that of the enterpriser, and as in the case of that prince of enterprisers, Jacob, it obtains the best blessing, while the hands that procure the venison for society arrive too late. Let us hope that the perpetuation of this ancient law of distribution is not due to senility or permanent blindness on the part of society.

But let me turn for a moment to the third proposition already advanced. One may abandon altogether the democratic justification of the economic process which has so long prevailed. This is done by those who hold that the law of the economic world must be the general evolutionary law of the survival of the fittest. And when this change is made it generally is assumed that it introduces an aristocratic standard of ethics in the place of the older democratic one. But in reality it is the abandonment of the ethical point of view altogether. For it makes economic power its own justification, whereas the ethical point of view requires the subordination of economic power to the total good of society. It is entirely possible to have an aristocratic theory of social good, but if the economic world is to be measured by it, economic power must be related to other and greater social goods by some positive law or principle. To call the law of the survival of the fittest in a purely economic struggle an ethical law is to exalt to ethical dignity the law of the jungle.

In conclusion it may be well to forestall the almost inevitable rejoinder to any criticism of an existing institution

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or system, namely, What do you propose as an alternative, and how is that alternative to be introduced? It would lie beyond the scope of this paper to introduce such an alternative, but the position that our argument leads to is that no such alternative should be offered or demanded.

Lest this should seem to be mere sidestepping, let me explain that the attitude to which the ethical consideration of economic systems leads is that of social experimentation. Past and present systems have a certain relative justification and at the same time involve certain obvious evils. Ethics should seek to disentangle the principle on which the relative justification of past systems is based and to give it wider and more consistent application. Much of our present trouble is due to the fact that the older economic theory had an ethics which has been retained unreconstructed while wide social reconstruction has been taking place, and so has served to obscure the roots of our present evils and make them appear as largely good.

The principles that should guide us in social experimentation have emerged in the course of our criticism. They call for a socializing of the economic motive and a democratizing of economic method, thereby securing greater justice in distribution of income, and, as I believe, an equal, if not greater, productivity on the part of society.

These principles taken together give us the now familiar ideal of industrial democracy. But if this ideal is to be taken ethically, it must be taken seriously, with the expectation that it will progressively find concrete embodiment.

It is a great advantage in addressing ourselves to such a task that we do not have to set our present wages and profit system over against Marxian socialism, or Syndicalism, or Russian Sovietism, and choose between them. We have such transitional programs as that of the British Labor party, which puts forth as the four pillars of the house that is to be built: The universal enforcement of the national minimum; the democratic control of industry (involving nationalization of mines and transportation; the revolution

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of national finance (carrying with it steeply graded scales of taxation); and the surplus for the common good. We have in our own country the Plumb Plan of railroad administration, which, if industrial democracy is the right ideal, should be scrutinized not hostilely but hopefully.

Such programs as these lead us to a development by which social groups democratically controlled shall be themselves the enterprisers and risk bearers and the recipients of profits. They point to a conception of the reward of labor as a share in a social product determined upon by democratic methods, instead of an allotment to each laborer of what he individually produces through the operation of an alleged natural law. And they give promise of far greater productivity in the economic process as a whole through awakening and developing the creative impulse in all members of the economic world.

If such suggestions seem too utopian, there is no reason for reacting against them in such a way as to throw ourselves into the attitude of social standpattism. For at least we can recognize the value of such a maxim as that supplied by John Dewey when he says: "Not order, but orderly progress, represents the social ideal."

EUGENE W. LYMAN.

UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

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DISCUSSION.

A Satisfactory Religious Code.

I agree in large part with the view of Ella Lyman Cabot in her review of Professor Sharp's book in your July number, that there must be "a permanent and universal foundation for rightdoing," —"a moral law above current opinion." I also hold, with her, that religious teaching should be given in the public schools. But I disagree when she proposes as an adequate code for religious teaching the so-called two Great Commandments—"Thou shalt love the Lord thy God," etc., and "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," and I wish to offer a religious and moral code which aims to be a first-hand and modern view of the universe and human life, and which contains the vital element, not only of Christianity, but also of other systems, ancient and modern. I express the principles, not as arbitrary commands, but as rational advice. The code is as follows:

1. There are ideal or divine types of personality and character, partially immanent in human life and partially transcendent. These we should exemplify and revere. They include the ideal or divine mother, father, wife, husband, etc.; statesman, soldier, scientist, artist, pastor, author, teacher, physician, nurse, laborer, artisan, financier, inventor, and many others.

2. There are universal laws of nature. These we should study, obey, and utilize.

3. There are at least four fundamental classes of actions or duties. These we should perform—in part individually and in part functionally. By functionally I mean by specialization, whereby, for instance, some persons might rear rather large families, while others whose occupations or constitutions are incompatible with family life might not marry at all. The four classes of actions are: (a) Physical actions—those in pursuit of food, clothing, shelter, and health. (b) Mental actions—those in pursuit of knowledge, æsthetic enjoyment, and character. (c) Reproductive actions—those pertaining to the sex relations, family life, rearing of children, and the care of the aged. (d) Social actions —those involved in our relations with other individuals.

4. Actions may be performed in the interest of the self, or in

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the interest of others. These we should perform in the right proportions. The first are egoistic, the second altruistic.

More briefly still, the code may be stated thus: 1. Exemplify and reverence the ideal. 2. Study and obey the laws of nature. 3. Care for the body, develop the mind, marry and rear children, and perform the duties toward others. 4. Strive for the welfare of self and for the welfare of humanity in general.

CYRUS H. ESHLEMAN.

LUDINGTON, MICHIGAN.

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BOOK REVIEWS

INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL ETHICS: The Social Conscience in a Democracy. By John M. Mecklin. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920. Pp. ix, 446.

Just what should be included in a work upon social ethics is one of the problems in writing such a work, for the field is by no means well defined. Professor Mecklin has conceived his subject broadly. He gives historical and psychological approaches, on the one hand, to our present national conditions, and on the other, to the social conscience. Then in Part 3, "The Social Order," after an introductory discussion of the institution and the individual, he deals with the home, the ecclesiastical ethic, the function of the school, and the ethics of private property, industry, business, the city and the state.

The most significant feature of the book is that, instead of attempting to decide questions of social ethics, and lay down the obligations of men in various spheres of life, the author aims primarily at understanding and interpreting. There is frank discussion of evils and no disposition to blink unpleasant features of American democracy, but the temper is not that of the fault-finder. The author evidently believes that the most effective criticism for constructive purposes is one that is less interested in belaboring society than in discovering the forces which have made it what it is. He does not conceive human nature so simply as to suppose that all capitalists or all laboring men are alike, although he points out the tendency of institutions and conditions to shape the ethics of the individual, and skew it this way or that. One of the most interesting features is the treatment of the religious background and the present ecclesiastical ethic. He points out that the two groups which were by far the most energetic and self-assertive at the time when the national ideals were forming, the Puritans and the Scotch-Irish, were both Calvinists and also came largely from the same middle class of the British Isles. He can speak sympathetically of Calvinism as a lofty doctrine and at the same time point out acutely how certain of its favored virtues no longer serve the ends they were designed to serve:

" . . . With the rise of surplus wealth and the develop-

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ment of the capitalistic class the virtues of thrift, industry, temperance, and frugality, together with the related virtues of obedience and respect for the existing order of things, came in time to be thought most becoming in the working class. The capitalistic class were exempt.

"The economic as well as the political philosophy of Puritanism has lingered longest among the middle class, the farmer, the country storekeeper, the small tradesman. At the close of the last century this group, under the leadership of Mr. Bryan, made a last pathetic attempt to bridle the trusts, to restore lost competition, in short to revive the economic philosophy of Calvinism. The scheme was doomed to failure for the reason that Calvinism no longer exists as a vital religious attitude in the hearts of modern men."

The perplexing question as to how far a church which attempts to conserve values can at the same time assume the function of moral and spiritual leadership, is frankly stated and an attempt is made to adjust our estimates of what the church can and cannot be expected to do. In the chapter on private property the strength of its constitutional position is pointed out with certain of the limitations through taxation, eminent domain, and the police power. It is a rather striking omission, however, that, although the fifth and fourteenth amendments which fortify the legal basis of property are cited, the sixteenth amendment which authorizes the Federal income tax, is not noted. In the opinion of the reviewer, this amendment deserves to be regarded as revolutionary. The exigencies of war taxation have shown that the income tax may be used in such a way as to bring about a very far-reaching change in bearing the burdens of society. Broadly speaking, the existing distribution of property may be attacked in two ways: Society may change either the methods of gaining property or the conditions of keeping it when gained. It may be that the experiment with taxation will lead to other experiments in attempts to influence the distribution of property, for since the war it seems to be increasingly difficult to regard the present distribution as either just or wise.

The book offers much good material for college classes and the references at the end of each chapter make it still more useful in this respect. It is a welcome sign of broader ethical interest by the teacher and a contribution to further development of the field.

J. H. TUFTS.

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SOCIAL THEORY. By G. D. H. Cole. London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1920. Pp. vi, 220. Price, 5s. net.

This is the first volume of a projected library of social studies, and the editor opens the series with a very able and arresting study in political theory which is the more valuable from his close association with the most effective thought of the Labour movement. The destructive side of the book is an attack on the political theory of the old bad type,—the theory of the sovereign state which has fared badly during the past few years. There is an oddity and unreality about that theory to-day, which is as out of date as James I's ideas of the divine right of kings. There is no doubt as to what Mr. Cole feels about Dr. Bosanquet.

The interesting section of the book is a pungent criticism of the totally false theory of representation (p. 103). The state, as we see it, is an omnibus association; it has to do too much and does it all badly. Our "representatives" do not and cannot represent us; "no man can represent another man and no man's will can be treated as a substitute for, representative of, the wills of others."

The remedy he suggests is the pre-eminence of function as the primary principle of social organization; the establishment of an ordered complex of producers' groups, consumers' groups and regional groups, with a co-ordinating authority, all roads leading to guilds. "True representation, like true association, is always specific and functional, never general and inclusive."

Instead of beginning with the sovereign state, Mr. Cole's political theory begins, and rightly begins, with the individual. As man is a social animal, he expresses himself, or some portion of himself; he forms associations, of which the most important are either economical or political. Economic associations fall into two classes, vocational or appetitive, that is those of producers and of consumers. Mr. Cole's ideal society would be a complex of such associations, each with considerable freedom of action, but each subject to the co-ordinating activity of a representative "soviet" of these societies. It is, of course, in the working out of these delicate adjustments between these societies, and between the supreme control and each separate body that practical difficulties may arise.

The book is compact and closely reasoned, detached, and even academic in manner and revealing, as do Mr. Cole's other works, an acute and masterly handling of his material.

M. J.

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SHORTER NOTICES.

SCIENCE AND LIFE. By Frederick Soddy, M.A., F.R.S. London: John Murray, 1920. Pp. xii, 229. Price, 10s. 6d. net.

Professor Soddy's book is a bridge between science and life, an emphatic statement of how fundamentally and beyond the possibility of escape our knowledge and control of the inanimate world underlies and determines the development of all life's potentialities; "for Science and Science alone can compass the material reconstruction of Society." The chapters on the Evolution of Matter and on radio-active change, the conclusion as to the immanence and illimitableness of natural energy open up the most amazing possibilities. War—for example—would be reduced to its simplest terms as follows:—"Any selected section of the world or the whole of it, if necessary, could be depopulated with a swiftness and despatch that would leave nothing to be desired."

The community which could liberate the energy of the atom, would have gained control over a force before which high explosives or electricity sink to insignificance and would gain wealth,—that is control of nature,—beyond the dreams of alchemists. Such would be the future of the community. But the gift to the community would be given by a man of science. Therefore, Professor Soddy says, the state can no longer afford to starve its men of science. "Starving, in the time-honored manner, a great pioneer of religion, reason or art was cheap. But starve the same type of mind in science now, and the community starves with him." It is a vigorous theme, imaginatively handled. Scientific investigators are silent, or rather speak only to the initiated, and endeavors such as this to make known the bearing of special fields of inquiry—in this case, radio-activity—upon the general problems of life are all too rare.

E. F.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPEAN THOUGHT: ESSAYS ARRANGED AND EDITED BY F. S. Marvin. Oxford University Press: London, 1920. Pp. 306. Price, 12s. 6d. net.

As Mr. Marvin explains, the term "recent" means here the period of time between two wars, 1870 and 1914,—what might roughly be called the "last generation." It is a period of complex fusion, change and fruitful growth in philosophy, science, political theory; and in spite of the difficulties of handling the vast intricate masses of still fluid material, the contributors have given readable and yet valuable summaries of the progress of thought. For the beginner, there could be no better introduction to the essential contributions of man's recent achievement. In physics the whole new realm of radio-activity has come within our ken, and at the same time chemistry has had its bounds enlarged. The new school of mathematicians claim that they have recast the foundations of that fundamental science and assimilated it to the simplest laws of all thinking, and Professor Taylor, in his vivacious and valuable chapter endorses the new logic of relations worked out by Mr. Russell, Dr. Whitehead and others, as "the most potent weapon of intellectual analysis ever yet devised by man."

He distinugishes between Traditionalism, the temper which is too indolent to think out a question for itself and consequently prefers to accept traditional ready-made answers to the problems of Science and Life, and tradition, which is the "body of organized sound sense." "The truth is something which each generation must discover for itself," he writes, and

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"true traditions may be quite as injurious if they have become mere traditions, as false ones."

In the sphere of political theory, as in philosophy, the old and *simpliste* doctrines have been criticised almost to the point of extinction, the old bad systems have been swept away. The state is no longer sovereign and unique in authority, and there has grown up the challenge of supernational conceptions, such as the League of Nations. The nation state is far too simple a solution of modern difficulties. There is no special chapter on the League of Nations, for the subject was treated in *The Unity of Western Civilization*, but the idea pervades the whole book. The chapter on economic development takes a wider range in date than the rest of the collected papers, beginning as it does with "hovering in fancy over the industrial scene in 1842." The level of the book is a very high one, and the editor, the author of "The Living Past," is to be congratulated on securing contributors who, in their time, can make the past a living thing.

M. J.

London, England.

WHAT THE WORKERS WANT: A STUDY OF BRITISH LABOR. By Arthur Gleason. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920. Pp. 518.

This is a highly valuable book for the American who wishes to know what is going on in the labor world in Britain. The author's own presentation and discussion of conditions occupies a relatively small part of the book. The greater portion is made up of the statements of prominent British labor leaders and of documents, official and other. The coal commission, the national industrial conference of February, 1919, the trade union congress, are reported in a way to make prominent the personality and words of Smillie, Hodges, Thomas, and others. There is little attempt to give the historic background of the various groups, but the reader who has been awakened at all to the new authority with which labor is speaking in Britain, and to its influence upon world politics, as well as upon labor problems in the narrower sense, will find here the best material yet available for understanding the situation.

THE CASUAL LABORER AND OTHER ESSAYS. By Carleton H. Parker. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920. Pp. 199.

The numerous readers of "An American Idyll" will welcome these essays by the remarkably vital person whom they have come to know from that picture. Besides the essay which gives its title to the book, other chapters are "Toward Understanding Labor Unrests," which is a study of the instincts, and of the maladjustments which our industrial system at present causes, and "Motives in Economic Life," which follows out the same theme with a more definite specification. The third paper, on the "I. W. W." which originally appeared in the *Atlantic Monthly*, was the first effective appeal to understand the I. W. W. instead of exploding at the sound of the letters. An appendix contains Parker's report to the governor of California on the Wheatland hopfields riot. The papers are edited by Mrs. Parker, who contributes an introduction.

LIBERTY AND THE NEWS. By Walter Lippman. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920. Pp. 104.

Of the three essays in this book, two appeared in the *Atlantic Monthly*. Recognizing the unsatisfactory service of the press toward an enlightened

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public opinion the author believes that the most serious question is not the dispute between liberty and "License," but the difficulty of making opinion "increasingly responsible to the facts." There can be no liberty for a community which lacks the information by which to detect lies." "When freedom of opinion is revealed as freedom of error, illusion, and misrepresentation, it is virtually impossible to stir up much interest in its behalf."

THE BRASS CHECK: A STUDY OF AMERICAN JOURNALISM. By Upton Sinclair. Pasadena: Published by the Author. Pp. 445. Price, $1.00.

This book recounts the author's experiences with the Associated Press and with various newspapers. It undoubtedly projects the personality of the author very prominently into the foreground and if the newspapers wish to challenge the statements, a libel suit would be an interesting method of testing these. But readers who have watched the reports which have appeared,—or have failed to appear,—of certain labor situations, and other matter, are quite likely to think that the statements are well founded. For example, when the report of a committee of lawyers on the alleged illegal practises of the United States Department of Justice appeared last spring, the writer was unable to discover any reference to it in a Chicago paper until more than a week afterwards, when a dispatch from Washington reported a criticism of it by the attorney-general.

THE FAITH OF A QUAKER. By John W. Graham. Cambridge: At the University Press, 1920. Pp. xvi, 444. Price, 21s. net.

The author, who is principal of Dalton Hall, University of Manchester, believes that, although he has written with definite reference to the Society of Friends, his pages have more than a denominational interest, as "not chiefly an introduction to the position of a small sect, but a statement of mystical religion in general." Mystics do not ordinarily organize. The Society of Friends is the only "considerable adventure in organized mysticism which has made for itself a permanent place in Christian history during modern times." Of special interest to readers of the JOURNAL, are the chapters dealing with the attitude of the Friends toward social service, and war. To the latter, nearly a hundred pages are given. The book is written in a spirit of fair-mindedness and not of partisanship.

PSYCHO-ANALYSIS: A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE FREUDIAN THEORY. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920. Pp. 199.

Now that psycho-analysis is so common a word, it is desirable to have a brief and simple account of Freud's theories. In so condensed a statement, there is of course room for little evidence or criticism. But the outstanding aspects of the theory are well presented.

RELIGION AND THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY. By Walter Samuel Swisher, Boston: Marshall Jones Company, 1920. Pp. xv, 261.

This is an application of psycho-analysis to religion. As with much of the work in this field, the importance attributed to sex and sex repression often imposes a strain upon the credulity of the reader. But on the other hand, close connection between sex and much of primitive religion and also certain phases of emotional religious experience is undeniable. The purpose of the book is to commend a training in the field of psycho-analysis for the educator and especially for the teacher of religion.

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SANITY IN SEX. By William J. Fielding. New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1920. Pp. xvii, 333.

This book is largely an account of the modern movement toward a more rational dealing with sex problems, rather than a discussion of the problems themselves. Much attention is properly given to the government's campaign. Other chapters deal with the efforts in industrial plants, and through the public schools, to provide instruction. Brief treatment is given to sex enlightenment as related to conjugal happiness and divorce. Birth-control is favored. A useful bibliography is appended.

J. H. T.

THE SOCIAL WORKER. By C. R. Attlee. London: G. Bell and Sons, 1920. Pp. 286. Price, $2.50.

This admirable little book deals with the field and organization of social work, with the qualifications and training of the social worker, and with the various agencies which are now prominent in the field. It is written in a philosophical spirit and with close-hand knowledge of the subject. Particularly interesting is its account of the settlement movement and its estimate of the future of that movement. The chapter on qualifications and training is packed with good sense. Although its descriptions of the various agencies is based on British material, the book as a whole is bound to be useful for the American social worker and student of social problems.

J. H. T.

WHAT IS THE KINGDOM OF HEAVEN? By A. Clutton-Brock. London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1919. Pp. viii, 152. Price, 5s. net.

Mr. Clutton-Brock's book has a fresh, arresting quality; it detains the reader, though its thesis is that of many other recent books and pamphlets, the bankruptcy of official Christianity. He would make the future of any London pulpit by his compelling manner alone. He sees that orthodoxy—and the orthodox—are unsatisfactory, indeed "a set of players of a little private game of their own, and getting a private satisfaction from it," and he seeks to lay his finger on the disabling defects of orthodoxy. This defect is, to him, an ignoring of Christ's doctrine of the Kingdom of Heaven, which he holds should be the centre of Christian thought and teaching.

With his accustomed dexterity, Mr. Clutton-Brock puts the question: "Is the universe a fraud?" The question is a real one, and we cannot be contented with any answer which has been given in the past. The answers implied in such phrases as "the survival of the fittest" do not satisfy. We cannot care a farthing for an universe in which the human race exists only so that it may survive; nor can we care a farthing for the survival of the human race in such an universe (p. 16). But "Salvation is seeing that the Universe is good and becoming part of that goodness." So Mr. Clutton-Brock approaches his idea of the Kingdom of Heaven as the centre of Christian teaching;—no mere phrase into which Christ fell when he wished to edify. He points out that Christ meant "something we can see, if we will, a reality more real than what is perceived with the senses"; in fact, the nature of reality as he saw it. Christ's Kingdom of Heaven is an idea *seen* more clearly than we can see a cow in a field. Without this vision, a man "sees only a chaos, a nonsense world, and can have no principles at all." The universe had to Christ—Mr. Clutton-Brock's Christ—the value and beauty which we feel in a supreme work of art, and our attitude should be to it, as to a work of art. What He says,

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in the Sermon on the Mount, is—"Do not demand this or that; forego your own expectation and then you will see what life, what God has given you." The Beatitudes are benedictions upon those who have ceased to demand (p. 43), the ethics of the Beatitudes represent the natural attitude of those who have seen the Kingdom.

This earnest book is worthy of attention as representing the high-minded and persuasive modernism that is working in the Church. Such modernists as Mr. Clutton-Brock are indifferent to old time controversies within the bounds of orthodoxy; the spirit, not the letter, is their concern. They are the new leaven, that may perhaps leaven the lump.

STUDIES IN CHRISTIANITY. By A. Clutton-Brock. London: Constable & Co., Ltd., Pp. 168. Price 4s. 6d. net.

Mr. Clutton-Brock begins his chapter on the Grace of God by the following statement: "In matters of religion now we are bewildered by the difference between the names of things and the things themselves." His book is an attempt to adjust this difference by an exposition of simple Christian Faith in its modern aspect. He uses and explains the phrase "absolute values," and it is one of his fundamental beliefs that all men (if they only knew it) have the same "absolute values," and would (if they only stopped to think) act upon them. He does not wish to take account of the diversities of thought, of knowledge, and of experience, easily dismisses Nietzsche, for instance, as archaistic and insincere. In his desire to write a constructive and uncontroversial book, he often substitutes "we think, we feel, we know," for "I think, I feel, I know . . ." Something is gained and something is lost by these important psychological assumptions. They create as well as destroy doubt. Sometimes a puzzled reader will ask himself: "Can it be that Mr. Clutton-Brock is paying humanity a compliment at the expense of truth?"

The personality behind the words is kindly and sympathetic, but it is difficult to penetrate the veil of repetition, contradiction and paradox, which hides it. It is a pity that so liberal and humane a writer should not take the trouble to express himself clearly or to reduce his thoughts to order.

There are indeed passages of admirable simplicity and clearness; the best, perhaps, are those which bear on the immediate ethical problems of the war. They show that the author has something to impart which a generation, disillusioned by war and burdened by hatred, cannot afford to neglect.

A. E. F.

Dorchester, England.

THE MARQUIS DE SADE: A STUDY IN ALGOLAGNIA. By Montague Summers, M.A., F.R.S.L., London. The British Society for the Study of Sex Psychology (No. 6), 1920. Pp. 23. Price, 1s. net.

Mr. Summers has carefully reviewed the vitally interesting figure of de Sade, a writer, critic, and student of sexual psychology of no mean order. His name, as is well known, has been given to an impulse which is "one of the most difficult problems, and yet one of the most fundamental, in the whole range of sexual psychology,—the relationship of love to pain."

According to de Sade, it is only through the sexual that the world can be grasped and understood, a statement of profound meaning; and it is unfortunate that his abnormal genius found imperfect expression chiefly in the langor and enforced monotony of his long imprisonment from 1777

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to 1790 in Vincennes and the Bastille. "Shut out from real life," as Dr. Ellis has well said, "he solaced his imagination with perverted visions"—to a very large extent, however, founded on knowledge, the real facts of perverted life of his time.

The unique position of de Sade has been, it is true, recognized by Dr. Havelock Ellis, who has stated that he "considerably furthered the progress of knowledge in the field of sex by his serious and precise attitude towards sexual aberrations," and after such a pronouncement, the study of de Sade requires no apologetic justification. Mr. Summers has, however, pursued the story of de Sade in further detail than has hitherto been possible, and dispersed some of the legends that have clung to this strange and extravagant figure.

E. F.

WOMAN'S WILD OATS: ESSAYS ON THE REFIXING OF MORAL STANDARDS. By Mrs. C. G. Hartley. London: T. Werner Laurie, Ltd., 1920. Pp. 256. Price, 6s. net.

Many of the conclusions of Mrs. Hartley's book are acceptable and even accepted; but they are put forward with a free use of statements such as "I wish passionately that I had greater powers to make you see what to me is so plain" (p. 158). This does not further her argument and, indeed, induces irritation. Mrs. Hartley's point of view is that "we are all to pieces morally, and should refix moral standards in sexual conduct formulating a code of good manners to meet the present needs. Divorce should be made cheap and simple, and 'honorable partnerships' outside marriage, not necessarily permanent, should be openly recognized." (This proposal, as Mrs. Hartley writes, "is not made lightly.") The most satisfactory chapter is that describing the position of the illegitimate child, and pointing out, though by no means for the first time, the backward position of England among civilized nations in this respect.

The book has taken, Mrs. Hartley tells us, eight months to write, but without her affirmation we should not have assumed so long a period of gestation. It is marked by the tension of the long war and the superficial disillusions of peace, and her summary of present tendencies seems too incoherent and egotistic to have much value.

N. C.

PAGAN AND CHRISTIAN CREEDS. By Edward Carpenter. London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1920. Pp. 318. Price, 10s. 6d. net.

Mr. Carpenter, in re-stating the close connection and similarity of the numerous creeds of paganism and the supposed unique case of Christianity, is drawn to treat the various religious rites and ceremonies as not isolated phenomena but proceeding from and the necessary accompaniment of progressive stages in the human consciousness. He marks three great stages in this growth: (1) that of simple, animal consciousness; (2) that of *self*-consciousness, and (3) that of a third and somewhat vague stage "whose indications and precursive signs we here and there perceive in the rites and prophecies and mysteries of early religions, and in the poetry and art and literature generally of the later civilizations" (p. 16). The speculations as to this *third* or cosmic stage of consciousness are in the realms of mysticism. "We have seen that there has been an age of non-differentiation in the past . . . why should there not arise a similar sense of non-differentiation in the future, similar but more extended, more intelligent?

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Certainly, this will arise, in its own appointed time." That is the method of the mystic and the preacher.

As to the third stage of consciousness, Mr. Carpenter tells us that "there is nothing left but a return to consciousness which shall have unity as its foundation principle and which shall proceed from the direct sense and perception of such as ruling throughout creation. The simple mind of early man and animals was of that character." We wish we could believe in any such development. The supposition that animals are more in union with these surroundings than human beings seems devoid of foundation.

M. J.

SCIENCE AND MORALS, AND OTHER ESSAYS. By Sir Bertram Windle, F.R.S. London: Burns & Oates, Ltd., 1919. Pp. x. 181. Price, 7s. net.

Sir Bertram Windle is a son of the church as well as a man of science; and this book of essays (apart from the later chapters which review recent scientific works) is a defence and Christian apologia. In a paper, "Theophobia," he concludes on the note: "It is for those who have themselves experienced the consolations of the catholic religion to do their best, each in his own way, to make known to others outside our body what things may be found within." It is in his scientific equipment that Sir Bertram is strongest and he has some very cogent criticisms upon the occasionally hasty pronouncements uttered by presidents in their addresses to the British Association; and of some of the more *outré* eugenic schemes.

P. J.

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THE INTERNATIONAL
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JANUARY, 1921

SOME PROBLEMS OF FAIR COMPETITION.

FRANK CHAPMAN SHARP.

I.

TO say "fair competition," is, according to some people, nothing more nor less than to say "fair brigandage." To discuss the ethical problems which competition raises is in their estimation on a par with the attempt (which today is made only for children) to attach a halo to the head of Robin Hood. Business competition, they say, is in its essential nature nothing but war. It may be correctly represented by two kings marshalling their forces to seize each other's territory; or, if you prefer, by two dogs fighting for a bone. Always and everywhere it is the attempt to gain through the loss of another. To talk about applying the principles of morality to this brutal struggle is to talk nonsense. For morality involves precisely a regard for the interests of other human beings, and a consequent willingness to be satisfied with less than one has power to seize. Competition says: "Thou shalt starve ere I want"; whereas morality says: "All men are brothers, and should treat each other as such."

This description of business competition may seem plausible at a casual glance. But a square look will show that it distorts fundamental facts. War involves two parties, one of whom can gain, if he succeeds in gaining at all, only at the expense of the other. But business competition cannot be represented by less than three parties, two competitors and a prospective purchaser. Business competition is the concurrent offering to this third party

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of services or other goods on the part of the competitors, as a result of which the former accepts the offer most favorable to himself and is in so far better served. Business competition is thus competition for the opportunity to serve. This is equally true whatever may be the motives involved. In fair competition that person gains the opportunity to serve who really makes the better offer. In return he receives the reward. The loss of the second competitor is thus only indirectly due to the action of his rival. It is due primarily to the act of the purchaser in choosing what he regards as the better alternative in preference to the poorer. No wrong is thereby done the rejected competitor unless it is the duty of the purchaser to choose the less advantage rather than the greater. It is impossible to see how this can be the case under any but exceptional circumstances. But if such a bizarre theory of duty is to be maintained, then we must insist that it is the customer, not the successful competitor who is primarily at fault.

Accordingly if there is anything essentially immoral about competition it must lie not in the relation between competitor and competitor but in the relation between the purchaser and the competitors. This relation, it is obvious, may take a number of forms. Instead of waiting for the competitors to come to him the would-be purchaser may go out actively in search of them (shopping). He may inform one man of the offer of another, in order to obtain better terms than the former would have offered him spontaneously. He may refuse to buy at the terms offered, preferring either to wait for future opportunities, or if the article be not a necessity for him, not to purchase at all. This is what is called "the higgling of the market." It must be carefully noted that apart from the use of intimidation and deceit, all bargaining consists essentially in some one of the above modes of activity.

Is there, then, anything essentially immoral in actions of this sort? It is impossible to see how they differ in kind from accepting the best offer thrown without any effort

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on one's own part into one's lap. It is true that when the transaction is consummated the customer may have paid less than he would have been willing to give if he had been compelled to choose between a higher price and not purchasing at all. It is equally true that the successful competitor might have been willing to sell at a lower price than that at which he actually sold, if he had been compelled to choose between selling at a lower price and not selling at all. But whether this unwillingness on the part of one or the other factor in the agreement was morally unjustified or not depends entirely upon what constitutes a "fair price" in the premises. The bargainer may have been trying to "overcharge"; or the would-be purchaser to pay less than the goods or services were "worth." In either case the party threatened with injustice is obviously entitled to get better terms if he can. In cases of overcharging and underpaying alike, however, the wrong is not inherent in the competitive system as such, but is due to that spirit of selfishness which wherever it exists will in any conceivable economic system get the most for itself at the least cost that circumstances permit.[1]

In so far as an economic system fails to secure the distribution of goods at a fair price it is of course imperfect. It is equally imperfect if it fails to raise the production of goods to the maximum desirable. Production is just as much a moral issue as is distribution. As far as the individual is concerned his failure to do his part to increase the world's store of goods is just as truly an exhibition of selfishness as is his refusal to part with goods once created except at an extortionate price. An economic system, accordingly, must solve two problems, that of production and that of distribution; and if by any chance the full attainment of one end should prove to be incompatible with the full attainment of the other it must make the most satisfactory compromise that conditions at the time per-

[1] It may be said that the socialistic system makes it possible to determine what is a fair price, while a competitive system does not. I have dealt with this point, by inference at least, in an article in this JOURNAL, Volume XXX, page 372, entitled, The Problem of a Fair Wage.

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mit. If then it could be shown that the system of pure competition (which, as Mill and others have pointed out, does not exist to-day and probably never has existed, at least on a large scale) solves more satisfactorily, in the long run, than any other attainable system, the double problem of production and distribution, the fundamental objection to competition as inherently immoral would fall to the ground.

Whether on the whole competition does work better than any other system which it would be possible to introduce and keep going is a question I do not mean to consider in this paper. I wish rather to discuss some important corollaries that flow from giving it an affirmative answer.

What, we shall inquire, will be the attitude of a man who accepts the affirmative answer and who also is permeated through and through with a love of his fellow men? Obviously he will wish the competitive system to continue. If such a man enters business he will give his customers the best service of which he is capable, and he will take the rewards that come to him as a result of his success in offering better services than his competitors—and he will take these rewards with a good conscience, just as he will approve of anyone else accepting such rewards under the same circumstances. In every day business life the economic motive is indeed very frequently the mere selfish desire to get money. But a man who is guided by higher aims can without difficulty find a place for himself in the competitive system also, provided always that he believes that this system is on the whole the most satisfactory one at present available for supplying the economic wants of man.

The socialistic writers beg the whole question when they urge the antithesis, as they are constantly doing, between "a system of production which will be carried on for use and the present one which is carried on for profit."[1] Where the producer is selfish and lazy he will, under any régime, competitive or socialistic, do the poorest kind and the

[1] See H. W. Laidler, *Socialism in Thought and Action*, p. 123 and *passim*.

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smallest amount of work he can possibly "get away with." Where he is selfish and ambitious he will shape all his work so as to make the best possible show, and appearance will coalesce with reality only by accident. In either case, he will, whether alone or in co-operation with others, demand just as large a return for his services as he thinks he can possibly get, and will not hesitate to squeeze the orange for the last drop of juice. The socialists seem to suppose that under their régime "practically all incomes would have the form of salaries for services rendered the community by the individual; and the different amount of those salaries would be determined by the collective judgment of the community, expressing itself through the organs of legislature and administration." But to suppose that any given economic group, as the coal miners, will peacefully accept whatever wages "the collective judgment of the community" decides to assign them, when by "direct action" or any other kind of action they can obtain more, is to suppose the magical disappearance in socialistic society of that spirit of selfishness which is precisely the thing that gives its evil character to our own.

Essentially the same criticism can be urged against the socialistic talk about "replacing competition with co-operation." Co-operation may be a name for a purely external relationship, for the mere fact that, from whatever motive, one man helps another in the attainment of his ends. This form of co-operation obtains to-day between the customer and the competitors. All the latter are more than ready to serve him, and the one selected actually does so. But if co-operation means an inner spirit it may be just as wanting in a socialistic society as it often is to-day under competition. The co-operator, in other words, may have his eyes fixed singly upon what there is in it for him. In either system, then, the selfish and the unselfish man will act each after his kind. There is thus as much room in the competitive system for the good man and honorable service as there is in the socialistic for the bad man and eye service. And in both systems alike the bad man will look for the grafter's or the bully's pay.

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There may be such a thing, then, as fair competition. As competition has two aspects, so a completely fair system would involve right relations, first between competitor and competitor, and second between buyer and seller. The two relationships are commonly inseparable. As far as a distinction is possible, however, this paper confines itself to the first. As between competitors competition is fair when each would-be seller seeks success solely by offering better service (including terms) than does his competitor. Competition is unfair when success is sought in any other way.

II.

This conception of the nature of competition and the distinction between fair and unfair competition supplies a complete justification of the code of morality traditionally acknowledged to be binding as between business men. It manifestly excludes the use of violence, intimidation in the sense of a threat to inflict a wrongful injury upon another, deceit, the making of certain contracts, and the breaking of most others. A study of the traditional code of fair competition would raise many interesting, important, and perplexing questions. But I do not mean in this paper to undertake this task, but rather to employ our definition for an appraisal of certain methods of competition which till within perhaps the last two or three decades passed largely without condemnation on the part of the general public, but which nevertheless are responsible to a very considerable degree for the total rejection of competition as a system on the part of certain high-minded but all too hasty critics. The most important of these practices may be included under the name of predatory competition. By this is meant the direct attempt to cripple or destroy the business of a competitor by the device of selling one's goods below cost.

Predatory competition includes what is called local price cutting. This is a practice open only to corporations doing a business over a large territory. It consists in selling below cost in one locality where competition is keen, and

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at a correspondingly higher price where competition is either non-existent or comparatively innocuous. But local price cutting, we must be careful to note, is only one form of predatory competition, although the most common one. Whatever and wherever an organization may sell, and whatever may be the means by which it plans to recoup its losses, the essence of the act is always the same. It is the selling of one's goods (whether a single line or all lines) at such a price as would if continued lead to the seller's own bankruptcy, with a view to ruining a rival or at least driving him out of some particular field.

The wrongfulness of such action follows directly from our definition of fair competition. Having said this it might seem as if all we need do were to rest our case upon the correctness and adequacy of our definition. But the practice in question has vigorous defenders; and what is more important, is at present widely and severely condemned by public opinion and forbidden by law only under certain conditions, and for reasons extraneous to the act itself. So that in the interests of clear thinking in morals and consistent action in law both the arguments by which it is defended and those by which it is commonly condemned need to be examined with some care.

The common view seems to be that predatory competition is not wrong *per se*, but only when it is practiced by the "trusts" or other very large corporations in an attempt to monopolize the trade of a certain territory or of the nation as a whole. Certainly it is placed under the ban of the law only when this condition applies. The position that it is wrong as between large concerns while quite innocent between smaller ones has been vigorously attacked by Mr. G. H. Montague.[1] He takes the position that it is always and everywhere justifiable. The essential feature of his defense is the assertion that we cannot have one code for large businesses and another for small ones. He further alleges that selling below cost lowers the price to the consumer and is for this reason "the most innocent

[1] The *Atlantic Monthly*, Volume 95, p. 414 (1905).

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mode of competition conceivable." Finally there runs through his paper as through most of the literature in advocacy of this practice the intimation, which with some writers appears as bald assertion, that this kind of a struggle contributes in the long run to economic progress because it leads to "the survival of the fittest." Thus, it is supposed, do things present and things to come all work together for good.

The plea of lower prices need not detain us for more than an instant. When a "trust" lowers prices below the cost of doing business in one locality it takes pains to recoup itself amply in some other district. If it is not able to do so in any other place it will do it in the same locality at a later time when its battle has been won and its competitors killed off. In fact it ordinarily does both.

The "survival of the fittest" is a catch phrase that has been used now for more than a generation in the discussion of social problems by a lot of people who are apparently unaware that the term is primarily a technical term in biology, bearing a highly specialized meaning which is quite different from the sense in which it is commonly used in the discussion of current social problems. In the economic world the fittest are those best fitted to do the world's work; they are the fittest to serve. The survivors of predatory competition are likely to be those possessing the longest purse. But the possessors of the longest purse are not necessarily the fittest. Fitness for the industrial world includes intellectual ability, willingness and power to work, and character, in addition to financial resources. But financial resources often stand for nothing but luck, for luck plays at least as large a part in business success as the cards do in determining success in an evening's game of whist. Sometimes the luck consists only in the fact that one happens to have been the first on the ground, as in the exploitation of much of the natural wealth of this country. Once more, financial resources may mean nothing more than a rich father, or father-in-law. Inherited wealth is playing an increasingly large rôle in the business

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world as we approach nearer to European business conditions. Finally, they may mean merely length of time that one has been in business. The defeated competitor may be a young man at present without any large amount of capital, but possessing ability and energy which would have insured him ultimately an adequate supply if he had not been crushed before he got a good start, and which would have made of him an efficient factor in productive industry. The possession of a long purse, therefore, is by no means the necessary concomitant of the personal qualities which fit men for a useful business life.

Where there is a real disparity in economic fitness between competitors, this fact will in the course of time demonstrate itself through the ordinary processes of fair competition. In the long run, for the most part, customers will go, if they are permitted to do so, where it is to their interest to go. Predatory competition therefore is not needed to separate the economic chaff from the wheat; the normal processes of industrial life will attend to that.

Mr. Montague argues that mere size cannot make a difference in a matter of right and wrong; that accordingly if predatory competition is fair (as is commonly admitted) between small units, it must be equally allowable in the hands of larger units. But this assertion (which is not above suspicion as a piece of logic) has a double edge. For we might accept it wholeheartedly and draw from it the conclusion that predatory competition is not justifiable as a weapon in the hands of any business organization, large or small. As against Mr. Montague and the man on the street alike, we must insist that as a matter of fact this is the only position which is compatible at once with those traditional standards of morality which all parties to the controversy profess to accept, and with an analysis of competition which succeeds in differentiating it from brigandage. The fundamental principle of traditional morality, both as incorporated in law and in any consistently worked out code of private morals is: So use your own as not to injure another's. The fundamental principle of fair com-

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petition, as revealed by a direct analysis of the competitive system itself, is that competition is fair in so far and only in so far as success is determined by superiority of service. Both roads lead to precisely the same terminus.

We must, then, I believe, take issue not merely with those who like Mr. Montague claim that predatory competition is right for big business because it is right for small, but also with those who assert that although wrong for big business it is right for small. In opposition to this view I should claim that it follows from the very nature of fair competition that the direct attempt to ruin a competitor is, as such wrong, and its wrongfulness is therefore independent of the amount of the financial resources of either party. Predatory competition is indeed more dangerous in the hands of a big corporation than it is in the hands of a small retailer because (among other reasons) it is more likely to succeed in attaining its ends. But, to paraphrase a famous line, not success but low aim is crime. The wanton destruction of an efficient economic factor is always and everywhere a loss to society, for never has there been an over-supply of this kind of commodity. And as far as the victim himself is concerned, ruin always feels like ruin, whether a man's loss be little or much. [1]

It should go without saying that selling below cost in order to market goods which cannot be got rid of under more favorable conditions, or in order to keep a factory running in an "off period," cannot be classed as predatory competition. The same may be said for selling below cost or giving away goods for advertising purposes, where this is the real motive and where it therefore alone determines the amount of money expended, the conditions under which it is done, etc. Under certain circumstances other people may find it difficult to say whether a given business house is, in so doing, laying itself open to the

[1] It follows from the preceding that in essence this form of competition was as wrong a century ago as it is to-day, even though the mischief done may not have been sufficiently great to attract general attention. The opposite position is taken in a valuable article in this JOURNAL, The Morals of Monopoly and Competition, by Professor H. B. Reed, Volume XXVI, p. 258 (1916).

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charge of predatory competition or not, but those in control know. And if there are some transition cases here which are difficult even for those immediately concerned to judge, this is no more than what happens in every department of conduct.

We may if we choose subsume our conclusion under the ancient provision of the Eighth Commandment, and thus place it under the ægis of our traditional morality. Viewed in one light a business may properly be regarded as a piece of property. If successful it certainly has a money value which may be sold as "good will." Therefore it may not be destroyed directly in the pursuit of merely selfish ends any more than may a farmer's orchard. If the fruit trees fail to bear fruit, the owner can blame no one but himself. The same is true if a business withers away because an insufficient number of persons care to avail themselves of the services it offers. But the active direct destruction of the one is on precisely the same moral plane as the direct destruction of the other.

III.

A thoroughgoing and consistent application of the foregoing principles to economic life will produce a profound change in the ordinary conceptions of business morality. The common view is that a man has a right to adopt any selling (or buying) policy he chooses. He may sell at any price he wishes, to any one he wishes, on any terms he wishes, and he may withhold in such measure and at such times and under such conditions as he wishes. "May not a man" it is asked "do what he wills with his own?" The answer is a counter-question. May a man run his own automobile down a city street at forty miles an hour? Or from the window of his own house, shoot with his own revolver at random in the direction of his neighbor's yard? Or build a wooden house on his own land within the fire limits established by the proper authorities? The reason for these and like restrictions is always the same: A man may not for the sake merely of his own pleasure or

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profit injure his neighbor, or even subject him or his to unnecessary risk. Why should not the principle which beyond controversy holds for the use of one's property apply equally to the conduct of one's business?

A farther study of this principle, so as to include the rest of its leading applications to the problems of sale and purchase, will clarify its meaning and indicate its significance for the conduct of business life. We may begin with the practice of inserting what are called "tying clauses" into contracts of sale; a practice which is generally known as the formation of factor's agreements. There are two leading varieties. The first consists in the refusal to sell except on condition that the purchaser agrees to supply his needs, either in some one line or in all the lines which the organization markets, exclusively from the one source. The second consists in charging the customer a higher price than his competitors are charged unless he engages to make all his purchases, whether in one line or in all lines (as the case may be), from the one organization.[1]

The power to force such agreements depends upon the existence of a monopoly or quasi-monopoly in some one line or group of lines. Thus the General Electric Company purchased from the foreign patentees the exclusive right to the manufacture and sale in the United States of tungsten and tantalum electric lamps. Because of the demand for these lamps the retailer was as good as compelled to carry them. If he did not do so, his customers, after the fashion of customers, would have turned their backs upon his store in disgust. Hence the company was able to force its carbon filament lamps upon the retailer, regardless of whether they were the most satisfactory available in quality and price or not. This monopoly was thus based upon patent rights. Sometimes the power to force goods down

[1] These agreements take a large number of special forms, which for the sake of keeping the fundamental principle in the center of attention, I have ignored in the preceding statement. For the details see W. H. S. Stevens, *Unfair Competition*, Chapters IV, V, VII; also the Report of the Commissioner of Corporations, March 15, 1915: *Trust Laws and Unfair Competition*, pp. 319–322.

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the throat of a wholesaler or retailer depends upon the ability to produce some line or lines so much of a favorite among consumers as to be the object of an insistent and extensive demand. The favor of the consumer may be due to nothing but widespread advertising, or it may have its source in some particular quality which the other manufacturers are unable to duplicate. The ability of the American Tobacco Company to force a "full line" upon unwilling retailers has had its source in these facts.

The evils of this practice are numerous and manifest. It destroys the chances of producers who, apart from the control of some specialty, may be as efficient as, or more efficient than those who thus seize their business; it prevents retailers who wish to serve as agents for different parties from doing so except under conditions which are practically prohibitive, and is thus a form of coercion; most serious of all, it limits the field of choice for the ultimate consumer and thus directly destroys the open market. In fair competition goods are sold on their merits. In this practice the goods of competitors are beaten and driven from the market not because of their inferiority but because of some specialty by means of which the possessor screens the inferiority of his other products or the unreasonableness of his prices.

The nature of the arguments urged in defense of this system may be seen from the following quotation.[1] "Factor's agreements are another phase of the modern wholesaler's endeavor to take into his own hands control of the whole process of distribution in order to protect himself against inefficient, unscrupulous, or unenthusiastic retailers. Such a contract assures the seller of wholehearted 'pushing' of his goods by the retailer, while at the same time it effectually limits the field in which the wholesaler must meet the competition of his rivals." In the above trinity "unscrupulous" is given a place evidently for the sake of its effect in raising the tone of the argument to a high level. Why a man who sells, let us say, a kodak

[1] 30 Harvard Law Review 72.

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camera made by the Eastman Company, and the photographic paper made by a rival should be any more unscrupulous in his dealings with the Eastman Company than a man who sells what he regards as an inferior paper solely because he must do so or get out of business, is a mystery which no special pleader has yet succeeded in explaining. Why such a retailer should be less efficient or less enthusiastic about selling a kodak camera which he has bought because he believes it to be the best thing of its kind in the market, is also past comprehension. What really counts in this defense is the last sentence: "It effectually limits the field" etc. This precisely is its condemnation.

If it be asked what is the difference between forcing a retailer to sign a factor's agreement and setting up an exclusive agency for the sale of one's own goods, the answer is that there are a number of obvious differences, the most of which were, in effect, enumerated just above. Confining our discussion to the unfairness of which the retailer or other distributor is a victim the chief difference between the two modes of doing business is that, as has been already pointed out, the factor's agreement is the product of force. The retailer is thereby compelled to carry certain goods which he does not wish to carry and to refrain from carrying others which he wishes to be in a position to sell. If the retailer carried the goods of a single producer on his own volition there would of course be no point in compelling him to sign an agreement to that effect. In fact many a dealer has fought against this constraint for months and yielded in the end only because he has found himself placed before the alternatives of surrendering his freedom of choice or going into bankruptcy.

There are other differences between the establishment of an agency and the demand for a factor's agreement. An exclusive agency is plainly marked as such; he who enters the shop knows beforehand what he is doing. The retailer doing business under a factor's agreement is supposed by the public to be not an exclusive agent but one who picks from the open market what he regards as the best it has to

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offer. Finally in the agency, properly so called, the obligations are mutual as between agent and principal. The principal supplies the capital and carries the agency in bad times as well as good; in the factor's agreement the man who is forced to serve as agent carries all the risks himself. If he fails the company loses nothing, but throws him away like used tea leaves and finds someone else to put in his place.

The second form of factor's agreements may be defined in two different ways. It may be said to consist in offering the retailer a special rebate on all goods purchased provided he agrees not to purchase from a rival. Or it may be described as charging the retailer a higher price than his competitors are charged unless he signs an exclusive contract. Obviously these are but two ways of saying the same thing. The Madison Gas and Electric Company has a series of charges for its products and allows its customers a rebate if they pay their bills before a certain date. Whether by this arrangement the consumer is getting a rebate, or whether he is simply being penalized for not paying his bills on time is a matter really not worth discussing. The business man who is forced to choose between buying superior goods elsewhere and accepting a "rebate" knows that if he is to remain in business his prices must be approximately those of his competitors. The original price apart from the rebate may easily be placed at such a point, and often has been (and probably is being to-day) placed at such a point that while he is quite at liberty to buy or not as he chooses he cannot possibly sell if he does any of his buying elsewhere. And where the discrimination against him is not so excessive it may still be enough to make the difference between floating and sinking.

At first glance, to be sure, this form of factor's agreement seems to be merely one application of the principle on which all wholesale trade is based. But there is an important difference. Wholesale rates are based upon the amount you buy from a given firm; the rebates under discussion are based upon what you buy from other people. In other

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words they are not based upon the actual amounts purchased from the firm granting the rebate, but upon whether you have bought any amount whatever from its competitors. The granting of wholesale rates is legitimate because, for reasons too well known to require mention, conducive to healthy business conditions; the granting of the latter is illegitimate because the aim is precisely the same as in the demand for exclusive agreements, *viz.*, to strangle competition and destroy the open market.

The factor's agreement, we see, aims to cripple or destroy a competitor by illegitimately inducing or forcing people not to buy from him. The next method of unfair competition which we shall consider is the attempt to reach the same end by inducing other parties, whether by offering rewards or threatening penalties, not to sell to him.

This practice may take many forms. Some years ago, in a certain Minnesota city, the owner of a department store who was also a banker, succeeded in preventing the proprietor of a rival store from getting a loan not merely from the bank of which he was the president of the board of directors, but also from every other bank of the city. The credit of the rival was excellent, and his security in itself perfectly satisfactory. The other banks simply did not dare offend a man with great prestige by serving a man with little or none.[1]

A man or a company or an association of individuals may thus attempt to ruin a competitor by barring him from the sources of credit. The same end may be sought by hiring manufacturers not to supply him with machinery or goods of whatever sort that are essential to the prosecution of his business;[2] or by threatening to boycott those who sell to him.[3] After what has been said the wrongfulness of these practices needs no discussion.

[1] A somewhat similar case will be found in *Trust Laws and Unfair Competition*, p. 328.

[2] Ibid. pp. 328, 329; Stevens, *op. cit.*, Chapter VIII.

[3] A case famous in the history of law is that of the Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society *v.* The Glasgow Fleshers' Trade Defense Association. It may be found in 5 Scottish Law Times 263, or 35 Scottish Law Reporter 645.

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In the preceding cases the wrongful actions consisted in inducing third parties not to sell or to buy from one's competitor. We turn now to the refusal to supply a competitor with what is needful for the conduct of his business. The problem is something of a paradox. It will ordinarily be of no practical significance except as he from whom the sale is demanded is the possessor of a monopoly. On the other hand in this event the problem will in most instances lose its importance for practice, in that the courts will compel the monopolist to serve, and since both parties are perfectly aware of this fact the question will seldom arise. Suppose, for example, that the owner of a store happens to be the owner of the town's electric lighting plant. Upon his first threat to cut off the supply of electrical current from the store of a rival the latter could apply to a court and could secure an order for service on the ground that the supplying of electricity is a "business affected with a public interest." While these considerations rob the problem of most of its practical importance, they render it one of the greatest interest for the theory of business morality. For they show that a certain very significant conception of ethics has so far become common property that the courts, which are apt to lag behind at least the more advanced portions of public opinion, regard it as beyond the range of controversy. This conception is that when a person sets out to supply a community with necessities and the community is really dependent upon him he is morally bound to serve all alike who have the money to make the proper return, including his rivals in business. The state has no right to compel a man to do that which it was not his duty to do without compulsion. If the compulsion which it exercises is justified in this instance, this means that the duty was there in the first place.

That this fundamental conception of the common law is a correct one is an immediate corollary from our definition of fair competition. You may not injure another in the pursuit of your own selfish ends—there is no provision here for exceptions in the matter of rivals. If it be replied

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that you do not injure when you merely withhold service, this is mere quibbling, at least as far as the problem immediately before us is concerned. The Austrian peasants, according to the reports in the newspapers, are withholding their grain and vegetables from Vienna, not because the Viennese cannot pay, but because the Viennese are socialists and free thinkers, and the peasants are seizing this opportunity to promote the destruction of what they regard as the unfit. They are, to be sure, merely refusing a service. But since modern man can live only by the interchange of services, they are as truly (as far as their own attitude is concerned) killing their fellow countrymen in the once great city on the Danube as if they had brought in a number of batteries of machine guns and mowed them down with cold lead.

The other side of the refusal to sell is the refusal to buy. In the case of a competitor this ordinarily takes the form of joining with fellow-members of a trade organization to boycott one who supplies them with goods and at the same time sells to their customers. A boycott of this sort is usually directed against a manufacturer, who, passing over the head of the wholesaler, sells directly to the retailers or even to consumers, or a wholesaler who deals with consumers. The boycott is a weapon by which it is sought to kill this form of competition. To understand the problem it must be premised that the boycotting organizations normally regard themselves as simply protecting their own rights, invaded by the unfair competition of the manufacturer or the wholesaler. The annual report of the board of directors of the New Jersey Lumbermen's Protective Association, submitted Feb. 26, 1907, contained the following passage: "It is wrong in principle for the wholesaler or the manufacturer, as we have always contended, to become active competitors of their own customers, the retailers."[1] This statement raises a counter problem: Can a claim of this kind be accepted?

The answer seems to me to be clear. One of the most

[1] *Trust Laws and Unfair Competition*, p. 330.

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serious features of the competitive system as it exists to-day is its wastefulness. The farmer and the manufacturer get but a small share of the cost which the consumer pays. This is, in part at least, due to the participation of too many intermediaries in the process of distribution. In some fields the middleman undoubtedly has a place. Just where this is can usually be determined best by experience. From the point of view of this paper, therefore, the experiment should be allowed to continue without hindrance. If the middleman is really needed he cannot be displaced. If he is not needed he ought to be. In the latter case those who through a boycott seek to prevent this consummation are doing the same kind of a wrong as that of the working men who—with precisely the same provocation—smash the newly invented machinery which they believe will "steal" their jobs from them.

This may perhaps seem a hard saying. Nor will one who has never been subjected to such a temptation wrap about himself the cloak of a Pharisaic self-righteousness and thank God that he is not as other men. But however much allowance we may be disposed to make in judging the wholesaler or retailer who sees his business threatened with ruin through the introduction of more economical methods; however much allowance we may make for the working man who meets a similar crisis in his life by sabotage, the fact remains that if they are fighting against the coming in of a better economic order they are doing wrong. The courts are therefore bound to interpose their veto; and those persons, at least, whose interests are not directly involved must recognize that the repression exercised by the state is essentially just.

The fundamental principle of fair competition is: Let the best man win. The tendency of our selfish nature is to say: Let me win, whether I am the best man or not. When it dares to be consistent this spirit will lead a man to commit murder if this is the most effective way of getting rid of a rival. Such a man of course represents the worst type because he will go to any length in order to win. But

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just as certainly as such a man stands at the bottom of the moral scale, just so certainly does he stand at the top who, however insistent the temptation, wills from start to finish to play the game according to the rules, and whatever happens acts on a level with the standard: Let the best man, the best goods, and the best methods of doing buisness win.

We have not however finished our study of the boycott against the middleman who jumps one of the recognized economic steps in order to widen the market for his goods. Suppose, for the sake of argument, it could be demonstrated, not by the slowly moving and ambiguous test of experience, but let us say by the reason of the economist, that for some particular trade the middleman is a necessity; and that the retailers or consumers who, when their personal interests dictate buy over his head, and when these same interests lead in the opposite direction run to him for goods or service, are in reality playing the sponge, in that they are leaving to others the burden of supporting an institution which in the last resort is alike indispensable for all. In this case would the middlemen be justified in boycotting any one who consents to be a party to the transaction?

We have asserted a duty to guide our buying and selling policies by considerations which take us out of the area of whim, prejudice, and antipathy, and which may at times call us to rise above the demands of economic self-interest. But it is obvious such a duty cannot be unconditional. No one is required (under ordinary circumstances) to sell goods to a firm whose credit is shaky. A fire insurance company ought not to be expected to insure the property of a man whom it suspects of arson. A business man, in other words, has the right to serve himself in serving others just as far as does not conflict with larger interests. Accordingly he certainly is not obliged to sell his goods to or buy goods from one who is injuring his interests by a policy which represents no contribution to the public good. Accordingly under the conditions imagined a boycott to protect the existence of one's business would be justifiable.

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By the admission of this exception to the rule which we have been endeavoring to maintain we may seem to have opened the door to everything to which it was closed. If a man may in self-defense consult the interests of his own business in determining his buying or selling policy where is this concession to end? Every business man finds himself surrounded on all sides by eager, vigorous competitors. Even if they are obeying the laws of fair competition they are striving with all their might to get trade away from him, and this means that they are doing that which if they could always win would ruin his business. Some of them may be small now, and their competition of no particular significance. But who can tell when a man of exceptional ability and energy will arise from amongst them, or when some one of them will obtain, perhaps from an outsider, a large accession to his capital? Who can tell whether one of his more powerful rivals is not working on a plan which when carried out will lose him every one of his customers? Therefore if self-defense is a legitimate excuse for a buying or selling policy aimed at a rival, why not start a "preventive war?" why not kill the rival now while one has a chance? "I have put for a general inclination of all mankind," writes Thomas Hobbes, "a perpetual and restless desire of power after power that ceaseth only in death. And the cause of this is not always that a man hopes for a more intensive delight than he has already attained to, or that he cannot be content with a moderate power; but because he cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of more."[1]

The answer to this objection seems simple in principle, however great the difficulties that it may sometimes raise in practice. Unless we are going to accept the creed of a Tolstoi we must allow that a man may defend himself against wrong, at least where the matter is beyond the jurisdiction of the courts. Certainly he is not called upon to play into the hands of those who are seeking illegitimately

[1] *Leviathan*, Chapter XI.

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to injure him. But from this it does not follow that he may ruin or in any way injure his competitors because of the fear that they may some day succeed through better service in attracting his customers away from him. It is of the very essence of the competitive system that none of its members can ever feel absolutely secure in his position. One of the chief arguments in its favor, as against socialism, is that, human nature being what it is, no large body of men can be trusted to live on Safety Street. Many or most of them would, it is believed, grow slothful, careless, indifferent, perhaps overbearing or downright oppressive. As was said of a famous piece of bacon, we must take the lean with the fat. We have no right to go to any length to secure perfect safety for our own business while denying, in the name of the competitive system, this right to everyone else.

The right so to guide our buying and selling policies as to protect our own legitimate business interests, as the term legitimate has been defined in this paper, cannot be denied because it is subject to abuse. The recognition of this right undoubtedly opens a door to grave aberrations because of the tendency of human beings to look with partial eyes at situations in which their own interests are vitally concerned. But there are no "fool proof" and no "rascal proof" principles of morality. He who expects the moralist to produce them is asking for a medicine that if taken as prescribed on the bottle will cure all physical ills.

If there is any truth in the contentions of this paper it is more important that they should be heard and heeded today than at any time since the rise of the modern economic system. "We in Europe know," the British ambassador to the United States recently said, "that an age is dying." If we in this country do not realize what this means, we shall have an opportunity to do so before very long. It means that the age of unquestioned privilege is disappearing, alike in the economic and the political field. For a century or more the chief beneficiaries of the competitive

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system have been assuring their less favored brethren that all is for the best in the best possible of economic worlds. These less favored brethren are now proposing to examine the situation for themselves. If they decide this doctrine is untrue they will unquestionably turn upside down the existing order. Those who believe in the competitive system should therefore see to it that it is shorn as quickly as possible of all excrescences, for in the eyes of prejudice the bad will always obscure the good. It is submitted that the practices condemned in this paper represent in sober truth a real excrescence. They cannot be justified by the same criterion by which we have sought to justify what we have called fair competition; they are for the most part easily separable from those methods of buying and selling which we have tried to exhibit as legitimate; they could not exist for a moment except as parasites upon an economic body to whose normal processes they are utterly foreign. With the attitude of the European worker what it is, and the probability that the attitude of the European worker of to-day will be that of the American worker within a generation, it is essential that our courts, our legislative bodies, and public opinion as a whole should learn to distinguish between what is fair and what is foul in our present competitive system; and having learned, should act. In particular, if "our captains of industry" and the men who make, interpret, and enforce our laws repeat the stupid mistakes of those who surrounded the late Czar Nicholas in the opening years of the Twentieth Century a not dissimilar fate may fall upon them, and upon us.

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IS THERE A LAW OF HUMAN PROGRESS?

VICTOR S. YARROS.

THE fascinating question which is put in the title of this paper has been revived recently by Professor John B. Bury's suggestive book, "Ideas of Progress," on the purely historical aspect of the subject. In the tragic years, 1914–17, earnest thinkers, perplexed and disheartened by the world war, took up that question of Progress and discussed it for a time without reaching very positive or satisfactory conclusions. The terrible and unnecessary war seemed to many an absolutely convincing refutation of the theory of (practically continuous and certain) progress in human thought and action. But the war is over, its ravages—alas!—have been forgotten, pessimism and despair have, in more thoughtful quarters, yielded sufficiently to the healing influence of time to permit fairly objective or intellectual treatment of the problems suggested by the great calamity, and a distinct change is noticeable in the renewed discussion of the conception of Progress. Optimistic the new spirit is not, but it is scientific or philosophical. The conclusions of the present debate will be worthy of careful consideration, but the time for a summary and analysis of them has not yet come.

Meanwhile it is perhaps proper to report progress in the discussion of Progress and to indulge in a few independent, modest reflections on the general theme.

It is now established that the idea of Progress is thoroughly modern; that neither the Jewish prophets and philosophers, nor the Greek speculators and savants, nor the Fathers of the Christian Church, revealed any knowledge of that idea. This, of course, is an important and interesting fact.

However, a modern idea is not necessarily an unsound and ill-founded one. The issue of moment is not historical. It is this: Is there any basis, any valid proof, for the idea

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of Progress? What has modern science to say on the question? Biology, sociology, social psychology, anthropology, politics, ethics, even history (regarded by some as a science) can be called to the bar as proper and competent witnesses in the case. What is their testimony?

Surely, if progress *is* a law of human nature;—that is, if we are assured of continuous, or virtually continuous, improvement in our economic, social, political and moral arrangements and relations, evidence of this great fact should be discoverable in the records of human activity. As to science, did not Professor Huxley define it as "organized common sense," and cannot organized common sense pass with tolerable assurance on the question whether or not the streams of human tendency reveal a law of Progress?

There is reason to hold that the discussion of this theme has been marred by a certain confusion of thought. Professor Huxley himself, though a clear thinker and exact writer, betrayed confusion of the issue when, in his ethico-sociological essays, he denied the existence of a law of progress, or of natural guaranties of the survival of the best—as distinguished from the fittest in a narrow sense—and immediately added that we have it within our human power and volition to improve human conditions indefinitely. This admission, on closer examination, may well be claimed to involve acceptance of the essence of the theory of continuous and certain progress.

For, as a little reflection will show, the theory of Progress implies, or rests upon, two assumptions—first, that humanity *can* advance if it wills to, and, second, that it *does* will to advance. Professor John Dewey has truly observed that Progress is a "retail job,"—that we human beings can advance if we desire to advance, plan advancement, study ways and means of removing obstacles to advancement, and steadily work for the realization of our ideals. This is what John Morley meant when he said many years since that Time produces nothing, and that it is we human beings who produce *in* time. Progress implies the existence of ideals, standards, conceptions not yet attained or carried

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out, plus a determination and capacity to attain and carry out such ideals and conceptions.

Taking human nature as we know it through history and through contemporaneous experience, what shall we say on either of these heads?

To begin with, the existence of ideals, standards, great, noble conceptions, is not and cannot be denied. Every religion attests this fact. Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity, Islamism severally hold up standards that are much finer and purer than those manifested in our actual conduct.

Whether religion be based on Revelation or on Reason and evolved human need, the great assumption that underlies it is that humanity *can* and *will*, some day, live up to the ideals now only professed and applied in a very small degree. Nor does any religious teacher of eminence contemplate a sudden and universal elevation and reformation of humanity. "Because strait is the gate and narrow is the way which leadeth unto life, and few there be that find it."

As to the adherents of the Evolution theory, there is not one of them who does not hold that the elevation and education of the average human being, or the average mass of human beings, will of necessity be a slow, gradual process. To quote Herbert Spencer:

"Far off as seems such a state [one where the highest altruism prevails] yet every one of the factors counted on to produce it may already be traced in operation among those of the highest natures. What now in them is occasional and feeble may be expected, with further evolution to become habitual and strong: and what now characterizes the exceptionally high may be expected eventually to characterize all. For that which the best human nature is capable of is within the reach of human nature at large."

"The truly honest man, here and there to be found, is not only without thought of legal, religious or social compulsion when he discharges an equitable claim on him, but he is without thought of self-compulsion. He does the right thing with a simple feeling of satisfaction in doing it, and is indeed impatient if anything prevents him from having the satisfaction of doing it. Evidently,

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then, with complete adaptation to the social state that element in moral consciousness which is expressed by the word Obligation will disappear. The higher actions required for the harmonious carrying on of life will be as much matters of course as are those lower actions which the simple desires prompt."

"*Data of Ethics*," *p.* 128.

Spencer and all other evolutionists, like the religious prophets and teachers, asserted, or assumed, that the best of which human nature has shown itself capable in conduct is within the reach of human nature at large. Is this assumption supported by science, by evidence? Is not moral distinction—not to say moral genius—as exceptional as intellectual distinction, or superior ability? Is it reasonable to suppose that in a few thousand years all men and women, or the great majority of them, in every part of the world, will spontaneously act as the very small minority of high-minded and noble persons acts today? How is this elevation of the great average mass to be brought about, and by whom? Is organized society to undertake scientific breeding with a view of improving the moral nature of the average individual, or is it to depend on changes in the environment, on the theory that in a better environment human nature as we know it will give a better account of itself?

We know, of course, that scientific breeding is not favored by any sane student of social problems. We cannot use and manipulate human beings as breeders manipulate animals. The common sense and the healthy instincts of humanity would never clothe the State with authority to control marriage or mating absolutely, and if the authority were given, the experiment would soon break down in practice. The reproduction of the utterly unfit may be prohibited, and the prohibition may be successfully enforced on the whole. But from such carefully limited control of human breeding to conscious and systematic attempts at elevating the moral status of the average mass of mankind the distance is obviously very great. The hereditary factor, so far as any state or collective action is

Hitler? B.F. Skinner?

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concerned, thus must be left out of the reckoning. If women, or men, or both women and men, ever evince a desire to select morally fit mates and companions, the hereditary factor may assume some importance.

We are reduced to the environmental factor. By improving the economic and social conditions of mankind, it is asserted, we can get far better results than we are now getting from human nature. The adage concerning silken purses and sows' ears, or about gathering figs from thistle, does not apply to humanity, it is argued, because human nature is extremely plastic and adaptable, so that, at a given time a given quantity, so to speak, of what we call conscience, or character, will produce widely different results under different influences.

Now every advocate of social reform consciously or unconsciously assumes that changes in human conduct may be brought about by changes in environment, including, of course, the educational system. Remove temptation, and sin and crime are lessened. Nature has not been modified, but certain faculties and impulses have been given new directions. The unruly boy who causes his parents and teachers much trouble, and who often glides into a predatory career, becomes a pioneer and a hero under certain circumstances. Abolish poverty, and certain offences disappear or become exceptional. Many of the most moderate reforms of this and previous generations have been based on the conviction that conduct can be greatly improved by improvements in the human environment. It is hardly necessary to add that every advanced or radical school of importance stresses the necessity of changing the environment as a means of elevating and bettering human conduct.

But *by whom is the environment to be changed?* By those who cannot live decently and worthily in the present environment? Are only the oppressed and disinherited, the victims of maladjustment or injustice, to strive for changes in institutions and arrangements? To answer "Yes" is to imply that intelligent self-interest alone is sufficient unto our needs and a satisfactory guaranty of

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progress. The advocates of the class struggle and of proletarian revolt appeal largely to self-interest and complain of the "ignorance and stupidity" of the victims of the present system. They expect that by armed insurrection, or other forms of direct action, the class that suffers most from injustice will overthrow the present system and create a new social and political environment—one in which justice shall be accorded to all. But, in the first place, class domination never has led to justice and never can lead to it. Bolshevism is a striking illustration of the deplorable and impossible consequences of a class war. History is full of less dramatic illustrations of the same truth. In the second place, history affords no basis for the notion that only the victims of a particular wrong care and desire to correct it. Always and everywhere have the victims of oppression and injustice had the sympathy, the active aid and even the aggressive leadership of men and women of the privileged and neutral classes. To assert that only selfish interest prompts and actuates humanity is to contradict all human experience. It is to contradict the experience of every living person who is not utterly blinded by some dogma to the realities in which he lives and moves.

If, then, the demand and movement for social reform are earnestly supported, and even led, by men and women who are not selfishly, in a material sense, interested in such reform, what does this fact imply? Why, it implies that there is something in human nature that revolts against injustice, that insists on redressing wrong and eliminating such evil from human life as conceivably can be eliminated by human intelligence and effort.

But, to draw this inference, is to affirm tacitly that there *is something in human nature which makes for Progress!* The difference between such a vague formula and the early Utopian assertion that there is a "law" of human progress is merely rhetorical and superficial. Those who perceived, darkly, that humanity has had ideals; that at all times men and women have been willing to toil, suffer and die for unselfish causes; that martyrs and heroic champions of

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religious, moral, social and economic reforms have always been honored and admired; that millions of humble persons sympathize with and support rebels and agitators against oppression and injustice, and, finally, that history is very largely a record of insurrections, revolutions and other movements having for their aim and object the reform of abuses, the amelioration of the lot of human beings, the emancipation of the human body or the human soul from cruel bondage—those who perceived all these facts and tendencies not unnaturally jumped at the conclusion that there was some "law" of human progress.

The term law is doubtless unwarranted. But the conclusion that human nature as it is manifested in conduct on the whole makes for progress is assuredly *not* unwarranted.

It is idle and irrelevant to speculate on the remote past or the remote future. Civilization, Dean Inge of the London St. Paul Cathedral holds, is "a disease," and rebarbarization of humanity, with ultimate extinction perhaps, may be inevitable. But speculations of this sort have no bearing on any problem with which we are concerned, or with which succeeding generations, for centuries and millennia to come, will have to concern themselves. The Dean of St. Paul, though a pessimist, persists in preaching the Christian gospel. His strange philosophy does not govern his own actual relationships. He is not indifferent to conflicts between good and evil, righteousness and iniquity, and uses his influence on the "side of the angels." His own practice, therefore, is proof of the moral progress he denies. So is the practice of other educated and thoughtful doubters and pessimists, who do not stop to reflect that their very pessimism is largely inspired by their passion for justice, their disappointment in the average mass of human beings who, from their viewpoint, are too slow and unresponsive to the appeals of the choice spirits for social reform.

It was pointed out at the outset of this paper that, if human progress is a fact, and if human nature is so consti-

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tuted that we can be certain of further, if not absolutely continuous, progress, then certain sciences, including history, ought to furnish testimony on the question. Let the more or less exact sciences speak through accredited representatives, but to history we can all turn for light. What does history say?

Civilizations have fallen and perished, but from what causes? Slavery, serfdom, immorality, idleness, invasion by healthier races, greed, rivalry and conquest. We praise Greek ideals, for example, and we talk of retrogression. But our ideals are infinitely higher than those of Greece in her day of glory. We talk of the Roman reign of law, but our own ideal of the reign of law is higher than the Roman because more democratic. The civilization of Europe and America is spreading to Asia and Africa, and there are no barbarous hordes to fear. There is no yellow peril and there is no black peril. The only danger to civilization is from within, and our resources, material and moral, are adequate to our realized needs. Our problems seem complex and difficult, but they are in truth no more difficult than those humanity has already solved in its ascent and evolution. Indeed, the advance of science, technology and art makes the solution of our problems easier with every passing decade. There is every prospect of abundance for all, and abundance creates conditions that are favorable to individual and national morality. Nations, like individuals, are learning to live and let live, to exchange products as well as ideas, without the irrational fear of giving more than they receive. More and more do men of affairs realize that a nation cannot sell without buying, and that wholesome prosperity must be based not on exclusive privileges, necessarily temporary and precarious, and always conducive to friction and preparations for costly conflicts, but on production, fair exchange and "open doors."

As with individuals, so with nations, fear is nearly always the source of meanness, selfishness, avarice, indifference to suffering. To remove fear is to lift inhibitions

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and release softer and better sentiments that are quite as characteristic of mankind, as innate, as the egoistic sentiments. The national policy of grab, like theft, is the product of fear and of limited imagination.

Next to economic abundance as a factor making for peace and amity is the growing ease and freedom of intercourse among the nations. Unfamiliarity breeds antipathy and dislike. It is hard to fight, maim and kill people whom you know and have associated with in business, recreation, or the pursuit of scientific and artistic aims. One can be rude to strangers, and among nations rudeness, chauvinism and prejudice founded on ignorance easily lead to armed conflicts.

Thus to assert that our civilization must perish because other civilizations have perished is to overlook the vast differences due to that scientific and technological advance which none disputes—differences that make external aggression unnecessary and unprofitable. True, these differences did not prevent the World War—which was unnecessary and which all can now see was unprofitable and disastrous. But that very war is, to millions of men and women, a warning and an object lesson. It may hasten progress. It may, after all, despite insincere politicians, prove to have been a war against war. The school that glorifies war as a biological necessity and as a purging and elevating influence has fewer adherents than ever before. Hundreds of thousands of young men were thoroughly sobered by their experience in the great war and are demanding peace, armament limitation and reduction of military forces.

But what of progress in the economic and political spheres? Grant that international relations may sooner or later be placed on a juster and higher level, and that external peace may be effectually secured by adequate arrangements. What of the greed, selfishness and indifference of human beings as displayed in the field of industrial relations? What of the problems of poverty and involuntary idleness—problems that, if not solved aright, will surely beget insurrection and strife?

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The answer, again, is that history warrants a firm belief that these problems will be solved by humanity in harmony with the dictates of reason and justice. They are new problems, historically speaking. They have but lately been realized as genuine and pressing problems demanding a permanent settlement. In various compromises, palliatives, short steps, experiments, the sober-minded student is able to sense gratifying indications of the coming settlements. Collective bargaining, industrial councils, arbitration and conciliation machinery, profit-sharing, what are these things but symptoms of a new industrial order? What are such reforms as social insurance, old-age pensions, unemployment insurance, systematization of seasonal work, and the like, but efforts to eliminate poverty?

Men are selfish, callous, cruel, vindictive, malicious? Yes. Proof of these qualities abounds. But men, the same men, are also sympathetic, altruistic, noble, self-sacrificing. Proof of these qualities abounds, likewise. To which faculties and elements are we consciously to appeal? This is the real question. And the answer is unmistakable. What we call Progress is simply a general and vague term for a variety of healthy, beneficial, constructive tendencies and movements that make for a better society. And all these movements are natural and inevitable. They are not in conflict with human nature. They could not well be and persist. They are not confined to negligible groups. They are thoroughly representative and typical of human nature.

Ah, exclaims the doubter, but there is no evidence that progress is steady and continuous. No, not in the sense that there are no periods of apparent stagnation, of reaction, of backsliding. There are social and human tides that ebb and flow. But in the long run progress is continuous. The milestones and guide-posts on the path of humanity traversed in historic times furnish impressive evidence that is too often ignored or belittled. In the abolition of slavery and serfdom, in the humanization of criminal codes, in the treatment of prisoners of war, in the

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changes in prison discipline, in the treatment of women and children, in the outlawing of barbarous and cruel sports and spectacles—as in many other manifestations of the human spirit—we can but see evidence of moral and emotional improvement.

How does it happen that the selfishness and callousness of human nature have not prevented these great and wholesome changes in conduct and in institutions? Evidently, there is something wrong with the generalization regarding the selfishness and cruelty and meanness of human nature. Evidently our human equipment, intellectual and emotional, not only is no bar to progress, but contains potent elements that impel or compel us to fight every serious maladjustment, to correct wrong, to plan improvements and to solve problems that challenge our intelligence. The spirit that admittedly insures the indefinite advance of science, regardless of all obstacles and perils, also assures the satisfactory handling of industrial, political and other questions that, as matters stand, menace internal concord and internal stability and harmony.[1]

Thus the original formula of Progress, metaphysically conceived, only needs to be restated in modern terms, and cannot be rejected as wholly fanciful and baseless. The human will is a will to live, to conquer, to remove obstacles, to extend horizons, to solve riddles and realize an ideal—an ideal of Beauty and Justice. This will make progress almost a law of human nature, after all.

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[1] Mr. H. G. Wells, in his remarkable book, "The Outline of History," reaches the conclusion that human salvation has been and is being retarded by ignorance, and that diffusion of knowledge concerning man and his development and present powers will make it possible for future generations to bring about infinite improvements in the material comfort and spiritual nobility of living.

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THE GENESIS AND DIFFERENTIATION OF THE MORAL ABSOLUTE

J. E. TURNER

THE principle that the rise of consciousness necessarily involves the progressive development of self-determined, *i.e.*, free-action[1] is, as it stands, too general to be finally complete. *All* fully willed action[2] is free; but this in itself leaves the main types of such acts undistinguished from each other, and does not explain why some are included in, while others which are similarly free are excluded from, the moral categories. But the discussion of the ethical criterion has been hindered by being confined within too narrow limits. Inquiry has been concerned disproportionately with right and wrong action, moral responsibility, punishment and reward. I do not question the supreme importance of these subjects; but they would, I think, have proved less difficult and have received more conclusive treatment, if they had been connected with other aspects which are in reality inseparable from them.

One or two concrete, if rather artificial, instances may be helpful. In adding a column of figures I may decide to write an incorrect total in an untidy manner, and then take undue advantage of my error. My inaccuracy may then be regarded as purely intellectual; or my work and myself may be styled inartistic; or I may be judged evil and deserving of punishment. Again, a genius may paint a remarkable picture, which is however false in perspective or anatomy and may have certain offensive characteristics. Then he, together with his work, may be praised æsthetically, corrected intellectually, and blamed morally; or it may be

[1] *Cf. The Genesis of Freedom of Will and Action.* This JOURNAL, April, 1920, p. 231.

[2] "Willed action," taken strictly, is redundant, since no distinction, except of phase or aspect, can be made between will and action in the full sense of these terms; but at the present stage the phrase is useful as excluding externally determined activities of all kinds, even instinctive, habitual, and automatic.

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maintained that, as an artist, he and his work are more or less exempt from moral judgment. But the emphasis would fall in both cases on the moral aspects; the artist's genius would be keenly discussed in a limited circle, but the hottest arguments would be concerned with the extent of his freedom from ethical criteria.

With life and the world such as they are, no doubt this is as it should be; but philosophic ethics should recognise that this distinction and emphasis are after all practical, and that there is in principle a marked underlying connection between all these aspects, so that each throws light on the others. On the one hand, they are all alike and equally free: how is it then that one has come to be stressed more than the others? On the other, the Absolute in its perfection contains neither intellectual error, bad art nor moral evil; what is the ground of our emphasis on the last of these?

These questions merely assume another form if we say they are concerned with values. How have the different types of value arisen? and why should moral values be given greater importance than the others? Do not all alike contribute to the Highest Value—Perfection?

In the opposite direction, an unduly intellectualist character has been assigned to Mind; it denotes thought, intelligence, ratiocination, rather than artistic genius or moral power; it is regarded as an attribute of scientists and philosophers rather than of poets and prophets; so that here also ethical freedom is divorced from that developed rationality in union with which it has its very being.[3] But Mind is essentially a whole, expressed discursively and abstractly in thought, intuitively and without express grounds in art, emotionally and dogmatically in religion.[4]

It is as such a diversified whole, again, that its develop-

[3] This separation is carried to its extreme in Bergson's antithesis between intellect and intuition.

[4] These are again practical, not absolute, distinctions. Thought always aims at unity, and the absence of grounds in art is not essential, for some great artists are also great critics and expositors. Dogma, again, increases in value as it finds rational bases.

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ment implies increasing self-determination or freedom—the general principle attained in my previous article. But neither this development nor the self-determination is amorphous; both tend to become, like all else in the universe, systematic, structural, at once highly complex, definitely ordered and completely unified. It is here that the illegitimate distinction with regard to Mind, just alluded to, arises; for while logical thought is recognised as complex and ordered, its equally necessary unity is disregarded; on the other hand the unity of a work of art is emphasised at the expense of its ordered definiteness and complexity.[5] But though technique does not always mean genius, genius certainly implies absolute mastery of technique; in this sense it is truly an infinite capacity for taking pains, for securing the finishing touch—the little more—the little less. This suggests a further problem: if we adopt the usual distinction between talent and genius, it appears that artistic and intellectual talent are rarer than moral; on the contrary, moral genius seems much rarer than the intellective or artistic.

I. A developed consciousness—a Mind—is possible only through the conservation of its content in such ideal forms as imagery, memory, and knowledge; thus consciousness always transcends the immediate present "given" content, assimilating this with the more or less permanent material previously acquired, and initiating action through the mutual influence of these two factors. Ideal content, in its early stages, is fixed in character and limited in range; so are the immediate "given" stimuli received from the environment; both factors therefore—one "in the mind" and the other "in the world"—are fairly constant in character and consequently in the results of their co-operation; for the ideal content reacts to the immediate stimulus more or less invariably, and action is automatic, habitual,

[5] Characters most readily appreciated in a great drama or novel full of personalities and incident, but—the true test of genius—each clear cut and defined, making its due contribution to the whole without loose ends and ragged edges.

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unthinking. But when the ideal content has greatly increased in capacity and variety, and when at the same time the "given" stimuli become more varied in character and less regular in occurrence, such automatic action becomes impossible, and must be replaced by a higher type more in consonance with the advancing nature of the inner and outer influences. At the same time the already existing certainty and rapidity of action must be preserved; no mere increase in scope and complexity would compensate for the loss of these attributes. The only method of retaining them is the adequate organization of the increasing mass of ideal content—its acquiring that ordered and definite structure which is the mark of high intelligence, which thus becomes the *sine qua non* of free action in a complicated and changing environment; as yet however without presenting any distinctions of type.

But for several reasons this principle tends to be overlooked. Voluntary action itself becomes habitual through repetition; or it may be more or less dispensed with owing to imitation and instruction, or again through the creation of an "atmosphere" which ensures the unconscious observance of principles which were originally imposed on society only by exceptionally strong willed persons or communities.[6] All these, with other similar influences, help to conceal the essentially rational basis of self-determined action. This is true even where it is at first sight least probable—in æsthetics; for, speaking broadly, and taking the minor details of life, society is more refined and artistic than in previous centuries, merely through the inheritance and spread of results originally gained by struggle and determination.[7]

This systematically organised ideal content, itself modi-

[6] This characteristic of social and religious reformers seems to be too much neglected. We assume that the facility with which their historic institutions operate also marked their origins, while the calm certainty of the founders itself masks their rugged powers of will; thus the contemplative elements in religion are exalted at the expense of the virile. But it requires a strong will to succeed even in politics.

[7] *Cf.* Dr. Bosanquet's suggestion as to Death, *What Religion Is*, pp. 77, 78.

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fied and perfected by the experience which it controls, is first differentiated into consciousness of ends and means—of purpose and its mode of realisation. The distinction is but the explicit entrance into consciousness of what was previously implicit in experience, in so far as ends had been achieved automatically or instinctively; and it is only after the course of life has been so determined that these fixed ends are regularly fulfilled that it becomes possible to modify and enlarge them into a wider system of which they remain the basis and type; for even while man can not live by bread alone, still he must somewhere find the bread of life.

This progress may equally well be described as the development of the sense of values, at first vague and indeterminate, and then more and more definite as either ultimate or proximate—absolute or relative; which are but ends and means under a new aspect. Values, like ends, are originally arbitrary, fixed, external; they are discovered, not conferred; recognized, not created; the objective attributes of the environment rather than the subjective deliverances of the mind; so that whatever forms the spirit creatively bestows upon them are but modifications of what is imposed upon it by its world; here as always subjectivity is the response to objectivity, and their unity is reality.

II. Thus *every* end, purpose or value has originally, because of its very limitations, an absolute character which operates implicitly before it manifests itself explicitly; and the subsequent progressive differentiation of voluntary activity may best be defined as the explication of this primary absoluteness, so that even in being retained its nature becomes profoundly modified. To primitive man, as to the child, every purpose, every simple combination of ends, was absolute; until he learned from the very conflict of his many absolutes that he must assign to each some relativity; must make his values relative both to each other and to some inclusive whole. And here a more subtle difficulty arose; for the very multiplication of these rela-

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tives finally concealed the absolute; amid the trees he lost sight of the wood; beginning as an absolutist he became a mere pluralist and pragmatist, until in learning to seek the chief end of life, the *summum bonum*, he turned hesitatingly to absolutism once more.

Both the deepest aspects of life and the ultimate problems of Ethics are determined by the character and position which must be finally assigned to this differentiated Absolute. It may easily belie its name in being too restricted, in resting upon too narrow a section of full experience, even when this is an indispensable element in the whole, as are the categories of knowledge, feeling and conation. For each of these justly claims an absolute of its own, distinctive and exclusive in its characteristics and imperative in its deliverances. This is most readily recognised in the case of knowledge, and manifested in our unquestioning acceptance of intellectual truth; on the other hand the nature of Truth itself and of its ultimate logical foundations are still matters of inquiry, and to that extent both the character and the implications of its absoluteness remain undetermined. But cases are not uncommon in which a purely intellective absolute dominates life, as in any intensely logical or scientific personality. Strictly analogous but more frequent instances are furnished by the power of the æsthetic absolute in artistic temperaments; and while the marked individuality of these—which really springs from the absence of universally accepted principles—and the remoteness of their interests from everyday life reduce practical considerations to the minimum, this is evidence on the other hand of the philistinism of ordinary experience; in principle the artist is right, even though his æstheticism is too often febrile rather than virile.

III. Before considering the distinctive character of the ethical Absolute, it is essential to observe once more that moral action has no peculiar claim to be regarded as "free"; for activity in both the artistic and the intellective domains is also "free," *i.e.*, is self-determined through reference to

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an ideal content. Just as there exists a moral conscience, so there may be an intellectual or an artistic; and while it may be difficult and painful to disregard these latter, still their violation may be fully deliberate and voluntary; and such neglect or defiance, in spite of the high level and complexity of their regulative principles, would not necessarily be regarded as "wrong" any more than their habitual observance would in itself (quite apart, *i.e.*, from ulterior "practical" consequences) be termed "right." But if this is the case (and it is I think to say the least arguable) then Ethics is faced by the difficulty that aspects of life, already extensive and rapidly developing, regulated by the advanced standards of Truth and Beauty, lie more or less completely beyond its consideration and application. On the other hand, to assert the contrary is to raise the question wherein consist the supremacy and inclusiveness of the distinctively moral criterion—distinctive, *i.e.*, in the sense of fully recognizing the reality and value of æsthetic and intellective ideals as such, even while itself transcending them; and it would be a serious error to connect its dominance with too low a level of human experience, such as pleasure or happiness, or immortality merely as such.

Any fully adequate discussion of the subject plainly concerns Philosophy rather than Ethics proper; it must suffice to point out that the Absolute in *all* its manifestations is protean, eternally self-developing, transcendent of any and every given experience; even in being more fully attained it remains always unattainable completely. As the growth in knowledge reveals new problems, so the achieving of every purpose discloses further ends which challenge our increasing powers; and in the history of humanity the "moral" code, under the stern pressure of rigorous outer circumstances and inner animality, long remains at the low level of "practical" duties, codified in a decalogue which recognises no "new commandment," and ordained by a limited and sultanic deity. Such an ethical absolute can not but suffer from its very definiteness and precision, indispensable as these are within limits; it is too rigid and

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inelastic to develop with the expanding spirit of man. When the spirit disinterestedly pursues knowledge, when it cultivates art for art's sake, morality is perplexed and baffled; it fails to properly adapt itself to the new conditions, and can not therefore see its way to include and dominate them as it has hitherto ruled "practical" life. It can only become despotic, or abdicate; it must either, perhaps misled by too patent and painful extravagances, condemn them root and branch as "wrong"; or, alarmed and puzzled by their strangeness, accord them some measure of immunity from its own judgments. The one course is followed by a too severe Puritanism, the other by a crass Philistinism; in both cases alike such an attitude is obviously faulty and unreasonable, and but a tacit confession of spiritual failure which results in serious injury to Life as a whole.

IV. The problem thus becomes that of maintaining the absoluteness of the ethical criterion while making it at the same time all inclusive, universal, and transcendent. It would be an error, as I have said already, to base its dominance on too low a ground, such as, *e.g.*, the greatest happiness principle; and it would be an equally serious mistake to assert it merely dogmatically, in some such form as that man is essentially a moral being who can never evade ethical dictates and control. For this will always leave two questions outstanding: Is this principle true? and How is its truth to be explicated and established as universally imperative? And while a complete answer can be given only by Philosophy, two suggestions may here be put forward.

The first is that the Absolute, in all its manifestations, must be a real Absolute, in two senses. Each of its forms must, as fully as its nature permits, reveal the Absolute *directly*, in such a way that it comes into intimate relation with man, instead of remaining afar off in aloof transcendence; for in it "we live and move and have our being." Again, it must be differentiated concretely and objectively, as recent Idealism holds it to be; not the barren subjective

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abstraction to which some philosophies have reduced it; and further it must be, as thus concrete and actual, also final, ultimate, and dominant. Nor does this finality contradict, as at first sight it may appear to do, its equally essential self-transcendence; for the ultimacy, after all, is always but that of a partial manifestation of the Absolute, and its recognition or attainment in any and every form in itself at once reveals its own limitation and incompleteness, thereby transforming it into a still more inclusive phase of the whole.

> So shall the drudge in dusty frock
> Spy behind the city clock
> Retinues of airy Kings,
> Skirts of angels, starry wings.

Our perceptive consciousness which analyses and divides must be supplemented by a synthetic vision which sees in everything the underlying whole, the infinite in the finite, the bush burning with celestial fire, but unconsumed.

There is a whole world of Philosophy in this last simple touch of the ancient Hebrew mystic—"unconsumed." The Absolute illumines, vivifies, transforms; but it does not destroy; even evil is conquered still to bring forth good. The world, seen in the Absolute, does not vanish; it remains what it is even while it changes; it retains its reality, but with somewhat added. The Whole is not something quite different from its elements; but the very putting together of the parts, so as to build therewith the Whole, in itself transforms them. They are transfigured by gaining completion, by finding their due complement, by the better fulfilling of their proper function; thus they do more than merely appear and vanish in unmeaning succession. The value of the world in its present actuality is preserved, and contributes to the still greater value of its future phases;[8] and however widely diverse these may become, still they possess unity, the unity of origin, of development, of value.

If then, secondly, the moral absolute does actually possess universality and self-transcendence, these attributes

[8] *Cf. The Conservation of Values, Monist*, April, 1920.

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can be derived only from the Absolute itself. But in what sense the Absolute can be said to contain and condition morality is a question, I think, to be considered by Philosophy rather than by Ethics as such. Ethics, like every other science or culture, must take its subject matter for granted; it must therefore postulate its moral absolute. It may examine or even determine its nature, but it must assume its existence to begin with, even though the assumption and the determination can not fail to react one upon the other; and further, whatever its nature may be taken to be, it will always remain possible to argue from that nature to its deeper basis in the constitution of the Whole itself. No Ethic, merely as such, can content the spirit of man; if it is to retain a living power over his life and will its sanctions must be found beyond itself; that, ultimately, is what its self-transcendence means.

In the truly ultimate moral sphere, then, the Absolute, in whatever form it may be manifested, makes a demand upon all and each of its members; a demand which is conditioned by their abilities and power of realisation. Certainly in the unconscious world development is automatic and mechanical; the urge of the Absolute, however we may characterise it, is there irresistible; it may be said to realise itself of itself; and in spite of all its change it is and remains One. But because the Absolute is also, however difficult the conception may be, a Whole, its determination must be self-determination; and wherever therefore there is, as in all personality, some measure (however limited) of real self-determination, there we have as it were an absolute within and confronting the true Absolute in which it had its origin;[9] an absolute which exhibits this character in all its striving to develop and complete itself. Thus there arises the possibility of something that is wholly absent from the mechanical natural universe—the possibility of real interaction and recognition; of conflict and opposition on the one hand, or of submission or co-operation on the other.

[9] The evil self, which recognises no other ends but its own, is thus obviously to itself an absolute:—"He trusted to have equalled the Most High."

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And because personality touches the Absolute at *all* its confines—feels in all its being this demand upon it to realise the Absolute more fully, and only in so doing truly to realise itself—it is everywhere and always subjected to an ultimate test and challenge which include and transcend whatever other standards of perfection—social, economic, artistic, or intellectual—it may itself discover or create, and which really constitute, for that reason, the final and basal moral criterion.

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THE LABOR PROBLEM FROM THE SOCIAL VIEWPOINT

I. W. HOWERTH

THE labor problem is primarily and essentially a social problem. It will never be solved until it is so regarded, and perhaps even then it can only be put in the way of solution. Social problems as a rule are not solved, they are outgrown. But the growing process may be directed and accelerated if the problems are understood.

There are four different viewpoints from which the labor problem is commonly regarded. They are the viewpoints of Labor, of Capital, of the Consumer, and of Society at large. Conclusions arrived at with respect to the problem are dependent upon the viewpoint that is taken.

From the viewpoint of Labor the labor problem is primarily a question of wages. Baldly stated it is, How may wages be increased relatively to the amount of work performed? Laborers, like other people, act in accordance with the law of parsimony, that is, on the principle of the largest return for the least effort. Their immediate return is wages. With respect to every industrial proposal, therefore, they ask, What is going to be its effect on the wage-scale? If it promises to raise wages, they are for it. If it threatens to reduce wages, they oppose it tooth and nail. This is not to say that they are incapable or indisposed, more than others, to consider any interests but their own. It means only that with the laborer his own interests come first, and these, by a conspicuous and universal trait in human nature, are likely to be identified with the interests of society as a whole. These facts should be taken into consideration in adjudging the policies and demands of Labor. The methods of organized labor, for instance, cannot with fairness be appraised unless the viewpoint of the laborer is taken and the psychological factor is allowed for. The closed shop, opposition to piecework, limiting

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the number of apprentices, hostility to the "scab," the sympathetic strike, etc., are all rational from the viewpoint of organized labor; that is, if the interests of Labor, at least its immediate interests, receive sole or even primary consideration.

Of course trades-unions, like other bodies of men, are sometimes mistaken with regard to their own interests. But their policies are determined from the viewpoint of these interests primarily. Wages being the immediate measure of Labor's welfare, it would be too much to expect that laborers, confronted by the selfish interests and practices of employers, should forget this fact and act only on broad humanitarian principles. An honest attempt to understand Labor, to look at the industrial situation from the laborer's viewpoint, would contribute far more to the promotion of industrial peace, than railing against the methods of laborers which, from some viewpoint other than their own, are unwise or reprehensible. This applies to the I. W. W.'s as well as to the A. F. L.

From the viewpoint of Capital the labor problem is primarily a question of profits. There is, of course, an ellipsis in the expression "viewpoint of Capital." Capital as such has no viewpoint. Only human beings have either viewpoints or interests. What we mean, therefore, by the viewpoint of Capital is the viewpoint of capitalists, that is, the employers of labor. Employers are as jealous of the profit percentage as laborers are of the wage-scale. Their first question with respect to any industrial measure or policy is, What will be its effect on profits? They, too, think and act in accordance with the law of parsimony, and with them the law becomes the highest profit at the lowest cost. It is hard for them to see that anything that is likely to diminish profits will promote the public good. With them, as with others, interest determines principle, more than principle determines interest. Why is it that employers generally oppose the policies of Labor? Candidly, it is because these policies threaten, or are supposed to threaten, profits. Of course employers persuade them-

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selves that they are the special champions of law and order, of the right of free contract, of Americanism, or of something else supposed to be essential to the good of all. But the fact remains that profits are their primary consideration.

Of course employers, too, are sometimes mistaken with respect to the effects of a proposed industrial measure. They used to believe, and many still believe, that a shorter work-day means lower profits. But this, of course, is not necessarily the case, as shorter hours may, and often do, result in increased production. In general they reluctantly yield to a demand for increased wages, for the economists have taught, and business sagacity thought it perceived, that profits fall as wages rise. This, however, is not the truism it was long supposed to be. With higher wages laborers consume more, expand and steady the market, and, from the stimulus afforded, may actually increase production to the extent that profits will rise. But in general the employer is a good judge of his own interests and the interests of his class. The point is that it is from the viewpoint of these interests primarily that he considers the labor question.

This, of course, is not meant to be a reflection on employers, any more than what was said about laborers was meant to be a reflection upon them. It is simply the statement of a cold fact, which no broad and purely objective study of the labor problem can possibly overlook.

Now, it is obvious that both the viewpoint of the employing class and the viewpoint of the laboring class are partial and one-sided. Neither class constitutes the whole of society. The interests of neither the one class nor the other furnish the basis for a permanent solution of the labor problem. Of course, if, as some maintain, the interests of all classes are the same, it would make no difference what viewpoint is taken, for an intelligent consideration of the interests of our class would lead to the same result as would the same consideration of those of any other class. But they are not the same, except when considered in the

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light of "some far off divine event," which, unfortunately, has little to do with the case. As things are to-day, it is certainly naïve, if not culpable, to talk of an entire identity of interests between Labor and Capital, and still more naïve to suppose that any impartial and reflective person is going to believe the stale and empty platitudes in which the reconciliation of Labor and Capital is urged on the basis of existing industrial conditions. Their interests are not identical any more than are those of buyers and sellers. If buyers and sellers have exactly the same interests, why higgle over prices? Grant, when a boy, offered his colt for twenty dollars, but said he would take fifteen if he couldn't get twenty—if those were the figures. He probably was proceeding on the assumption of an identity of interests between buyer and seller, and he fared as others will fare who proceed on the same assumption. The fact is, that while Labor is dependent upon Capital, and *vice versa*, laborers and employers are, in the matter of distribution, antagonistic. They are at war. Their policies are in general war measures. The gain of one is often the loss of the other. This is necessarily so in a competitive industrial system. We may defend the system on the ground of its beneficent results. But it is poor logic to do so and at the same time deny its essential fact, or try to harmonize it out of existence. Labor and Capital are virtually compelled to selfish considerations, hence self-interest characterizes the *ex parte* discussions of the labor problem by laborers and by capitalists. Neither can propose on the basis of their own class interests any permanent solution of the problem.

By the Consumer's viewpoint I mean, of course, the viewpoint of those who consume the commodities or services affected by a given labor dispute, the so-called "public." All members of society are consumers, and strictly speaking the consumer's viewpoint is the social viewpoint. But in every open conflict between Labor and Capital there are always some "innocent bystanders" who find themselves injured or inconvenienced by the dis-

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turbed circumstances. They call themselves "consumers," and interpret the situation in terms of their own interests. As a rule they will take sides against those to whom they are led to attribute responsibility for the inconveniences and hardships they are obliged to endure. Loud complaint will be raised at the tyranny of Labor or Capital, whichever is held responsible. The equity of the case is not the primary consideration. Both Labor and Capital are well aware of the disposition of the "public" to pronounce judgment on purely subjective grounds, hence both jockey for position, each trying to attach the blame to the other. In this matter, Capital has the advantage because of its greater influence with the Press. The recent railroad strike well illustrates the case. Labor declared the strike without observing the legal technicalities or amenities supposed to be a part of the code of industrial warfare. It therefore was pronounced "a lawless strike." Walking commuters were easily persuaded to attribute their enforced and painful exercise to Labor. Labor was thus held responsible for disturbing the peace. It must be rebuked and defeated. Citizens became strike-breakers, and gloried in their action. No serious effort appears to have been made by them to ascertain the underlying causes of the strike, so as to apportion justly the blame. The interests of the "public" were imperiously affected, and the result was what might easily have been predicted. For consumers, like others, are likely to view an industrial situation from the viewpoint of their own immediate interests, that is to say, to take a one-sided view of the matter. It is as impossible to arrive at any permanent solution of the labor problem from the Consumer's viewpoint as it is from that of Labor or Capital. All are alike partial, prejudiced and selfish. Any adjustment of Labor and Capital arrived at from partial considerations must necessarily be a mere *modus vivendi*, certain shortly to be disturbed.

We come now to the fourth viewpoint, that of Society at large, the social viewpoint. Only from this viewpoint do the interests of all receive due consideration. The problem

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then becomes, not a question of wages or of profits, or of the convenience of the "public," but of social well-being. The sole consideration is the bearing of any and every industrial proposal upon the welfare and happiness of every member of society, or at least "the greatest happiness of the greatest number." If the labor problem could be settled from this viewpoint, it would be settled once for all. But, as I have said, it may be capable only of a progressive solution. Something will be achieved, however, if it can only be clearly stated, for a problem clearly stated, it is said, is half solved. What, then, is the labor problem from the social viewpoint?

Stated broadly, the labor problem from the social viewpoint is merely the problem of supplying the economic needs of society with the least possible expenditure of time, means and energy. Here again we may perceive the law of parsimony, but it has become a social law. More simply stated the problem is that of providing the necessary utilities of society with the least amount of work. This statement, however, will be obnoxious to those who regard work as a good *per se*. There have always been those who insist that work, independently of its purpose and results, is an indispensable activity for somebody else. They fail to see that work, like other forms of human effort, should always be submitted to the test of social utility, and that it is not an end in itself. We work to live, we do not live to work.

Now, if work be considered with this thought in mind, the first thing that leaps to the eye, when we regard the labor problem from the social viewpoint, is that a large part of the work of society, perhaps half of it, is wholly unnecessary, and ought to be dispensed with. I mean unnecessary; of course, from the viewpoint of social well-being. William Morris once wrote an article on "Useful Work and Useless Toil." The title, it is true, is more alliterative than accurate. For toil is not useless if it satisfies a desire. But there are many perverted desires. They require products of labor for their satisfaction. We

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should all be better off without such desires, or if they were turned into proper channels, and, being without them, work would not be necessary to gratify them. All work, then, that merely gratifies ignoble desires, depraved tastes, debased appetites, is altogether useless from the standpoint of the true well-being of society. It is in this sense that Morris speaks of "useless" toil. In this category lies all the work that ministers to unbridled appetites, depraved tastes, extreme luxury, vain display, ostentation, invidious social distinctions, and all the wastes of a competitive national and industrial régime. Waste means obviously, and by definition, labor to no valuable social purpose.

Anyone who tries to form an adequate conception of the unnecessary work of society will contemplate the extravagances of the rich, the foolish expenditures of the poor, the vicious indulgences of both classes, and all forms of consumption that the highest type of man and society would naturally try to dispense with. Modern life is full of examples. So also is the life of the past.

One of the typical illustrations of unnecessary labor in past times is the construction of the pyramids of Egypt. According to Herodotus, the largest of these required the labor of one hundred thousand men for twenty years. The object was to commemorate a king. But the king so commemorated was a tyrant so detested that his statues were defaced by later generations. But he had the power so to misdirect labor, and he used it to such an ignoble end. When we remember that there are about forty of these pyramids, and evidences of the former existence of as many more, we begin to perceive the vastness of the amount of useless or unnecessary labor in ancient Egyptian society. Similar illustrations are to be found in the life of every people. The pyramids and palaces of the ancient Mexicans, Central Americans, and Peruvians, the Great Wall of China, all bear witness to the superfluous labor of the past. The almost incredible extravagances of the Roman emperors—Lucullus watering his trees with wine, Caligula squandering the revenues of a province on a single feast,

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dinners of nightingale tongues, or of the tongues of parrots that had been taught to speak, and the like examples—are all evidences of unnecessary labor in ancient Rome. It is safe to say that at least half the labor of society has been expended uselessly. To appreciate the vast amount of unnecessary labor and to get rid of it is the first step in the solution of the labor problem from the social viewpoint.

It should be obvious that the elimination of unnecessary labor is a legislative and an educational problem. Demand for useless labor may be restricted as rapidly as public opinion will support appropriate restrictive legislation. The prohibition of the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors is a case in point. But the creation of the desired public opinion must come through education. As the education of the young is most effective, our schools must aim to develop a type of individual whose appetites and tastes are in harmony with social well-being, and who in consequence will offer no demand for useless labor. The highest type of man or woman will be ashamed to waste the labor power of society through the gratification of vicious indulgences or ignoble tastes. The true principles of social economy, rather than the vapid political economy of too many of our textbooks, should be taught in our schools.

But supposing that society recognizes and takes steps to eliminate all unnecessary labor, what is the next step in the solution of the labor problem? Plainly it is the organization of the necessary work of the world so that it will be performed without waste, and with no harmful results to human life. This involves a wise distribution of labor power, an economical adjustment of labor time, and the perfection of labor conditions.

As to the distribution of necessary labor, we may say at once, if we broaden the term to include all useful service, that it should be performed by all who are able to work. There is absolutely no sound reason why some should labor and some should loaf, why some should work and others shirk. Justice demands that all should serve, and while, even in ideal conditions, many must be engaged in what the

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economists call unproductive labor, still there are sound physiological, if not moral reasons, why even manual labor should be distributed among all. At any rate, the labor of providing the goods and services necessary to the highest social well-being should be shared by all. No able-bodied person should want to be excused.

Observe the situation now. Thousands are out of employment—want work, but can't get it. Other thousands avoid labor on the ground that it is more honorable to live in idleness than to take a hand in the necessary work of the world. Thousands are overworked. Other thousands are employed in occupations that are uncongenial, to which by nature they are unadapted. They are drudges, that is to say, uneconomically employed. All this is commonplace, but what does it show? It shows that the work of the world is socially unorganized, carried on with practically no regard to minimizing the time, means, and energy expended. An employer who attempted to conduct his business on the principle followed by society, or rather the absence of principle, would be regarded as crazy—and he would be! Society is indeed only in the amœba stage of its intellectual development. We have reached a point in the development of a social consciousness in which we talk, and are talked to, in terms of "we" and "our." "We" must produce more, we are told, as if industry were in fact a social undertaking. The common man is expected to grow enthusiastic, and does grow enthusiastic, over "our" wealth per capita, "our" foreign trade, "our" merchant marine, etc., matters in which he has about as much direct interest as he has in Rockefeller's millions. The general participation in, and interest in, the work of society that our language often indicates can never be real until there is a common industrial purpose, with unified and organized effort to realize it. To secure this effort and purpose is the second step in the solution of the labor problem.

But in utilizing and organizing the entire working power of society, shall we employ women and children, and the

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old, the lame, the halt, and the blind not altogether incapacitated? Certainly. Work, as it should be performed, is a blessing. Why withhold it from any one? In a properly constituted society, there would be no valid objection to some labor on the part of women and children. It is now objectionable chiefly because it is not properly apportioned, and because women and children are exploited, used primarily to heap up profits. That so many of the old and partially disabled are now unemployed, being useless in profit making, though potentially useful in social production, is one of the tragical features of modern life.

Social well-being demands that all members of society be employed at tasks suited to their powers and tastes, that is, be doing what they can do best.

"But," it will be said, "the work of the world will never be organized on the basis here set forth except under compulsion. The average human being is averse to labor. He works only under the spur of necessity, or when forced to do so by external authority." This is partly true under present conditions. But intelligent social organization would change these conditions. There is in man an "instinct of workmanship." He likes to do things, to produce objects of use and beauty, to exercise his powers productively. What he does not like is to be used by others to serve their ends. He objects to being exploited. He associates the idea of exploitation with labor for wages, and the conditions under which he is often obliged to work balk or pervert his productive instinct. Taking into consideration the actual conditions of modern industrial society, the wonder is that there is as much interest in work as there is. Labor is usually irksome if the end it serves is not personal, or if the conditions are repugnant or degrading. Perfect the conditions, make the end the common good, and all will work voluntarily, unless it be those of confirmed habits of idleness; and they will soon die, leaving in their descendants no trace of their indolent habits, since acquired characteristics are not inherited.

The third step, then, in the solution of the labor problem

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in its all-round aspect is to make labor interesting and attractive instead of irksome and repugnant, a joy and a blessing instead of a curse. Can this be done?

Well, everybody knows of someone who works because he likes it. "He would rather work than eat" we say. Is this because of some peculiar inherent inclination or predisposition? Possibly, but if so, the peculiarity can be generalized. For, as Herbert Spencer says, that which the best human nature is capable of is within the reach of human nature at large. But it is more likely that the interest manifested in his work is due to a fortunate, though fortuitous, combination of circumstances. The job fits the man. His work is a natural expression of his powers, gives scope to his emotions, and is therefore satisfying. With ideal organization all necessary labor may be made to produce this effect upon the laborer. It can be made interesting if an interest in the common well-being can be awakened. For it is a psychological truism that interest in the end of effort awakens an interest in the appropriate means. Thus even drudgery may be made interesting, and cease for that reason to be drudgery. But if social well-being instead of profits and wages were made the end of industrial effort, the machine would quickly take the place of the drudge. Mechanical means would supplant man power in the interest of economy.

This doctrine of the potential attractiveness of all necessary labor will doubtless seem absurd to the unthinking, but it has been taught by some of the greatest thinkers of the world. John Stuart Mill refers with approval to the idea of Fourier that "no kind of useful labor is necessarily or universally repugnant, unless either excessive in amount or devoid of the stimulus of companionship and emulation, or regarded by mankind with contempt." Spencer says, "When we have come fully to recognize the truth that there is nothing intrinsically more gratifying in the efforts by which wild animals are caught, than in the effort expended in rearing plants, and that the combined actions of muscles and senses in rowing a boat are not by their essential

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natures more productive of agreeable feeling than those gone through with in reaping corn, but that everything depends on the co-operating emotions, which at present are more in accord with the one than the other; we shall infer that along with the decrease of those emotions for which the social state allows little or no scope, and increase of those it persistently exercises, the things now done with dislike from a sense of obligation will be done with immediate liking, and the things desisted from as a matter of duty will be desisted from because they are repugnant."[1] Lester F. Ward in his *Applied Sociology* devotes a section to "attractive labor." After approving the now generally accepted doctrine that the odium of labor is largely conventional and artificial, arising from caste and its habitual performance by persons of a lower class, he expresses the following conviction: "We are brought back to the principle. . . that the normal exercise of the faculties is not only agreeable, but, in the broadest sense of the expression, constitutes the sum total of human happiness. . . . There is no reason why, under such conditions (increased use of machinery, reduction of labor time, etc.) the labor of supplying society with all the material goods needed for its general comfort should not become both agreeable and attractive. . . . It is only necessary to divest it, first, of the artificial, or at least unnatural odium derived from the spirit of caste, and secondly, of the undue excess to which it is carried in society, which would rob the most enjoyable forms of activity of all their charms."[2]

So much for the philosophers. But isn't this same doctrine of the possible enjoyment of labor taught even by the "practical" supporters of, and apologists for, the present industrial order? The magazines are full of it. Homilies containing it are heard on every hand. "Work hard and cheerfully, and maybe promotion will follow." "Manifest a deep interest in your work. You will produce more, and your wages will be advanced." We hear such things

[1] *Data of Ethics*, (*Principles of Ethics*, Vol. I.) pp. 183–184 (par. 67).
[2] Ward, L. F., *Applied Sociology*, p. 336.

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everywhere. Even the poet says: "Give me the man who sings at his work." The man who could sing while performing some of the drudgery now required, repugnant, ill-paid, and scorned, would be an imbecile, or have great powers of abstracting his thought. The truth is that most of this modern exhortation of laborers to be happy in their work is mere preaching, designed merely to quiet or prevent dissatisfaction with existing labor conditions. Labor cannot be made universally attractive by the hortatory method.

There are undoubtedly difficulties in the way of making labor attractive and interesting, but let us analyze the subject and see whether these difficulties are altogether insurmountable.

First of all, there is some labor that is already interesting. It is reputable, not too arduous, engages the full powers of men, that is, it exercises all the faculties, which is the condition of happiness. It partakes of the nature of art. With respect to this labor, the problem is already solved.

Second, there is labor which fulfills these conditions, except it is unduly prolonged. The remedy here is plain. It is a reduction of the amount of labor required, the granting of leisure. Leisure is as essential to happiness as labor. In all occupations in which work is excessive the demand for a shorter work-day is imperative. It is equivalent to a demand for more leisure. The moment work becomes excessive, with respect to time or strength, that moment it becomes a curse. It detracts from life, and the very essence of a curse is that it degrades, brutalizes, injures life. "All work and no play makes Jack a dull boy," says the adage. All work and no leisure makes the laborer a dull man, and dullness is inconsistent with that largeness of outlook, that full and free exercise of all the faculties without which there cannot be fullness of life. The leisure given would not be spent in idleness and thus be a social loss—not if education does its proper work. Leisure is synonymous with freedom. Men would be free from their social task, willingly performed, to devote themselves to the creative work prompted by their individual

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tastes and aptitudes. With the compulsory tasks of society properly apportioned, and properly limited in time, they would be quickly performed; and from the leisure gained the world would profit materially, and in a measure now undreamed of, from the unhampered operation of the creative instinct of man.

Third, there are certain kinds of labor, which, because of their monotonous nature, can never be made interesting in and of themselves. Some of these can be eliminated by machinery. The residue can be made attractive only by properly adjusting the conditions of their performance, and by developing a strong interest in the social end they serve. Improving the conditions is not an impossible task, and if the interest of the worker in the social aim cannot be aroused, and if he cannot be made to see that all necessary labor is alike honorable, then our educational agencies must in so far be a failure.

We see, then, that the objects to be aimed at in all attempts to solve the labor problem are, first, the elimination of all unnecessary labor; second, the organization of all necessary labor on the basis of a perfect social economy; and, third, the making of all necessary labor attractive, so that the end of economy will not be defeated by compulsion, and so that the laborer will truly live while he works. These ends are remote. We shall not live to see them realized. Because they are remote, some will feel that all thought of them is impractical. But the skillful pilot guides the ship by the distant star, rather than by the near and floating objects. One thing is certain. Glorifying the existing order, denying the most obvious industrial facts, pretending that there is no real labor problem, that the labor agitator is the sole cause of all the trouble, and the like, will not solve the problems. With half the work of the world an unnecessary expenditure of labor, with many idle, with many overworked, many hating the tasks they are obliged to perform, with constant friction among the different industrial classes, we have before us a gigantic problem. It is a social problem, primarily educational,

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but in part legislative. It may be progressively solved by the inculcation of sound ideas with respect to labor, and the enactment of such laws as will secure the social end desired, namely, the strict conformity of work with the social weal. Social weal is the ideal in the light of which all proposed labor legislation, all industrial measures, should be considered. They should not be determined by the interests of a single class. Some, as I have said, profess contempt for ideal considerations. But the ideal is the test of the practical, and he who will not consider what industrial conditions ought to be, who will not look at the labor problem from the social viewpoint, should never speak of the solution of that problem. For there is nothing clearer than that the problems of an evolving society cannot be permanently solved on the basis of existing conditions.

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THE INSTINCT OF WORKMANSHIP AND THE WILL TO WORK

J. D. STOOPS

THE older economists regarded the search for pleasure and the avoidance of pain as the determining motives of business activity. Psychology has dispelled this idea. We do not seek pleasure; we find pleasure in securing certain objects. It is generally assumed that patent rights are necessary to guarantee the creative activity of inventors. Because money represents social prestige it is a potent stimulus to invention as well as to other forms of economic activity. But invention at its best is indifferent to financial reward. The greatest inventors, like the greatest musicians, poets, and artists, are driven to creative activity by an irresistible impulse. The instinct of workmanship is the main source of energy which drives the wheels of industry. It functions in spite of loss, failure, and poverty. It is at its best in those who are not dependent upon the stimulus of financial profit. When the bird builds a nest; when the beaver constructs a dam; when the monkey goes through a process of manipulation, there are present no ideas which anticipate definite objects. Such behavior is due to action-patterns inherited in the lower brain levels. And human beings possess these same action-patterns. These instincts are associated in the human brain with abstract thought but such association does not change their hereditary and non-voluntary character. The object of the will is the thing to be accomplished. Pleasure is an accompaniment of the accomplishment of any object of will. The same is true of profit or gain. When workmanship is at its best the will proceeds with the directness of instinct. In its highest forms workmanship is not only unaware of profit but even blind to obstacles in its way.

There are then a number of instincts such as manipula-

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tion, constructiveness, workmanship, and contrivance, which give to human behavior a trend, a drive, a line of direction, a form and outline. These instincts underlie our economic and vocational activities. And this group of instincts can be given full rein. Unlike the instincts of sex and pugnacity and possession, the instinct of workmanship does not in itself endanger the lives of others. It is creative. Its fullest expression may be wholly constructive. It needs intellectual organization if it is to be productive. But when it is given complete sway it is never in itself anti-social. It is an instinct whose energy may be enjoyed without remorse.

The instinct of hunger is among the most important of the fundamental instincts. The tendency to seek the breast, to suck things, to put things in the mouth, is a manifestation in the infant of the will to live. The animal exhibits an almost unbroken attention to whatever stimulates his senses of taste and smell. Hunting in animals and in primitive man is an outgrowth of the instinct of hunger. Chasing and grasping an escaping animal is preparatory to killing and eating it. The pursuit of large game among gregarious animals tends to assume a co-operative form. The evolution of tools, such as clubs, traps, and arrows, makes possible more intellectual forms of food-getting.

Intimately associated with the instinct of hunger is the hoarding instinct. Animals and primitive men collect and hoard food. The instinct of acquisition is associated with nest-building and home-building. It led to the collecting of flocks. With the further development of intelligence, a long intermediate process came in between the beginning and the end of the pursuit of food. Here came in the development of agriculture and commerce. The professions and all the higher vocations are inseparable from the instinct to seek food. There is an inborn trend which leads men to possess, to appropriate. To store, to hoard, to collect, is an irresistible drive in the human mind. It is the root of the institution of property. Instinctive social tendencies like the parental instinct and gregariousness

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may modify the instinct to acquire, to possess, along social lines but the instinct itself is ineradicable. There is no limit to the objects and interests that may be brought within the scope of this instinct.

The human race took a vast stretch of centuries to learn how to work. Many individuals do not achieve this difficult process. Man learned the difficult art of work by transferring to industry the organization and control which he had achieved in the violent emotional activities of his more primitive life as a hunter and fighter. He substituted tools for weapons but there was no essential modification of the underlying patterns of the older instinctive activities. Primitive man obtained his food by fishing in the flowing streams and by hunting wild game; he fought for his clothing with fierce beasts. Here were personal encounter and the energizing, emotional experience of fear, anger, and self-preservation.

If it be true that the energies of the will are in the instinctive patterns of the mind, then the will to work must have an underlying system of instinctive predispositions like any other form of organized behavior. There is no other foundation for an efficient form of vocational pursuit. In the mind of the artist, the poet, the inventor, the creative industrial organizer, there are definite mental patterns which impose on the phenomena of experience more or less definite forms. When the mind meets the facts of experience with a drive or pattern which gives these facts a certain form there is a creative, organizing, thrusting forward of the will which is accompanied by a consciousness of power.

One of the corollaries of the Freudian psychology is the proposition that nervous and mental diseases, in their acquired form, are the result of a conflict between instinctive trends and the ideal strivings of the personality. Any system of instinctive trends which is not incorporated within that system of ideal strivings which we call the moral self will necessarily set up a tendency toward mental and moral disorganization. Creativeness and efficiency can

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exist only when the will is supported by instinctive predisposition. Where there is conflict between volition and instinctive trend there is insufficiency and disorganization of will.

We are today recognizing a divorce between moral personality and vocational activity, especially in the industrial sphere. This conflict results practically in a case of dual personality. Unless the instinct of workmanship be organized in such a way as to make one's vocation an integral part of one's personality, the will can be neither an adequate, nor a morally organized, will. To prosecute a vocation which is not the expression of one's richest innate capacities is to exhibit an incomplete and ineffective will in the field of one's vocation.

Work which is disassociated from the driving forces of our instinct-patterns is drudgery. Physical and nervous breakdowns are the result not of the nature or amount of work done but of the nervous and mental conditions under which the work is done. It is not the work done which wears us down; it is the tension, hurry, anxiety, and lack of co-ordination; above all it is the lack or the frustration of a creative emotional drive.

The instincts of workmanship and of acquisition are as much a part of personality as the instincts of sex or fear or gregariousness. They have not been so regarded and there has grown up a vicious dualism between the world of industry and the world of morality. To work so many hours for so much pay without any vital interest in the process is to have a dual personality. The object of such a vocational activity is not an organic part of the agent's personality. Think of the emotional loss in the machine-like regularity, the impersonal routine, of the modern industrial operative who works so many hours for so much pay and has no personal interest in the concern in which he is only a "hand" or an employee! In the industrial world the disassociation of the mind of the worker from the creative drive of the instinct of workmanship has broken the contact of the will with the latent instinctive sources of power.

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To spend one's time in a line of work in which one has no serious interest is to cultivate a divided mind. Here is a fundamental condition of neurasthenia. Indeed if one is to be adjusted to a machine, if one is to perform a set of stereotyped reactions at a time and in a manner determined by an impersonal machine, if scientific management means a perfecting of the work of the machine irrespective of the emotions and the will of the operator, then imagination and initiative would actually seem to interfere in the adaptation of the man to the machine. Many operatives left the grind of the factory for military service with a consciousness of release. Here was adventure; here was an escape from the dull monotony of the machine.

It is this adaptation of the mind to the machine with its constant suppression of the emotional life which is behind the demand for shorter hours of work. It is also related to the new custom of an annual vacation. It is associated with the increasing demand for a practically non-educational form of drama. The Greek went to the theatre in the morning and the play presented some ideal of conduct. The brain which has been fatigued by uninteresting mechanical labor prefers vaudeville to Shakespeare.

If there are inherited action-patterns which determine the lines of direction along which the will must develop, then a disassociation of the will from any action-pattern means a disorganization of the will in some corresponding field of conduct. We know of no universal, changeless will which functions independently of the instincts. If this be true any frustration of the instinct of workmanship means an inefficient will in the field of one's vocation. Workmanship and the sense of property are as deeply rooted in our constitution as hunger, fear or sex. Of all the instincts which most directly underlie our social institutions, those which lie at the basis of workmanship and property are the last to receive universal social recognition. That curiosity is the root of the desire for knowledge; that sex is the basis of the family; that "empathy" is the source of religion, is universally recognized in the literature on these subjects. And

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now we are learning that there are instincts which drive us to construct and to invent, which underlie the processes of work, of industry, of vocation. We are beginning to see that the state and industry as well as religion, the family, and education, are intellectualized and organized forms of instinctive tendencies. It is becoming clear that the evolution of the technique of industry is just as vitally related to the nature of personality as the evolution of the home, the school, and the church. A newer sense of individuality must completely reorganize the instincts of workmanship and possession. The disorganization of personality because of repression in religion, in knowledge, and in the field of the state is a problem which has come down from the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. To-day we are aware of another type of repression,—the repression of the instinct to manipulate, to experiment, to be a cause, to construct, to create, and also a repression of the instinct to possess, to own property. It is a growing consciousness of the repression of these instincts brought about by the popularization of science and the spread of democratic thought which underlies the present industrial unrest. Personality can be as thoroughly disorganized by a repression of the instincts which underlie one's work and vocation as by a repression of those instincts which lie at the basis of religion or science or the family. There is nothing more basic, more central, in our life and conduct than the organization of the instincts of workmanship and possession.

The suppression of the emotional life in the industrial process is also associated with the presence of alcoholism. When the mind is broken into dual personalities, when the will is disassociated from the instincts of workmanship, of acquisition, of possession, the manual worker is forced to live in a small compartment of his total self. This suppression of the instincts which underlie the will to work, like any other continued suppression, is a narrowing and a distorting of the personality. Alcohol is one way of escaping this suppression. Is it any wonder that the

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industrial worker resorts to drink and drugs and emotional excesses in his attempt to restore to experience the lost elements of emotional experience which are an essential part of a normal life? "Zealotism in religious belief," says Münsterberg, "tyranny and cruelty, sexual over-indulgence and perversion, gambling and betting, mysticism and superstition, recklessness and adventurousness, and above all, senseless crimes, have always been the psychological means of overcoming the emptiness and monotony of an unstimulated life."[1]

We are getting new light on the psychology of fatigue. There are many forms of fatigue that are not due to prolonged work. Many men who have gone into war service have worked longer hours than in their regular occupation, but with less fatigue. The work has stimulated the emotions. Such work has been somewhat of the nature of a game. Experiments on fatigue in the school-room show that a great deal of the fatigue of the student is due to repressed emotions, thwarted desires, monotonous routine, lack of interest and perspective. There is a chronic occupational fatigue which arises not from work or from overwork, but from disorganization of will. Where the individual's self is not in what he does there is a dualism of mind and therefore a confusion and weakness of will.

The emotion of fear plays an important part in the psychology of industry. Recent experiments on the ductless glands have produced invaluable results not only in medicine, but also in psychology. It has been shown that during such emotions as fear and anger the adrenal glands secrete into the blood stream a substance known as adrenalin, which adds increased energy to the muscles of the extremities, thereby facilitating movements of defense or of flight. Since there is no immediate use of the digestive organs in case of fear and anger it is easy to understand the contraction of the blood-vessels of the digestive organs which expels the blood to the large surface muscles of the extremities, thereby aiding defense or flight. The emotions

[1] *McClure's*, Vol. xxxi (1908), p. 443.

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of fear and anger are accordingly incidental to occasions of crisis. They are dynamogenic; they aid the organism in overcoming difficulties, in meeting emergencies. If, however, an emotion of fear or anger becomes chronic, the substances poured by the ductless glands into the blood stream are not used by the muscles in meeting any emergency. In cases of chronic fear or anger, therefore, these secretions act as poisons or toxins. They put an extra strain on the brain, on the kidneys, on the whole organism. Chronic fears, fear of unemployment, fear of sickness, of disability, are therefore conducive to fatigue, of whose cause the individual will be absolutely unaware. Some form of guarantee to the individual against want, sickness, accident, and disability would more than pay for its cost in the better economic returns which would result from a more secure and confident state of mind.

The demand on the part of labor for participation in the management of industry can be met only when labor achieves the technique of industrial organization. Such a technique, however, presupposes an established tradition regarding the training and organization of that entire group of instincts which underlie the functioning of an effective, intelligent will in the industrial world. The freeing and development of the instinct of workmanship which underlies the evolution of industry will be as long and as difficult a process as the intellectualizing of the instinct of gregariousness which underlies the growth of the state. And democratic participation in the organization of industry will be possible only when there has been developed a continuous group tradition to sustain the sporadic efforts of individuals.

The present type of leadership in industry is the product of centuries of individualistic tradition. The great industrial processes of to-day have been consciously organized for profit. When, however, we come to see that social instincts and social motives are as fundamental in our constitution as individual instincts and individual motives, we shall no longer recognize private gain as the sole determining motive

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in the organization of the instinct of workmanship. The individual's gain would logically be determined according to the value of his product. Economic gain should be society's compensation to the individual in order that he might be free to work out his specific vocation. When the social aspects of experience are as well recognized as the individual aspects, we shall have a new type of leadership in industry.

In the aristocratic societies of the past workmanship and possession have had free expression only in the few. To-day the school, the press, and oral propaganda are teaching the many to demand the freedom to express their instincts of workmanship and possession which has heretofore been limited to the few.

To live and work for concerns which are not immediately the object of one's own purpose is to be dominated by motives which are extraneous to one's own will. It is the consciousness of this fact which is at the basis of the current demand on the part of labor for participation in the management and organization of industry.

The instincts of workmanship and possession through the development of individualism have become disassociated from the parental and gregarious instincts. In this way men have come to work and save not as members of families and communities and states. The instincts to create and to possess have been set free from those instincts which give the mind its social patterns. Many individuals live primarily to create and amass wealth.

There has taken place in the minds of women a disassociation of another sort. The will of woman when it is disassociated from the drives of workmanship and parenthood tends to assume a parasitic form.

The instinct to possess must be organized as an integral part of a personality which expresses itself as profoundly in social as in individual interests. The instinct to possess must be organized within the social patterns of experience which underlie the home, the community, the state.

The instinct to possess must be correlated with the in-

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stinct to create. The instinct of workmanship can alone give creativeness and power to the will to work. It can furnish a drive to the will which is as creative in industry as in science and art and religion.

Until this organization of the will is effected in the fields of the instincts of possession and workmanship there will remain a disorganized personality.

"You will hear," says Emerson in his essay on Literary Ethics, "that the first duty is to get land and money, place and name . . . . It is this domineering temper of the sensual world that creates the extreme need of the priests of science . . . . Let us seek the shade, and find wisdom in neglect. Be content with a little . . . . Why should you renounce your right to traverse the star-lit deserts of truth for the premature comforts of an acre, house, and barn? Truth also has its roof, and bed, and board. Make yourself necessary to the world, and mankind will give you bread, and if not store of it, yet such as shall not take away your property in all men's possessions, in all men's affections, in art, in nature, and in hope."

Here reason in the individual is identical with an absolute reason. Such a reason makes the individual supremely indifferent to the "external" interests of the physical environment.

Such a dualism of mind and matter was the logical result of the Greek dualism of citizen and slave and of the mediæval dualism of soul and body. The suppression of the instinct of property was a part of the ethics of world-denial. When, however, the mediæval saint surrendered his interest in property he did so with the full assurance that he was an organic part of the organization of the Church universal, with its hospitals, its libraries, its cathedrals, its schools, and its guilds. But when Protestantism and individualism perpetuate this absoluteness and independence of the will they are dealing with an individual will which has broken its allegiance to a world-organization and is attempting to stand alone. Under such changed conditions the old doctrine leaves the individual naked and alone. The cor-

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porate personality of the Greek citizen and of the mediæval saint has given way to the isolation and conflict of competitive individualism. The absoluteness of the inner will which regarded matter as external and accidental, in its modern individualized form, has left the saint of the Protestant type and the ordinary individual citizen fairly naked in a rich, material world.

Another form which this view takes is the dualism between extrinsic and intrinsic needs and desires. After the organic needs have been met there must be a cultivation of "intrinsic" interests, such as philosophy, art, etc., which have value in themselves. There is a fear of the endless refinement of desires. Luxurious novelties through habituation become unconscious necessities. Matters of diet, clothing, amusements, spaciousness in building, improvement in mechanical equipment, luxuriousness and finesse in laces and rugs, can be elaborated without limit. The problem is solved by the dogma regarding the intrinsic and the extrinsic, or that which is and that which is not an end-in-itself.

There is a confusing sensationalism which reveals itself in the drama, the dance, music, in spending for display, etc. There is, however, no antidote for sensationalism in any dogma of extrinsic and intrinsic. It is probable that the chief cause of the contemporary outburst of sensationalism is the economic repression of the instincts of sex, of parenthood, of workmanship, and of possession.

The dualism between economics and morals is shamefully evident in international relations. Practically all "civilized" control of colonial policy is a subtle form of the exploitation of helpless peoples.

Why should prophets, teachers, artists, musicians, inventors, scientific investigators, have minds disassociated from the material interests of life? Because they are the product of, and the perpetuators of, a moral tradition which holds material things to be external to a moral and spiritual will. The weakness of our moral and intellectual leadership in the field of industry is the result of our moral

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tradition. Our wills are ineffective in reconstructing a disorganized industrial world because our minds have been literally disassociated from those instincts which underlie the world of industry.

It might be said that our age is the age of the machine. The steam-engine, the electric-engine, the sewing-machine, the phonograph, the typewriter, the telephone, the telegraph, the æroplane, have to a large extent revolutionized the character of our world. Every great invention helps to change the character of civilization. Fulton, and Watt, and Howe, and Edison are as potent factors in the evolution of civilization as the Napoleons or the St. Augustines. Coal and iron and steel; electricity and water-power; railroads and shipping; all forms of foodstuffs and clothing; art galleries, libraries, magazines, and newspapers, have become absolutely essential to our moral life. A moral will without this material equipment is for us an impossibility.

That matter without moral organization can be no part of moral conduct is axiomatic in our ethical thought. That form and organization and a unified will cannot exist apart from the material, the content, the objective interests which the will organizes has not been recognized. Without the material interests in life the will would be utterly without content. Such a will is an abstraction, not a reality.

The tempered steel which has come into our lives from the Stoics, the Cynics, and from Christianity, has been used to make our wills independent of the material world. What is most needed now is that we use this tempered steel of the will in organizing the world of material things. A moral will which does not have at its command the necessary wealth of economic material is an inadequate will and is unable to function in the world of to-day.

The machine which has revolutionized our industrial life has been the centre about which the life of the worker has been organized. When, however, we come to see the machine as an instrument of a creative will, it will no longer symbolize an era of materialism. Instead of subor-

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dinating the will to the machine, science will put the machine into the hand of the worker as an instrument whereby his will can be aided and extended. The machine will then add to our old consciousness of material power a new consciousness of moral power.

When we thought of the will as independent of instinct, emotion, and sentiment, we regarded it as a spiritual entity which was the same in all individuals. We thought of the will as only extraneously related to the body. This view of the will likewise kept it aloof from the material world. We see the will to-day as an organization of instincts and emotions and sentiments. This conception of the will implies an organization of the responses of the organism to the environment. This definition of the will involves an organic relation of the will to the material world. There can be no morality of industry until the world of the machine with its exactness in space, its precision in time, is correlated with the instincts, the emotions, and the will of the workman. And there can be no correlation of the will and the world of the machine until we get a larger view both of the will and of the material world. An oriental rug, a Greek statue, an Italian painting, a copy of Dante, a drawing of a Doric column, are all physical, material things; but they are physical things into which have been wrought the very souls of their creators. The mode of architecture of a house, and its location, are physical characteristics, but they help to give the house a soul.

Conscious experience has two poles: one is an inner, subjective centre, a will, an organizing focus; the other is represented by the objective ends to which all our instinctive and voluntary responses are directed. The traditional dualism between an inner moral will and an outer world of fact must be avoided. This can be done only by achieving a larger, more inclusive definition of both the will and the material world.

Morality and religion do belong to the subjective integration of experience, but a subjective process of integration must have objective material to organize. By morality and

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religion we mean not a realm of mind and will which is private in the sense that it excludes physical things. We mean rather the way in which we organize the material of life, physical as well as mental. The classical and mediæval periods had a moral organization which was superior to ours; but this was because the material content of their civilization was simpler than ours. Our material world is confusingly complex. We must, however, achieve a form of moral organization for the rich phenomena of our modern world. It is the function of ethics and religion to give moral unity to the wealth of material of the economic, social, and political world which has been made available by modern science. In this focus of moral organization lies the solution of the industrial problem.

The main current of civilization from the sixteenth to the twentieth century was concerned with the freeing of the will from authority. It was a process of individualization. The development of steam power in the nineteenth century was controlled by the individualistic philosophy of the eighteenth century. This was one current of disorganization. The process of individualization on the part of labor; the freeing of the individual will of the laborer, is the secret of the unrest in the twentieth century. This is another phase of disorganization.

Another form of disassociation has its origin in the dualism between the mind and the material world. The traditional philosophy has defined mind as an inner subjective consciousness. On the other hand the exact sciences have dealt with the material world in mathematical, quantitative manner. This development took the form of a stark opposition between an inner, spiritual, rational subject and an outer, material, external object or thing. In this way the whole material world became morally taboo. It was external to our moral experience. There grew up an absolute opposition between personality and material things. The moral will became an inner subjective attitude; physical, material things came to be objective and external. The will became introverted; it turned in on itself.

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Material things, on the other hand, were excluded from this inner sense of personality; they were cut off from the moral will. We see, then, going along with the process of introversion in the development of the will a corresponding process of mechanization in the field of the exact sciences. Modern science has tended more and more to treat all its material as if it existed independent of, and apart from, any appraising or valuing will. This has given us a distinctly realistic view of the world. The exact sciences, such as astronomy, physics, and chemistry, have given us a world which is impersonal and which exists prior to, and independent of, the mind and the will of man.

This dualism of mind and matter is the foundation of the stratification of society into thinkers and manual workers. Some men are clay, which must be molded by the pure gold of the educated mind into the forms of most service to society. This dualism of brain and muscle was carried to such a point by the Greeks that even the carving of sculpture was thought to degrade the mind. Here is a full-blown disassociation of the will in all its industrial phases from the sphere of knowledge and science.

This view of the material world as external to the moral will has given us in the field of economics the non-moral law of individual and group competition. The categories of the physical sciences and the law of the machine have resulted in a quantitative rather than a qualitative standard. Higher speed, greater production, have been the predominant motives. Not the qualitative organization of wealth for the sake of human need, but a constant increase of material production for profit has been the ruling economic motive. This development of a non-moral theory of industry has recently been adopted by the employees in their approval of the principle of direct action.

The ethics of introversion deals with the problem of property by limiting desire. The individual is regarded as a self-centred spiritual unit who in some way creates industrial relationships as the occasion demands. Love, respect for personality, good motive, are thought of as able to

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create proper industrial relationships without the "external" mechanics of legislation. But the desires and the will cannot be trained and developed apart from the objective interests of life. We can train the instinct for possession only through a rational organization of material interests. The traditional idealistic conception of the mind by excluding material things rendered the will ineffective and unreal in the economic realm. It also deprived the objective material interests of any moral standard whatever.

The traditional intellectualistic type of idealism has brought about an aloofness of the will from the material world which has been both a product and a cause of industrial disorganization. An economic realism which treats the material world as independent of a moral will is the concomitant of an inadequate subjective idealism. On the other hand subjectivism in morals is accentuated by a non-moral realism in economics. The ethics of asceticism has taught us how to be in want; but we have not yet learned how to abound.

The Christianity of the *mediæval* type attempted to christianize those *abstract aspects of personality* which are in the sphere of the reason and the will. It attempted to abstract those aspects of personality which it regarded as constituting the inner or *interior life*. Psychology is now showing us that such an interior moral will apart from the whole system of instincts which relate the mind to its environment is a pure abstraction. There is no inner will which functions apart from the instincts of workmanship and possession. A well-organized will must function in and through all the instincts with which nature has endowed us. The centuries of disassociation between the will and the instinct of sex and parenthood are over so far as theory is concerned. The divorce of the instinct of curiosity from the development of knowledge is also in theory fast becoming a thing of the past. But we are just beginning to recognize that conflict between the will and the instinct of workmanship brings about a mental and moral disorganization. We must no longer attempt to train reason and

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will as ends in themselves. Through psychological analysis, through vocational guidance, through every possible means, the individual must be led to discover the inherited capacities along whose lines his intelligence and will can make their richest development. The richest development of any individual's will is possible only within certain instinctive lines of behavior. These lines should mark out the field of one's vocation. Here is the field for the development of one's instinct of workmanship. The blocking of the will here means disorganization both of personality and of one's life work.

The newer sense of personality of which Christianity is our most adequate symbol has not yet reorganized the instincts of workmanship and property. These instincts must be trained and developed in the spirit of him who was The Carpenter. There must be a christianization of all our instincts, including those which underlie our vocation.

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THE MOTHER'S CONFESSIONAL.

HENRY S. CURTIS.

THOSE who have read Hawthorne's story of "The Marble Faun" will remember the experience of Miriam in St. Peters. She has seen Donatello hurl the blackmailer from the Tarpeian Rock. Her regard for Donatello, and her feeling that the blackmailer has had his deserts make her keep her secret, and the death is reported as an accident; but it preys upon her conscience, and she can find no peace, until, although a Protestant, she goes to the Confessional in St. Peters and tells what she has seen. Then, as though by magic, the oppression melts away, and peace comes to her spirit.

It is not for nothing that the confessional has held its place in the Catholic Church through all the ages, for it has always served the double purpose of keeping the priest in close touch with the lives of his people, and of furnishing relief from sins committed and wrongs done.

Within the last two decades, there has grown up in Vienna, a new school of psychology which is known as psycho-analysis. It originated as a means of treating hysteria, but has since broadened into a general theory of the sub-conscious soul and its inner meaning. While many of us would not be ready to accept the general implications and conclusions of psycho-analysis, we cannot dispute the fact that hysteria and many serious forms of mental aberration are often cured by it. It is simply the method of confession to the doctor of sins committed.

Freud says that these sins concealed become thorns in the spirit which fester and ferment in the darkness until they express themselves in outward physical pains and various undesirable symptoms. But both the pains and symptoms are cured by complete confession with emotion of the sin which caused the trouble. Probably all of us can remember instances from our own childhood where some

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particular misdeed of ours made us wretched for weeks or perhaps months, until finally we found a sympathetic ear into which to pour our tale, and then lo, our trouble was gone. The mother is the one safe confessor for every child, and it should be a part of her ambition to fill as perfectly as possible this position.

We little realize childhood's troubles and fears. We adults have forgotten them. I once went through with care a questionaire which brought in several thousand replies on, "the fears of little children." The astonishing thing was, that while these fears often made children wretched for months or years they were seldom told, and most of them were absolutely groundless. I have often taken little children from the city into the woods and have nearly always found them afraid of wolves, and bears, and lions. They never seem to appreciate that these fierce animals of fairy tales and picture books are not found in Massachusetts or Michigan. When I was a boy of five, a neighbor of ours shot himself, and for three years afterward my life was made wretched by a fear that my father would do the same. We once had a little girl of four in our home for about a year. She was always afraid that we might leave her in the woods or at some of the places to which we went, I suppose on account of the story of Hansel and Gretel, and she always wanted to be perfectly sure that we had no such idea in our minds.

Not only is there this great range of groundless fears but there are the little anxieties to which children are constantly exposed—in regard to health, to hellfire in the olden days, to school work and other things. The great majority of these anxieties also would be quieted if the child and mother were in closer sympathy and understanding.

And then there are the sins of omission and commission of which we have been guilty. The thing which we were told to do and did not do, or the wrong committed. All of these not only weigh upon the spirit and spoil the spontaneity of childhood but trouble its sleep as well.

Every mother should establish her confessional at the

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bedside, and strive for a fifteen or twenty minute period of the greatest intimacy every evening before the child goes to sleep. In this the events of the day and the plans of the morrow should be talked over that the child may have peaceful sleep, and that he may go to the new day with an untroubled conscience.

If the mother is to have this confidence and is to serve as the real mother-confessor, she must cultivate this intimacy from the earliest years, and show by her interest that she wants to hear all of the little events and adventures in the daily lives of her children. If she does not show interest, she will not be told, neither will she if she is too much horrified by things committed. She must maintain an attitude of constructive criticism by always being in perfect sympathy with the child. Her suggestions must be helpful so that the child feels that he has found both peace and a solution to his difficulties.

Many of us have wished that we might begin our lives again and avoid the mistakes we have made. This opportunity is given to every mother if she will enter thus sympathetically into the lives of her children, and know both what the day has yielded and what is planned for the morrow. It means much to the children to be thus relieved of their fears, to have adult counsel each day for the trials of the day, and to know that there is someone who understands and is deeply concerned about each event in their lives. If it is possible for the mother to establish and maintain such a confessional, it will solve the chief problems of delinquency and much of the unhappiness of childhood.

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SCHILLER AND SHAFTESBURY.

ALLAN L. CARTER.

SCHILLER and Shaftesbury have frequently been associated because, though they lived in periods which seemed to bring much evidence to the contrary, they persisted throughout the whole of their work in the belief that man is essentially good. Owing to the re-editing of his works and to the recent admirable investigations of his thought, there has been during the past decade a revival of interest in Shaftesbury. Further reason for the renewed interest in Shaftesbury lies in the fact that his work contains the essence, perhaps in its most attractive and available form, of the creed of human goodness. Schiller, despite the appalling facts that confronted him in the history of his time, unmistakably voiced his faith in the same creed; and while, unlike Shaftesbury, he has received but slight attention in our own time, because he is inevitably associated with Kant, his work serves to emphasize and to bring into strong relief the basic contentions of Shaftesbury. An intimate relation between Schiller and Shaftesbury has been assumed in all the more thoroughgoing investigations of the history of thought. As to the details of this relationship, however, there is as yet no concensus of opinion. Before passing to a consideration of the parallel themes and their treatment in Schiller and Shaftesbury, it may be interesting briefly to review the main facts in the discussion of their historical relations.

In general, there are two ways of looking at the relations of Shaftesbury and Schiller, both of which have in turn been the result of the decision of Schiller's relation to Kant. The first and older view is held by those who believe that Schiller became essentially Kantian following his intensive study of Kant's philosophy; that as a result of this study Schiller went over to Kantian principles definitively. These writers, then, place whatever influence is traceable to

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Shaftesbury in the earliest philosophical writings of Schiller, and they assume a repudiation of Shaftesbury when Schiller takes up the study of Kant. This view, which has for its sponsor no less authority than the able writer Windelband, has been elaborated by Professor O. F. Walzel in his introduction to the last Cotta edition of Schiller's works. He undertakes to derive the closeness of opinion between Shaftesbury and Schiller from Schiller's contact with Herder and with Wieland, both of whom have been known as ardent champions of Shaftesbury in Germany. This conception tends to disregard any possibility of influence from Shaftesbury which may have resulted through Schiller's early study of Fergusson; and Professor Walzel in his discussion seems to distinguish between Shaftesbury's indirect influence, held to be negligible, through Fergusson in the Garve translation and Shaftesbury's direct influence which came later through Herder; what the details of such distinction are, however, unfortunately remain unsaid. Such an interpretation finds very naturally its culmination in Schiller's elaboration of the "beautiful soul," as explained in the essay on "Grace and Dignity." This second view, therefore, is taken as evidence of the denial of Kant and of the enthronement of Shaftesbury in a point which contains the crux of the whole question. Those who hold that Schiller is definitely Kantian quite conceivably are less likely to bring forward the essay on "Grace and Dignity" and to accord it the position of keystone in Schiller's thought, as many writers incline to do, but they insist rather upon the importance of such later work as "On the Service to Morals of Aesthetic Habits," in which it is not impossible to see an expansion of the Kantian doctrine and an end of Shaftesbury. As matter of fact, however, all these views may well be substantiated from evidence assembled from Schiller's essays, though far too frequently one or the other of these opinions has been supported merely through exclusion of part of the work. In fine, the assumptions of Schiller's kinship, or of his indebtedness, as some writers would have it, to Shaftesbury amount to five

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particulars: (1) that Schiller borrowed the idea of practicing virtue out of pure inclination from Shaftesbury; (2) that the conception of the "beautiful soul" is the rehabilitation of Shaftesbury's "virtuoso"; (3) that the principle of the advancement of moral ends through aesthetic means is precisely the same in both authors; (4) that Schiller develops his early pantheism from Shaftesbury; (5) that Schiller's notion of world harmony is quite as referable to Shaftesbury as to Leibnitz. Hence it follows, if the assumptions of those who see essential closeness in thought between Shaftesbury and Schiller are taken at full value, that Shaftesbury's work is entirely prelusive to Schiller's; and Schiller does but little more than to comment upon the operation of the earlier ideas, adding what might be termed simply the natural accretion to Shaftesbury's system during the eighteenth century.

Manifestly, the difficulty in the way of these theories about the influence of Shaftesbury upon Schiller is the fact that these writers who support them are attempting to assume specific reference for what is nothing more than a broad principle, or even a generalization. It cannot be said that any of the ideas mentioned are in a strict sense the exclusive property of Shaftesbury; in fact, they are such as might easily suggest themselves to any mind strongly bent by an interest in aesthetics and ethics. Moreover, the external evidence that Schiller knew Shaftesbury at first hand is insufficient; and there is no reason to suppose that Schiller would bridle any enthusiasm for Shaftesbury in his letters where he is particularly open and full. If any explanation why Schiller wrote as he did after the fashion of Shaftesbury or of Plato is necessary, it seems quite as logical to seek the reason in study of his personality and temperament as in his relations to earlier thinkers.

The justification for a parallel study of the thought of Schiller and Shaftesbury is to be sought less in the challenging statements about the historical relations of these writers, although these statements have acted as a spur to many students, than in the need for a succinct account of similari-

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ties in belief and of the intellectual and emotional processes by which these beliefs are bodied out.

To anyone attempting to write about the philosophical views of Schiller there are at once presented numerous difficulties: these exist both in the very inconsequential manner in which the material is brought to paper as well as in the more fundamental matter of terminology. It is, of course, open to question whether Schiller is saying anything new in these somewhat remarkable terms, and what Carlyle remarks facetiously about the Kantian philosophy may be here not without application to Schiller: "To an exoteric reader the philosophy of Kant almost appears to invert the common maxim; its end and aim seem not be 'to make abstruse things simple,' but to make simple things abstruse. Often a proposition of inscrutable and dread aspect when resolutely grappled with and torn from its shady den, and its bristling entrenchments of uncouth terminology, and dragged forth into the light of day, to be seen of the natural eye, and tried by merely human understanding proves to be a very harmless truth, familiar to us from old, sometimes so familiar as to be a truism." Schiller, it must be remembered, is not fundamentally a philosopher, and, although he establishes an exceedingly close articulation in much of his writing between his freer poetical bent and his formal interests in philosophy, he rarely achieves the consciously crisp sequence and the orderliness of thought which are so desirable in philosophic studies, and into some of his articles he brings a baffling poetic fancifulness of term which leaves the real thought content vague. Furthermore, there is in no strict sense of the term a regular philosophical system in Schiller's work, and while he does not share Shaftesbury's attitude toward one—Shaftesbury is responsible for the caustic observation: "The most ingenious way of becoming foolish is by a system"—Schiller's poetic drift always bears him outside any purposive cataloguing of ideas, consequently what is subsidiary in one essay often assumes prime importance in another work.

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This shifting of emphasis presents a peculiar problem in Schiller; and it has undoubtedly contributed much to the antipodal views which obtain of his relation to Kant. To the student of Schiller's incomposite philosophical writings, therefore, the essential difficulty is to know where to take him, what essay or group of letters to accept as the true norm of his thinking, and what opinion to relegate into the background as beside the main drift of his thought, or as irrelevant or antithetical to it. On the whole, it is probably true that few poets have striven more earnestly than Schiller to make their intellectual judgments the children of uncontaminated reason, for he lived at a time when reason not only reigned supreme as the trusted arbiter in all disputes, but was confidently looked to as the interpreter of all the hidden things of life. In this Schiller was far from successful. Take him where you will, there is always the potential emotional element lurking in the background, ready at a moment's notice to spring forward and save a too finely spun intellectual fabric by substituting a cloth of commoner pattern.

For the sake of completeness and truth it is necessary to add that Schiller is frequently the mere rhetorician and, occasionally, close to the pedant, his curious fondness for the intellectual jugglery of the paradox being, perhaps, his worst failing.

Again, there is the added difficulty in the distance in time from the present. Even under favorable circumstances it is hard to reconstruct the intellectual trend of former periods sufficiently well to furnish their accurate and well regulated picture in entirety. This is especially true of the eighteenth century which, intellectually, at least, seems so incompatible with the present. The work of Shaftesbury has other problems, chiefly those of archaism and of classicism in expression. Shaftesbury, however, unlike Schiller, does not invent terms as he goes along, nor does he ever engage, wilfully, at least, in metaphysical obscurity; the real difficulty in arriving at a suitable interpretation of his work lies in the spirit with which he treats

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his subject, whether it be his jest or his earnest. The distance back to his age makes it impossible, perhaps more than any other factor, to decide categorically.

In England, on the whole, in his own age and later, Shaftesbury has not been taken very seriously: he has been frequently dismissed as a charlatan or what is worse, "an intellectual coxcomb"; and while he has been unquestionably of influence, he has never been read in England with the indulgence that he has received from the Germans. It is suggestive in this connection to make a comparison of the attitude toward Shaftesbury as represented by the English writers, Saintsbury, Leslie Stephen, and Bosanquet with the discussion on Shaftesbury in Hettner's work, which may be taken as normative for the Germans. Bosanquet, for instance, says: "Shaftesbury is far from being a great philosopher, and does little more than reproduce in terms of the individual's sensibility the current ideas of the age"; and Hettner: "We have every reason to return to the writings of Shaftesbury for in them we may learn not only the truth, but also the beauty of speculative thinking."

After even cursory examination of the response of German thought to Shaftesbury, it is clear that Schiller finds the chief contentions of Shaftesbury congenial. It remains, then, for the main discussion to emphasize the points of convergence and of divergence in their writings. The aim in this discussion is to be mainly expositional: there will be no attempt to take up the works chronologically, or critically to determine the validity of any theme for the complete structure of either writer. Nothing could be more beside the purpose than to insist that Schiller borrowed, or did not borrow, his doctrines from Shaftesbury; moreover, one's attitude on such questions, where the evidence is so obviously conjectural and slight, is matter for personal preference, certainly it seems not to permit of scientific establishment. Since there is greatest convergence in Schiller and Shaftesbury in their ethics, this topic will be treated first.

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General Characterization of their Ethics: Schiller and Shaftesbury show greatest kinship in their conception and treatment of ethics. The quintessence of both is essentially Greek and is derivable particularly from the ideas of Plato, which remained uncultivated throughout the middle ages only to blossom forth with freshness at the end of the seventeenth century under the influence of the Cambridge Platonists. In seeking to characterize somewhat generally the main trend in these ethical principles, it is enough to point out that the main bent is on the side of intuitive goodness and the perfectional possibilities of mankind, both Schiller and Shaftesbury being, as a matter of fact, broadly classifiable as aesthetical intuitionalists in their ethical thought. Both systems are supported further by the fact that the perfectional possibilities of mankind are aided in their development by the addition of happiness. Although both these ethical systems are fundamentally intuitive and perfectional, they are rarely ever purely so. Both authors proceed occasionally from and toward hedonistic principles, and they substance out their systems by them. Jural ethics, whether the result of religion or of severely rationalistic precepts, are distasteful to both writers.

Intuition; The Moral Sense; Aesthetic Education. That man is by nature good is one of the keynotes of Shaftesbury; and this idea is so thoroughgoing that he holds it is only by some violent perversion of his nature that man is capable of anything bad.[1] Schiller supports the same view, although, curiously enough, he finds Kant's arguments correct in which he establishes a basic propensity in man toward evil; such an interpretation of human nature, however, is revolting to Schiller.

In this fundamental conception lie notable differences. Shaftesbury invariably exaggerates the inherent moral sense of man, while Schiller prefers to treat it as a subjective tendency which needs much care and especial training.

[1] *Characteristics* (Fifth Edition): I: 259–260.

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It is in the fuller development of the ineradicable good that Shaftesbury goes beyond what Schiller would be likely to subscribe to, although Schiller is content to be less explicit upon this point in his formal utterance. Goodness with Shaftesbury, almost uniformly, results from conformity with an external and hence objective thing: it is something that may be recognized as freely and as unerringly as the excellence of a work of art. Schiller takes the more conventional view of goodness, that it is the spiritual part of man which expresses itself from within outwards toward ideal conduct, but which corresponds with the symmetry and perfection of the universe. The real divergence, however, is that goodness, according to Shaftesbury, is something full-fledged, and that whatever modifications it suffers are pretty sure to be detrimental, while with Schiller the process of education is again and again referred to as absolutely necessary before the supreme achievement of beautiful morality can be approximated.

Schiller's chief contention in the moral education of mankind, the insistence upon the necessity of preliminary training in aesthetics as an absolute basis for moral conduct has, broadly speaking, in its elaborate transcendental psychology nothing with which Shaftesbury's main contention, that the study of art helps to form a just taste which becomes of value in sensing harmony, may be compared.

In Shaftesbury there is matter of fact, if not altogether commonplace reasoning upon the value of training for the moral nature of man. Proceeding, here as elsewhere, to draw example from the physical side of man as well as from the animal kingdom, he starts with the thesis that unused parts become impaired and finally diseased, and that animals who do not fulfil the tasks that nature has set them, become unnatural, "lose their instinct and ingenuity of their kind, whilst they continue in the pampered state." So with man, also, it has been arranged that most are kept busy; some men, however, are provided with all things by the labors of others and are apt to remain inactive if they do not devote themselves "to letters, sciences, arts, hus-

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bandry, and public offices, and they accordingly sink into settled idleness and inactivity." Shaftesbury concludes: such a life "must produce a total disorder of the passions, and break out in the strangest irregularities imaginable."[2]

At bottom, Shaftesbury's discussion on this point is merely a plea for legitimate exercise; he is not narrowly concerned with the particular kind of exercise taken, unless it be for the fine gentleman, for whom he undoubtedly recommends a certain amount of activity with the arts. Schiller, on the other hand, tends to make his system more embracive, more broadly applicable.

Laboriously in his "Letters on Aesthetic Education" with in many places a disconcerting wealth of paradoxical statement and even of fanciful treatment, Schiller evolves much finespun theory, and while he never once comes firmly to grips with his formal subject, the cornerstone of his faith, the essential closeness of virtue and beauty, is clear and it is placed conspicuously at the beginning of the work.[3]

The chief principles elaborated in this discussion (we have Schiller's word for it) are Kantian; in their treatment, at least, they bear little resemblance to Shaftesbury's ideas. There is much circumventive logic about the intellectual and the emotional impulses, masquerading as the "matter bent" and the "form-bent," really earlier contentions in new guise. Schiller finally presses on to an abstraction of beauty, the main principles established on the way being: melting beauty relaxes the tense man, makes the sensual man thoughtful, and the intellectual man susceptible to the world of sentiment; energetic beauty imparts vigor to the relaxed man. The central point of the treatise, however, is reached where the aesthetic condition, by eliminating the conflicting elements in man's nature, clears the way for the natural impulses to function unobstructed.

In the idea that only out of the aesthetic condition can the moral properly develop, Schiller inverts Shaftesbury's contention, since Shaftesbury holds that there must be

[2] *Op. cit.*, II: 133.
[3] First Letter (Goedeke's *Schiller*, X: 276).

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first inner harmony, meaning a moral state, before the outward beauties can be observed. But Schiller's whole description here goes far beyond anything Shaftesbury suggests, although it is unquestionably in this parallelism, if not identification of ethical with aesthetical judgment in Shaftesbury, and in the aesthetical phase of the double standard in Schiller, that similarities are involved.

These similarities verge chiefly on the function of taste as an ethical determinant. Taste in morals is cultivated, according to Shaftesbury, precisely as taste in art, by observing the best examples and by studying them; but this moral taste for the harmony of "inward numbers," to use Shaftesbury's words, is a fundamental thing, and it must come before the recognition of the outward harmonies, hence Shaftesbury conceives the success of the "deserving artist" as directly conditioned by his understanding for moral beauty.[4] Schiller's description of the function of taste in ethical judgment is given in his essay "On the Service to Morals of Aesthetic Habits." Here Schiller asserts as axiomatic that the moral may never seek its justification outside itself, and while taste may favor moral conduct, it can never by itself achieve absolute morality. He thinks of taste as of true religion, a valuable aid toward moral conduct, though it is not in any sense the analogue of the ethical; in fact, it is to be regarded as a supplement to it, not a substitute for it.

The transition from the ethical to the aesthetical is much more immediate in Shaftesbury, and while Schiller brings his ethics and aesthetics into closer relations by his suggested educative process, Shaftesbury is content to see but slight independent existence of these principles; he either merges them or maintains the completest parallelism thoroughout their functioning, regarding them coexistent and coextensive. Just as the moral sense apprehends what is good, so the aesthetic sense selects what is proportionable. It is only in his more poetic and idealistic conceptions that Schiller approaches Shaftesbury's trust in the emotional

[4] *Characteristics:* I: 338.

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and aesthetical operation of ethics. For reality, however, they do not overlap, nor in their practical workings do they permit, strictly speaking, of parallelism.

A striking similarity on the intuitional side of ethics, one which throws considerable light upon the basic views of both authors, is the immediacy with which the recognition of the proper kind of ethical response takes place. In the story of the man who had fallen among thieves,[5] lost his clothes, and was forced to stay by the roadside in cold weather awaiting help, Schiller has five travelers pass by, all of whom wish to help, but only one of whom is capable of performing an ideal moral act. This man, without reasoning and without calling up possible kinds of conduct before the bar of stern justice, simply acts with absolute directness. The reason for the inhibition of the proper response from the other characters, is interesting and closely in accord with the favorite views of Shaftesbury. The first man is unable to look upon any human suffering, and he absolves himself by leaving his purse,—almost the precise illustration that Shaftesbury uses to show that an over development of sympathy is harmful since it interferes with the proper functioning of the social affections. The second traveler requires pay for his services. The third reluctantly consents to the use of his horse and of his cloak, fearing that he may be the one to suffer from exposure. The next who passes is an enemy of the wounded man, but from sheer pity he consents to help, though not to forgive. Acting from mere impulse, the last man who chances to pass sets down his bundle to take up and carry the wounded man. Schiller's real quarrel with the first four men is that they remain too conscious of "themselves and their belongings," while the act of the last man is spontaneous, unasked, and undebated. Schiller dilates especially upon what he calls an automony of result, which may follow from a diversity of means. Shaftesbury, also, in his discussion of temperance requires an absolute autonomy in morals.[6] Furthermore, Shaftesbury expressly declares that

[5] Schiller to Koerner, February 18, 1793.

[6] *Characteristics:* II: 251.

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the good man is led by some "immediate affection, directly and not accidentally to good and against evil," and there is no better illustration of an action being done, as Shaftesbury puts it, "through insufficient and unequal affection"[7] than the very case has here adduced. Shaftesbury would not admit that the action of the first four men in Schiller's example were moral. In another place Shaftesbury, speaking about the immediacy of the recognition of the ethical, says: "A man of thorough good breeding . . . never deliberates in this case, or considers of the matter by prudential rules of self-interest and advantage. He acts from his nature, in a manner necessarily and without reflection: and if he did not, it were impossible for him to answer his character."[8]

Both Schiller and Shaftesbury, therefore, tend to throw out reflection and debate, not only on the ground of being unnecessary, but because they tend to subvert the moral purpose and end: in Schiller's mind they invite a diversity apparent in the result, and to Shaftesbury reflection and debate in such principles are proof of an insufficient affection, thus destroying the moral value of the act, making it "iniquous and wrong."[9]

Hedonism. It is particularly in those early works of Schiller which resulted from the impetus afforded him in the personality and in the intellectual bent of his beloved teacher Abel, that the hedonistic side of his thought becomes defined; and, in fact, the bulk of his thinking on this side may be somewhat sharply demarcated as occurring before the period in which his thought is modified and constrained from its contact with the thought of Kant.

In Schiller's ecstatic school-boy writings, particularly in "Gehoert allzuviel Guete, Leutseligkeit und Freygebigkeit im engen Verstande zur Tugend," and in "Die Tugend in ihren Folgen Betrachtet," which are definitely known to be his, there is the same conception of happiness which is

[7] *Op. cit.*, II: 31. [8] *Op. cit.*, I: 129.
[9] *Op. cit.*, II: 31.

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familiar from Shaftesbury: "That to have the natural affections is to have the chief means and power of self enjoyment, the highest possession and happiness of life."[10] Happiness is thus made the reward of the virtuous life; but neither author is sufficiently hedonistic to explain all the motives in a moral act upon the basis of their bringing happiness, rather do both authors regard it a fortunate coincidence that the virtuous life leads to happiness.

Schiller avoids the difficulty of confusing an intuitional with a hedonistic ethics by having man omit consciously to formulate ideas on the motives toward virtue, either as to his own inclination or as to nature's purpose; in fact, Schiller clearly calls into prominence the idea that man may not be conscious of nature's purpose to achieve his happiness. Shaftesbury likewise calls nature to the support of his hedonistic conception; though in turning away abruptly in the second volume of the "Characteristics" from the idea that the mere recognition of virtue is reason for embracing it to descant on the motives for a virtuous act, Shaftesbury invites an element of serious inconsistency into his system: "Whoever, therefore, by any strong persuasion or settled judgment, thinks in the main that virtue causes happiness and vice misery, carries with him that security and assistance to virtue which is required."[11]

Eudaemonism. Further, though less striking, inconsistencies exist in the eudaemonistic tendences which occur in the work of both authors, chiefly, however, in Shaftesbury, since it is quite conceivable that the idealistic Schiller is less ready to align himself with any belief which includes the possibility of utility; and he is also less concerned with the social aspects of virtue. But with Shaftesbury, on the other hand, the principle that virtue is the real good of the individual, as well as of the species, is voiced consistently throughout, the natural variant being, since virtue and beauty are the same, that beauty is the real good.

[10] *Op. cit.*, II: 126.
[11] *Op. cit.*, II: 67.

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In the belief that virtue is for the individual's good, Shaftesbury undertakes to support his convictions from his notion of the psychology of ethics: he inquires about the reaction of beliefs upon the men who hold them; and it is thus that virtue and interest coincide, since the proper opinion of the good makes for the individual's good. According to the doctrine of the affections, whatever is good for the individual is also good for the public, and the two are brought by Shaftesbury into an almost complete identity.

Mildness Versus Rigorism. Leaving aside for the nonce these somewhat general classifications into the various categories of belief and turning to consider the temperaments of these authors, it is clear that the ineluctable penchant in both Schiller and Shaftesbury toward refinement,[12] suavity, and mildness is unquestionably an important item in determining the basic elements of their ethics. Schiller pronounces nowhere with greater emphasis upon the need of refinement than in his surprising review of Bürger's poetry, and there can be no doubt that at that time he had recovered fully from his youthful extravagances, that he had become what he afterwards remained. In a letter to Goethe[13] Schiller praises the Christian religion since it does not require the stern Kantian imperative, and in its place it puts a free inclination; as a manifestation of the supreme working of aesthetical principles, Schiller regards the Christian religion the highest. Schiller's very pleasant definition of virtue is significant, virtue being an inclination toward duty. Elsewhere, Schiller arraigns Kantian rigorism[14] since it makes no provision for the children of the household and regards only the servants and the slaves. Shaftesbury also speaks contemptuously of coercion in morals as suitable only for the vulgar. The whole subject of coercion in morals is treated by Schiller in

[12] Excepting, of course, some of the earliest poetic and dramatic effusions of Schiller, such as the poems from the Anthology and the "Robbers."

[13] August 17, 1795.

[14] Goedeke: X: 101.

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a famous passage where he says that the beaten enemy may rise again, but only the reconciled foe is truly overcome. Shaftesbury's conclusion is that any moral act which is produced under restraint is no more to be accounted truly moral than a wild beast in chains is to be accounted gentle.[15] Both authors partake of the generous attitude which accords even villains and thieves elementary virtue, chivalry, and honor; both authors prefer to contemplate those moral acts which proceed in all freedom and joy of the spirit, without conflicting divisions of the emotions, and with no trace of compulsion, coercion, or of mastery.

Closely allied to these inclinations is Shaftesbury's conception of the rôles that good-breeding and education[16] play in the moral life. It seems, however, that Shaftesbury requires what might be styled gentlemanliness rather than vigor of mind. The narrow and foppish distinction that he makes between the vulgar and the well-bred man has brought him much deserved criticism. Similarly, in Schiller's essay on "Grace and Dignity," particularly in the conception of the "beautiful soul," it is impossible to believe that the serene, untroubled countenance, and the gentle, flowing movements are masculine attributes.

Such a caricature of life as Schiller elaborates in the first part of this essay cannot but lay its author open to serious question, both as an artist and, more particularly, as a thinker. If the discussion is, as many critics incline to take it, a subtle tribute to a beautiful woman, it seems excusable; but if not, then Schiller, like Shaftesbury, must be convicted of deliberately closing his eyes to some of the noblest and best elements in human character. The contrast with modern thought is, perhaps, clear enough without a definite background, but when compared with Hardy's description in *The Return of the Native* of Clym Yeobright's face after thought had had its way with it, the difference is striking. Schiller, in Hempel's translation:

[15] *Characteristics:* II: 55.
[16] *Op. cit.*, II: 38; I: 129.

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"In a beautiful soul, sensuality and reason, duty and inclination, exist in harmony, which is made manifest to the eye by lovely forms. It is only when subserving the behests of a beautiful soul that nature can be free and yet preserve her forms; for the former is lost under the tryanny of a rigid mind, and the latter under the anarchy of sensual excesses. A beautiful soul spreads an irresistible loveliness even over a person without natural beauty; it may even triumph over natural deformities. Every motion emanating from such a soul will seem easy, gentle, and yet animated. The eye will beam with brightness and a perfect absence of restraint; the light of emotion will radiate from its centre. The gentleness of heart will impart a loveliness to the mouth which no dissimulation could feign. There will be no rigidity to the features, no restraint in the voluntary motions, for the soul is unconscious of either. The musical voice will move the heart with the pure stream of its modulations."

Hardy:

"The view of life as a thing to be put up with, replacing that zest for existence which was so intense in early civilization, must ultimately enter so thoroughly into the constitution of the advanced races that its facial expression will become accepted as the new artistic departure. People already feel that a man who lives without disturbing a curve of feature, or setting a mark of mental concern anywhere upon himself, is too far removed from modern perceptiveness to be a modern type."

Harmony. The doctrine of harmony is at once the most durable and the most conspicuous link between Schiller and Shaftesbury. Of the two writers it is, perhaps, the more conclusive and fundamental with Shaftesbury, while with Schiller it represents a port, as it were, towards which he is ever sailing but in which actually, though not in his fancy, he never drops anchor. This dominant search for harmony in the universe and in the understanding of life begins in the earliest metaphysical speculations of Schiller, where he is seeking a real basis for harmony amid the seemingly conflicting themes of matter and spirit. To establish harmony in this work the problem, quite obviously, is to span the gulf between the material and the spiritual. In this attempt, of course, Schiller has not been successful,

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and outside of a certain fancifulness the work is little interesting; but the attempt thus early to formulate one of the problems which never lost its appeal to his mind is sufficiently striking. The subsequent forms that this question took were to establish a basis upon which could be founded the proper balance between duty and inclination, whereby these two elements, usually so prone to conflict, are capable of correlation: first between the emotional and the intellectual impulses, and finally between the moral and the aesthetic side of man. With Shaftesbury there is no conscious striving to attain harmony out of conflicting elements; rather does Shaftesbury assume that harmony exists and is everywhere fundamental.[17] This broad and deliberate assumption, taken as a point of departure, makes plain a host of differing relations in the universe, since in the fashion also of Leibnitz, evil is recognized, but is interpreted as good in disguise; this conception affords an answer to the most irrelevant and diverse questions.

If one were to assemble into a single group all the passages in which Schiller and Shaftesbury sing the praises of harmony, of whatever sort, and mention it as an ultimate, or as a basic principle, their number would be considerable and would represent practically all of their writing.

A common point of view from which both Schiller and Shaftesbury review harmony is that it is the natural and the healthful state. Shaftesbury, with his predilection for examples from the animal world, shows how the vicious animal is actually ill, unnatural, not "at one with himself," while Schiller, seeking added light from the field of anatomy comes to similar conclusions. It is noteworthy in this connection that Schiller in his insistence upon the correlation of the animal nature of man with his spiritual nature does not require checking of the animal side; in fact, this early work lays considerable stress upon the equal claims

[17] Compare the tart humor of Leslie Stephen: Freethinking and Plainspeaking, p. 273. "Standing amidst the relics of the desperate struggle of this life, amongst the carnage and shrieks of the wounded and the brutal triumph of the conquerors Shaftesbury finds a solace in his elegant smelling bottle, skilfully compounded of the best philosophical essences."

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of both parts of man. Shaftesbury does not underrate the claims of the body, but wishes it to assert its proper rights along with the higher intellectual pleasures: it is only when it crowds out the better things of life, that he rebukes it.

Exceedingly close is Schiller to Shaftesbury when he describes body and soul as two vibrant strings;[18] by striking one a sympathetic vibration is set up in the other. This is in Schiller's thought the wonderful, predetermined sympathy which makes the heterogeneous principles in the nature of man into a single thing: Schiller does not think of an independent existence of body and soul, but rather of their intimate mixture in the alembic of humanity.

Removing the conception of harmony from the realms of physiology and of metaphysics and bringing it over into ethics, it is apparent that there is much less straight thinking than before. Shaftesbury's realism and Schiller's idealism, it is true, explain difference in accent and emphasis; moreover, if rightly understood, they go far towards explaining what might at first sight seem sheer inconsistency and inconsequence in thinking.

There can be no doubt that the premises of Shaftesbury are reasonable enough: "It is as hard to find an altogether good man as an altogether bad man"; "It is more usual to praise a man who goes through a struggle to overcome evil than one who needs no struggle, yet the propensity to sin is not an ingredient of virtue." Once he is taken up with the discussion of virtue, however, he sees it only on the brightest side, all jarring elements, struggles, and imperatives are waived. In this way Shaftesbury engages in the difficulty of recognizing a variety of elements in the beginning, only to choose those which are relevant to his main assumptions of harmony and beauty. Schiller, too, although perhaps more excusably, clearly recognizes at first jarring discord, but it is his chief concern to resolve these dissonant elements in man's nature, or in the universe, into complete harmony.

This realization of complete harmony tends with Schiller

[18] Goedeke: I: 165.

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to become a wholly ideal achievement: the human race may proceed toward it not in the hope of immediate, but only in the hope of ultimate success. It is true that his poetic imagination frequently gets the better of his judgment so that he speaks of this state as though it were reached; moreover, his enthusiasm for Greek civilization lends color to his belief that the attainment of harmony in life and in the state is possible, yet when he is frank with himself, he is unable to shut out the appalling pictures of his time, or to find any explanation of them which is agreeable to his mind.

Hand in hand with this striving for harmony goes the dislike for disharmony and confusion, whether, as with Shaftesbury, this feeling becomes thoroughgoing enough to throw out any decision which involves it, where the motives are at variance, or whether, as with Schiller's view of less positiveness, conflicting motives are at the most, admissable only in the means, never in the end, and result in the ideal act. Both writers firmly hold to the ideal conception that the whole character must be moral, so that it may broadly evidence itself in the moral life, not in individual acts. This, in Shaftesbury's parlance, is the "intire affection."[19] Schiller, also, speaks of totality of character, and he is explicit that "man is not intended to perform isolated moral acts, but to be a moral being; not virtues but morality is the requirement." And this is precisely the point upon which Schiller attacks Kant, for if the person must summon before his nicely poised ethical concepts every new situation which involves various possibilities of moral response, it is conceivable that the element of confusion which Schiller is at such pains to escape, is not only made possible but it is actually invited. Manifestly, however, the problem of totality in moral character exists more for Schiller than for Shaftesbury, because Schiller's mind was at times largely obsessed with the magnitude of the conflicting elements in human character, and who sought shelter from stern reality by postulating ideal conditions.

[19] *Characteristics:* II: 113–114.

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"Beautiful Soul"—"Virtuoso." Working from the kind of emotional perceptionalism that is at the basis of the thinking of both authors, it is logical that the culmination of ethical creed should be comparable in each. It is Schiller, however, who has been able to bring to bear the full weight of his poetic imagination and depict an ideal with attractiveness. Schiller's long intellectual and emotional apprenticeship in the service of the ideas of harmony, correlation, and regulation has in its normal course led up to the preparation of a highly specialized thing. The most conspicuous service rendered by the conception of harmony is the ideal of the "beautiful soul."

As far as the outward facts are concerned, there are few intimate bonds between the "beautiful soul" and the "virtuoso." Shaftesbury's ideal is the man of the world, "the refined wit of the age," a well-bred gentleman, one who has traveled abroad and who knows the political life of the principal nations of Europe. This "virtuoso" has much in common with the philosophers, who in their inquiries simply carry "good-breeding a step higher."[20] The sum of philosophy, according to Shaftesbury, is to learn what is just in society, beautiful in nature, and in the order of the universe. But the "virtuoso" is not primarily an ethical ideal, and Shaftesbury contends that "virtuosoship" is a closer approach to the virtuous and sensible than scholarship. It is interesting in his demands for "virtuosoship" and good-breeding that Shaftesbury requires the polished gentleman in his researches to rest content with the more general studies, with those in which the beauty and harmony of life are most apparent, for if the student so far forgets the gentleman as to proceed into the niceties of "insect and shell-fish life," he becomes fitly subject for ridicule. This word of caution from Shaftesbury is enlightening and of intrinsic worth since it suggests the extent to which Shaftesbury goes in the admission of the formative value of external things; and Shaftesbury does not hesitate

[20] *Characteristics:* III: 161.

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to condemn the education in his time since it tended to make scholarship less compatible with virtue than "virtuosoship."

The real rapprochement between Schiller and Shaftesbury does not, however, rest wholly upon inference: in the latter part of his extended treatment of "virtuosi" and philosophers, Shaftesbury distinctly requires "a heart and a resolution" to complete the character. Schiller regards the "heart and the resolution" to be the all important part of the "beautiful soul," and his almost complete absorption in the discussion of the subjective conditions which explain it, form the most striking element in his treatment. The "beautiful soul" is a highly particularized ideal, and Schiller goes so far as to say that it has no other merit than that it exists.[21]

The "virtuoso" patterns his life according to the external harmonies present in the fine arts; the "beautiful soul," in so far as it assumes the proportions of reality, is a beautiful, essentially feminine manifestation, in which all the varied and elsewhere conflicting elements of feeling have achieved absolute consonance, and of which the outward movements are but the measured symbols of an inner, well-nigh oriental, spiritual tranquillity.

Moral Grace. Most thoroughly in accord with ideal harmony is the conception of moral grace and beauty, which stands for both authors as the supreme achievement of art and ethics. This tendency to award moral beauty the highest place is implicit in Schiller's whole discussion (his flattering remarks upon Corneille's Cid, where he calls it the acme of art because the plot demands no evil, have not been sufficiently quoted), and this inclination is traceable to his earliest writing. In the Kallias Letters, Schiller is amazed that Kant can put the beauty of a fanciful, oriental scroll-work over that of the highest beauty of humanity. Here again Schiller thinks of such beauty of character as an ideal to be striven for. That Bürger did not

[21] Compare Shaftesbury's discussion on the same point. *Characteristics:* II: 292.

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strive towards such beauty, and that he felt no moral answerableness to his readers, caused Schiller to speak so harshly about his work. Imperfection in form Schiller could forgive, but not indifference toward what he considered the poet's exalted prerogative and duty, the cultivation of a beautiful morality. At the very end of his career, in the lyrical intermezzo "Homage to the Arts" Schiller is still interested in perfect morality as the ultimate beauty. Shaftesbury, also, declares that the inward beauties are the most real and essential, the "most naturally affecting"; but in his declaration of the "profit and advantage" to be derived from their cultivation, Schiller would be little likely to concur. Elsewhere, Shaftesbury conceives the study of the inward perfection and the moral grace to be the highest: he believes that an appreciation of this "moral grace and Venus" forms the proper criterion for distinguishing between merit and blemish, virtue and deformity. In the discussion of the "better self" Shaftesbury gives an almost precise analogue of Schiller's idea, expressed in his letters on aesthetics, that every one carries within himself a purely ideal personality, and that it is his task to correlate all the tendencies of his nature with the unswerving unity of his character.

It is through this ideal of absolute morality that aesthetics and ethics again meet in the beliefs of both authors, and just as the ethical judgment in Shaftesbury's scheme is made to depend upon a feeling for the symmetrical in conduct, and in Schiller to depend upon a cultivated taste, so in the completest beauty there is a reversion to the basic ethical element.

God and the Universe. There are several similarities between Shaftesbury's "Philosophical Rhapsody" and Schiller's "Philosophical Letters, Julius to Raphael." The rhapsodical vein in which both essays are conceived is perhaps the most noticeable outward trait in common. Two friends in both cases are the chief figures, and the important contributions are made by the more effusive of

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the two, the second member acting as a check to the enthusiasm of his friend. Both works, also, deserve mention among the "theodicies" of the eighteenth century, since in function, if not in purpose, they serve to define and justify the place of God in the universe. Similarly, in each work there is much glorification of nature, and a pantheistic treatment of it is always consciously in the foreground.

As usual with Shaftesbury and in the poetical conceptions of Schiller, the unity and harmony of the universe are postulated as basic principles. "It is no hard thing," says Shaftesbury, "to be persuaded that nature is a single thing." This is evidenced by the harmony of infinite parts which can but mean a more embracive harmony of the whole. This grand conception of the all pervading harmony cannot but show the smallness of man. Schiller contrasts him with the hugeness of the universe, and Shaftesbury calls attention to the prolonged period of infancy in man as compared with the lower animals. From this it is only a step, however, to the glorification of the mind of man which is able to compass the universe with understanding. Both Shaftesbury and Schiller have precisely the same method of reasoning from the fact that man, as he proceeds in his ability to understand the universe, comes more and more to assume the position of the creator through his approximation to His views. Shaftesbury contends that ill humor alone can cause disagreeable thoughts about God. The mind, then, which is able to discern the harmony of the universe partakes of a supererogation of God, given in lieu of narrower conceptions in religion. This doctrine is, somewhat illogically, subsequently merged into a pantheistic creed: harmony is everywhere present; hence God is everywhere present. Shaftesbury conceives the "antient cause" to be in every place and void.

Conclusion and Summary. The most outstanding conclusion to be derived from a general survey of the parallel themes in Schiller and Shaftesbury is that their similarities

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lie more on the emotional than on the intellectual side. There are, for instance, several themes which are broadly comparable as general principles, or as doctrines, but in which the intellectual support is entirely different. In several of his contentions Schiller has a subject which might conceivably appeal to Shaftesbury or to Plato, but he attempts to dignify his discussion by having recourse to an elaborate psychology, partly of his own invention and partly modeled upon the accepted views of his recognized contemporaries. It is generally true, therefore, that Shaftesbury's beliefs are in the nature of conclusions, while Schiller's, on the other hand, take the form of conclusions inferred from cautious premises. Furthermore, in Schiller there is at times a curious line of demarcation between what he liked to believe and what he was compelled to accept as true because of his respect for wholly intellectual judgments. The reason why Shaftesbury, the realist and the physicist of ethics, and Schiller, the idealist and the metaphysicist of ethics, come into such close touch in the chief of their cardinal doctrines, is, then actually not so hard to explain, for Shaftesbury was content to develop only those themes which were agreeable to his ideas of harmony and inherent goodness, and Schiller, when too conscious of the jarring inconsequencies of life, retreated from them into his realm of idealism, there to find the encouragement which his environment could not offer. There is also, in effect, a good deal in Shaftesbury which seems nothing more than a "retreat from reality," although this is not attained by postulating ideal circumstances, but merely by shutting out part of the facts of experience.

The tendency to seek harmony in all the varied manifestations of life and art is unquestionably the point at which there is the largest amount of convergence in both authors. From the doctrine of the harmony of the universe to that of the harmonized individual is but a step and both Shaftesbury and Schiller pass readily from one to the other.

That moral beauty, meaning the perfection of the individual and the completest expression of humanity in him,

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stands highest in the scale of aesthetics is similarly held by both, and this principle is in the closest accord with the doctrine of harmony, since absolute harmony is perfection and, on the aesthetic side, active, creative beauty is put highest.

Perception of the moral, then, because the character under ideal conditions is thoroughly at one with itself, takes place without debate. It is immediate because it is unhampered. Schiller, it will be remembered from the Kallias Letters, gets at this question from his definition of beauty, "a freedom in the appearance," that is, an act is beautiful only when it seems to determine itself; it is hardly necessary, however, for Shaftesbury to have recourse to such a roundabout approach since, as he naïvely conceives it, merely seeing the beautiful and the good is sufficient reason for embracing them.

Intellectual achievement, likewise, is accorded a place of honor by both writers. Shaftesbury requires, to be sure, a very modest kind of intellectual prowess, and he prescribes very definite limits within which it may be used and outside of which it becomes mere pedantry. Schiller praises it, though with less reservation, and, judging from his formal statements, he is willing to play the obscurantist in its favor.

Moral education through art bulks large in the concern of both writers. Shaftesbury, of course, knows nothing of Schiller's elaborate excursions into metaphysics in search for reasons for the close relations between art and morality; but both Schiller and Shaftesbury stand upon a similar platform in maintaining that the artist is helped by his art and a proper understanding of its principles, and both desire a further application of art training towards morality.

Conventional religion both authors dislike. It is Shaftesbury, however, who dilates upon its evils more completely, while Schiller thinks true religion misunderstood and the irrevelant aspects emphasized.

Similarly, all confusion, irregularity, disharmony, force, and coercion are utterly distasteful to their thought, and they take every means to avoid them.

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The chief divergence in the teachings of Schiller and Shaftesbury centres around the doctrine of utility. Shaftesbury stands frankly for virtue because it is the good of the individual and of the race, while Schiller specifies that it is the higher spiritual good which virtue achieves. This division of doctrine may serve further to explain why the "virtuoso" and the "beautiful soul," considered merely in their outward manifestations, have so little in common; in fact, it is largely by inference that the one appears in a just sense to be the analogue of the other. In fine, here as elsewhere, it is in the spirit rather than in the letter that Schiller and Shaftesbury stand in substantial agreement.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

LECTURES ON MODERN IDEALISM. By Josiah Royce. Yale University Press, New Haven, 1919. Pp. xi, 266.

This forceful volume, revised for publication under the editorship of Dr. Jacob Loewenberg, is announced as "heading the list" of Professor Royce's posthumous works. It consists of lectures delivered at Johns Hopkins University in 1906, under the title "Aspects of Post-Kantian Idealism." Very justly do its publishers say that it fills a genuine need in philosophical literature; that the idealistic doctrines of the self, the social order, nature and the Absolute are here presented with that power, clearness, and adequacy which Josiah Royce alone could summon to such a task. The reader is held to continuous admiration that so much could be accomplished within the brief compass of ten lectures, and that such clearness could be maintained when dealing thoroughly and fundamentally with matters usually so difficult.

Professor Royce is surveying a field covered by many textbooks, as well as by his own previous volume on *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy;* but he is doing so with a different purpose. Here he presupposes that type of knowledge on the part of his reader. "In vain do we look," says Dr. Loewenberg, "for the hackneyed themes of a hundred histories of philosophy." The discussion addresses itself at once, then, to the more significant and vital problems, and easily surpasses in range and depth that which the books of the other type contain. To the advancing student of philosophical matters it must be a volume of very genuine service.

The first two lectures are given to Kant's conception of knowledge and the forces that tended to modify it. Here the large significance of Kant's viewpoint is first brought out in connection with the argument for the deduction of the categories. Then we are shown that "Kant had a very singular power of holding his judgment suspended regarding matters that almost any disciple of Kant is at once tempted to decide, and to decide in a way that leads to a modification of the Kantian doctrines." This suggestion is worked out in such wise as to make luminously clear the rise of the issues concerning the interpretation of Kantianism. The student can see why Kant remained a Kantian; but he can

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see also with special clearness the necessity that was laid upon Fichte to regard him as a half-philosopher.

The third lecture moves into a study of Schelling, which continues until the close of the fifth. The rich suggestiveness of this thinker is skillfully exploited to display the manifold motives which were working in the idealism of that period. Thus the Kantian conception of the self is brought into connection with a conception of the Absolute which, owing something to the mysticism of Spinoza and of the Hindus, yet undertakes to develop also the more characteristic factors of Western thought. "The new doctrine was never meant to be any mere revival of mysticism. I tried to suggest its spirit by calling its religion a synthesis of mystical and rationalistic motives. What I now add is that these rationalistic motives were dialectical, largely because of the stress which these thinkers laid upon the active element in thought, in truth, and in reality" (p. 86). Indeed, Professor Royce repeatedly urges that these "absolutists" had much of the spirit of pragmatism within them, just as he eventually points out that recent pragmatism is an offshoot of the Kantian and post-Kantian insight. Concerning Schelling, after explaining the significance which he found in the dialectical method, and expounding the problem, viewpoint, and something of the course of thought in the Philosophy of Nature, Professor Royce develops rather more fully the teaching of the *Transcendental Idealism*. One important thing touched upon is Schelling's emphasis upon the social implications of selfhood. "The sense of this doctrine, which Schelling derived from Fichte, and which he expresses with the greatest definiteness, is the same as that which with regard to recent investigations Professor J. M. Baldwin and I have emphasized" (p. 127).

Of the four lectures devoted to Hegel three are given to the *Phenomenology;* and I know of nothing in our literature which is likely to be so serviceable in opening up to the student the meaning and importance of this difficult classic. Professor Royce's students had already spread the report of his splendid skill in interpreting Hegel through this work; and it is a matter of profound congratulation that some of the results of that skill are thus preserved for the benefit of all readers. One suggestion alone, that *Weltgeist* might be translated as *Everyman*, throws a flood of light. The ninth lecture, which deals with Hegel's mature system, studies this chiefly in its relation to the *Phenomen-*

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ology. Particularly important here is the discussion (pp. 223–225) of the maxim that *Alles Wirkliche ist Vernünftig*, and its distinction from fatalistic determinism; and of the kindred question concerning the sense in which a relative irrationality enters into Hegel's world.

A concluding lecture deals with the later fortunes of idealism and its present position. Here the significance of the reaction against idealism is interpreted, and a highly interesting discussion is given of the value of those individual variations of philosophical opinion, so characteristic of the present time. While displaying the utmost breadth of sympathetic consideration, Professor Royce strives to overrule all these in general, and the followers of Schopenhauer and of William James in particular, to the greater glory of that ideal of systematic consistency which modern Idealism has been endeavoring to state.

The work of the editor has been so well done that it is nowhere in evidence. The main criticism upon the entire volume is that one could wish it had been before the philosophical public at least ten years ago.

E. L. Hinman.

University of Nebraska.

Reminiscences of Leo Nicolayevitch Tolstoi. By Maxim Gorky. Translated from the Russian by S. S. Koteliansky and L. Woolf. Richmond: The Hogarth Press, 1920. Pp. 71. Price, 5 s. net.

These fragmentary reminiscences of Tolstoy are of the highest biographical importance, and Tolstoy, who in earlier biographies is dim and cloud-like, is illuminated by the ardent candour of his biographer. The fierce light is so searching that the eye shrinks, and yet Gorky begins and ends on a note of wonder, for "the man was Godlike";—perhaps a kind of Russian god in their amazing folk-lore "not very majestic, but more cunning than all the other gods."

The ethical teaching of Tolstoy in his later years when a disturbance of his relations towards every aspect of human life becomes evident, is explained by Gorky's portraiture of the man. The Manichee in Tolstoy that wrote the *Kreutzer Sonata* is illustrated by some significant details. "Woman, in my opinion," says Gorky, "he regards with implacable hostility, and loves to punish her. It is the hostility of the male who has not

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succeeded in getting all the pleasure he could, or it is the hostility of the spirit against the degrading impulses of the flesh. But it is hostility, and cold." It is the expression of some complex, some suppression, as is evident from the disconcerting fact of his coarseness, so frequently mentioned by Gorky. "From the ordinary point of view, what he said was a string of indecent words," is a sentence that will surprise some readers of Gorky, who is not restrained by unnecessary conventions. Yet Gorky, the author of *The Lower Depths*, was hurt and offended.

The same intolerable light is turned upon Tolstoy's preoccupation with religion. The thought of God, Gorky says "incessantly gnaws at him," as if this divine concern were a mere irritation. Tolstoy bulks so large against the skies that Gorky even envisages Tolstoy and his deity as having the relation of "two bears in one den." Of Christ he speaks with no spark of feeling, and though "at times he admires him, he hardly loves him." "It is as though he were uneasy: if Christ came to a Russian village, the girls might laugh at him." So he transferred his enthusiasm to Buddha, and recommends the Buddhist writings.

It is curious that in spite of Tolstoy's central teaching of non-resistance and forgiveness the man was essentially the Russian land-owner, despotic on his own estate. What he had to give, he gave despotically. The instinct of the dominating class was still strong in him in spite of the vapour of universal forgiveness, and loving one's neighbour, in which his later life was hidden. If anyone contradicted him "suddenly, under his peasant's beard, under his democratic blouse, there would rise the old Russian *barin*," and he bore down upon the Tolstoyans unmercifully if they disputed his theories, until, as Gorky says "their noses became blue with intolerable cold."

"What he himself did not need, he gave to people as though they were beggars; he liked to compel them, to compel them to read, walk, be vegetarians, love the peasants, and believe in the infallibility of the rational religious reflections of Leo Tolstoy." His final flight, just before his death, seemed to Gorky a sensational act to force the public conscience to bend to his personality, the madness of a pillar saint bent on dazzling the world with the glory of righteous blood, thus converting his life into the "saintly life of our blessed father, boyard Leo," with the despotic intention of increasing the influence of his religious ideas, the weight of his teaching. Yet even in Gorky's letter, written in the white heat

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of his resentment at the "going away" from Yasnaya Polyana, there is, above all, admiration and wonder at the "old magician, scattering about him the living seeds of indomitable thoughts."

M. J.

London, England.

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. By C. Delisle Burns. London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1920. Pp. x, 189. Price, 5s. net.

Mr. Burns has written an extraordinarily interesting and personal book in the guise of a handbook in which the chief problems arising from the contract between different governments and peoples are illustrated.

The scheme of treatment summarises the governing principle in international politics, the Great Power system, and the distinction between different kinds of states and governments. Differences in culture among states are then analysed, and we are next led to the relation between minor states and parts of states by industrialised countries and the exploitation of territories inhabited by native races. Attention is then turned to diplomacy which has been evolved for foreign politics, and to later stages of international organisation, such as the League of Nations; but of this organ he speaks critically, for "much of what is usually meant by a League of Nations remains in the region of the unrealised ideal." The original connections of the League, established under Peace Treaties which "contain evidences of vindictiveness, primitive jealousy and political incompetence have been detrimental to its prestige, and the problem arises whether the treaties will damn the League; or the League redeem the Treaties." His last word is, however, that the League is a fact which is new enough to be left for the present at least uncondemned.

As might be expected, among the wealth of material, Mr. Burns, who is a master of lucid statement, has chosen some very significant and unforgettable examples to illustrate his problems, relying on the fact that the need of the general public and even of some statesmen appears to be "not so much inculcation of a Gospel as instruction in an alphabet." Readers who follow him from Alpha to Omega will find the book a text book in the sense that it is a compact, well-arranged synopsis of international problems, brought up to date, but with none of the colourless neutrality characteristic of text books. "The plan is to give definite instances of these problems and not to discuss theory,"

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is the promise upon the wrapper; actually the instances, chosen and set by Mr. Burns are as expressive as a discussion, for (as he admits in the introduction) a certain very definite attitude has been adopted and certain very definite conclusions are implied in regard to some issues. There is no mistake about his attitude; war is to him altogether an evil institution, and a useless and cumbrous political method, but hitherto the commodities of the world have been more truly international than are the minds of men; and it is clearly indicated that the interest of all nations is not to be found by the ancient process of each seeking its own. We are now standing at the beginning of a new period, able, if the desire is strong enough to transform the situation. *If the desire is strong enough*—but that is the key to the problem. There are, of course, many who desire to leave the world better than they found it, and they know the common life of men will not advance in happiness so long as national war and private greed are so prominent as they are now. "Idealists they may be called. Idealists," Mr. Burns writes, "are the salt of the earth; but the salt is still in the salt-cellar, it has not been put into the eatables, and salt is after all for seasoning, not for snaring birds, as some politicians seem to suppose." The problem, therefore, is to make ideals effective, and to induce idealists to act in financial, commercial, and administrative affairs. The creation of the international mind and the organisation of international action in every sphere, governmental and voluntary, is therefore the greatest need of the world to-day. N. C.

SHORTER NOTICES.

CHAOS AND ORDER IN INDUSTRY. By G. D. H. Cole. London: Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1920. Pp. viii, 292. Price, 7s. 6d. net.

We are actively conscious of industry today because of the interruptions —strikes—in its normal working, and as consumers and users, we have direct experience of the results of chaos in industry. The ordinary man realises that unless the chaos is converted into order, the future will hold for him, not merely occasional discomforts and disturbances, but perhaps the dissolution of the society on which the realisation of his personal desires depends. Thus far the majority of intelligent persons have got. They are *conscious* of industry, and some are even curious about the motives and capacity of the parties in the industrial conflict, but the highly technical nature of some industrial problems, the remoteness of the Trades Union organisation from the purview of the *intelligenzia* baffle the inquirer. To such, Mr. Cole is a guide, throwing his clear dry light in dark places. Industrial disturbances are seen not as mere random ebullitions, but as symptoms of fundamental causes of unrest in the economic system.

The present problem is the readjustment of industry, and according to

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Mr. Cole and his school, the lessening of the authority and functions of capitalism and the increasing of the functions and economic power of the working class. If it cannot be so transformed, the capitalist system will, he believes, go to pieces, "not perhaps this year, but next year or the year after, or at least within the next decade." An interim measure, such as the Whitley Councils—joint standing industrial councils representing employers and employed,—is a harmless piece of machinery at best (p. 118 & ff.) and does not affect Mr. Cole's stumbling-block, which is the final and exclusive control of the employer over the way in which he runs his business. "The general opinion of the Labour world is that the Whitley Report can safely be ignored."

The moral of this failure is that there is no way out of the industrial deadlock by the creation of such joint bodies for negotiation. The way out is, with Mr. Cole and a small but influential school, the establishment of guilds and a "gradual encroachment," by means of shop stewards, committees, works committees, and so on, upon the control of industry until the functions of industrial management are gradually transferred to the Workers' organisations. The case for guilds has been put in various forms by prominent guildsmen, but the extent and character of its influence since about 1915 has not been sufficiently realised, and Mr. Cole gives some interesting instances of its driving force. It would obviously be no easy matter to change over from production for profit, to production for use under democratic control, but the main value of Mr. Cole's book is its practical application of guild principles to the conditions of the great industries with which he is familiar. M. J.

CREATIVE REVOLUTION: a study of Communist Ergatocracy. By Eden and Cedar Paul. London: G. Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1920. Pp. 224. Price, 8s. 6d.

Creative Revolution is a defence of the Bolshevist revolution dedicated appropriately to Lenin. The author's view is that the dictatorship of the proletariat is a necessary transitional stage to the millenium, when class shall have been abolished once for all, and we shall be in full enjoyment of pure ergatocracy—"the administration of the workers, for the workers, by the workers; since all except the immature, the retired, and the incapacitated, will then be active workers, there will be no class rule." The dictatorship, we are glad to read is no more than a transient and necessary evil. Ergatocracy is not already in being in Russia (in spite of passages in which they claim to see ergatocracy 'triumphant in Russia') for Russia is still obviously in the acute stage of dictatorship, though it appears to be rather a dictatorship of a single mind, Lenin's, than of the proletariat. This is a necessary stage, according to the authors, turning to England, in development from Parliamentary democracy to communistic ergatocracy, thus replacing the "camouflaged oligarchy of the bourgeois." Lenin, though not a greater mind than Marx, lives in more plastic times, and is therefore able to "find an artist's self-expression and to delight the artistic sensibilities of all true revolutionists as archetype of the creative revolutionists in action." We cannot help thinking that the potter's hand has shaken.

Revolution envisaged as a transcendental creative act wherein the animate stuff of the social organism is remodelled, appears again and again as the writers' inspiration. And this mystic attitude towards the liberating effect of the Revolution is reinforced by the later teaching of Freud and Bergson. The receipt of the author's political attitude is contained in the bibliography.

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The book is interesting as illustrating the attitude of the advanced wing of the intellectuals and it is probably true that the tame labour battalions are dwindling and the 'wild men' are becoming inevasingly numerous. It emphasises also the close parallel to the soviet system in the Shop-steward movement, in which the authors see the organ for bringing about the revolution.

KARL MARX ON VALUE. By J. W. Scott, D. Phil. London: A. & C. Black, Ltd., 1920. Pp. viii, 54. Price, 3s. 6d. net.

Professor Scott, the author of *Syndicalism & Philosophic Realism*, deals in the short study with the fallacy underlying Marx's theory of value, promising to return at some future time to his main teaching and hypotheses regarding capitalistic society. As is well known, Marx's theory of exchange-value was that its measure is the amount of labour socially necessary for its production.

Marx, after having defined exchange-value; and having raised the question 'where does this mysterious power named exchange-value come from?' proceeds to build upon his answer, which he assumes is the correct one. He builds as we know an entire economic system upon it, all without offering the reader any test whereby he might try and see for himself whether it is the true answer or no. But actually, if value comes from labour alone, as in Marxian economics, it will vary with it. But it does not do so; the price of an article admittedly follows the total amount of capital requisite for the thing's production.

Does the whole teaching of Marx fall with the defective corner-stone which his ablest followers have so definitely abandoned? "Is there no truth at all hovering around Marx's somewhat cumbrous mind as he works out a theory of value through so many hundred pages." What is left is that in some general sense of the term man lives by labour, and that we are all here to work, "but nothing that he has given will enable us to say of those who are obviously working, how much work they are doing," and our one hope of success in settling these questions will be precisely on our ability to forget altogether the sort of abstract quantitative standards that Marx endeavoured to use. M. J.

THE CONDITIONS OF THE WORKING-CLASS IN ENGLAND IN 1844. By Frederick Engels. Translated by F. K. Wischnewetzky. London: G. Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1920. Pp. xx, 298. Price, 5s. net.

This reprint of Engels' early work on English social conditions in 1844, first published in Germany a year later, is timely. The state of things described in the book and in the preface, belongs to the past; for since 1844 (the middle years of the industrial revolution) England's commercial progress has been so immense that the earlier status seems entirely primitive and unsignificant. Many of the crying abuses have disappeared, and the spirit of the book is Engels as a young, hot enthusiast of twenty-four believing in the imminence of revolution with the fervour of a Bakunin: "The war of the poor against the rich now carried on in detail and indirectly will become direct and universal," he prophesies, adding, "that it was too late for a peaceful solution." Engels, in 1892 (in the preface which is here reprinted) did not even at that time attempt to bring his book up to date, but considered it as of value as representing one of the embryonic phases of international socialism. The gulf between the power and progress of the organised unions to-day, and the condition of 1892, when the unskilled proletariat was just "beginning to shake off its torpid despair, and the skilled workers had already conquered their portion," is significant.

J. E.

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THE SLIPPERY SLOPE AND OTHER PAPERS. By W. A. Bailward. London: J. Murray, 1920. Pp. xiv, 236. Price, 10s. 6d. net.

The late Lord Salisbury once advised those who wish to study foreign politics to do so upon large maps. Mr. Bailward is carrying his readers who wish to study the problem of poverty and its relief to a large-scale map and face-to-face with this detailed record, criticises very drastically modern democratic tendencies. He brings to his subject a practical knowledge of the working of the Poor Law and an adequate knowledge of the history of poverty. "The poor ye have always with you" is his refrain, and he brings sufficient evidence to show that even in the remoter periods of history much the same things were being said and done in regard to the problem of poverty as are being said and done at the present time. The great measures of unrestricted State relief have had from the earliest times a "monotonously disastrous character," the device or dole announced as a new experiment is really an old failure. Pauperism is Mr. Bailward's *bête noir*, a state of mind which is not necessarily connected with vice and drunkenness, but in its commonest form is "an indefinite weakening of the character, a dulling of the spirit, a sort of lowering of pitch." The pauper is not so much a poor person as a poor creature. Next to the increase of payment for labour, Mr. Bailward's remedy is a growth of the spirit of self-maintenance and self-respect. In the early days of the 18th century, Defoe laid down the principle that the object of statesmanship is to enable men to live by their labour and to raise the poor out of their poverty. The only method is to induce them to raise themselves; and the mitigation of poverty by large and sweeping systems of material relief has been shown in the past to be delusive. J. E.

GOD AND PERSONALITY: Being the Gifford Lectures delivered in the University of Aberdeen in the years 1918–1919. By Clement C. J. Webb. London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd.; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1918. Pp. 281. Price, 10s. 6d. net.

This 'First Course' deals with Personality in God, and is to be followed by Personality in Man. Mr. Webb defends this order on the grounds:—(a) that the philosophical discussion of the nature of human Personality is posterior in time to, and largely the outcome of, the controversies about Personality *in* (not *of*) God in the Christian Church; and (b) that "Personality is not something which we observe in men; rather it is something which, though suggested to us by what we find in men, we perceive to be only imperfectly realized in them."

Out of this arises both the strength and the weakness of the book. Its strength in the wealth of historical material, both philosophical and theological, which Mr. Webb provides. And its weakness as shown by the steady descent from a mere placing of personality "in the class of what we may call ideals"; to its corollary—the constant appeal when in intellectual difficulties to the deliverances of the "religious consciousness" (see *e. g.* pp. 180, 214.); and finally to a very obvious attempt (in the words Dr. Rashdall has applied to another thinker of this school) to keep on good terms both with the religious world which thinks of God as a Self and with that philosophical world which will have no God but the Absolute.

A. E. H.

THE ACQUISITIVE SOCIETY. By R. H. Tawney, New York: Harcourt, Brace, Howe, 1920. Pp. 188.

The acquisitive society in which we at present live is contrasted by the author with the functional society. The root difficulty with the acquisi-

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tive society is held to be not that it does not produce enough, but rather that its very principle is a conception of industry which makes inequality and functionless incomes permanent. The idea of function "would eliminate the surpluses which are the subject of contention, and would make it evident that remuneration is based upon service, not upon chance or privilege or power to use opportunities to drive a hard bargain." Greater production will not produce peace unless there is justice. But the present order does not produce efficiently. It is more and more breaking down in its pretention to do the work of society. "The public cannot have it both ways. If it allows workmen to be treated as 'hands' it cannot claim the service of their wills and their brains."

The book is an extraordinarily clear statement of the present strife of principles which the more thoughtful are beginning to consider, not from the abstract merits of socialism and individualism, but from the practical point of view of a harmonious and efficient society. J. H. T.

THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY. By Frederick J. Turner, New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1920. Pp. 375.

A reprint of the brilliant essays which the author has published from time to time, on forces in American life which had previously received little recognition. The ethical aspects of our national development as affected, on the one hand, by the village life of New England or on the other by the scattered dwellings and other environment of the frontiersman, and particularly the development of democracy, are suggestively treated in these illuminating essays. J. H. T.

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THE INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL OF ETHICS

APRIL, 1921

PROFIT-SHARING AND INDUSTRIAL PEACE.

ARTHUR O. LOVEJOY.

AMONG existing movements for reforming the distribution of wealth in the interest of the working class, profit-sharing is one of the oldest—if not as a theory or a propaganda, at least as a program in actual operation. The first profit-sharing system in industry was established more than three-quarters of a century ago—five years before the appearance of the *Communist Manifesto* of Marx and Engels, a generation before the beginning of the Single Tax movement. From 1842 to the present day there have always been experiments in profit-sharing going on, and there have always been both business men and social philosophers who have vigorously advocated the general adoption of the plan. While the movement has, in these seventy-eight years, made some headway, it has made less than its early enthusiasts expected. In view of its age, its progress has been by no means notable, either in Europe or America. There have appeared, however, within a few years, some indications of a considerable growth of interest in the plan in the United States. Two somewhat influential leaders of opinion, President Eliot and the late Mr. G. W. Perkins, came forward not long since in enthusiastic advocacy of the plan. "Through the smoke and din of the present combat," writes Dr. Eliot, "it already appears to many disinterested lookers-on that profit-sharing combined with co-operative management . . . is the only road to industrial peace." Much the same conclusion was expressed

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in a widely circulated address by Mr. Perkins. "Our laboring people," he declared, "are no longer striking for a definite increase of wages, but for what they regard as a fairer proportion of the profits of the business in which they are engaged. If I am right about this, then we are rapidly leaving behind the period when labor disputes could be settled by a mere increase in wages, and are entering the period when profit-sharing in some form must be practiced." There have also been published during the past three or four years several important volumes in which the records of American experience in profit-sharing have been collated much more extensively and analyzed more critically than ever before.[1] These include the report of an elaborate investigation of "all genuine profit-sharing establishments" in the country, conducted for the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics by Dr. Boris Emmett; an illuminating collaborative study by Professors Gay and Heilman and three business men, Messrs. Burritt, Dennison and Kendall, designed "to enable the management of a business to determine whether profit-sharing might profitably be introduced among any portion of its employees, and what methods would prove most practicable"; and an extensive collection of reports and discussions brought together by the National Civic Federation, and now issued in a much enlarged second edition. In view, especially, of the new material thus available, the time seems opportune for an attempt to sum up the state of the argument with respect to the significance and possibilities of profit-sharing, both as a means of increasing industrial efficiency and as a "road to industrial peace."

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[1] *Profit-sharing in the United States.* By Boris Emmett. (Bulletin No. 208 of the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics.) Washington, Government Printing Office. 1917.

Profit-Sharing: Its Principles and Practice. By A. M. Burritt, Henry S. Dennison, Edwin F. Gay, R. E. Heilman, Henry P. Kendall, N. Y., Harpers. 1918.

Profit-sharing by American Employers. Published by the National Civic Federation. N. Y., 1920.

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A word of definition is a necessary preliminary. In much current speech the term profit-sharing is applied too promiscuously; some specialists, on the other hand, have sought to restrict its meaning somewhat arbitrarily. Profit-sharing may properly be said to exist in any establishment in which, in addition to a fixed wage, the employees, or some portion of them, receive, as part of the promised compensation for their labor, either periodically or as often as dividends are declared upon capital stock, some proportion of the net profits of the enterprise—"profits" being reckoned only after the payment of the current rate of interest upon capital has been provided for. So defined, "profit-sharing" excludes all those numerous systems by which fixed bonuses are, under various conditions, added to the basic wages of employees; for in such systems the amount distributed does not depend upon and fluctuate with the net earnings of the business. The definition given likewise excludes all plans for distributing fixed amounts of stock, or for selling stock upon especially advantageous terms, to employees; for though, after the stock is acquired, the employee's income varies with the profits of the company, this fluctuating portion of his income is not received by him as a compensation for his services, but as a return upon the capital which he has invested. In the present article I shall be concerned solely with wage-earner's profit-sharing, that is, with the extension of the system to the rank and file of industry, and shall disregard those plans under which only managerial or other "discretionary" and relatively highly paid employees participate. It may be said in passing, however, that the case for the sharing of profits by all responsible higher officials of a company seems so clearly made out that it no longer need be discussed.

Within the limits of this general definition, three essentially distinct and, indeed, conflicting kinds of profit-sharing must be discriminated. The distinction between these kinds lies in the different purposes which dominate them; though in each of these different purposes there is

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implicit a fundamentally different theory of general social policy, and from each of them there result—or should result—different practical plans for working out in detail the general profit-sharing principle. Unhappily both the discussion and the practice of profit-sharing have been, and usually still are, profoundly vitiated by a failure to define sharply the principal purpose in view, and to realize the mutual irreconcilability of the three ends, one or another of which those who adopt such a plan may conceivably seek to realize thereby.

1. Profit-sharing has sometimes in the past been merely a device, not very skilfully disguised, for keeping wages down and trade-unions out; and examples of the same type are by no means lacking in contemporary American industry. As Mr. John Graham Brooks recalls in a recent volume, a great English engineer welcomed profit-sharing half a century ago because it would "prevent inroads on the capitalistic structure and protect the manager from all interference from the unions." One American "profit-sharing concern," mentioned (as an example of how not to do it) by Professor Gay and his associates, reports that on January 1st of each year "any employees who insist on securing an advance of salary are dropped from the profit-sharing list." Where a share in problematical profits is thus held out to an employee in lieu of a part of the fixed wage current or obtainable in his trade, the advantage to the employer is obvious; the advantage to the wage-earner is, in ordinary cases, worse than dubious. When, furthermore, this questionable boon is made to serve as a justification for repressing those organizations which skilled workers usually regard as the most promising agencies for protecting their own interests and improving their condition, profit-sharing is certain to seem to employees, and usually is in fact and in presumable intent, a plan for maintaining or enhancing dividends at the expense of wages, or of the wage-earner's liberty of action, or of both. When, in addition, workers are required to take their share of profits in securities of the company employing them, profit-sharing

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becomes a means for coercing employees with respect to the investment of a portion of the recompense of their labor—and sometimes for coercing them into highly injudicious investments. By the same requirement, moreover, the employer obtains, as a labor leader has remarked, a species of "insurance against strikes," while the employee gets no corresponding insurance against conditions which would ordinarily lead to strikes. That trade-unions should bitterly oppose "profit-sharing" of this type is natural and justifiable; though they have sometimes too hastily transferred the antagonism aroused in them by such schemes to plans having both a different purpose and different actual effects.

2. There is possible, and there sometimes is found, a second type of profit-sharing which, while it, also, is essentially designed to benefit the employer, seeks to gain this result by means of a real increase of employees' earnings and a genuine improvement in their condition. The logic of the plan is summed up in the classic anecdote of Robert Owen: when a factory owner once said to him, "If my men liked they could save me £10,000 a year by better work and avoidance of waste," he replied, "Then why don't you pay them £5,000 a year to do it?" It is, in short, assumed, by those who adopt a system of this type, that profit-sharing will produce an increase of profits in which both employer and employed will participate—whether the effect be brought about by an increase of the productive energy and efficiency of individual employees, or by the fostering of economies, or by the creation of a better industrial *morale* and the avoidance of "labor troubles," or by all of these together. It must be emphasized that it is no part of the intention of a company, in adopting this sort of profit-sharing, to reduce the dividends of its stockholders for the benefit of its wage-earners; its ruling purpose is, on the contrary, to gain greater dividends than before. The wage-earner's share is to be limited to the additional profits resulting from the profit-sharing and, ordinarily, to only a fraction of these.

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Since, however, the essence of this plan consists in the provision of an incentive which will actually increase the total, long-run productivity of the working force (or of some part of it), it is obviously necessary that the incentive be one which really appeals to employees, and that it be not attended by incidental features which arouse their hostility or distrust. No scheme, therefore, is well adapted to the end in view, and none is likely to be exempt from the suspicion that its real purpose is rather of the sort first mentioned, unless it fulfills at least these five fundamental conditions: (a) the union scale, or at least the rate of wages usual in the industry and district, must be paid to employees irrespective of their shares in the profits—which thus become in all cases a clear addition to the customary wage; (b) the percentage of net profits (after normal interest on capital and necessary reserves have been provided for) which is to go to employees must be definitely announced in advance, and also the ratio of distribution among the several classes of employees; (c) the percentage of addition to "normal" wages, in a successful year, must be large enough to make its attainment seem to the average participating employee worth some special effort; (d) employees must be permitted to examine the books of the company, either through representatives from their own number or through accountants selected by them, in order that they may satisfy themselves that the terms of the profit-sharing agreement are being carried out in good faith; (e) there must be no attempt to use the profit-sharing system as a means of preventing or impeding trade-union organization, or as a substitute for collective bargaining in the determination of the ordinary wage.

When these conditions are not realized, profit-sharing naturally tends, at least in large establishments, to arouse the suspicion of the wage-earners and the opposition of the trade-unions, and is more likely in the long run to produce friction, lowered *morale*, and diminished efficiency, than the contrary. For it is manifest that where such requirements are not fulfilled there are plausible grounds for the fear that,

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whatever the intent of the plan, its eventual effects will be unfavorable to the interests of the employees.

It is, apparently, systems fulfilling these requirements that Mr. Brooks has lately hailed hopefully as "the new profit-sharing." But what may be called pure cultures of this "new profit-sharing" are not abundant in the United States. Most of the plans now or recently in use in American profit-sharing establishments are of an ambiguous character, lying upon the border-line of the type first mentioned. The probable intent of the firms adopting them has been to offer their employees a real, and a really effective, inducement to increased efficiency and to a more cordially co-operative spirit. But only a small number of employers seem to have been able to keep this purpose clearly and steadily in view, when working out the details of their schemes; the temptation to try, incidentally, to accomplish other (and incongruous) objects—and, in particular, to take a thrust at the trade-unions—has usually been too strong. Most employers, in short, have failed to do what was most obviously requisite in order to make their purpose to benefit their employees, as well as themselves, unmistakable to a hard-headed and perhaps inordinately suspicious body of wage-earners; and they have, in consequence, often found their more or less well-meant experiments in profit-sharing highly disappointing. Both the Civic Federation's investigators and Mr. Emmett find that (in the words of the latter) "under the majority of the plans the prospective beneficiaries are not even given an inkling as to the specific proportion of the profit that their employers are willing to share." Mr. Emmett also reports that "no profit-sharing firm is known to have in operation any system of collective bargaining or of definitely established friendly relations with trade-unions." Even when some of the fundamental conditions above indicated have been met, they have often been granted grudgingly and after controversies which have worsened rather than improved the relations between employer and employed. Thus one corporation reports in the Civic Federation's volume that it tried profit-sharing

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for two years. "During the first year it was distinctly understood in the rules of the game that members of labor organizations would be barred from participating in the profits. At the end of this period this restriction was withdrawn"—but it had, of course, been enough to prejudice the whole experiment from the start. At the end of the second year, the only labor organization in the works demanded "that a committee of their organization be allowed to examine the books and accounts of the company with a view of determining whether they had been cheated or not," and also asked for a representative on the board of directors. Both these demands seem to have been regarded as unreasonable by this company; yet the former only required the observance of ordinary businesslike procedure. If one of two "profit-sharers" of the more usual sort—namely, business partners—were to refuse the other access to the books, it is unlikely that the partnership would long continue. It is surprising that men of affairs should hope for beneficial results from "profit-sharing" conducted under conditions which—as either an acquaintance with the history of similar undertakings, or an elementary knowledge of human nature, would have shown—rendered its success impossible.

It is the purpose of profit-sharing of the second type to increase profits by increasing the amount or diminishing the unit-cost of production. But is the system really capable of bringing about a material increase of the productive efficiency of the average individual worker in the rank and file of industry? That it has not in fact done so, except in a few relatively small establishments, is the conclusion reached by most of those who have carefully studied American experience. Messrs. Burritt, Dennison, and their associates write:

"One fundamental conclusion may be formulated: Regarded purely as an efficiency method, as a business arrangement for increasing profits by sharing them, the effectiveness of general profit-sharing is in direct relation to the rank of the participators, and in inverse relation to the size of the concern or of the participating group." . . . "It is a notable fact

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that all the plants which have operated genuine profit-sharing schemes for any considerable period have been comparatively small concerns in which one or a few managers conducted a long campaign of education, largely by personal contact with the participants." . . . "We make no appeal for the widespread or universal introduction of profit-sharing among the rank and file."

Mr. Emmett reports that only three out of sixty profit-sharing employers "stated definitely that the system had increased the individual or collective efficiency of the participating employees." But it is difficult to judge how far these negative results are due to an inherent weakness of profit-sharing as a type of incentive, and how far they are due to peculiarities of the specific plans adopted. The effectiveness of an inducement to the putting forth of special effort obviously depends upon two principal factors—first, upon the amount of the inducement, and second, upon the directness and certainty of the relation between the effort demanded and the attainment of the desired reward. In the latter respect, profit-sharing is inevitably weak. The individual employee, under it, gets no certain or directly proportional return for any exceptional energy or care which he may display. True, he will, under such a system, probably receive some actual increment of wages; but he does not necessarily see this increment as the consequence of particular efforts of his own. In point of fact, its attainment depends not so much upon him as upon others—upon the efficiency of his fellow-workmen, which he can control but little, and chiefly upon the ability and energy of the management, which he cannot control at all. There is, therefore, among those who have most thoroughly considered the matter, almost universal agreement with the conclusion expressed by Professor Gay and his collaborators: "profit-sharing is not urged as a means of promoting individual efficiency when there is any basis for measuring and [directly] rewarding individual effort."

Yet an inducement may be effective even though its attainment is uncertain and indirect, if it is sufficiently

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great in amount. And it is probable that the apparent failure of many American profit-sharing schemes as incentives to efficiency is also due in part to the fact that they have offered too small an addition to the employee's wage. Gay and his collaborators are of the opinion that "an additional share amounting, as a minimum, to five or six per cent of wages is required to excite and sustain the interest and effort of any group of employees"; but it is not clear upon what empirical basis this opinion rests, and it appears doubtful whether the minimum is not underestimated. One manager reports in the Civic Federation's volume that "6% on wages was not enough to make it a decided factor." Of thirty-four establishments reported upon by Mr. Emmett, the addition amounted in more than half the cases to less than eight per cent of the employee's "normal wage"; and in one third of the cases it was less than six per cent. And it is significant that he finds that the three employers who alone, out of sixty, stated explicitly that profit-sharing increased the efficiency of their force, all paid unusually high profit-sharing dividends to their employees. Evidently, by making the potential return great enough, the inertia due to the indirectness of the relation between the employees' effort and result can be overcome.

Merely as an inducement to greater efficiency, profit-sharing is questionable on theoretical grounds and it has not vindicated itself in American practice; though no certain conclusions can be drawn from experiments so ill conducted as most of those in this country have been. The most unequivocal success of the plan has been as an inducement to greater continuity of service. As an employer quoted by Mr. Emmett observed: "It works precisely like an increase in wages, but is more valuable because the employee, in order to receive his share, has to wait till the end of the distribution period, a fact that makes him hesitate before quitting." The testimony of profit-sharing employers is almost unanimous that the scheme has in this way reduced materially their "labor turnover." Since permanency in the same employment is a factor in produc-

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tivity, this tendency of profit-sharing is of some importance to the public at large as well as to the industrial manager. But it must be observed that there is no reason why an inducement to permanency in service should take the form of participation in profits—in other words, why the inducement should fluctuate with the earnings of the business. The desired result could more simply and with much less misunderstanding be reached by a fixed system of graduated bonuses for length of service. Consequently, only those firms which seek to disguise their real object, or those which are doubtful of their ability to pay such bonuses and therefore wish to hold out to their employees speculative inducements which they may not be able to realize, have much motive—so far as the present consideration is concerned—for adopting profit-sharing. It is evident also that the continuity of service induced by profit-sharing, as a system of deferred payment of a part of wages, may often be contrary to the worker's interest. An employer quoted by Mr. Emmett remarked that his "valuable help would certainly have been stolen had the plan not been in operation." He apparently meant by this that his best employees would have been tempted away from him by higher wages offered in other plants or other industries. However gratifying this effect of profit-sharing may be to the employer, it is hardly such as to commend the plan to those of his employees who are intelligent enough to perform a simple arithmetical calculation.

It is not, however, as a direct inducement to efficiency or to length of service that profit-sharing is chiefly commended by its most earnest advocates, but as a means of bringing about better relations between capital and labor. I have already quoted remarks of President Eliot and Mr. Perkins to the effect that the adoption of this plan of distribution is the "road to industrial peace." To this hopeful view the testimony of American firms conducting profit-sharing establishments lends some apparent support. Dr. Emmett found in his investigation of sixty such firms that there was an "almost unanimous consensus of opinion that the plans

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did have a very decided tendency to establish more satisfactory relations between employer and employee. This seems to be particularly true of establishments where the profit-sharing plans have been in operation for a considerable length of time." More recent examples of similar favorable reports may be found in the Civic Federation's volume.

Yet to this seemingly weighty testimony from experience little real importance can be attached. For, in the first place, the number of wage-earners in these establishments is an almost negligible fraction of our industrial population. Mr. Emmett found not more than 30,000 employees "coming under genuine profit-sharing plans." In the second place, the experience of most of the establishments thus reporting has been brief. Of the profit-sharing schemes existing in 1916, nearly half were less than five years old; two-thirds had been in operation less than ten years. More important still, these establishments are by no means typical of American industry as a whole. With a few exceptions, they are small. Scarcely any of them, it would appear, are union shops, practice collective bargaining, or have regular relations with trade-unions. In this respect their situation is conspicuously different from that found in most of our great industries. It is evident that no conclusions drawn from the experience of non-union establishments under profit-sharing can be applied to the probable relations of union workers to their employers under that system—especially when the fact is borne in mind that the opposition of trade-union leaders to such schemes is vigorous and almost if not absolutely unanimous. Of twenty-five of the principal officials of American unions whose opinions were elicited by the Civic Federation's investigators, not one spoke well of the plan. In highly "organized" industries, then, profit-sharing is unlikely to prove a very direct road to industrial peace; its most immediate effect may be expected to be increased friction with the unions. Moreover, the testimony of employers as to the "better relations with labor" resulting from their adoption

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of profit-sharing, is not always unambiguous; it sometimes means only that they believe that the system has helped them to keep the unions out of their plants. This hardly means "industrial peace" in the long run. It must be remembered, also, that the favorable testimony on this point is largely offset by numerous reports of unsuccessful experiments, many of them now abandoned. These, however, have been less carefully collected; so that it is not possible to assess the relative weights of evidence on the two sides. Finally it is evident that we cannot conclude from the effects of profit-sharing when it is an exception to its effects when it should be the general rule. Where it now actually gives to the workers in a plant a somewhat greater reward than is customary in other plants, it doubtless tends to better relations between employers and employed. But would the same result necessarily follow after profit-sharing became the usual thing?

It is not, then, from the rather meagre, conflicting, and eminently equivocal evidence of American experience that any trustworthy conclusion can be drawn respecting the general effect of profit-sharing upon the relations of labor and capital, under American conditions. To judge of the probable effect, we can only analyze more closely the plan itself, and endeavor to infer—human nature and the present temper of "labor" being what we pretty well know them to be—how the minds of wage-earners would in the long run react to such a plan. And here it is important to remember the distinction between three types of profit-sharing, of which two have already been defined. Many of those who are most hopeful of the effects of profit-sharing upon industrial relations appear to have in mind what I have called the "second type." The essential characteristic of this type is that, while it aims at an actual increase of employees' recompense, it aims also at an increase of owners' dividends; it is, in short, a form of profit-sharing for profit. That it is to this type that President Eliot and Mr. Perkins refer in their articles already cited seems plain from their language. "Every good profit-sharing scheme," writes Dr. Eliot,

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"turns out to be for the advantage"—which here presumably means the pecuniary advantage—"of both parties." The question now to be considered, then, relates to the effect upon industrial relations of that type of profit-sharing which is conditioned by the requirement that the adoption of the scheme shall yield a return to the individual employer, or to stockholders, additional to the profits otherwise obtainable.

Now the principal, chronic, and increasing cause of "industrial unrest" is dissatisfaction with the existing division of the collective income of the community. Wage-earners at present, as Mr. Perkins has said, not only want more wages; they also want "what they regard as a fairer *proportion* of the profits of the business in which they are engaged." To that fraction of labor which has imbibed the Socialist philosophy of distribution—a class much more numerous than the membership of organized Socialist parties—a "fairer proportion" means the whole of profits, including the interest now paid on loaned capital. Demands inspired by these principles will naturally not be satisfied by profit-*sharing*. "The industrial problem will never be solved," writes an American trade-union organ of Socialistic tendency, "until capital ceases to be regarded as an active participant in production, rightly demanding profits, and becomes what it really is, a mere instrument in the hands of labor, no more entitled to dividends than a pick or a shovel." To a Guild Socialist, again, such as Mr. G. D. H. Cole, profit-sharing is simply "one of Labor's red herrings," an attempt to divert it from its true goal.

Yet it is probably true that most wage-earners hold both a less definite and a less extreme view as to what constitutes a just distribution; they doubtless are, in the words of Mr. Perkins, "willing that capital should have its fair reward." But what reason is there for thinking that they will eventually regard profit-sharing, of the type under consideration, as assuring its "fair reward" to both labor and capital? What, in fact, does labor in general hold to be that just proportion of the produce of industry which

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should be allotted to it? The only answer that can confidently be given is that labor claims, at any rate, a much greater proportion than it at present receives; and that no clear limit can now be set to the future expansion of its demands, when situations arise favorable to the pressing of those demands. The policy of orthodox trade-unionism is, in the words of the Secretary of the American Federation of Labor, "to take advantage of every lawful opportunity to better the condition" of the wage-earner; that is, to seek to obtain a continuously increasing share of the national dividend, by the use of methods of economic and political pressure. To the trade-unionist, no share which he sees a prospect of obtaining by these means is likely to seem more than a "fair share."

To a body of workers in this general state of mind, profit-sharing, of the type under consideration, offers nothing which seems fitted to alter that state of mind—unless, perhaps, it be to exacerbate it still further. For, in the first place, the program of profit-sharing for profit neither brings, nor attempts to bring, any solvent formula of distributive justice. It is, it is true, described by its advocates as a plan for "giving the worker his fair share." But it contains no principle whatever for determining what his or anyone's fair share is. It offers to the laboring masses, stirred with a vague but potent sense of injustice, no clear and simple argument to show it which of its aspirations are equitable or practicable, and which are not. In so far as it is consistent, it is concerned not at all with the question of equitable division, but solely with the question of effective incentives to a specific end—the end, namely, of increasing corporate earnings. It therefore fails to touch those explicit or (more usually) tacit but deep-rooted and pervasive presuppositions out of which "labor unrest" is continually generated anew. Second, this type of profit-sharing does not necessarily promise *any* increase in the proportion of the earnings of a company which go to the wage-earners. Whether in any given instance it has this effect depends upon the ratios of the several factors in the

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equation. It is possible to increase the worker's recompense through profit-sharing while actually decreasing his proportional share in the earnings of the industry. Assuming, however, that only those plans are to be considered in which some increase in the proportion going to the wage-earner is assured, there remains even in these cases the essential requirement of all profit-sharing for profit, *viz.*, that the adoption of the scheme shall be "for the advantage of both parties." This, of course, can only mean that the profits already obtained or obtainable by individual owners or stockholders on existing investments must in no case be touched. But it is, in the main, against profits now received by capital or business enterprise on existing investments that the claims of malcontent labor are directed. Of the *present* produce of industry, say the spokesmen of these discontents, the worker receives less than his rightful proportion. What, then, is the likelihood that such discontent will be allayed by a plan which begins by announcing, without argument, that no change is to be made in the apportionment of the present produce of industry, as between employer and employee?

The workers' shares, by the intent of this plan, being thus limited to a part of what may be termed "excess profits"—those attributable to the effects of profit-sharing itself—it must further be noted that the whole of these excess profits is likely to seem to the worker to be the product of his own efforts. The employer is not required, in order to gain his part of this increment, to invest any further capital in the business or to take any new risks. By the theory underlying the plan, the increment is to be wholly due to the greater zeal or increased efficiency or more continuous service of the employees, under the incentive which the scheme provides. "I alone," the worker is therefore likely to say, "am asked to *do* more in order to create this additional product; even supposing, then, that the boss is entitled to all his present profits, by what right does he claim any part of this addition?" This reasoning would scarcely pass muster in the American Economic Association; but its

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effectiveness at a union meeting or a Labor Day picnic, as a means of damning this type of profit-sharing in the eyes of workers, cannot be doubted. And labor would be entirely right in concluding that, at any rate, no special gratitude was due from it over the adoption of a scheme of which the primary requirement is that it shall increase the profits of the employer through additional efforts of his employees, at no cost to himself. For precisely this, of course, is the essence of all forms of profit-sharing for profit. It is not a sharing of anything which the employer had, or could have had, apart from the sharing.

It is clear, then, what our conclusion must be with respect to the probable effect of this type of profit-sharing on industrial relations. When its details are intelligently and liberally planned, its introduction may sometimes—under certain conditions and within very narrow limits—help to create a somewhat friendlier and more co-operative attitude on the part of the wage-earners, at least in non-union establishments; though even in such cases, the persistency of this effect over a long period of time is questionable. But we shall deceive ourselves if we look to such a plan for a solution, or even for material aid towards a solution, of the social problem. The deeper causes of industrial unrest remain untouched by it. The belief that any substantial, general, and lasting improvement of the relations of capital and labor to one another and to the rest of the community can be brought about by the adoption of a simple device which is to cost nobody anything, is but a curious survival of a disappearing kind of economic optimism. It is a form of the theory that omelets may be made without breaking eggs.

3. There is, however, a third type of profit-sharing, constantly confused with the foregoing, but differing from it fundamentally in purpose and underlying theory. It may be described as profit-sharing not for the sake of profits but for the sake of sharing. In the long run, it is true, it may turn out to be profitable to all concerned; but it is not subject to the initial condition that its adoption shall be to the

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pecuniary advantage of capital as well as labor. It consists in a voluntary surrender by the present owners of an enterprise of a substantial portion of *any* profits which may be earned by it—not merely of a portion of the excess profits produced by the sharing. If no increase of earnings should result, the purpose of this type of profit-sharing would not be defeated. Such a plan implies a conviction that the existing method of distributing the earnings of industry between the two classes of participants therein is in some degree inequitable or socially inexpedient; and that the employer is therefore under a moral obligation—after interest upon capital, and wages, have been paid at the current rate—to divide the remaining profits with all those actively engaged in the business.

Examples of profit-sharing of this type are not numerous in America or elsewhere; in the Labor Bureau's investigation in 1916, only three profit-sharing companies, out of sixty, gave it as the main object of their plans to furnish "an equitable distribution of the profits of the undertaking, irrespective altogether of hopes for increased efficiency." Among the small number of such companies is one of the two oldest, and in many respects the most interesting, of American profit-sharing enterprises. Its plan is summarized as follows:

> "After a 6 per cent dividend is paid upon the outstanding stock, the entire remainder of the year's profit is invested in the business and in the form of 6 per cent stock is distributed among the employees and customers. Every participating employee receives his regular wage, a 6 per cent cash dividend upon the stock which he already owns, and the year's dividend in the form of additional 6 per cent stock."

The employees now own one-third of the capital stock; their shares have full voting power, and they are represented on the Board of Directors. Dividends on wages have fluctuated between 10 per cent and 30 per cent. In this case, it will be observed, the original owner of the capital stock takes no part of the profits, other than 6 per cent on the portion of the present capital owned by him. A similar plan is in force in a department store in Boston,

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except that half the profits (after 7 per cent has been paid on capital) go to six managerial employees, the remaining half to the 2500 other employees in proportion to salaries.

It is not, however, essential to the type of profit-sharing under consideration that no profits (in addition to ordinary interest) should go to capital. The general adoption of this feature of the two plans mentioned would probably be economically disastrous; for it is unlikely that the entrepreneur's, as distinct from the lender's, reward can safely be eliminated from among the motives on which the maintenance of adequate production is to depend. This third sort of profit-sharing, like the second, contains no principle for definitely determining what fraction the workers' share should be; but, if it is hoped to affect materially the relations of labor and capital, that share must, at the least, be far greater than would probably be immediately justifiable in any system of profit-sharing for profit. The most promising form which such a plan might take, at least experimentally, would be an offer by capital to "go halves" with labor in the entire net profits of the enterprise, in which the two constitute equally indispensable factors. That labor, having been granted half, would presently be found demanding the whole, is, indeed, possible; but it is very far from certain, since the working of such a plan would mean for labor a liberal education in economic realities, such as it now lacks.

If there were much chance of its extensive adoption, profit-sharing of this type would deserve serious consideration, as a program of reform in distribution from which both an increase in production and a very great improvement of industrial relations might be hoped for. Compared with many other schemes of social reform which now have the support of large organized movements, this program seems compact of wisdom and prudence. It leaves ordinary interest untouched—and therefore does not destroy nor diminish the incentive to thrift. It presupposes no abandonment of the competitive régime in production and marketing. In the form of an equal sharing by entrepreneur and

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labor, it leaves an appreciable, though a diminished, incentive to the spirit of industrial and commercial enterprise, and provides a recompense for the taking of risks. Since boards of directors would still be free to reserve, as at present, a large proportion of corporate income for reinvestment in the enterprise, and since a part of the worker's share might also be regularly reinvested in the business, the provision of new capital for the expansion of industry would probably be not much less secure than at present. Such are the negative merits of the plan which we may call profit-halving. Its positive merits consist in its probable effect upon production and its probable effect upon industrial relations. The incentive to increased efficiency which profit-sharing on this scale would hold out would probably be great enough to yield actual results. And it would at least tend strongly to produce changes in the state of mind of the worker which would profoundly affect his attitude towards his work, towards his employer, and towards the rest of society. It would, if generally adopted, bring about to a great degree an actual identity of economic interest between what are called capital and labor. Since the worker would get half the profits, methods and policies favorable to the increase of profits would be not only actually but—what is more important—also obviously and directly to his advantage, as well as to that of the employer. Capital and labor would be in the same boat, and would *know* that they were; because every laborer would become in some degree—and eventually in no negligible degree—a capitalist, and the economic class distinction would be in great measure obliterated. Until that is, by some means or other, accomplished we need expect no peaceful or secure social order. The profit-halving plan would gain an incalculable moral momentum from the start from the worker's knowledge that the employer was not—as in profit-sharing of the second type—gaining additional profits through the introduction of the scheme, but was on the contrary making an actual sacrifice. Combined with co-operative management or an "industrial

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republic," such as already exists in one great American plant described by Mr. Paul W. Litchfield in a recent volume, such profit-sharing would develop into a genuine co-partnership between the organizer of industry, representing invested capital and directive ability, and the working force—a co-partnership in which labor would be sobered by an acquaintance with the actual economic problems and difficulties of the enterprise and by the fact that a large part of its own income would depend upon the success of the business.

Profit-halving, no doubt, like other types of profit-sharing, would be opposed by trade-union leaders; its natural tendency would be to make unionism seem less important to the workers, and to diminish their class-consciousness, since it would, as has been pointed out, partially and progressively diminish the economic class-distinction. It would make all workers direct and certain and substantial participants in the interests and gains of capital (in which alone lies much hope of lasting industrial peace). In short, it is quite possible that a program of this sort might gradually kill the labor-unions—kill them "by kindness"—as it apparently has already done in the few plants in which it has been honestly tried. And there is already, as Mr. John Graham Brooks has recently remarked, a field in which profit-sharing may well enter, not into conflict, but into competition, with trade-unionism. If, Mr. Brooks writes, the union leaders

> "are to capture the superior millions of the unorganized, they must make a better bid than the profit-sharers. For many years we are likely to see a very pretty competition here between those who believe that capitalism is to be reformed, but maintained in its essence, and those who would abolish the wage system and substitute control by labor organization."

But a better, or at least a more effective, bid can be made only by profit-sharing of the third sort; only by those whose willingness to share is not restricted by the condition that they thereby make additional profits for themselves.

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The plan is, of course, applicable only in a part of the industrial field. It obviously could not be introduced in industries not operated for profit, such as government-owned public utilities. It would be without effect in industries which habitually earn only ordinary interest on capital. It touches only a part of the problem of distribution; for wage-earners' profit-sharing does nothing for the consumer. It might, in fact, as some economists have suggested, tend to shift the principal line of economic conflict from the relations between employer and employed to the relations between producers (including both employers and employed) in the more "vital" and the less effectually competitive industries, on the one hand, and the rest of the community, as consumers, on the other hand. But we already have in the United States one successful working example of the combination of consumers' with producers' profit-sharing. And in any case, the situation of the consuming public could be no worse than it is now, when the workers in industries of this character hold and exercise—through the threat of disastrous stoppages of production—immense power to compel their employers to increase prices, in order that wages may be raised.

Yet, be the plan itself never so practicable and desirable, the prospect of its adoption on any great scale is slight. For—at least as conceived by most of its advocates—it has not behind it the driving force of self-interest. Reforms affecting the distribution of wealth are usually accomplished not by those who will lose but by those who will benefit by them. But profit-sharing of this type, if it is to be introduced at all, must apparently be introduced by the voluntary action of persons whose incomes would—certainly for some time, and perhaps permanently—be diminished thereby. The consent of the stockholders of thousands of corporations to a considerable reduction of their dividends would be necessary for the general establishment of such a system, under any conditions which would make it conducive to industrial peace and social harmony. In short, a potentially costly act of civic virtue

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on the part of great numbers of men must be presupposed by those who look to such a plan for a solution of the labor problem. And there is nothing in modern history to encourage the belief that great numbers of men are capable of such acts of civic virtue. Their lives most of them will, indeed, cheerfully enough hazard in the cause of the community, in time of war. There is no evidence that, in time of peace, they are equally ready to hazard their incomes. Whether there is any other real "road to industrial peace," upon which no costly acts of civic virtue are needful, is a question which it would perhaps be discouraging to discuss.

But whatever the future of profit-sharing, the beginning of wisdom in any discussion of the subject is a recognition of the irreconcilability of the three purposes which have here been distinguished. The attempt to combine them is the sure way to fail to realize any one of them. The most misleading thing that can be said about profit-sharing is the remark, in an otherwise illuminating and judicious book, that "profit-sharing for business reasons and for humanitarian purposes are not inconsistent"—if "humanitarian purposes" include a substantial and enduring improvement of industrial relations. No profit-sharing which "business reasons" will be likely to prompt tends in any significant degree towards the lasting establishment of a more harmonious and co-operative social order; while the kind of profit-sharing that might bring us far nearer to such an order is one which ordinary "business reasons" would in all probability condemn. Those advocates of profit-sharing who fail to face this fact, fail in consequence to point out the sole possible means to the consummation they desire.

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WHY DO ANIMALS FIGHT?

WALLACE CRAIG.

THE fact that all animals fight has attained immense importance in our day, because it is used as an argument in favor of the doctrine that men also should fight one another, that warfare ought not to be abolished. This doctrine I shall speak of for convenience as militarism; which is far preferable to calling it Nietzscheism or Treitschkeism or Prussianism, for all such names are invidious and more or less unjust. Militarists are at work in every nation, and in every nation they emphasize what they call the "biological" argument for war. They paint lurid pictures of "nature red in tooth and claw," dwelling on the many instances of rapacity, cruelty and destruction which undoubtedly occur in nature. They claim that theirs is a true picture of the life of animals, and also of the natural life of man. Their argument looks plausible, and it furnishes entertaining reading for the populace. But I believe it to be fallacious, partly because it exaggerates the cruel facts in nature, but far more because it misinterprets their meaning.

The attempts to refute the biological argument for war, so far as I have seen them, have been inadequate, some of them even absurd. Some pacifists have claimed that "No animal fights its own kind." Now, if the word pacifist means a person who longs to see war abolished, and who is willing to labor to the very best of his ability toward that end, I am myself a pacifist. But I believe that the cause of truth is more fundamental than the cause of any one man's theory as to how to make peace. Let us tell the truth, regardless of consequences. And the essential truth in this matter is that every animal fights its own kind. If we wish to discover any biological support for a policy of pacification, we must not seek to do it by asking "Do animals fight?" That question is not worth investigation,

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because the answer is already known. We must change the question and ask "Why do animals fight?"

The militarists are ready with an answer. They claim that the means by which a race progresses, or even maintains its present standard, is the killing of the less fit in the struggle for existence. And if the struggle to the death should cease, the race would degenerate. This presupposes the truth of the theory of the all-sufficiency of natural selection. Now, I shall not allow myself to be drawn into the debate between the rival theorists in genetics. I favor no one proposed solution of the problem of heredity and the method of evolution. On the contrary, I emphasize that this problem is not solved and that, therefore, the militarist has no right to base an argument for war upon one particular theory as to the origin of species. Our knowledge of genetics is not sufficient, and we doubt whether it ever will be sufficient, taken by itself, to settle the debate either for or against the biological argument for war. The pacifist is right in saying that the argument for war is "not proven," but he cannot say that it is positively disproved, by what we know as to the method of evolution. To find the evidence on which to base a positive verdict, we must turn away from the theories of evolution—which are all highly speculative—and examine at first hand the facts as to fighting among animals.

To understand why an animal fights, we must watch its fighting behavior, and also study the relation of its fighting to its other behavior, to its life history—in short, to its whole economy. This cannot be done by the old-fashioned method of surveying the entire animal kingdom, collecting therefrom a mixture of fragmentary and miscellaneous information. On the contrary, our problem can best be attacked by an intensive study of one species, or one group of related species. And if it can be shown that even one flourishing group of animals has evolved into its present prosperous state without its members engaging in internecine strife, that is enough to prove that warfare is not necessary for evolution.

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My own specialty, as a student of behavior, is the Columbidæ, and I shall use pigeons as my chief examples. But I have studied other birds and mammals sufficiently to be sure that the statements made in this paper have a wide and general application among them. The birds and mammals are the most important animals for our problem. And the pigeons are a properly representative group: because, first, their behavior is typical; they quarrel and fight just about as much, or as little, as do the majority of birds. A healthy pigeon never allows another to trespass on his territory, or in any way interfere with his interests, with impunity. And, secondly, the pigeons are a "dominant" group; that is to say, the pigeon family is found all over the world, it has evolved into a large number of species, and the number of its individual members is enormous. All signs indicate that the pigeon family is in the most flourishing condition and in a state of rapid, progressive evolution. If the members of such a group live and act in a manner contradictory to the militarist theory, this is sufficient to prove that the militarist policy is not necessary for the welfare or the evolution of a race.

A friendly critic has asked me whether the generalizations presented in this article are true of carnivores such as the lion. In reply I would say that I believe they are. The published accounts of leonine behavior, so far as I have read them, indicate that our knowledge of the lion is fragmentary and incomplete. But the lion is only a large cat. Feline behavior is best known in the common cat. All the generalizations set forth in the present article are true of cats. Some of them are less true of cats than of pigeons, but, on the other hand, some of them are more true of cats than of pigeons. For example, the felines "space out" much farther than pigeons do, and consequently come less into conflict with each other. The terrible powers of the carnivores are exercised chiefly upon their prey, not upon their own kind. I never knew of a cat being killed by another cat in a fight. And our problem concerns only fighting between animals of the same species.

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With reference especially to the higher vertebrates, we shall maintain and defend the two following theses: I. Fundamentally, among animals, fighting is not sought nor valued for its own sake; it is resorted to rather as an unwelcome necessity, a means of defending the agent's[1] interests. II. Even when an animal does fight, he aims, not to destroy the enemy,[1] but only to get rid of his presence and his interference.

I. The animal fights in order to gain or to retain possession of that which is of value to him, such as food, mate or nest. With animals, as with men, the cause of a quarrel is very commonly a coveted territory. My dog drives away other dogs from my house and yard. In general, each agent drives away other animals from his own nesting place, his chosen place for sleeping at night, his place for basking in the sun, or other territory which he can appropriate and use. Two animals fight only when their interests conflict. This is the fundamental fact in regard to infra-human fighting.

Animals do not enjoy fighting for its own sake. Unless his anger is aroused, the agent's behavior indicates that he has no appetence[2] for the fighting situation; he does not seek it; when in it he does not endeavor to prolong it; and he reveals by his expressions that he does not enjoy it. On the contrary, fighting belongs under the class of negative reactions or aversions;[2] it is a means of getting rid of an annoying stimulus. As McDougall says, the stimulus of the instinct of pugnacity is the thwarting of some other instinct. If the animal's instincts are not thwarted, if annoying stimuli do not thrust themselves upon him, he will never fight. He fights only when he is attacked, or threatened, or his interests are interfered with. He does not go in active search of a fight, except in play, in which

[1] We shall use the term "agent" for the animal whose behavior we are studying. His opponent we shall speak of as the "reagent" or the "enemy." The word enemy is thus used, as it is used by writers on the science of war, in a non-invidious sense.

[2] Craig. Appetites and Aversions as Constituents of Instincts. *Biol. Bull.*, 1918, Volume 34.

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no injury is done to either side. Of course it is true that when necessity compels him to fight, he shows eagerness to attack, and joy when he achieves the victory; these are necessary in order that he may be a good defender of his rights. But when we try the experiment of keeping a bird in such a peaceful environment that he never tastes the joys of battle (except in harmless play), he shows no sense of loss, but is manifestly happier than the birds that fight. The pigeon, unless his temper is aroused, has no appetence for a battle. He has appetence for a great many other objects; as, water, food, mate, nest: if kept without such appeted objects he shows distress, tries to get out of his cage, and in every way makes clear to us that he is seeking the appeted object. But when he is kept without enemies, he never manifests the least appetence for them. This is true of all birds and mammals, so far as I know them. I am sure that it is true of the common fowl, although the cock is one of the most celebrated of fighters. It is a popular error to suppose that a bird such as the game cock, which shows unyielding bravery when in a fight, must necessarily be an aggressive bird, seeking the joy of battle for its own sake. The fact is that in the poultry yard the game cock is not a quarrelsome bird; if neighboring cocks do not unwarrantably thrust their presence upon him he lets them alone and attends to his own affairs.

At this point the question naturally arises, Why do animals fight so much as they do? For it is undeniable that under certain conditions there is a very great amount of fighting among them. In seeking an answer to this question it is important to notice the circumstances under which the excessive amount of fighting takes place. One of these circumstances is that of caged animals which are crowded so closely together that they constantly fall afoul of one another. Pigeons, if thus crowded in quarters that are too small for them, fight to a degree that is cruel and distressing. Since each pair of birds insistently drive trespassers away from their nest and from a certain territory around their nest, if the pigeon-keeper crowds the nest-boxes too closely

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together constant fighting must inevitably result. Such a state of affairs is not natural. It does not exist in any species in a state of nature. And it has given to some theorists an exaggerated notion as to the frequency of fighting among animals. In a great many wild species the amount of fighting is, I am sure, extremely slight.

Indeed, anyone who has watched wild animals with a philosophical eye must have been struck by the beauty and delicacy of the adjustments through which they avoid collisions with their fellows. Thus, in a flock of flying geese each goose maintains with astonishing precision the standard distance between himself and the goose ahead of him. When a great number of robins are searching for worms on a large lawn, each keeps with a pretty faithful constancy a distance of two or more yards between himself and any other robin. This tendency to "keep one's distance" is so widespread among animals and so various in its manifestations that it constitutes a study in itself. It is known to naturalists as "spacing out." Birds "space out" their nests with similar regularity, the distance varying with the species. The bank swallow burrows within a foot or two from the burrow of his neighbor; the kingfisher prefers a distance which I should estimate at about a half-mile. The interesting fact about these myriad cases of spacing-out is that nearly all of them (of course, not quite all) are adjusted without fighting. Evidence indicates that in a vast number of cases the animal seeking a nesting-place, and finding one that is already occupied, peacefully passes on and looks elsewhere. These quiet cases of adjustment are likely to be overlooked by the observer; the cases of fighting are conspicuous and thus seem to be a greater proportion than they really are.

Notwithstanding all these facts, there remain cases in which two animals, even among those that are in a free and natural state, may be observed to quarrel and fight throughout a whole day, and to renew the quarrel when they wake the next morning. The reason for such excessive fighting may be stated briefly as follows:

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The adjustment of conflicting interests requires intelligent co-operation and some degree of social organization. Most animals, because of the low state of their intelligence and of their social organization, have a narrowly limited power of co-operating. That is why their differences must be settled so often by fighting. The following illustration, though simple, shows the point clearly. If we set up a new pigeon cote containing several compartments, each with its own door, and allow the pigeons to choose compartments for themselves, it may happen that two males will choose different doors from the very first, in which case they may live side by side in peace. But it may happen that on trying the new dove cote both males become enamored of the same door and each tries to enter it and make it his own. If these birds were endowed with reason, one of them would address the other in this wise: "Friend, in this dove cote there is plenty of room for you and me and for our families. Let us agree that you shall use the right door and I the left." But since pigeons are not endowed with reason they cannot make such a conceptual agreement; if both birds have chosen the same door they can adjust the difficulty only by fighting for it. In short, the reason why animals fight is that they are too stupid to make peace.

That this is the true explanation is indicated by the fact that if we lend the birds our reasoning power, if we act as arbitrator and settle their disputes for them, they gladly accept our adjustments and live in peace. Thus, in the case of the two pigeons fighting for possession of the same compartment in the dove cote, if I take one of the birds and keep him in a different compartment until it becomes "home" to him, then I can let him out, he will return to his new home and leave his neighbor at peace in the one which he had first chosen. This is an illustration of what we said before (p. 268), that if a man who keeps a flock of birds acts as a "benevolent despot" among them, administering justice and successfully resolving all conflicts of interest, the birds under his rule show no desire to fight, and are happier than those that do fight.

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The amount of quarreling among animals varies (other conditions being equal) with the degree of their stupidity. Some individual pigeons are much more quarrelsome than others. The truculence of some individuals is due to the fact that they were reared under unnatural conditions which kept them in constant brawls. If as adults they are allowed to live a free, normal life, they outgrow their excessive quarrelsomeness. As their experience increases they tend more and more to adjust their differences with their neighbors without fighting. This fact is of great importance for our problem; because it proves that as viewed by the birds themselves fighting is not a good, it is a necessary evil.

The law that aggressiveness does not pay is conspicuously true among animals. The contentious pigeon, as every fancier can testify, brings disaster not only to his neighbors but also to his own cherished home and family. Hence it is not surprising that in the course of evolution the birds have become as gentle and peaceful as we know them to be, and that even the individual bird strives, with his limited intelligence, to adjust the difficulties that arise between himself and his neighbors and to avoid actual fighting.

II. These last observations naturally lead up to our second thesis, which is, that even when an animal does fight he aims, not to destroy the enemy, but only to get rid of his presence and his interference. This point is important, for if the militarist theory were correct, that the function of fighting in the economy of nature is the elimination of the "weaker" individuals or groups, then we ought to find that the behavior of the fighting animal is directed toward the extinction of the enemy's line of descent, as, by the destruction of the reagent himself and also his eggs and young. But the behavior of animals does not conform to this theory. Especially among the higher vertebrates, observation shows that they do not follow the militarist policy, and without it they live and thrive and progress.

The only animals which in any degree follow the militarist policy are, I believe, those of parasitic habit. Some

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of the ants, bees and wasps have become "robbers," systematically destroying their congeners, even those of their own species, in order to appropriate their stores of larval food. It is a sad and discouraging fact that wherever in the animal kingdom some members have developed sociality and co-operation and thrift, their very prosperity has furnished opportunity for the breeding of a race of despicable parasites. But there is a grain of consolation in the fact which has long been known and has recently been emphasized by Professor Wheeler,[3] that the parasitic habit leads, in the course of time, to the destruction of the parasite itself. A specialist on the hymenoptera could probably write a positive refutation of the militarist theory, by showing that those animals which do follow a militarist policy thereby lead to their own extinction.

But I am not a specialist on insects. Among the higher vertebrates, parasitic behavior is found only in rare cases, as in that of the European Cuckoo. We are told that the young cuckoo works systematically to push its nest-mates out of the nest and thus destroy them. Such a systematic attempt to destroy its rivals is, I am sure, not to be found in any non-parasitic species. The young cuckoo exhibits the behavior that would be found in other animals if they followed a militarist policy, and makes clear to us by contrast that they do not follow a militarist policy. The non-parasitic bird or mammal aims, as we said before, not to destroy his rival, but only to free himself from his presence and his interference.

To prove this thesis we shall present an analysis of the animal's fighting behavior. We shall inquire especially as to the behavior of that individual animal who is the better fighter of the two in the contest, the one destined to be the winner if the battle be fought out. With such an individual as agent, the reagent may do one of three things: namely, (a) flee; (b) submit; (c) persist in fighting. We shall describe the behavior of the agent in these three cases.

[3] Wheeler, W. M. The Parasitic Aculeata, a study in evolution. *Proc. Amer. Philos. Soc.*, 1919, Volume 58.

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(a) If the reagent flees, the agent does not pursue him indefinitely and seek to destroy him. On the contrary, he pursues him only far enough to eliminate him from the field of interest about which the battle is being fought. Thus, when a dog has driven an intruding dog out of the territory over which he claims sovereignty, he does not pursue him farther (unless there be some other cause for the pursuit), but by barking and other expressions of triumph and satisfaction he shows that his end has been fully accomplished. So it is with all animals that I have ever observed driving others away from their territory or their mates or their food. That is all that the agent cares to accomplish. He shows no tendency to pursue the enemy to the death.

That this generalization is true and fundamentally important is evidenced by the fact that in many groups of animals, indeed in probably all animals in some degree, there has been an evolutionary change from destructive forms of fighting to forms of fighting which are merely expressive or ceremonial, which drive away the reagent by threatening or warning him without doing him any injury. This is a part of what Hocking[4] has named "the dialectic of pugnacity." The pigeon warns his enemy by a display which is highly ceremonious, consisting of elaborate cooing and gesturing. The celebrated mock-battles of the capercaillie and of a great many other birds furnish other instances of the same trend in evolution. All birds and all mammals are endowed with instincts to threaten the enemy, to make feints, to hiss or growl or roar, or to vent their anger in other expressions which serve to warn the reagent and often cause him to flee without a blow being struck. It is important to notice that these attempts to drive away the enemy are used first, before the physical combat. If the aim were to destroy the enemy he would be attacked silently and by stealth: but in most species he is not so attacked; he is first warned, and given every opportunity to withdraw from the field. In a great majority of the

[4] Hocking, W. E. *Human Nature and Its Remaking.* New Haven, 1918. Chapter XXIV.

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conflicts among animals, the ceremonial combat is all that is needed and all that is used: the reagent may withdraw as soon as he is threatened; or he may at first make a counter-display, but withdraw on discovering that the agent is more determined than he. The physical combat is resorted to only after the ceremonial has been tried and has failed to settle the dispute.

(b) If the enemy submits, the agent ceases fighting. In pigeons this is witnessed again and again. In the heat of battle the agent may rush upon his enemy, jump on his back, peck him with all his might, and pull out his feathers. But if the reagent lies down unresisting, the agent's blows quickly diminish into gentle taps, he jumps off his prostrate foe, walks away, and does not again attack the enemy so long as he is quiet. This behavior is typical, and it proves that the pigeon is devoid of any tendency to destroy his rival.

Further study of this behavior indicates that it is not merely negative, not merely the absence of an impulse to destroy. The bird has a positive impulse to quit fighting a non-resisting bird of his kind. One explanation of this impulse is to be found in the mode of instinctive sex recognition. When a male meets a stranger belonging to his own species, provided this male has not learned by experience to discriminate the sexes, the only discrimination he shows is this: if the stranger fights, the agent treats it as a male; if the stranger refuses to fight, the agent treats it as a female; if the stranger first fights, then submits, the agent treats it first as a male, then as a female. This mode of sex recognition is so widespread in the animal kingdom that it seems to be fundamentally ingrained in the nature of the male. Audubon tells us that when he watched a battle between two wild turkeys, when one of them had been defeated, he was surprised to see that the victor, instead of injuring him, showed toward him the amorous behavior which is generally accorded to a female. Audubon need not have been surprised. Behavior of this sort is now known to be characteristic of a great many

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animals ranging all the way from the lower invertebrates to the Primates. Thus we see that in the male animal there is a fundamental trait which tends to prevent him, and in most cases does prevent him, from doing any injury to a non-resisting member of his species.

We showed under (a) that the enemy who flees is not pursued to the death. We have now shown under (b) that the enemy who submits commonly finds his life spared. The non-destruction of the enemy is more certain under (a) than under (b). An enemy who has fled from the field of operations is perfectly safe. It is but natural that an enemy who has submitted is not perfectly safe; the pugnacity may smolder, and may break out again into violent fighting. The facts are too complex to be treated in this short article. Suffice it to say that in those rare cases in which an animal, or a group of animals, kills a non-resisting member of the same species, such killing is in various ways exceptional or accidental;[1] it is not a policy, not a common and regular form of behavior, and very far from being a systematic pursuit.

(c) When the reagent refuses to flee and refuses to submit, the agent is obliged to resort to physical force. It is extremely interesting to notice that even in this case the physical force used is often of a form which serves merely to rid the agent of his enemy without doing him any hurt. Thus, when the common pigeon quarrels with his neighbors on one of the high ledges on which they like to perch, his principal method of dealing with his opponent is to seize him by the nape of the neck, drag him to the edge of the ledge, and hurl him off into space. The bird that is thus hurled off spreads his wings and flies without injury.

From what has been said thus far, it is clear that when a pigeon deals with a rival pigeon, his behavior is directed first toward inducing the reagent to flee voluntarily, then toward forcing him off the field. Only when these means have failed, when the reagent refuses to flee, refuses to sub-

[1] See, *e. g.*, W. H. Hudson. *The Naturalist in La Plata*. London, 1892. Chapter XXII.

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mit, and is too powerful to be hurled off the ledge, only then does the agent endeavor to the utmost to injure his opponent. Then the two pigeons meet in a grim, silent, unrelenting, physical struggle. This brutally physical struggle appears in extreme contrast to the more common pigeon fights, which are highly ceremonious. Yet even these fiercest struggles, unless they are protracted for a very long time, do not result in the death of either combatant. And at any time when either combatant feels that he has had "enough," he needs only to leave the field in possession of the victor; he thereby saves himself from further injury. For even after the most prolonged and painful battle it still remains true that if the enemy flees or submits the agent ceases fighting.

In conclusion, we can give only a few brief statements as to the bearing of the facts of animal behavior upon human problems and upon philosophy.

1. No bird or mammal follows a policy of non-resistance. And we find no trend of evolution toward a policy of absolute non-resistance. Even in the peaceful settlement of disputes each animal asserts his rights by expressing his determination, and often by making feints or threats. Further, each individual and each social group is prepared to resort to force, and to exert force to the utmost, if necessary, in order to defend its interests. Defensive fighting pays.

2. On the other hand, aggressive fighting does not pay. Among animals, as among men, fighting is a wasteful and harmful means toward the attainment of the ends sought by the contestants. In adaptation to this fact, we find that both in the history of the race and in that of the individual there is a trend away from destructive forms of fighting, toward the adjustment of disputes by harmless means. Progress in this direction involves the development of intelligence, of self-control, and of a technique for the adjustment of difficulties. Such progress has been made by all the higher animals, in varying degree. Birds and mammals strive to control their angry impulses. They

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cope with the problem of pacification, for their interests depend upon it. We human beings, when we strive toward world peace, are only travelling farther in the same line of progress in which our infra-human ancestors took the first steps. Whether we shall ever achieve world peace, I do not predict; because I do not know whether we can ever develop our understanding, our self-mastery and our political technique to a degree of perfection sufficient to cope with the immense difficulties of world organization.

3. The third conclusion, which we shall present here chiefly as a criticism of militarism, is, in its broader aspects, a criticism of the whole "biological"[6] philosophy of certain schools of current thought. This conclusion is that a distinctively "biological" need for fighting does not exist. The reasons why animals fight are substantially identical with the reasons why men fight. These reasons all pertain to the subject matter of our first two conclusions, and they may be summed up in one sentence. Animals and men fight because they must conserve their interests, and their technique for the adjustment of conflicting interests is too imperfect to adjust all cases of conflict. This, we believe, is the only true argument for war. The militarist denies that this is the whole argument. He says that if we ever should achieve a world organization which would adjust all conflicts peaceably and abolish war, the race would degenerate, because war is a "biological" necessity. His "biological" argument takes two forms; viz., (a) the definite; (b) the indefinite.

(a) The definite "biological" argument is based upon the theory of the all-sufficiency of natural selection. In reply to this argument, I do not need to offer any opinion as to the method of evolution. All I need to say is that, whatever the method of evolution may be, it cannot be in contradiction with the facts of animal behavior. And the facts of animal behavior prove that fighting to the death

[6] This word is put in quotation marks to make clear that our criticism is aimed, not at biology proper, but at the misuse of biological theory by certain philosophers and writers on human affairs.

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is not necessary for the welfare or for the evolution of a race.

(b) The indefinite form of the argument pictures a mysterious, irresistible "biological" necessity or "destiny," which threateningly overhangs our human efforts and will cause the extinction, or at least the degeneration, of any people that lives up to its humanitarian ideals. In answer to this, I have given evidence to prove that the animals also are humanitarians. The higher animals strive to avoid destructive fighting, and some large and important groups of species have so far achieved this result that they have reduced fatalities to a negligible quantity. These great groups of animals have been evolving their pacific régime, and thriving under it, for millions of years, and are today in a state of progressive evolution, the very opposite of degeneration. Therefore, we may brand as false and contrary to the evidence of facts, the militarist statement that degeneration threatens to overtake us if we should put into practise our humanitarian ideals.

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THE SOCIAL UNREST OF THE SOLDIER.[1]

RALPH M. EATON.

THERE has been a great deal of casting the white light of realism upon war now that the world has settled into a state of semi-peace. This was not fashionable during the War. It was defeatism. But now we are relieved of looking upon the bright side of things, and can add up accounts. The sentiments and emotions of the War are stale. People no longer care for them. They put them aside as hateful dreams and deceptions to be wiped from honest memories. The soldier has come back. For the most part the world has been sadly disappointed in him. It has recognized its idealization of him—its extravagant praise of heroism, devotion, sacrifice, consecration to the ideal, etc.—as a passing phase of its war psychosis. A popular novel announces in its foreword that, although it mentions the War, it "should not be dismissed, should not even be characterized as a 'war book.'" This is an index to the temper of the age.

Mr. Procter in the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS for November speaks in this vein of disillusionment. After giving an admirable and realistic analysis of the soldier's motives, he concludes: "My general verdict on war is that it leaves us infinitely poorer morally." "War is the business of killing," he says. ". . . War is the direct opposite of civilization and the direct opposite of morality." He pictures the returned soldier as "drained emotionally" and as unfit to enter again into the peaceful business of society.

What Mr. Procter says of the returned soldier is true. The last two years have witnessed a steady process of pulling to pieces the war heroes. The idols have been found to have feet of clay. We hear no more of the regenerated

[1] In reply to T. H. Procter, "The Motives of the Soldier," in the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS for October, 1920.

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soldier, of purgation by fire and sword, of the strange light of vision in the eyes of the men who have stood face to face with death. All this belongs to another age.

The returned soldier has consistently been the social misfit. In many cases he was unwilling to go back to his old job. He wanted something different, something new. If he did go back to his job, he was lazy; and often in the end he gave it up. A banker told me regretfully of a young man whom he had taken at fourteen and trained in the ways of office work and business success. The War ruined him. He stayed in the office only a month after he came back from France. He preferred to return to France without any prospect of business success, without even a means of livelihood. The men from the country were unwilling to stay on the farms. The returned soldiers flocked to the cities. It was evident that something had happened to the men who went through the baptism of fire; something which instead of uplifting them, made them unwilling and unfit, without great effort, to take their place in society. The many employment agencies and reconstruction bureaus often worked in vain at finding places for the soldiers. Business and industry are run on a profit and loss basis. They cannot take inefficient workers even if their services to their country do give them some claim to employment. The soldier became in a great many instances an object of charity. A Boston paper published recently the following announcement: "6,000 ex-service men and families of Greater Boston are depending upon Boston Metropolitan Chapter, American Red Cross, for help. Unless $200,000 is raised our obligation to those who fought for us will be unfulfilled."

The extent to which the soldier has been willing to capitalize this obligation of society to him has been another noticeable feature of his post-war psychology. In both the United States and Canada the soldier has demanded a large bonus. He has become a thorn in the side of the politicians. Through ex-service organizations he can hold a club over some of the policies of nations. This is par-

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ticularly true of the United States, where the American Legion is daily gaining strength.

The soldiers have created these powerful ex-service organizations for several reasons. First, they want to perpetuate the comradeship and solidarity which the War developed. Then, they want to wield some measure of control in the society for which they fought. There is also the very strong desire to uphold the feelings, the prejudices, and the cause for which they stood. It is this motive which has caused the American Legion to be on the reactionary side of almost every social issue. They are carrying on the war attitude. They are looking backward to the days when free speech was dangerous as giving succor to the enemy, when political opinions were punishable under the Espionage Act, when labor agitation stood in the way of winning the War.

But I believe that the most important of all motives in the formation of these ex-service organizations is a distrust of the society to which the soldier has come back. The soldier sensed that the society which was with him as long as he was fighting was likely to be against him when the War was over. Alone he would be powerless against the social order which would try to suck him in again. In union was strength to resist the pressure which must immediately be brought to bear upon him when he ceased to be a soldier.

What happened to the soldier? Why did he become a social misfit? Why did he distrust and fear the society for which he fought? I do not think that Mr. Procter's explanation is adequate. I do not think it is because he "is infinitely poorer morally" or because he is "drained emotionally."

The War was a release of social pressure in certain directions. At the same time it applied a much heavier military pressure in other directions. The return to civil life has brought about a readjustment of these pressures. But the complex tendencies to action which the War unchained, the restlessness, the adventurous spirit, the return to prim-

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itive methods of life, are not so easily bound up. The soldier's life, having gathered an initial momentum in a new direction, refuses to go back into the old grooves.

It is usually supposed that this release of pressure which war brings about is an unchaining of the beast. "War is the business of killing." We hear of blood-lust, of cruelty, of a return to the savage state. This is as much a fiction as the belief in the soldier's regeneration. We have only to read such faithful accounts of the psychology of the soldier as M. Barbusse's "Le Feu" and Phillip Gibbs' "Now It Can Be Told" to see that men do not take pleasure in killing. Only in tales of horror does the Mr. Hyde lurk beneath the Dr. Jekyll. Blood-lust is an uncommonly rare motive to action in war. It was so rare in the British Army that the military authorities, who thought it ought to be present, set about stimulating it in a systematic way. Mr. Procter describes the gruesome dummies on which the Tommy was taught to exercise his hate and his bayonet. This absurd artificial cursing, hating, lusting, all for a piece of lath and sacking, which was so essential a part of the British training, proves that it is difficult to teach men to kill in cold blood. I doubt very much if blood-lust is one of the innate tendencies of human nature.

If it is not the brute, what is it that war unchains in men?

First of all, war sets a premium on human ingenuity and skill of all sorts. It is not a man-to-man struggle calling for simple pugnacity and hate and anger. It is an exceedingly complex game. It summons men's constructive and inventive instincts. Of course all the construction and invention is bent, in the end, towards destruction and waste.

You may answer that war demands invention of the officer but not of the private. The private is a part of the machine and needs neither to construct nor invent, but only to obey orders. This is not true. If the private does not plan a campaign or invent a new poisonous gas, he does use skill and ingenuity in many forms. At the front the soldier is a kind of Robinson Crusoe, the army a

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kind of Swiss Family Robinson. The soldier must be a jack-of-all-trades. He must scheme continually to make himself comfortable and life livable.

This is a part of the struggle with the physical elements. Man is, perhaps, the most completely and successfully adapted of all creatures to his environment. He can survive under almost any physical conditions which exist on the earth. He inherits from his ancestors vast reserves of ingenuity, power, nervous strength, and nervous co-ordination which have enabled the race to endure in the struggle for life. War calls upon these reserves. In the exercise of them man discovers that he is continuous with the generations who battled against the seas in thirty-foot ships and with the pioneers who tamed the wilderness.

Above all, war stimulates the social instincts. It is a common undertaking, demanding such mutual support as no peaceful pursuit demands. The soldiers are forced into close, often disgusting contact; crowded into freight cars; piled like wood on barrack or dug-out floors; huddled into a single blanket or mudhole. They must learn to despise, to pity, and to help their comrades. There is no escaping into privacy. From this springs that comradeship, that interaction of the cells of the army organism, of which Mr. Procter speaks.

Then there is the *Wanderlust*. The soldier is always going somewhere, and always wanting to be anywhere except the place in which his lot, for the time, puts him. The psychologists do not recognize any instinct of roving. I suppose the desire for change, for movement, is akin to curiosity and the tendency to reach out and grasp. Let us call it a developed and conscious form of that restlessness with which the tentacles of certain sea animals roam about in search of food.

The tendencies to action of which I have been speaking showed themselves in a most marked way in the American Army. Mr. Procter observed the war-wearied Briton. His motives were somewhat different from those of the American.

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The American Army was a young army. It suffered from the defects of youth. The current criticism of it in the European mind was its rashness, its desire to rush beyond its objectives, to take chances, and blindly to throw regiment after regiment when the chance failed. A German officer once in my hearing called the Americans "brave fools." But if the Americans were young, they were, for that very reason, nearer to the type of original human nature. They had none of the apathetic, *blasé*, "fed-up" attitude which characterized the Tommy; nor any of the cynical resignation of the *poïlu*, who summed up his reaction to everything in the phrase "c'est la guerre." They were as crude as they were ingenuous; proud of their birthright, which they conceived as liberty—liberty to trample on French gardens and French sentiments. They were generous and impulsive; they hated deception and loved strong drink. I have heard more than one Parisian call them "*grandes gosses.*" They were thrilled with the belief that the War was the great adventure.

The spirit of exploration, of curiosity, of entering into the unknown which poured through the soul of the American soldier, is, I venture to say, the first and one of the most powerful reactions of original human nature to war.

It is not difficult to agree with Mr. Procter that as a motive for joining the army it is sub-moral. It is true that this call of the wild brought only a small proportion of the recruits. In the long run the British Army was most effectively replenished by compulsion of one sort or another. In America there was almost no appeal to this motive. The draft act swept all the available men into the War whether they wished it or not. The difficulty of voluntary enlistment in most wars seems to prove the comparative weakness of the call of adventure. In reality it proves nothing of the sort.

Our safe and peaceful civilization with its manifold devices for preventing pain and inconvenience, with its industrial ruts, with its machine processes, places a tre-

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mendous initial inhibition in the way of the adventurous spirit. We are discouraged from being rash. It is only the socially immature—the bright and irresponsible youth, or the primitive, underdeveloped man, who rushes to the colors in search of the great adventure. But remove the initial inhibition, burn the bridges, and place the man, by whatever means, on the road to war, and he will begin to be stirred by it. It will begin to be an adventure.

The spirit of adventure is only a very general name for that release of pressure and the outpouring of complex tendencies to action of which I have spoken. It is like going on a camping trip or taking a journey to the North Pole. We visualize ourselves doing primitive and difficult things, and about the whole hangs the mystery of the unknown and the joy of discovery. A brief enough joy in the case of war!

When this release is new, when all the liberated tendencies to action are feeling their way into consciousness, the soldier is, like the American, eager and rash. Very few of the Americans got enough of the War to be really fed up. To the old and tired armies of France and Britain, the edges of all these released tendencies were dulled by suffering. The spirit of adventure was a motive left very far in the rear—as far back as the variety theatres of London and Paris. Mr. Procter is, of course, correct in saying that the motives which sustained the soldier were the moral ones, and, more important still, the mechanical ones of discipline and habit.

Discipline is the military pressure. It acts in an essentially different way from the pressure of society in civil life. It is impersonal. It has no regard for the individual. It demands, above all things, obedience to orders. Its aim is to create reflex arcs which will lead to the performance of certain acts at certain times. The soldier must become so knit to his rifle, to his squad, and to his officer that he will function automatically when they function. But discipline only vaguely and in a general way cares what the soldier is, or what he does, so long as these things do not interfere

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with the performance of the reflex acts which make him a part of the mechanism.

The soldier resents discipline strenuously enough when he is in the army. He understands that it is a restriction of his freedom. He knows that it has to some extent mechanized him. But when we readjust the pressure, take off the military inhibitions and put on the civil inhibitions, then the soldier begins to feel that life is cramped and small. He becomes Kipling's soldier:

> "Me that 'ave been what I've been, . . .
> 'Ow can I ever take on,
> With awful old England again. . . ."

This is why the returned soldier is a misfit. To go from the trenches to an office desk, from the seat of a lorry bumping along shell-swept roads to a factory, to be chained to a machine instead of to a squad of seven other human beings —it is not by any means easy.

Who is to be blamed, the soldier or society? And are we to agree that it all comes about because war leaves the soldier "infinitely poorer morally"?

William James proposes a "moral equivalent for war" because he believes that all the energies which war releases could be diverted and conserved and made to do work for the good of mankind, just as the physical energy of heat can be transformed into its mechanical equivalent of work. "Modern war is so expensive," says James, "that we feel trade to be a better avenue to plunder; but modern man inherits all the innate pugnacity and all the love of glory of his ancestors. Showing war's irrationality and horror is of no effect upon him. The horrors make the fascination. War is the *strong* life; it is life *in extremis;* war-taxes are the only ones men never hesitate to pay, as the budgets of all nations show us."[2]

If war shows us that there are vast reservoirs of human engery which civilization does not tap, the unrest of the

[2] James, Wm., "The Moral Equivalent of War," in *Memories and Studies*, p. 269.

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returned soldier proves another thing. Civilization cuts off and balks some of the most important human tendencies to action. The soldier's inability to fit into society is due in some sense to the failure of society to fit original human nature.

Modern industry and business are the best illustrations of what I mean. And it is in fitting into industry and business that the soldier finds most difficulty.

The deadening effect of machine processes upon the life of the worker has formed one of the most important chapters in modern social thought. In the factory there is little scope for creation or invention. The spirit of adventure, the desire for change and novelty, make poor, not good workers. Industry does not let out any of that spontaneous flood of energy. But suppressions turn into perversions, and the spirit of adventure finds its realization in schemes of sabotage, in visions of violence and revolution. The unrest of the laborer in the coal fields and steel mills is of the same genus as the unrest of the returned soldier. They are both signs of revolt against a civilization which pinches human nature.

What of the relation of men to men in business and in the factory? In business, competition is far more important than co-operation. Every one is for himself; the emphasis is distinctly not on the social motives. In the factory fraternizing among the workers curtails production; the boss is present to prevent sociability. In the great cities we are impressed with the cold contempt of class for class, and the intensity with which every individual strives to take advantage of every other individual. Our society is unsocial. There is very little of that "interaction among the cells" of the social organism which was comradeship in the army.

Mr. Procter cites the prevalence of strikes and labor troubles as proof of the fleeting nature of the fraternity which appeared in the War. What opportunity had this spirit to endure with the great individualistic machine of civilization waiting to swallow up the soldier? With the

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stay-at-homes doing their best to force the soldier back into the old unsocial tracks of competition, class struggle, mutual fear and distrust—and calling him morally degenerated when he refused to stay where he was put—how could the *camaraderie* of the War hold up?

No. The returned soldier is not as good as he was for the purposes of modern society. But that is not because he has become a brute. He has not fallen away from human standards. Some of the blame rests with society. If war is inhuman, so is industry. And if, as Mr. Procter says, the real effect of war is that "it cheapens life," so do modern business and the modern factory cheapen life. It is too often not life, but the material means to life which society values.

Let us not say that war is good. And on the other hand, let us not say that the civilization to which the soldier has come back is without stain. To be thrown out of adjustment to a very imperfect society is not to become a moral degenerate. Even if the returned soldier is a social misfit perhaps there is still a place for him in Heaven.

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HOW PHILOSOPHERS MAY BE USEFUL TO SOCIETY.[1]

THOMAS REED POWELL.

SOME word of apology is due from a mere lawyer who ventures to talk to a company of those who move in the higher realm of philosophy. My best excuse is that I was invited. I did not rush in; and I honestly fear to tread. But I recognize that I possess in ample measure the qualification desired by your committee on program. You have wished to hear from some one who is not a philosopher, and your wish is now to be fulfilled. In thanking you for the courtesy of your invitation, I beg to point out that it carries with it an obligation on your part to be charitable to my shortcomings to the full extent that they are characteristic of the qualification upon which you insisted. I have escaped being a philosopher, even though I sat under the same teacher of philosophy with whom John Dewey began his philosophic studies in the old Vermont college from which we both came. He was a noble gentleman, but, unfortunately for me, he could not make bricks without straw and his product varied according to the material with which he worked. I have also escaped being a philosopher in spite of reading the first paragraph of most of the articles in the *Journal of Philosophy* during the past five years. Those of you who have read the succeeding paragraphs know better than I what I have missed. I sometimes wonder just why I have been able to practice this self-restraint. Why is it that most of the articles written by professional philosophers have no compelling interest for those who are curious about both the speculative and the practical aspects of the problems that arise in running the

[1] A paper read before the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association on December 30, 1920, as part of a symposium on the subject: "The Rôle of the Philosopher in Modern Life, with Reference Both to Teaching and to Research."

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affairs of the world? I infer from the advance abstract of Professor Pratt's paper that his answer is that philosophy has slight concern with such problems.[2] But I assume from the topic set for this conference that the rest of you are not equally retiring. It is not for an outsider to mix in such family quarrels. I can only commend your disposition to hear all sides, and then pass on to my particular task which obviously depends for its existence upon an assumption contrary to that which Professor Pratt cherishes.

I find this task less easy than it would have been had I written my paper as soon as your invitation came. Compliance with your request for an advance abstract has proved embarrassing. There was nothing to abstract, so I composed a prospectus, and in it I find that I have put the gist of all I have to say.[3] Yet I still must write my paper

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[2] Professor Pratt's abstract, as printed in the *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 17, pp. 690–691, is as follows:

"The philosopher's duties are twofold; toward the general public and (if he be a teacher) toward his students and his institution. Toward the general public the philosopher has the same duties as have other intelligent citizens—to formulate an opinion on important questions and to use his influence in what he regards as the right direction. Whether he has duties *qua* philosopher which go beyond this will depend on the extent to which he can be said to be in possession of special knowledge or skill bearing on public questions. The philosopher as such may be regarded as a specialist in four fields—Psychology, Ethics, Logic, Metaphysics. As psychologist the philosopher may properly be regarded as a specialist on certain aspects of certain public questions; and with this special knowledge goes a corresponding duty. It is very doubtful whether in any of his three other capacitities he has anything of special value to offer to the public.

"He should refrain from spending more than a little of his time on practical issues for still another reason, namely because he has other things of importance to do; and if he devotes himself largely to solving the world's practical difficulties he will perforce neglect some of his more special duties and will bring philosophy into disrespect. The practical applications of philosophy are merely its by-products. The chief function of the philosopher consists in championing and keeping alive the spiritual life of man. Especially in the age in which we live is there great need of this."

[3] This prospectus, as printed in the *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 17, pp. 688–689, is as follows:

"The contribution of the philosopher to the solution of the problems of the social sciences may begin by shedding light on the questions whether the social sciences are sciences and whether their problems are susceptible of solution. The philosopher, as an outsider, may be expected to be free from a number of assumptions unconsciously accepted by students of special aspects of social relations. He can therefore help them to uncover these assumptions and trace them to their origins. He can show them the extent to which their methods

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while the mood in which I drafted the prospectus has yielded to one so different that I might easily be convicted of false impersonation of myself. For in the interim I have been disobedient to the injunction "Do not open until Christmas" and have been revelling in the immortal letters of William James and the poems of Edwin Arlington Robinson. I have attended a funeral on the white Vermont hillside where four generations of my family are buried, and I have been deceiving my children about Santa Claus. These are not experiences to make one intent on considering how the philosopher can help solve the problems of society. They make one sympathetic towards Professor Pratt's credo that "the chief function of the philosopher consists in championing and keeping alive the spiritual life of man." If any or all of you can feed and warm the craving spirit of man by a tithe of a tithe of what William James has done, and thanks to the immortality of the printed page will always do, God forbid that you should be distracted by the problems of society. Gratitude for William James tempts one to be tolerant even towards those of you who incline to the Moody and Sankey school of feeling and expression. Blessed are the music makers and the dreamers

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are common to a number of disciplines and put them in touch with developments elsewhere that have a bearing on their special work. He can teach them to be more critical of their modes of reasoning and of their canons of judgment. He can tell them when they set artificial boundaries to their inquiries and can hint to them what lies beyond. He can help them to see how much of their judgments is based on technical, expert knowledge, and how much is mere personal preference. If he approaches them in a humble spirit he can teach them to be humble.

"To do effectively what is here suggested, each individual philosopher should acquire familiarity with some one of the special fields of inquiry in which students of society claim a proprietary interest. Law has a special claim to attention because it is made up of a series of human judgments which are for their purpose authoritative. Here issues are really settled, so far as concerns the case at bar. Out of a series of antecedent facts arises a new fact which must be taken account of. Much of the law is philosophy in action. Whether good or bad philosophy it actually does a genuine job. In so far forth it is so whether it is so or not. Law is solid food for philosophers to sharpen their teeth on. A study of authoritative human judgments is a study of ethical ideals or of practical compromises that are matters of fact and not merely of aspiration. Philosophers may perhaps profit from walking in places where they are sure to know when they stub their toes. In learning enough about law to be able to help lawyers improve their methods and their product, philosophers may gather material which is of use for their philosophical inquiries and may acquire greater skill in keeping their feet on the ground while their heads are in the air."

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of dreams whenever they minister to those who have need of them. Yet as I think again of those first paragraphs of your articles in the *Journal of Philosophy*, I begin to doubt whether my spirit has been more cold or hungry than it would have been had I read on to the end. I find so many of you obsessed with the technique of an esoteric discipline quite remote from the spiritual life of man. And so I am persuaded that no stone should be hanged about my neck if anything I say should tempt the least or the greatest among you to follow the trail of this conference into the fields which students of society have marked out. I fear no loss to the spiritual life of man from any such excursions. For I am confident that any of you with a spiritual message to give will find for your kindling insight the same need and scope in man's relation to his neighbors as in his relation to himself or to the unseen. Even if there is occasional antagonism between these two relations, the way of the cloister is not victory but surrender. I venture to think, therefore, that Professor Pratt's premise does not lead to his conclusion. I doubt if one can champion and keep alive the spiritual life of man if one neglects wholly the practical issues that arise in his relations to his fellows and to the institutions and associations around which so many of these relations gather. The truth that man does not live by bread alone is not confined to the life of the imaginary person who is abstracted from his human environment.

I

The general subject of this conference is, I take it, how can philosophy helpfully be brought to bear upon something else than philosophy. Can it profitably nourish something else than itself or profitably feed on something else than itself? The special topic suggested for my consideration is "the relation of philosophy to the social sciences" in the hope of finding out "how far it may contribute to these and to the solution of their problems." The phrasing is not mine. It raises at once two questions which are, I take it, somewhat philosophical in their nature. Are the

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social sciences, sciences? Whatever they are, are their problems susceptible of solution? The first question may be little more than an invitation to dispute about terminology. Yet terminology and classification may be convenient tools for getting at something more important. It is well, at any rate, to remind ourselves that the disciplines often known as the social sciences differ radically from other enterprises with which the term "science" is a claim to kinship. Of centigrams and centimeters and of controlled and repeated experiments, the so-called social sciences know comparatively little. They are, it is true, making increasing use of index numbers and coefficients of correlation, and are thereby approaching more nearly to precision in the collection and co-ordination of their chosen groups of facts. They are subjecting some of their hypotheses to modes of verification which tell them at least something about the margin of error. Yet these tools are at the mercy of but a few of the thinkers in the fields of inquiry frequented by students of society. Most of us have to do the best we can in some other way. As Mr. Justice Holmes has put it:

> "In the law we only occasionally can reach an absolutely final and quantitative determination, because the worth of the competing social ends which respectively solicit a judgment for the plaintiff or the defendant cannot be reduced to number and accurately fixed. The worth, that is, the intensity of the competing desires, varies with the various ideals of the time, and, if the desires were constant, we could not get beyond a relative decision that one was greater than the other. But it is of the essence of improvement that we should be as accurate as we can."

"Being as accurate as we can" seems a fairly good general definition of scientific method. It demands higher talents than those that merely tot up items. Paradoxical as it may seem, it is sometimes possible to weigh the imponderable and to grasp the intangible. This is done by the ward politician, and it is one of the tasks of the student of politics. As philosophers are familiar with both the heaviest and the lightest imponderables and are at home with the most elusive and the most cageable intangibles, they may be

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expected to help their less gifted colleagues in handling such shadowy substances with as firm a grasp as their shadowy nature permits.

Where counting and weighing are not possible, we need some other technique. In dealing with social problems we need a technique that is born of imaginative sympathy and is controlled by honest and clear-headed dispassionateness. We need both passion and the governance of passion. We need the proper fusion of feeling and thinking. We need men versed in discerning and evaluating both simple and complex relations, in distinguishing the enduring from the evanescent, the trivial from the fundamental, the symbol from the substance. We need men who can keep their heads in the presence of the passion that comes from fear or from desire. In a word we need men who have the philosophic spirit. This spirit cannot get us far without a knowledge of the facts. But it can help us to get a knowledge of the facts. For this philosophic spirit where shall we turn more hopefully than to the philosophers and to those who have sat at the feet of the philosophers? Whether you study our specific problems or not, you will help us to deal with them if you give us examples of that fine temper and discipline of the mind which the pursuit of philosophy professes to produce. Be a model of clear perception and calm reflection, and your students will be better citizens and governors. Be a master of sifting and weighing evidence, and your students will be better jurors and judges. Know when you do not know, and your students will be less likely to indulge in the dogmatism that is the easy offspring of ignorance. Control the instinct for partisan bias, and your students will be more eager for balances untipped by prejudice. Without these qualities you cannot contribute to the solution of our problems. With them, you cannot keep from contributing. By and large, I take it, your indirect influence on the minds of those who sit in your class rooms will be a more potent force for good or for evil in public affairs than any specific contributions that you will make to the discussion of social problems. Your opportunity is

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the greater because so much is expected of you. You are regarded as the high priests in the temple of wisdom. If you turn out to be little shambling acolytes, the temple itself loses its sanctity.

II

With the requisite qualities of mind, and the power to use them in the presence of temptation to resort to qualities less noble, you need not greatly care whether you are applying them to the problems of metaphysics or of law or economics or history. It is essential, however, that you be not ignorant of that to which you apply them. It will not do to emulate the student who wrote in his examination paper that he did not know the facts but understood their significance. Before you apply your powers to the handling of social problems you must understand what those problems are. You cannot understand the labor problem from the economics you learned a generation ago or from what you read in the newspapers. You cannot understand international relations by reading diplomatic notes or the speeches of presidential candidates. You cannot understand constitutional law from reading the Constitution or a few scattered opinions of the judges. Your look from the outside can be of great value just because it is from the outside; but this value is conditioned on your knowing what you are looking at. Do not flatter yourselves that you have the secret of an intellectual poultice that will heal the body politic whenever or wherever applied. The *a priori* remedies for social ills are many, but their cures are *null*. And here I may venture the opinion that there are no cures for social ills that have ever proved complete or lasting. We do not solve social problems. At best we escape from them by means which leave other problems less vexing. At worst we jump from the frying pan into the fire. A purely intellectual problem can be solved, because it can be created so that it has the seeds of its solution. The mind giveth, the mind taketh away; blessed be the name of the mind. But the problems of society do not

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stay still long enough to be solved. While we are passing judgment, the facts have changed, and we render our verdict on an hypothesis instead of a reality. Our very verdict is one of the facts that enter into our problem. It often unsettles more than it settles.

I have purposely let myself go beyond my depth so that I may raise a Macedonian cry. I feel strongly that students of law and of economics do not realize the extent to which they concern themselves with hypothetical issues of their own creation. I am convinced that often they deal with fantasies rather than with facts. I know that they need to have some one come and help them out. We intellectualize our problems and thereby we falsify them. If you realized how much of legal and economic analysis is nothing but the tight articulation of loose artificialities, you would burn with missionary zeal. I do not say that you could not be excused for passing by on the other side, if you remind us of the slogan that charity beginneth at home. But I do say that, if you have faults of your own, you can become more clearly aware of them by observing their counterpart in the doctors of law and of economics. This is not merely because it is easier to see the mote in your neighbor's eye than the beam in your own. Much more is it, in my judgment, because the flaws and the artificiality in economic and legal reasoning show up more distinctly in the result than do similar sins in the enterprise of pure metaphysics. In law and in economics it often makes an important difference whether you go straight or crooked. And in these fields, too, there is something more objective and tangible to talk about than in metaphysics. There are more extrinsic aids to make use of in checking up what you have done. Internal consistency alone cannot so easily satisfy. Loading the premise is more readily exposed to view. Though I put my comparison dogmatically, I mean it only as a suggestion. To those of you who are skilled in metaphysics, the errors of the ways of your colleagues may be as patent as the errors of my colleagues in law are to me. In so far as this is so, I must abandon the first appeal of Moses to

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Hobab in favor of the second that presumably prevailed. Instead of saying "Come thou with us and we will do thee good," I will urge: "Leave us not, I pray thee; forasmuch as thou knowest how we are to encamp in the wilderness, and thou mayest be to us instead of eyes." If for no other reason, come thou with us for we have need of thee.

Of this need none can doubt. Our great dependence upon the technique of reasoning is too obvious to need elaboration. Judicial opinions are full of flabby classification and false antitheses, of words that say more than they mean, of vicious abstractions and unwarranted generalizations that obscure genuine issues. Probably the syllogism is neither used nor abused as much as might be expected. But I am sure that the dilemma is present in thousands of cases where it is not explicitly recognized, and that rash results are reached by grasping one horn firmly and entirely forgetting the other. That this is not always so is evident from a classic statement of Mr. Justice Holmes which I never tire of quoting. In discussing a question of the police power, he says:

"All rights tend to declare themselves absolute to their logical extreme. Yet all in fact are limited by the neighborhood of principles of policy which are other than those on which the particular right is founded, and which become strong enough to hold their own when a certain point is reached. The limits set to property by other public interests present themselves as a branch of what is called the police power of the state. The boundary at which the conflicting interests balance cannot be determined by any formula in advance, but points along the line, or helping to establish it, are fixed by decisions that this or that concrete case falls on the nearer or the farther side."

Here is the recognition that many legal problems as formulated present instances of the irresistible force meeting the immovable body, and that the formulations are true only in so far forth. If this happens when we confine ourselves to the accepted data of the law, I hesitate to think how often it must appear if the data of the law are not accepted as the sole criteria. How often would the philosopher armed with the meaning and the power of what the law rejects entirely look upon us lawyers as upon children play-

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ing with dolls? How many revaluations might you thus force upon us? Not until you try can you know how much you might work "designs on the night of our knowledge, . . . so that haply we know somewhat more than we know."

III

Some of the most perplexing problems of jurisprudence arise from the double function of authoritative adjudication. Each decree is both an end and a beginning. It settles something about the past. It projects something new into the future. I have the glimmering of an idea which I cannot express, that what is settled is not what we assume it to be. Every decision of an appellate court is a judgment on a hypothetical state of facts. The judges no longer care what is really so. They are interested only in what appears to be so on the face of the record from the trial court. We have an elaborate and in many respects an artificial mechanism for transmuting the deeds and intents of men into a printed record. In so far as the process of transmutation conforms to the required procedure, the record is final for the purpose of the law. But it still remains at best an hypothesis. The further issues raised by the hypothesis may be said to be settled when they are finally passed upon by the court above. There is an actual solution of a hypothetical issue. Some one must pay money or go to jail because of an opinion on an assumed state of facts. But the solution of such hypothetical issues may touch only the fringe of the actual issues. It is like settling the issue as to who shall be President without settling anything else. I do not mean by this dim gesture to point a contrast between the problems of law and of society and the problems of philosophy. There is, I doubt not, as great a proportion of hypothetical issues in philosophy as in law. But philosophers do not sit on the woolsack or wear the ermine. They are not fettered by *res adjudicata* and *stare decisis*. From *stare decisis* we see what I had in mind when I said a little while ago that our very verdict is one of the facts that enter into our problem. We have to

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remember that our disposition of the controversy immediately before us affects others yet to come. We have to think about not only what we are thinking about but also about what we are going to think about it. We are always making points which help to establish a line. The greatest intellectual difficulties in the law arise from the fact that law is a system which demands a degree of coherence between its several parts. These difficulties are unduly enhanced by our pretence that the system is much more complete and closed than it really is. It really has many open pores and great leeway in its joints. We are borrowing all the time without realizing it. The worst of the law is the law that feeds only on law. As outsiders, philosophers might recognize this more readily than we who can usually fill our practical rôle by merely frying in our own fat. You can make us as thinkers be more conscious of how much we borrow and so help us to see our need of borrowing and of borrowing wisely. And if in the process you are compelled to think more carefully whether your calling like ours brings myopia to those whose nose is always to the grindstone, and whether it is the worst or the best of philosophy that feeds only on philosophy, you will be reaping the assured reward of those who cast their bread upon the waters. Perhaps we may say not only that we have need of thee but also that we will do thee good.

The presence of the dilemma in so many cases in law compels us to ask how the issues are decided when they cannot be settled by logic. The large answer is that the judges do what they think the best thing to do in the premises. And so the law is an agglomeration of instances of what courts think the best thing to do. I am loth to believe with Professor Pratt that the philosopher as a specialist in Ethics has nothing of special value to offer the public in evaluating the things which courts have thought best. While the fields of law and of ethics are not coterminous, they have much in common. I fail to see how one can consider ethical problems without dealing with matters that concern the law. Unless the student of ethics is content to

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take his standards from the Bible or from his own inner consciousness, he must be interested to know the standards which others hold and strive to apply. Unless the philosopher would be content to know what Robinson Crusoe should do with no Man Friday around to complicate matters, he should be especially interested in the ethical problems that arise out of the conflicting ideals and interests of men living in society. He should care about the obligations that are deemed sufficiently important to be enforced as well as about those that are left to the forum of conscience. He should care about the standards that actually prevail as well as about those that he thinks or feels ought to prevail. And above all he should realize that the difficulties in ethics arise far less in the formulation of precepts than in their application to concrete quarrels. By their fruits ye shall know them. The bite of the law is in its applications. In a judgment that is an order to the sheriff, technique of reasoning and perception of values express themselves in ways that count. The applications bring precepts and formulas from the clouds to the earth. They and they only tell what the precepts and the formulas really mean. To quote again from Mr. Justice Holmes:

"Our system of morality is a body of imperfect social generalizations expressed in terms of emotion. To get at its truth, it is useful to omit the emotion and ask ourselves what those generalizations are and how far they are confirmed by fact accurately ascertained."

And in another connection he tells us:

"A generalization is empty so far as it is general. Its value depends upon the number of particulars which it calls up to the speaker and the hearer. Hence the futility of arguments on economic questions by one whose memory is not stored with economic facts."

Unless there is no such animal as an ethical fact, the same must be true of argument on ethical questions. An ethics which stops with the precept and cares nothing about its application or the process by which it is reached seems at best only a pleasant flight of fancy. And if ethics does care about the application and the process, it can find no more fruitful field for study than that of the law. I should lay especial emphasis on the process. The situations of life

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are so infinite in their variety that a knowledge of ethical precedents would by itself help us little more than the mastery of Peter Piper Picked a Peck of Pickled Peppers helped the stutterer who found that it did not often oc-c-c-ur in c-c-c-onversation. What is needed for ethics is to inculcate the ethical mind. What we call the legal mind develops from intensive study of the process by which judicial decisions are reached. So it should contribute to the development of the ethical mind to devote attention to the process by which ethical decisions are reached by the courts. Continual practice in the discipline of forming ethical judgments has the same advantages over studying ethical principles that running has over reading about running.

IV

The discerning among you will observe that I have been thinking of you in your rôle of pedagogue as well as in your rôle of philosopher, and that I have left it to you to make the proper apportionment of my suggestions. Even if it be conceded that the material of the law offers little to you as philosophers, it may still be urged that it offers much to you as pedagogues. By not confining yourselves wholly to the ruminations of philosophers you can help to overcome the ever-present evil in the existence of that educational device known as the curriculum. Who knows how much students have suffered from the impression that their only task is to master a subject and from the delusive comfort that when a course is over and the examination successfully completed they have, in the lingo of the undergraduate, passed off the subject? Of all disciplines, philosophy seems to me least entitled to be regarded as a subject apart and aloof from others. With all deference to professional philosophers who may differ, I submit that the love of wisdom which is assumed to animate the philosopher is no passive adoration of some pure intellectual image. A man to be wise must be wise about something. Wisdom is not an end, but a means to other ends. It is a guide, not a goal. By bearing this in mind and letting it play its proper part in your instruction, you may extend the horizons of your

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class-rooms and persuade your students that the qualities of mind which you exemplify and which you seek to inculcate can be used in other ways than to pass examinations in philosophy. One of the greatest things we can do for students is to train them in philosophic method, using the word in its largest sense to cover the appreciation of values as well as skill in taking connected steps. But the best way to teach philosophic method is to make it do a piece of work, with as little self assertion in the process as possible. And in saying this, let me hasten to confess the sinfulness of this paper throughout. I hope some time to atone for it by writing the paper that this ought to have been. It should have taken some selected judicial opinions and shown how they cry for help from philosophers and have left it to you to see whether philosophers might save themselves in saving others. It should have given examples of the psychology, the ethics, the logic and the metaphysics that appear in the law and have left it to you to decide what you choose to do about it—whether you prefer to teach philosophy or to teach philosophically.

I would not leave you with the impression that we have no philosophers among us. Those who wish to know what philosophy can do for the law have only to read the works of Roscoe Pound and of Mr. Justice Holmes. Of horrible examples to be avoided, there are many more whom it would not be courteous to name. The contrast between the good and the bad makes it all the more evident how much we need you. We look to you as the spinners of the golden thread. We wish you to weave that thread into all the fabric of life. The threads we weave need yours to make our texture what it ought to be. To those of you to whom concern for our problems would be a descent from your high appointed task, there is perhaps no better reply than to compare it with the other descents that are from time to time indulged in. For my part I confess that, if it is well to hitch your wagon to a star, it seems to me also well to hitch your star to a wagon.

THOMAS REED POWELL.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

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OBJECTIVE FREEDOM.

PRABHU DUTT SHASTRI.

OBJECTIVE freedom is true freedom actualised in the world we live in. Subjectively, man is conscious of being free, and the knowledge of the freedom of will is rooted in this intuition. But it is not enough to be conscious of the fact that I can *will* what I will; in order to be able to enjoy that life of peace and repose which comes from a complete harmony of a multitude of wills, I must be able to actualise my subjective freedom in the world. It is only then that the various individual wills will cease to clash with one another.

In Hindu Philosophy the conception of true (or objective) freedom is known as *Jīvanmukti*, which means the attainment of *mukti* or freedom in this very life (or, more literally, while alive: *jīvat*). Such freedom is most difficult to realise, and falls to the lot of those only who by means of a severe and long training have been able to experience their identity with Nature. There is the same universal spiritual principle—the *ātman*—existing in man and pervading nature. It is the great cosmic illusion—Māyā—that creates the human error of differentiating the Self in man and the Self in nature. The fact is that man, by some kind of ignorance, dissects existence into the subjective and the objective. Howsoever, such a distinction may be necessary for the makeup and organisation of our knowledge and experience, it is ultimately false, and is at the same time responsible for many speculative errors when a mere distinction in thought is treated as a division in reality. Hindu philosophy attempts to set down the means enabling us to transcend the sphere of Māyā and attain true freedom. It does not simply analyse the notion of such freedom, but lays down the practical steps leading to the path of its realisation, such as *Sama, Dama, Uparati, Titikshā, Samādhāna*, etc. True freedom is true Yoga,

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the freedom enjoyed by a Yogi, who attains to that spiritual vision by which he sees "the same one and the all" everywhere. In his consciousness all barriers and limitations of individuation cease to operate, since he transcends the very principle of individuation. He transcends space, time and everything else. This enables him to govern nature, and to attain to those eight kinds of perfections (*siddhis*) which are viewed as wonderful miracles. If he is true to the functions of a *real* Yogi, he does not care to demonstrate his mystic power by suchlike miracles, but leads a life of complete indifferentism, like that of an inert block of stone, as it were. He transcends the territory within which moral distinctions are called for or valid. He moves in the sphere of the *non-moral*. This is the very highest stage of self-realisation, which can hardly be appreciated by those who judge every conduct and every activity by their human norms of utility. We are all inclined to that way of judgment, and consequently highly-developed souls, the great saints and sages, appear to us as eccentric or mad, since they refuse to follow the usual lines of human activity. The stage next below this one would be that of the highest moral perfection, when man, conscious of his identity with the principle of the Good, or of his individual will with the universal human Will, is capable of doing the greatest amount of good to himself and to others. A true psychology of the moral self reveals the fact that working for the good of others is not by itself an ultimate motive. It may either be a means to the realisation of our own individual good—since man, existing as he does *in society*, can hardly realise his own good except through the social good—or may spring from the higher consciousness in which the barriers of individuation are lost and the individual feels that he should love his neighbour not because of his being a neighbour or fellow-man but because it is the same undivided *ātman* that manifests itself in both. The ultimate motive is each man's own good. Life is a great battle, in which each one must take part or perish on "the wheel of transmigration." In order to attain the life of peacefulness and

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bliss, one has to fight this battle, and in this battle it is only individualism that counts. If you want to see the moon, you have to use your own eyes; by no means can you enable the blind man to see it. By self-culture and self-effort alone is it possible to approach the way to the Yogi's peaceful and passionless life.

The general trend of Western thought is not in favour of the realisation of a *non-moral* life, since it views the moral distinctions as ultimate and the moral life as the highest form of personal life. With this radical change in standpoint, the criticism hailing from either side falls beside the mark. It is only in some scattered utterings of the mystics that you find any attempted approach to the conception of true freedom referred to above, while it permeates the spiritualism of every serious-minded Hindu. The typical expression of the European mode of viewing the life of objective freedom is to be found in Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*, in which I believe Hegel appears to be at his best. I shall therefore attempt to give a very brief exposition of Hegel's conception of Objective Freedom.

There are, according to Hegel, three stages in the development of objective freedom, viz., *Recht*, *Moralität*, and *Sittlichkeit*. In the first stage, we find an external law imposed upon us, and we are only required to obey it and not argue about its rationale. Our motives, our approvals and disapprovals, do not count. It is the sphere of mere legality in which we live at this stage, when we are no more than mere persons. But at the second stage called *Moralität* (by no means identical with the English word *morality*) the "mere person" of the legal sphere is turned into a "subject," and the law is not merely obeyed but also recognised and approved. In the sphere of *Recht* the mere command was enough, but in the second stage it does not act as a motive at all unless it receives our internal acquiescence. But there is still something better than the striving or the apposition of the subjective and the objective, and this is realised in the third stage called *Sittlichkeit*, which means objective freedom. Such freedom is incorporated

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in the minds of the citizens and implies an implicit and free obedience to the moral law. This is the farthest limit Hegel's thought could reach, and it obviously falls short of the conception of *Jīvanmukti* of the Hindu systems.

The reason is that to Hegel the true form of reality was the State—and even then, not the *ideal State* as in Plato, but the state as it actually exists (this is a point which offers much scope for criticism). In the State, says Hegel, the true moral will comes into the sphere of reality, and Spirit lives in its true nature. The State is a symbol of freedom as realised in the sphere of actuality. The highest morality in the State is based upon the carrying into effect of the rational universal will.

But is such universal will always actually carried out? Does it mean that *what is is right?* At any rate, that is the obvious implication from Hegel's view of the essential rationality of the State *as it actually exists*. This does not explain the *raison d'être* of sin, evil, suffering, bad institutions and the like, which can in no sense be called right or rational. Hegel cannot answer this objection except by quibbling: "Sin issues in death; bad institutions must catch fire, because the nature of things is moral. The good alone is real."

Hegel's discussion of objective freedom is thus carried into the sphere of political philosophy rather than of moral and metaphysical philosophy; hence there is not much in it to compare with the Hindu notion of objective freedom, worked out from a different standpoint. But a presentation of the two views may by itself prove of some usefulness to the student of philosophy.

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MODERNISM AND IMMORTALITY.

CAVENDISH MOXON.

THE Roman Catholic controversialists are to some extent justified in their charge that in Protestant countries the belief in immortality has ceased to count. Some persons who are religious believe that there is no future life for the soul after death. Others who accept the traditional belief fail either to make it a personal conviction or to connect it with their manner of life. The causes of this prevalent disbelief and uncertainty are chiefly two:

(1) The spread of scientific knowledge and of naturalistic metaphysics has roused in many minds a vague feeling that the new theories have shaken the foundations of the old belief. And

(2) the Church as a whole has persisted in the use of antiquated defences against the new attacks and has refused to abandon untenable positions.

This confusion of Christian thought is specially noticeable in regard to the idea of bodily resurrection. The ancient theory was at least consistent in teaching that just as Jesus' body rose from the tomb, so in like manner will our bodies rise at the last day. But modern knowledge has compelled the reformed churches to allow their members to deny a bodily resuscitation in our case. Yet the Anglican bishops are trying to prevent the clergy from denying the literal disappearance or resurrection of Jesus' corpse. If the bishops can conceive our resurrection in a new and modern sense apart from a reintegration of scattered particles of matter, it is hard to see why the life of Christianity depends on our believing this new sense of resurrection to have been impossible in Jesus' case. The bishops ought to extend their persecution to those who disbelieve their own physical resurrection or to allow the clergy to deny the tradition of the empty tomb in its miraculous implication.

The Church will never stem the tide of unbelief by appeals

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to authority or by refutation of the illogical dogmatism of unbelievers. The only way out of the present chaos of half beliefs is a way that calls for faith, patience, and courage. If the Church lacks these qualities she is better dead; if she fosters them in her members the result to-day will be that she will urge all truth-seekers resolutely to test the traditional arguments for immortality, boldly to burn the rubbish and then consider what is the essence of the old belief in the light of our knowledge and our religious needs. At the outset of our enquiry we may state what appear to be the results of the criticism of the traditional Christian belief in resurrection:

(1) The criticism of the records in the New Testament makes it probable that the Church has been mistaken in supposing that Jesus' body suddenly disappeared from the earth by a miracle of resurrection on the third day after His death.[1]

(2) The criticism of natural science makes it probable that no literal resurrection will take place either of the whole or of any portion of the human race.

(3) The argument from the infallible authority of Jesus has completely broken down. It is precisely in his eschatological beliefs that Jesus has been shown to be mistaken. From this it follows that we can no longer assume a priori the absolute truth of his belief in the Fatherhood of God or the resurrection of man. It is important to notice what is the effect of these three results of criticism upon the Christian hope. Denial of the resurrection does not imply disbelief in immortality. Some Modernists like to say that they still hold the fact of resurrection whilst doubting or denying the old belief about its mode of accomplishment. But this juggling of a new meaning into an old and well defined term is calculated merely to irritate the layman. Therefore it is truer and wiser to say that you deny resurrection, if you do, and at the same time to show that, so far as this criticism goes, the way is still open

[1] The evidence of this conclusion is admirably set forth by Prof. Kirsopp Lake in *The Resurrection of Jesus Christ.*

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for a consideration of the further and separate question of personal immortality.

It is a fact that many moral and religious people who deny a physical resurrection yet continue to hold fast to a belief in personal life after death. It is also clear that their motive for this belief is not a mere desire for their own persistence and pleasure or a mere physical fear. It is rather a moral demand that the universe should prove friendly to human values. By this belief in immortality they express their faith in the worth of goodness and the value of human endeavor. And most Christians not only believe in the conservation of all values already achieved, but also in new opportunities after death for the completion of lives cut short by evil. On the other hand there is a common belief in the punishment of the wicked, for their own good, in purgatory or for the satisfaction of a Christian sense of justice, in hell.

The defenders of the belief in personal immortality make much of these supposed demands of our moral nature as the strongest proof of their belief in survival in the absence of clear and direct evidence from "the other side."

It is important, therefore, to examine these moral claims, and if they survive our scrutiny, to enquire whether it seems likely that the nature of the world will guarantee their satisfaction. We are told that the world or God *must* satisfy our moral need for new opportunities beyond the grave. But we shall reply that before taking this risky leap from a judgment of value to a conclusion about existence we must examine our moral judgment to see whether our wish is obviously in accordance with the nature of the world.

The belief in personal immortality has value for religion because it implies (1) that human values are really good, (2) that these values are preserved after death and (3) that personal growth and decay are not confined to this present life. Of these three implications (1) and (2) do not demand this particular belief for their assertion. Indeed many believers in the eternity of human values have been, like

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pre-Christian Hebrews, unbelievers in personal immortality and development after death. And until the evidence for post-mortem psychical activity becomes stronger, it is the duty of the churches to allow their members and their ministers who hold the first or the second implication of the traditional belief in life after death to deny that the moral or scientific evidence is enough to warrant our making a belief in personal immortality an essential part of every Christian's faith.

The distinction that we have just made between the fact and the manner of the preservation of human values is declared by orthodoxy to be unreal. Professor A. E. Taylor is one of the most recent defenders of the traditional belief in personal immortality as the only reasonably possible manner in which values can be preserved eternally intact.[2] He admits that the essence of the religious belief in immortality is the quality and not the mere quantity of existence after death. He believes that only a "moral" certainty is possible and desirable. Hence he rejects all a priori arguments from the indestructibility of the soul, and he regards the arguments from spiritualism for mere survival as being incapable of guaranteeing the safety and increase of the human values in which religion is interested. He thinks that the best argument for immortality is drawn from the moral demands of those who believe in God. He is sure that values will either be preserved in persons or not at all. For him only two alternatives are reasonable: either belief in personal immortality or pessimistic atheism. He refuses to allow Christians to affirm the eternal value of the good life whilst professing ignorance or disbelief with regard to another life after death. He dares to assert that there must be a moral advance in this new life in order that our moral demands may be satisfied. Now we shall not be surprised if modern Christians refuse Professor Taylor's dogmatic demand that they shall choose between a literal acceptance of a belief springing from the moral

[2] See his essay in *The Faith and the War*.

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demands of a section of the modern world and blank disbelief in all values and in their preservation.

Is it quite so morally certain as Professor Taylor supposes that the nature of reality must exactly correspond with his ideal destiny for the human soul? Even on the orthodox theistic hypothesis, is it wise to be so sure what must happen after death if God is just? All previous attempts have failed to enclose the possibilities in the form of a simple alternative or dilemma. The path of beliefs about man's history here and hereafter is thickly strewn with illusions. Christians have been firmly convinced that resurrection must mean resuscitation of our mortal flesh and bones; that justice demands the eternal torment of the damned. Professor Taylor's dogmatism about another and far better life after death not only conflicts with the warnings of experience, it also depends on a dualistic view of the two worlds. Here the devil causes sin and death to prevail; but there God has made a better world free from the domination of evil.

If, however, God is supreme it seems to follow that evil is here because the human values He desires cannot be won in a world apart from evil. What right then has Professor Taylor to assume that a further moral advance towards God can take place after death in a far better world? If human values persisted unchanged after death we could then imagine a mode of eternal life infinitely better than this evil world. But if an advance in moral worth is to be assumed then the belief of spiritualists in another life closely resembling this life in its general conditions is the most reasonable hypothesis. The history of the belief in personal immortality is another reason against the attempt to bind belief in values to the dogma of moral progress after death. For this belief arose at a time when men lived in a small world of which the Earth was the centre. In those days the only other beings in the world were angels and devils: there was no thought of the evolution of life on other stars. To-day we cannot assume that either our Earth or our human race has a supreme or final or exclusive

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value. The theory of evolution has taught us to regard each species not only as an end in itself but also as a means to a further development. A natural pride of race makes it hard for us to apply this truth to our own species. As Professor Bergson reminds us (*L'Évolution créatrice*, p. 276) "chaque espèce se comporte comme si le mouvement général de la vie s'arrêtait à elle au lieu de la traverser. Elle ne pense qu' à elle, elle ne vit que pour elle." Now it is inevitable that this deep-rooted generic egoism should have been specially strong in the religion of geocentric times. We must be prepared to question the centrality of man now that we have learned the pettiness of our planet. It may well be that the human race is a means to some higher form of being. In that case human life has intrinsic value, even though its end be to produce fuller life here and not to prolong its own life hereafter.

From this vast extension of our view of the world it follows that we can hardly presume to declare that, unless our personal values are augmented after death in an environment more favorable to virtue, there is no meaning and value in life and no reasonable motive for continuing to struggle against sin.

The question of personal immortality ought not to be discussed apart from the meaning and value of the whole human race in the world process. Man has neither being nor worth in isolation. He has no absolute claim to any rewards or benefits, temporal or eternal. Therefore it is impossible to decide the question of his immortality on a priori grounds such as the abstract requirements of justice. If it could be shown that the world's progress would best be promoted by human activity limited to this life, the individual could then have no claim to an extension of life that would hinder the whole cosmic process.

Our view of the world has forever removed our certainty that man is the end and crown of creation. We can no longer ask, as our forefathers did, what is the good of every other creature in relation to man? But if the other living beings were not specially created for our use or pleasure,

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how can we any longer assume that the world itself must be so ordered as to satisfy our lust for a perpetual extension of pleasure and our petty desires for adequate rewards?[3]

Professor Taylor is again the mouthpiece of orthodoxy when he declares that we must believe in personal immortality if we are to think nobly of the soul (p. 134). Without this belief it would not matter to him whether he had acted "well" or "badly." And on page 135 he even goes so far as to suggest that a rational judge without this belief would find no warrant for pronouncing the moral goods that are painfully won to be still the highest. But if these goods are valuable they are valuable because we judge their worth in this life—unless Professor Taylor can only see their justification in an unearthly society. How then is an atheist proved to be irrational because he still pursues these goods simply because he sees their value as enhancements of our earthly life? The atheist can still desire to enrich individual and social life: unless he is morbid and degenerate he must desire this increase of life. He will doubtless deny the "good" of life-denying "virtues," such as the longing for martyrdom, asceticism and celibate isolation, but he will affirm the values of all the qualities which uplift the race through the individual.

Professor Taylor confidently holds out to the unbeliever the cheerless prospect of the certain death of the world. But this final dissolution of the universe is by no means certain. We may well ask Professor Taylor the question put by Professor Bergson (*L'Évolution créatrice*, p. 268), "Mais, même du côté de la matière inorganisée avons nous le droit d'étendre à l'univers entier des considerations tirées de l'état présent de notre système solaire? A côté des mondes qui meurent, il y a sans doute des mondes qui naissent."

Nietzsche's belief in the eternal recurrence of the finite forms of life gives him a strong motive for acting in such a way that he would not dread its eternal repetition. For

[3] Even though our pleasure be a highly refined religious altruism.

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such an atheist as Nietzsche with a vigorous faith in life there is no such slackening of the sense of obligation as Professor Taylor supposes to follow disbelief in life after death. It is the weak and degenerate who will only live well if they have the reward of immortality dangling ever before their eyes.

The earthly life of man may well be like a work of art. A piece of sculpture has a value in itself though it is not preserved forever. Unless Professor Taylor agrees with B. Croce that beauty is fully expressed in the soul apart from the material form, he must admit that the artist leaves some part of the value of his life behind him when he dies. If it is not a waste of time to produce perishable forms of art, why should the art of living well be neglected even though the artist dream of no perpetuation of the beauty of holiness?

We conclude, then, that belief in the continued personal activity of the self after death is not a necessary postulate for the moral life. But the question still remains; is there any certain ground of belief in immortality?

(1) The argument from moral and religious needs to belief in personal progress in life after death.

Professor Taylor maintains (p. 137) that it is unreasonable not to believe that the Universe will answer our moral needs just as it answers our rational needs. But the questions at once arise: What are our true moral needs? and how does the universe satisfy our rational needs? The ancient Hebrews believed firmly in Yahweh and yet felt no moral need for this personal progress after death; and many religious Orientals in our time make no such demand upon the universe as Professor Taylor thinks reasonable. Is it not possible that our true moral needs are not yet perfectly revealed to the human race? Is the man of faith compelled to be certain that his present needs *must* be met by the Universe or God? It may be that the demands of moralists like Professor Taylor can be no more exactly answered than the moral demands of the savage for heavenly fighting and feasting. For as Dr. McTaggart pointed out in the

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Hibbert Journal (Vol. 4, p. 116 f.) tastes differ and change. "A Maori warrior might well find that the idea of an immortality without fighting made the world intolerable."

And how does nature satisfy our rational needs? Not by shaping itself in accordance with men's beliefs about magic, miracles or animism. If, then, we cannot impose a priori beliefs of our reason upon nature, how can we reasonably assume that nature must satisfy certain far from universal moral demands?

The horror that Professor Taylor feels at the thought of personal extinction *may*, after all, be the very natural and deeply rooted physical will to live which leads every creature to avoid death when unmoved by a stronger desire. Belief in personal activity after death *may* be a myth desired to strengthen the natural instinct that we should love the good life and seek to prolong it so far as the good of the race and the individual demands our persistence. In that case the men of the future would gain strength to face the facts and to live a full and valuable life without the aid of personal immortality. These men would no more share Professor Taylor's horror than he shares the horror of the Maori warrior. Men who by experience have learned the values of earth would have no need of a reward in heaven to spur them on to live worthily in this life.

It is most unlikely that the faith of Jesus demanded "a continual and unlimited augmentation" of personal values after death, since for Him the final judgment appeared to be close at hand. And in view of the faith of a Modernist like George Tyrrell it seems simply untrue that every believer must either accept Professor Taylor's traditional belief or become a pessimistic atheist. To Tyrrell the perpetuation hereafter of man's moral struggle seemed "geomorphic"—a conception of heaven in terms of earth (*Essays on Faith and Immortality*, p. 225). Dean Inge also completely escapes Professor Taylor's dilemma. On the basis of a form of absolute idealism, quite apart from any historical or scientific evidence, he is convinced that the values of human personality are fully preserved, though

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he sees no reason for postulating a progress of souls in time or space after death, and indeed roundly asserts that "the question whether it is 'my' soul that will live in the eternal world seems to have no meaning at all" (*Hibbert Journal*, Vol. 15, p. 592).

(2) The argument that justice demands progress after death affords as little support to Professor Taylor's dogmatism as the foregoing argument from moral needs.

This argument is only made plausible if justice is held to demand a retributive punishment as an end in itself. Professor Taylor imagines that Bismarck, by dying, escaped the penalty which later generations are paying for his sin, and that unless he survives to pay his penalty, the whole world will be as unjust as this earthly section of it is.

Here we come back to moral needs. It is a fact that many Christians simply cannot desire that any outward penalty shall be inflicted either here or hereafter merely as a penalty. They feel that if Bismarck acted unworthily he suffered as a consequence the only just penalty, namely a shrinkage of spiritual stature: they do not demand that he should live in order to receive an additional outward adversity. Since we cannot decide what is just for us to receive till we know what our destiny is, we can hardly use our ideas of what is just to prove a truth about our own destiny. Man has no rights in abstraction from his world.

(3) The argument from an infallible person, book, or society. The baselessness of this argument has been so often and so clearly shown that it is needless to do more than refer to the full argument in A. Sabatier's *The Religions of Authority and the Religion of the Spirit.* The objections have indeed gained strength since this book was written in so far as the critics have shown that it is precisely in eschatological matters that the evidence for the fallibility of Jesus is strongest.

(4) The argument from the Christ of experience. There is a growing tendency amongst modern students to admit that the evidence for the miraculous disappearance of Jesus' body is quite insufficient as a basis for belief. It is

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obvious that if Jesus' survival depended on a bodily disappearance which is unique in history, his resurrection becomes a hindrance rather than a help to faith in the survival of other men. Many Liberal Christians, therefore, suggest that it is enough to believe in objective visions of the "risen" and telepathically present Jesus. Some apologists who find no sure ground for belief in survival in the confused records of the New Testament rely instead upon the Church's witness to the Christ of experience. The mystical sense of Christ's dwelling in believers and the results of his activity in the Church are together supposed to offer a sure and certain ground for belief in his and therefore in our life after death. Bishop Henson, for instance (in the *Hibbert Journal*, Vol. 2, p. 483) seems to argue from the influence of Jesus to the fact of his resurrection. But in order to use this argument it is necessary to establish two impossible premises, (1) that we can distinguish between communion with the risen Jesus Himself and communion with the Spirit of his life, and (2) that the results in the Church could not have followed from the grace of God and the influence of a mortal Jesus on the minds of men.

(5) The argument from psychical research. If ever the evidence for survival prove sufficient to convince a majority of the trained investigators and psychologists, no doubt the question will have received a definite answer of great interest and importance, but not an answer that will satisfy Professor Taylor's moral demands. For Professor Taylor's religious purpose the evidence from psychical research is worthless because it fails to disclose a better life unhindered by evil, and because the alleged messages do not guarantee the eternal value of the spiritual life and the victory of good over evil, which form the chief interest in the belief in life after death from the religious and moral point of view adopted by Professor Taylor.

(6) The argument from the Fatherhood of God. In so far as this is a metaphysical belief it has a right to be held as a theory, but not to be imposed upon all religious people as a dogma. It was only reasonable to set up the Father-

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hood of God as a certain premise for the proof of immortality so long as it was possible to assume the infallibility of the theological metaphysics of Jesus. To-day it is just as impossible to accept without question or criticism Jesus' belief in the Father as his belief in the Devil.

We conclude that the moral and religious needs of the present day forbid our setting up any one theory about human immortality as a necessary dogma for all believers in the values of personality. History shows us that when men have thought too much about the future life they have often lacked enthusiasm for the enrichment of our present life. Dean Inge admits "that the absence of any clear revelation about a future state is an indication that we are not meant to make it a principal subject of our thoughts." It is probable that equally dangerous to a full earthly life is the preoccupation with absolute values of a supposed real and eternal world, of which other world the history of human consciousness on earth is but a shadow.

If Professor Taylor cannot preserve his zest for the fullness of life without his belief in immortality, it is good for him to believe in it. Only let him not proceed to infer that it is either true or necessary for all. Many men and women have been devitalised by this very belief and have led a solitary and antisocial existence in one long ecstasy of heaven. There is only one absolutely binding dogma for all, *viz.*, the will to well-being in this present life. All other beliefs have religious and moral importance just in so far as they promote and enrich this life.

CAVENDISH MOXON.

LOS ALTOS, CALIFORNIA.

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THE STATE UNDER A SHADOW.

A. R. WADIA.

GREAT events never fail to create profound restlessness in the minds of men. It would be surprising if the devastating effects of the last war did not give rise to a criticism of political ideals, which may rightly or wrongly be held responsible for those effects. Thus it is that the thoroughness of the German political machine has been the recipient of an endless attack from the press and the platform, and together with it the very conception of the state has come to be challenged and discredited. It was symptomatic of the growing feeling that shortly before the outbreak of the war Mr. Ernest Barker should have penned an instructive article on *The Discredited State*, which, however, was published only in the February of the following year.[1] Since then the whole conception of state has been criticised to tatters, till within the last years two interesting books have been published from two different standpoints which seek to see the whole autocracy of the "state" buried out of sight. Professor Hobhouse in his *Metaphysical Theory of the State* seeks to combat the prestige of it at its very fountain-head in Hegel, while Mr. Bertrand Russell in his *Roads to Freedom*, chafing under the deadening unity and power of the state, seeks to put an end to it by placing men under the twofold co-ordinate and hence mutually restrictive authority of an association of consumers and an association of producers. But it seems to us that all this disaffection is but a temporary exaggeration produced under the nerve-racking effects of a cruel war. It is highly questionable if the political evils of our time can rightly be laid at the door of Hegel's philosophy. Further, the unity of the state as embodied in the unity of a sovereign power within it is a distinguished mark of an advanced civilisation, and cannot be got rid of without introducing

[1] See *The Political Quarterly* of February, 1915.

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those very evils of divided power and divided will, which have been gradually brought to rest during the course of centuries. To say this is not to admit that the modern state has attained its zenith of perfection. The political evolution yet clamours for a higher order of things, and the political restlessness of to-day is due not so much to the power of the state as to the prostitution of that power to an unworthy selfishness, which has been masquerading under the pompous names of patriotism, nationalism, and imperialism. All the great achievements of Europe have been carried out under the fostering protection of the much decried and "discredited state," and it is the aim of this article to show that the political development of the future will be as much dependent on a thorough appreciation of the conception of state as the political development of the past has been.

Idealistic philosophy has always regarded the state as the highest political discovery of mankind. Its primary necessity is stability; its governing aim is an ordered development. It is true that it has been a cardinal creed of Idealism from the days of Plato and Aristotle onwards to emphasise the state as a whole rather than the individuals of which it is composed. But to conclude from this that individuals do not count at all in an Idealistic régime is to convict Idealism of an absurdity, an absurdity, however, which an Idealist would be the first to disown. Professor Hobhouse thus expresses this popular misconception: "But as a fashionable academic philosophy genuine Hegelianism has revived, and the doctrine of the state as an incarnation of the absolute, a superpersonality, which absorbs the real living personality of men and women, has in many quarters achieved the position of an academic orthodoxy."[2] If, indeed, the individuals were so ruthlessly sacrificed to the state, it would be the most hideous ogre, worthy the contempt of every thinking man. But to conceive of a state as opposed to its individual members is a

[2] *Metaphysical Theory of State*, p. 24.

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flagrant error, for the state apart from the individuals would indeed be a most "bloodless category," and as such it would be incapable of those crimes which have been so freely attributed to it of late. It exists only in and for the individuals; its lifeblood is the lifeblood of its individuals; it is the concrete embodiment of the struggles and aspirations of its individuals, so that whatever a state is, it is as its individual members have made it. The emphasis on the state is only the emphasis on the individuals in their collective capacity. As Professor Hobhouse insists, there is a difference between society and state,[3] but the difference is not absolute; the state is only one kind of society, but being the highest society it comprises, and in a sense becomes identical with society, for the most complete society is the state. Hence it would be perfectly natural to say that the interests of the state are always more absorbing and important than the interests of any single individual or any narrow class of individuals. Individualists and realists may deny this in theory, but in practice they cannot but accept it. However mistaken and false the political ambitions of Germany, as she used to be, may have been, she was certainly true to the spirit of a state inasmuch as whatever was conceived to be the welfare of the Vaterland was rigidly accepted and adhered to by the rank and file of Germans. Professor Hobhouse condemns this as slavish and as destructive of the highest individuality of its members; he regards "the Hegelian theory of the god-state" as sapping "the rational humanitarianism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries."[4] We shall not pause here to discuss the justifiability of the implied criticism of Hegel, but as already stated it must not be lost sight of that even from the Idealistic standpoint the state apart from its individuals is a dead entity; that it exists not for its own glory but for the welfare of its members; and that it will be what it is made by them. The whole machinery of the state is but a plastic instrument which may be wielded

[3] *Metaphysical Theory of State*, pp. 75–6.
[4] *Metaphysical Theory of State*, p. 6.

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in a good or a bad cause. Looked at as an instrument it is unethical in itself; it becomes moral or immoral according to the end it serves. But whether the end is good or bad, as an instrument it is indispensable. We may condemn Germany's aims as unholy, but we cannot deny that the early victories of the Germans were entirely due to the brilliant use they made of the machinery of the state. It may have been an abuse, but abuse cannot detract from the use of a thing. This is amply illustrated by the whole history of the last war. Whatever Germany did, the Allies were forced to imitate. Whether it was conscription, or gas poisoning, or blockade, or air raids, or a rigorous censorship ruthless and blind in its working, loss of individual liberties—all these characterised Germany from the very beginning, and every allied country, England included, had to follow in her wake. Nothing else has so clearly shown as the last war that God is always on the side of big battalions. Mr. Bertrand Russell is at least consistent and fair when he condemns the whole conception of the modern state. Professor Hobhouse is guilty of patriotic partiality when he condemns Germany and throughout his book suggests that England has been free from these faults. We do not wish to put England on the same level as Germany; we only wish to emphasise the inherent logic of political life, which forces a state into an attitude of sternness that brooks no opposition, and that is even guilty—as even Professor Hobhouse sorrowfully admits[5]—of a petty and ungenerous persecution of individuals who have the courage of their convictions, which for the time being are opposed to the dominant motives of the state. In times of crises individual liberties have always been unheeded. *Salus populi suprema Lex:* as Mr. Ernest Barker himself admits, the state is "based on the political idea of law and order;"[6] law and order as the indispensable presuppositions of development are the very breath of the state, and in the interests of law and order the state has to

[5] *Metaphysical Theory of State*, p. 94 footnote.
[6] *Political Quarterly*, February, 1915, p. 113.

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make its reality felt. Even a free America had to don the clothes of Mars as much as the bureaucratic Germany. But what a world of difference is there between the state of President Wilson pressing all the resources of the state in the interests of a suffering humanity, and the state of Kaiser William, striving to Germanise the world!

Not even an anarchist would venture to deny the gregariousness of human beings. Man can live only in society, and the evolution of the history of man is the evolution of the varying phases and kinds of society he has made for himself. The state is the last link in this long chain, and as the most developed type of human society it brings to the forefront the problem of the relation of an individual to the state. It has been sometimes argued that an individual continues the same whether he is within or without a particular group. Thus Mr. Arthur McDowall writes: "If the group is treated as a real person, the individuals who compose it cease to have the rights of persons, and the uniting principle gets a fictitious strength."[7] Yet how is it possible to deny that there is a world of difference between a man who is a member of a trade union and one who is not? The difference is palpably due to the distinctive nature of the body to which the former belongs, and hence the strength of the uniting principle cannot be fictitious. There is indeed a difference between a group and its members, although this difference cannot be absolute, since the group can continue to have its being only through its members.

So, too, on Idealistic premises, as we have already seen, the supremacy of the state is inevitable, and all attempts at any absolute distinction between it and its members end but in anarchism. Professor Hobhouse, without countenancing any such absolute distinction,[8] yet somehow tries to maintain the independence and liberty of the individual against the state. He admits that "the work or the life of the association is something different from the work which

[7] *Realism:* a Study in Art and Thought, p. 294.
[8] *Metaphysical Theory of State*, p. 29.

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could be achieved or the life lived by the same people apart from that association."[9] To say this is to admit that a particular individual is what he is, simply because he is a member of a particular association, so that the ideals of that association have fed his ideals, and he through his life work contributes to the vitality of these ideals. This is all that Idealism seeks to maintain. It makes no demand "for the sacrifice of all the individuals who belong or may belong to a society to the interests of that society,"[10] for it is aware as well as Professor Hobhouse that such a demand would defeat the very end of the society. At best it would demand the sacrifice of some in the interests of the whole, and the justice of this demand, I believe, would be accepted even by Professor Hobhouse.

The state as the highest type of association comprehends within it several other types of association, the chief of which is the family. It is remarkable that an individual *qua* an individual has been for some time silently receding into the background, and that he generally comes into contact with the state as a member of a profession or of an association like a trade union. Hence he owes a double allegiance first to the rules of the particular narrow profession or association to which he belongs and secondly to the state whose citizen he claims to be. These duties may conceivably clash with each other, as happened in the case of doctors when the insurance act was passed, and then it is generally the state that wins and ought to win. *Prima facie* this may seem an undue restriction of the liberty of an individual. In reality it is an acknowledgment of the greater necessity of the state. Associations like the individuals of a family may come into conflict with each other, and for the amicable settlement and even the prevention of these conflicts a higher association is necessary, and this higher association has been recognised as the state. It is the ultimate source of all freedom, because all

[9] *Metaphysical Theory of State*, p. 28.
[10] *Metaphysical Theory of State*, p. 30.

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freedom has its basis in rights, and rights are the creation of law. The state is the harmony of the whole. It is the polar star which guides the activities of all the other associations comprised within it. These associations cannot be conceived as hostile to the state, for they exist because of the place preserved by the state, and they flourish in so far as the state lets them flourish. Hence the problem of the state has become one of "polyarchism"—to use Mr. Barker's phrase[11]—and the very position of the state in the hierarchy of associations points to its intrinsic worth.

The real function of the state is to conduce to the complete well-being of its members, *i.e.*, to their moral and material development. To further this end the least it can do is to preserve order and the most it can achieve is to create an environment for the free development of all its individual members. Within the limits of this minimum and maximum there are various possibilities of achievements and these possibilities supply the varying criteria of different states. Nothing has contributed so much to the misapprehension of Idealistic political philosophy as the use of the term "state." It has been generally understood as signifying a certain static state of things, as if any existing state is, by the right of being, entitled to be recognised as the state. But the very essence of a state is to develop, and it would be the negation of Idealism to put a limit to such development. It has perforce to develop slowly, because not being abstract, but made concrete through the life of individuals and their associations, it can only progress through the progress of associations. Whenever a state has sought to quicken its rate of progress irrespective of the fitness of its material to achieve that progress, as *e.g.* happened in the case of Oliver Cromwell in England and in that of Akbar in India—it has paid for its rashness by stimulating all the unhealthy forces of reaction. When a political philosopher talks of the state, he cannot possibly be expected to mean by it all the varying and mutually

[11] *Political Quarterly*, February, 1915, p. 120.

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conflicting types of it. Hence he uses it only in its ideal sense, as the perfected state wherein all the associations have a harmonious life and all the individuals find the most perfect means for their moral development. Such a state has not so far existed, but the conception of it serves as the standard, whereby to test the relative worth of all historic and existing states. To interpret the profound aphorism of Hegel: "the real is the rational," so as to mean that whatever exists is rational is to miss the very essence of Hegelianism. For to Hegel the reality of everything is only commensurate with its rationality, *i.e.*, only that deserves to be called real which truly fulfils its function in the universe. Applied to the state the aphorism would mean that only that state is truly real which adequately fulfils its function of moralising its individuals. It is surprising to find such an astute writer as Professor Hobhouse saying: "The foundation of this theory is the belief that the ideal is realised in the actual world, and in particular in the world of organised society, not in the sense already noted above that there are ideals operating as psychological forces in human beings, but in the sense that the world at large, and in particular the social world, is, if properly understood, an incarnation or expression of the ideal; that, as one thinker would put it, the Absolute is perfection; or, as Hegel, who may be considered as the father of this school, laid down, the insight to which . . . philosophy is to lead us is that the real world is as it ought to be."[12] But all this is a mere travesty of Hegel, for what he means to say is not that the actual is the ideal, but that the ideal is to be realised through the actual, and only in so far as the actual realises the ideal, is it worthy of being known as real. In politics this would mean that every existing state is actual, but it would be real only in so far as—and only to that degree—it approaches the ideal. The much-decried conservatism of Hegel is in fact only his innate conviction that the world and society alike evolve,

[12] *Metaphysical Theory of State*, p. 17.

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that no evil is permanent, but that it gradually yields to good. How far his praise of Prussia is to be taken as philosophically justifiable is a matter of dispute, and does not essentially touch "the whole spirit of his teaching," as even Professor Hobhouse admits in one place,[13] though in a different context.

We have so far maintained that the state is fundamentally ethical, in the sense that its aim is to render the moralisation of its individual members possible. For the realisation of that aim it is necessary that they should have freedom to attain their moral ideals. This involves mutual toleration and a prevention of mutual hindrance. To safeguard these conditions the power of the state is essential. Further, if the individuals themselves are not in a position to know their own good, it would be necessary to take steps to make them know what they ought to know even if it involves the use of the power of the state. There is such a thing as "compelling one to be free," and if such a confirmed individualist as J. S. Mill could advocate compulsory education and interference of the state in the matter of marriages, one need hardly be surprised if such a philosopher as Hegel, who was so bent on the moral evolution of human society should have advocated the use of force on the part of the state to attain its end and to fulfil its mission. It would be easy to distort this view and define state as Power, as Treitschke did, but Power in itself is not morality, and hence such a view has neither been nor can be a view of Idealists. To attribute such a view to Hegel, or to consider it as a logical development of his view is to misread and misinterpret him through and through. The majesty of the state is due not to its command of an unlimited force, but to its ethical nature, its supreme necessity as an indispensable instrument for the growth of the spiritual nature of man.

In recent years it has been very commonly asked: Is the absoluteness of the state really indispensable? Does

[13] *Metaphysical Theory of State*, p. 102.

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not its power conflict with the freedom of individuals? This idea looms so large with Professor Hobhouse and Mr. Bertrand Russell[14] that the latter would split the power of the state into two co-ordinate bodies: one consisting of the consumers, and the other consisting of the producers, while the former would in some way not quite intelligible limit the power of the state. This view suffers from all the defects of an unstable equilibrium, for while continually declaiming against Germany as Hegel's "God-state," he has not a word to protest against the powers of the English state, which in effect are as vast as Germany's, though as a democracy her power does not press so much on its individual members as in the case of bureaucratic Germany. This contrast only shows that nothing is wrong with the fact of power as such, but that the problem is as to who should wield this power. Mr. Russell's plan of two co-ordinate authorities has all the elements of anarchism within it, for history has always shown that where there is no one supreme power capable of meeting all emergencies, there is a tendency for continual strife with all the possibilities of its blazing forth into an open rupture. Europe itself suffered for centuries from the evils of a dual allegiance to the church and the state, and Hobbes with the instinct of a statesman rightly dwelt upon the supremacy of the state over the Church. Europe has been wise enough to follow this policy and European states have prospered. It would be easy to point out numerous abuses of its power by a state, where the weak and the innocent have been oppressed, where selfishness of one or a few has successfully overcome the General Will. But these have been merely incidental evils. If the absoluteness of the state is necessary, the misuse of its power cannot affect its rightness. At most it only shows that the state in question has not attained a high development and requires its defects to be overcome. Through blunders and errors, conscious and unconscious, a

[14] *Roads to Freedom*, p. 121: "Government and Law in their very essence consist of restrictions on freedom, and freedom is the greatest of political goods."

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state progresses. The richness of its experience is a guarantee of its stable development. Not the worst detractor of the state can deny that all the great landmarks in the history of European civilisation synchronise with the passing of epoch-making laws. The voyages of exploration, the foundation of trading companies, that ultimately attained sovereign power in distant lands, all the great measures for the uplift of mankind like the Education Acts, Factory Legislation, franchisement of millions of men, have been the result of state activity. Its ungenerous lapses into religious tyranny, repressions of all new manifestations of human spirit, were due more to the narrow bigotry of fanatics than the temporal powers as such, and yet why blame even the Church? There is a curious fatality in mankind which makes new discoveries and new ideas always hateful to the masses of the men in power, and the tyranny of the majority, which Mill did so much to combat, would manifest itself even without a state, and often in spite of the state, as the "lynch-law" of America has often shown. Great progressive strides have always had to be taken by the few in the teeth of many, and the many have only been gradually won over.

What noble part the much-abused autocracy of the state has played in the history of mankind can best be realised in comparison with its impotency in the East, especially India. The despot of the East may maim, imprison and kill, may devastate and burn territories as he pleases. But when it comes to putting an end to any real social evil, current in the prostituted name of religion, the despot is as helpless as a babe. In India the consciousness of a state has been peculiarly weak. Patriotism as a general virtue was for ages unknown. The Brahmin and the Kazi sufficed to close the book of progress, and in their presence the kings could but grovel in humility. A solitary Akbar might rise in the course of ages and seek to soften the sternness of creeds, but his death marked the death of his dreams as well, and the tyranny of old books and texts reigned unchallenged once again, forcing men with bandaged eyes

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to grope in the dark, even though there be glorious sunlight all around. The political consciousness of India is but a legacy of the British rule, and how far removed is the autocracy of the state in India from any real power is shown in the inability of the legislatures to touch even a festering sore in the social polity without raising a howl of protest from the priest-ridden masses, the blind leading the blind. Europe would have been still sunk in the ignorance of the Middle Ages, had not the various states come to her assistance and after a heroic struggle thrown off the priestly yoke. India is still in the stage of medieval Europe; the intellect of her children is still overclouded with veneration for empty forms and class privileges. What emancipation of intellect Indians have already achieved is due to the bold action of the British Government in introducing English education, and the progress of India will depend only on the degree to which the state will undertake the task of creating a fresh outlook, and doing away with those social evils, which have set up the prescriptive right of centuries for their continued existence.[15] It is indeed a tribute to the state when even such a hostile critic of it as Mr. Russell has to admit the necessity of it for peace and war, tariffs, regulation of sanitation, sale of noxious drugs, and a just system of distribution.[16] Even in his previous book, *The Principles of Social Reconstruction*, he is seriously troubled over the decreasing birth-rate in England, France and Germany, and feels powerless to combat this evil except through "the state maintenance of the mother and the children" provided that "both parents are physically and mentally sound in

[15] The passionate intensity of Bakunin's denunciation of the state is but an instance of the excess which is necessary to shock men into thought. "The state is not society, it is only an historical form of it, as brutal as it is abstract. It was born historically in all countries of the marriage of violence, rapine, pillage, in a word war and conquest, with the gods successively created by the theological fantasy of nations. It has been from its origin, and it remains still at present the divine sanction of brutal force and triumphant inequality" (Quoted in *Roads to Freedom*, p. 63).

[16] *Roads to Freedom*, p. 144.

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all ways likely to affect the children."[17] The reason for this apparent inconsistency is not far to seek. He may be the most heterodox man in England to-day, but it is the heterodoxy of an Englishman, in whose very veins runs a full sense of law and order, and law and order are the very lifeblood of a state. He but illustrates in his person the astute remark of Mill: "Both in a good and a bad sense, the English are farther from a state of nature than any other modern people. They are, more than any other people, a product of civilisation and discipline."[18] It is the innate sense of state that has made England since the days of the Romans so remarkably fruitful in politics.

Thus we see that the advanced position of European countries to-day is due pre-eminently to the conception of state as *majestas*, and that the need for such a conception in the case of backward countries like India is equally imperative. Mr. Ernest Barker finds that the state has had only two enemies to deal with: religion and economics. The thought is very suggestive, yet it is questionable if is really borne out by history. Religion has indeed very often come into conflict with the state, but always in the form of this or that dogmatic creed. Religion as such in Europe has never disdained the activities of a state. Where would Luther's Protestantism have been without the political ambitions of German princes and the polygamous proclivities of Henry VIII? Religion has always tried to have the power of the state ranged on its side; the relation of Church to state in Europe has generally been guided on the principle of the old adage: Orthodoxy is my doxy; Heterodoxy is somebody else's doxy. While each sect has been eager in proclaiming its independence of the state and thus striving to limit the autocracy of the state, it has nevertheless on gaining political power sought to domineer over other sects through the state. The case of the Roman Church is the most notorious, but in its lust for temporal power it has found noble adherents in all the established

[17] Pp. 184–5.

[18] The Subjection of Women, Chapter III.

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churches, even in the Puritanism of Cromwell and his followers, and the Protestantism of Calvin. Several modifications would be necessary before Mr. Barker's statement could be literally accepted: "English Non-conformity has been the main influence in the discrediting of the English State, just because it has been the noblest."[19]

It is much easier to deal with the second "enemy." Far from economics trying to achieve its independence of the state, the last half a century and even more goes to show how assiduously attempts have been made, and with remarkable success, to economise the state. The laissez-faire craze was but a temporary phase in the economic evolution, and in spite of the patent defects of state interference it was found inevitable and desirable to put the economic structure on a sound basis of guaranteed state control. The zest with which Socialism, which was originally purely economic in its origin, pursues its political activities is by itself sufficient to show the misleading nature of Mr. Barker's analysis.

The conception of the state is truly all comprehensive. Under the impulse of collectivism even individualist England has been hurried into far-reaching responsibilities like national insurance, old-age pensions, an extensive educational program and what not. The hand of the state is found in every activity. This may be interpreted as a sign of its immense popularity. Nevertheless in numerous influential circles this increased activity and power of the state has been viewed with a profound distrust. The traditional Conservatives and cautious Liberals are agitated over their "liberty." There is a reason for this agitation, but it is to be found elsewhere: in the international abuse of the power of the state. Making allowance for every exaggeration and the peculiar influence of old party notions, few students of European politics would care to deny that there is really something wrong with the state in Europe to-day. It is remarkable that the disease it is

[19] *Political Quarterly*, February, 1915, p. 104.

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suffering from has been courageously diagnosed only by a few leaders of the masses, and that disease is nationalism of the most brutally aggressive form that the world has ever witnessed. Out of the ashes of Feudal Europe under the inspiration of the French Revolution arose a number of national states, whose struggles form one of the entrancing chapters in the history of mankind. A united France, a free Greece, a national Italy, and even the German Federation held out visions of a rejuvenated world. But in reality these nation-states have sought to feed themselves at the expense of the non-European world. Nationalism once established has become an insatiable land-hunger, exploitation of the economic resources of the world, coupled with a brutal disregard for the welfare of "subject" peoples. As the noble apostle of liberty, J. S. Mill, never tired of pointing out, a possession of unlimited power is as disastrous to those who wield it as to those who are victims of it. International jealousy has led to vast armaments as the symbol of national preparedness for war and national unity. In the face of self-created enemies each nation thinks it the acme of political wisdom to render itself subject to the power of its state, for the state is the visible symbol of nationality and the only potent influence for the realisation of political ambitions. Mr. Barker puts it well, when he speaks of sovereignty as "a lotion for external application. But it ought to be labelled 'Poison—not to be taken internally.'"[20] It is not surprising if a poison—the military power of the state—meant for external application comes also to be used internally at times with disastrous effect on the rights and aspirations of the struggling poor.

Prince Eugene Troubetzkoy penned a powerful indictment of the state in his *The Reign of Nonsense in the World, in the State, and in Human Life:* "It is not only our virtues that are in bondage to the state: it has need of human vice as well. It cannot dispense with spies; it buys man's conscience and turns it to profit. To penetrate

[20] *Political Quarterly*, February, 1915, pp. 119–120.

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the diplomatic secrets of its neighbours, it avails itself of the wiles of prostitutes and of every species of blackguard. Moreover, its own subjects must be made into perfect instruments of war without pity for the men of another race, unscrupulous and ready to sacrifice all morality to the needs of the state. The state demands that itself shall be the final criterion of human conduct, and for this reason it will recognise no value to be higher than its own not even that of the human soul, not even the intrinsic worth of man. It is not difficult to picture to oneself what the consequences would be, if the absoluteness of the state were to win a definite triumph. We should see the state transformed into a terrestrial divinity; and that would be the final victory of the powers of nonsense. And then the vicious circle in which human life revolves would complete its round in a last achievement—the total ruin of man."[21] Few would care to deny that there is considerable truth in this language. Espionage through the scum of mankind has become a fine art in France, Germany and Russia, and a government based on espionage is as unworthy as one that is based on the might of cannon. Nevertheless as we shall see there is a striking confusion between the nature of the state as such and the use to which it has been put by the unscrupulous greed of Europe.

The conception of a nation has been well described by Mr. Arthur Greenwood in his article on "The Nature of Nationality" as "a body of people with certain common elements, including race, language, literature, religion, etc., with a common history, a common heritage of accomplishments and common traditions from the past; who have, as a consequence, developed a peculiar and characteristic culture, which is expressed in their institutions, laws, manners and customs."[22] So defined, a nation is innocuous and intrinsically even something beautiful. But it degenerates into a fanatical machine imposing its nature on foreign elements—as in the German attempt at Germanising

[21] *Hibbert Journal*, January, 1918.

[22] *Political Quarterly*, February, 1915, pp. 87–88.

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Alsace and Lorraine—or merely ignoring and suppressing foreign elements as in the terrible history of the colonisation of Africa and America. The political greed of Europe has not always been controlled either by Christianity or even by elementary morality, and one need not be surprised if such a state of colonial and imperial affairs has an unhealthy influence on home-politics, too. It has been observed how the ranks of Anglo-Indian officials feed the conservative party in England, and how their autocratic sway in India tends to kill the generous impulses and lofty ideals of English democracy.

None can but admit that there is something wrong with the state as it is, but the defect lies in its note of aggressive nationalism and not in the conception of state as such. An idealist must needs be impelled by the notion of evolution to feel that the state as it is must in course of time give place to something new and better, shining in all the refulgent light of a moral outlook, and signs are not wanting that a better state of things is swimming into horizon. The nineteenth century has often been described as the century of democracy, but democracy has not yet achieved its real mission; it has not fully endowed the world with its own native spirit. The future moralisation of the race will depend on its capacity and willingness to be thoroughly democratised. A nation in its completeness involves the equality of all its members, and when this equality is gained, that nation also becomes a democracy. At present nations have been wrongly conceived as units in perpetual conflict with one another, whereas they ought to be thought of in terms of harmony and co-operation.

Europe to-day suffers from two diseases, one internal and the other external. Internally it suffers from an intense mutual jealousy; externally it suffers from a swollen head which makes it blind to the moral rights of humanity other than European. These two diseases are very closely connected with each other, each receiving nourishment from the other. Hence any remedy that could be usefully applied to the one will also have a healthy influence on the

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other. The anarchism of individuals has been mastered by the different states. The anarchism of nations and states must be equally brought under the control of a master-state. Hitherto, unfortunately, all such attempts have been failures, for the curse of an aggressive nationalism has been too potent to be affected by purely moral considerations. Nationalism as a healthy growth would mean the development of all the national capacities, which conduce to a higher life; in practice it has meant a systematic exploitation of weaker peoples. This has necessitated huge armaments, and armaments have negated the motive-spring of democracy and equality. It lies with Europe to purge herself of this disease and re-establish the state to fulfil only its rightful functions. But few nations in Europe can be expected to show that magnanimity and staunch adherence to a lofty ideal, which the United States have shown towards the Filipinos. Hence the whole conception of the League of Nations is admirable from the standpoint of Europe herself, as it certainly is from the standpoint of humanity at large. But even at the time of writing this, the cancer of selfish nationalism has been showing a rift, which makes all thoughtful people wonder if the League of Nations will not be just another magnificent failure. Yet, whatever the fate of the League of Nations, there is no doubt that that is the only way out of the international chaos under which the world is groaning to-day. The anarchism of nations can only be put to rest by a federation of nations. It will be imperfect in the beginning, for in the past might often triumphed over right, and might will claim its prescriptive advantages. But unless humanity is lost beyond redemption, it is not a hopeless faith that gradually right will regain its pre-eminence, and might will remain an unhealthy memory of interest only to the antiquarian and the historian.

It is remarkable that while some thinkers speak of the discredited state and some write to discredit the state, the general tendency is to strengthen the state. Socialism for good or for evil is undoubtedly in the ascendant in all the

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advanced countries, and by lessening national selfishness and by generating a sense of respect for the rights of other people it may be expected to pave the way for a world-state, or rather a federation of states. In such a federation all that is best in nationality will find its completion; without it in the words of Mr. Greenwood "the finest blooms of nationality will waste away." Under a mistaken conception of liberty one may be tempted at times to view with suspicion the growing powers and the machinery of the state, but it is instructive to realise how without these powers and this machinery, a federation of states remains an empty ideal. Both the British Empire and the United States are great examples of the success with which a federation may be worked and given the will to realise it and a willingness to prefer what is morally right to what is economically paying, a league of nations, too, can become a living reality, and the Moloch of nationalism and the shibboleth of prestige may find a none too early burial.

The present weakness in the conception of the state need not permanently detract from its real perennial worth. They but serve to show that it has not yet attained its full growth. Its perfection will be marked only by the moral freedom of an international tribunal which is vested with the *majestas* of the state, and which will be moral enough to moralise the immoralities of nations. The discredit into which the modern state has fallen is only a passing cloud and it may ultimately tend to strengthen its foundations, for in the wise words of Mr. Barker—though used in a different context—"Real ideas cannot be killed: they can only die by the suicide of their own excess or the slow internal decay of their own life."[23]

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[23] *Political Quarterly*, February, 1915, p. 113.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

THE IDEA OF PROGRESS: an enquiry into its origin and growth. By J. B. Bury, Regius Professor of Modern History and Fellow of Kings College in the University of Cambridge. London: Macmillan & Co., 1920. Pp. xv, 377. Price, 14s. net.

"Since the Exhibition, Western civilisation has advanced steadily . . . for the most striking advance has been made in the technical conveniences of life. . . . So far the hopes of 1851 have been fulfilled. *But* against all this technical progress have to be set the sufferings of the industrial workers, the distress of intense economic competition, the heavier burdens of preparation for modern war. The very increase of 'material ease' seemed unavoidably to involve conditions inconsistent with universal happiness." So, throughout, Dr. Bury, with admirable detachment, holds the balance, but never tips the scale. He has once more laid the thinking world under an obligation, placing this time all his authority and erudition at the service of telling the life story of an idea—the Idea of Progress, undreamed of by the Ancients, hidden from the Middle Ages, haunting the minds of sixteenth and seventeenth century thinkers, forcing its way into consciousness in the eighteenth, stalking abroad in our own day, perhaps, as the author suggests, only to pass away in an unending process of spiritual death and generation.

Although he dedicates his book to optimists, it would be hard to number Dr. Bury among them, and harder still to become one through reading his book. That the idea has existed is clear enough, but whether there has been, there is or there ever will be *progress*, are questions which Professor Bury leaves severely alone.

Perhaps the existence of progress is still so difficult to prove or even, for many minds so difficult to believe, because the idea of it is comparatively young, much younger than we had suspected. The Ancients were too pessimistic and rigid-minded to hit upon it; Mediaeval doctrine apprehended a progress into another world rather than progress in this one, where, in any case, almost everything was thought to depend upon Providence and not upon the will of man. During the transition period between the fourteenth and seventeenth centuries, "the milieu was being prepared

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in which the idea could be born," but thought was too much under the influence of the classical tradition. Dr. Bury shews in his introduction how Progress was only suspected by Bodin to have existed in the past, and then only progress in knowledge, which it remained for Francis Bacon to value as having been a means of increasing human happiness in the past; and how Descartes was the first man to conceive of progress in the future, but still only intellectual. As the idea grew, it found champions and enemies, and in the controversy between Malebranche and Bossuet, between the Ancients and Moderns, the view of the world as degenerate and decaying was struck to the ground. And it is significant that the weapon was the appeal to science. With Fontenelle the problem of whether there has been progress is academically and analytically examined, but in its literary aspect, and it was only in the middle of the thirteenth century that the Abbé de Saint Pierre turned men's minds towards the possibility of social perfection. Soon Montesquieu and Voltaire, philosophising history, deducing laws of development from the past, due to the conscious efforts of human reason rather than the intervention of Providence, prepared the ground for the views of the Encyclopaedists and Economists. The former from the theoretical point of view of truth, the latter from the point of view of utility, came to see in man the centre of the Universe. Rousseau next gives the idea for the first time a political turn, "raising on the one hand the penetrating question whether civilisation was a mistake," affirming, on the other, that progress for one must be progress for all. The next important protagonist is Condorcet, to whom Professor Bury devotes a masterly chapter.

Meanwhile in England, where society had been less conscious of its struggle and more content in the consciousness of civil and religious liberties, Hume, Adam Smith, Gibbon and Godwin reviewed the past more temperately, and looked to the future more sceptically than their French contemporaries, until the dream of perfectibility fired the imagination of Shelley and the Lake Poets. By the beginning of the nineteenth century the idea of progress had established itself as a truth.

German thinkers—Kant, Fichte, Hegel, and later Marx—naturally inclined towards the "closed system." The Industrial Revolution and the unprecedented scientific and technical achievements of the century encouraged complacency. We are told how the search for a Law of Progress began with Saint Simon,

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was continued by Comte, and historically reinforced by Buckle. And the story ends with the appearance of the theory of Evolution acclaimed, at first, as the handmaid of progress, and then recognized as a truth which might lead either to optimism or pessimism.

It will be seen from the above summary how large is the author's range, carefully and logically circumscribed as it is. The chief value of the work lies, however, in the angle of vision. Most of the thinkers analysed and quoted are well known to students of political philosophy and sociology, many of them to unspecialised educated readers. It is possible that members of one or the other class, disillusioned by the recent war, might dismiss the book impatiently as a story shewing how helpless, if not hopeless and aimless have been the efforts of men in the past. "You tell us," they might say, "that men have believed in this idea, lived and died for it. In a world out of joint, we feel that it will never be realised. What we want is teaching which will *encourage*." The answer is old: the truth must prevail. And it is for having applied dispassionate scientific methods to a problem which, more than any other, has stirred the passions of the modern world, which embraces all the hopes and fears of men when they consider the world as a whole, that we are grateful to Dr. Bury. His book "gives light without heat," and on reflection, it gives light in many dark places.

It is perhaps as much a contribution to psychology as to history. "There is an order of ideas," says the author, "that play a great part in determining and directing the course of man's conduct but do not depend on the will—ideas which bear upon the mystery of life such as Fate, Providence or personal immortality. Such ideas may operate in important ways on the forms of social action, but they involve a question of fact, and they are accepted or rejected, not because they are believed to be useful or injurious, but because they are believed to be true or false. The idea of the progress of humanity is an idea of this kind." Just as the research of psychology in the recesses of individual being has recently discovered unsuspected phenomena, so a historical treatment of ideas brings to light new facts about men in the mass, and it is this part of the problem of the nature of man which has been least explored.

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ITALIAN EMIGRATION OF OUR TIMES. By R. F. Foerster. Harvard Economic Studies, Vol. XX. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1919. Pp. xv, 556.

Professor Foerster has undertaken the task of presenting the facts with reference to the movement which has taken the Italian workman not only to the United States but to France, Germany and Switzerland, to Northern Africa, and to Argentine and the other South American states as well. Because he makes us see the American problem as a part of that larger migration which, as he points out, constitutes in numbers and duration a "most notable historical phenomenon," it is the more valuable to American students, who usually know only a single Italian colony in a single city.

Professor Foerster's critical discussion of Italian statistics of emigration, of the Italian literature on the whole subject—not heretofore available in English—as well as the history of the development of the present government's policy of protection and supervision, is especially valuable.

Italian students have been urging the necessity for recognizing that there is and must be an international labor market which can be drawn upon by all countries for seasonal work, for large engineering projects and for general development in a new country and that there is a real international problem in the protection of these migratory workers against exploitation which should be taken up by the nations concerned.

Professor Foerster presents many facts which bear out this theory—especially its responsiveness to economic conditions in the decreasing or increasing numbers of those who leave, and the increasingly temporary character of the migration. On the other hand, his discussion of the agricultural system, and the social and political conditions of the country, leads to the conclusion that the workers of Italy, and particularly of southern Italy, have been faced with only three alternatives—strikes, revolution, or migration. To what extent the changes now taking place in Italy, as to the exact character and permanence of which we know so little, will change the situation, cannot be foretold.

Whether the Italians will answer the call for labor in all parts of the world in such large numbers in the future the necessity for international understanding on the subject will remain.

In his conclusion Professor Foerster points out the importance of international agreements with reference to (1) standards of fit-

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ness, (2) distribution of immigrants, (3) citizenship, and (4) protection against exploitation. It is interesting in this connection to recall that the U. S. Immigration Commission recommended an international Conference with these general objects in view; that the President was empowered by Congress to call such a Conference in the immigration law enacted in 1917; and that the Italian government delegates endeavored to have the subject placed on the agenda of the International Labor Conferences of 1919 and of 1921. Professor Foerster's exposition of the subject should bring us nearer to the time when, by international action, the unnecessary hardships of exclusion and deportation, the exploitation of one group and the reflex suffering which it entails on others, will be reduced.

GRACE ABBOTT.

Hull House, Chicago.

A CONSTITUTION OF THE SOCIALIST COMMONWEALTH OF GREAT BRITAIN. By Sidney and Beatrice Webb. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1920. Pp. xviii, 364. Price, 12s. 6d.

The proposed reconstruction of the British constitution by the Webbs is due to a request of M. Camille Huysmans to the constituent bodies of the International Socialist Congress that they should furnish reports upon the socialisation of industries and services, and upon the constitution that should be adopted by any nation desirous of setting its house in order upon Socialist principles. The authors thought that statements of abstract principles would be of less value than a concrete proposal or a new model worked out in some detail for Great Britain, which would represent the changes to be wrought in the fabric of the constitution such as a strong Socialist Ministry would probably be led to propose. If there is to be an Utopia, it is to be an Utopia according to plan. The first part, which is the survey of the ground, may be avoided by those who wish to get at the constructive side of the book which begins in Part II. The ancient institution of a hereditary monarch is retained, though the authors do lay some stress on the social disadvantages by which it has hitherto been accompanied; but the House of Lords will simply cease to exist. The Commons are to be broken up into two halves, a Political and a Social Parliament, the former controlling foreign affairs, national defence and the judiciary, while the latter controls all the

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industries and services and holds the purse strings,—to use an old slogan of socialists, "the government of men must be distinguished from the administration of things." A change in this respect would not be unacceptable, when the failure of Parliament to cope with the collective business of the community is borne in mind. In the Webbs' scheme both parliaments would be elected geographically.

From this proposed dual system of parliaments, they pass on to the organization of industries and services. It need not be supposed that the progressive socialisation of industries which they look forward to will ever be universally complete and that there will be no unsocialised enterprise. "It may even be predicted with confidence that there will always be a toleration of unsocialised industries and services such as the whole realm of individual production in horticulture, peasant agriculture and the artistic handicrafts together with the vocations of poet and artist."

A chapter is given to measures of transitional control over those undertakings which at any particular time are not yet promoted to the status of a public service. A standing Committee of Productivity for the assistance of the nation's industry, which would turn the searchlight of published knowledge upon all industrial enterprise, is recommended, and also a course of expropriation on the lines adopted by local authorities in the absorption of private property. In the end, the state will own practically everything, for this is no syndicalist system, indeed, the tone of the book is practical and conciliatory. "We want," they say in conclusion, "to get rid of the stuffiness of private interest, and to usher in a reign of Measurement and Publicity."

M. J.

SHORTER NOTICES.

COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION. By Joseph K. Hart. The Social Welfare Library. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1920. Pp. 225. Price, $2.25.

This volume is the first of a series, entitled "The Social Welfare Library," under the general editorship of Dr. Edward T. Devine, and as such it has an introduction presenting the point of view of the series. In the opinion of the editor, social work during the past ten years has concentrated upon technique at the risk of losing the larger view of social conditions, forces and motives. The Library is intended to contribute to social thinking rather than to technique.

This opening volume by Dr. Hart, well known to students of social aspects of education because of his *Democracy in Education*, is well conceived

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for the purpose stated. Anyone who is aiming not merely to put over some "stunt" in the way of a pageant, or a playground, or a council, but to study the deeper aspects of community life and development, to consider the relations of individual and community, to reflect upon the democratic ideal of life and society, to understand the obstructions in the way, and to analyze the necessary conditions for community deliberation, will find abundant stimulus and valuable suggestion. Somewhere between the short and easy methods of the enthusiast on the one hand, and the over-philosophic and too timid attitude on the other, these extremely intricate problems of community organization must be worked out. This volume is an excellent beginning.

J. H. T.

BOLSHEVISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE. By Bertrand Russell. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920. Pp. 192. Price, $2.00.

As indicated by the title, this volume falls into two parts; Part I, Present Conditions; Part II, Bolshevik Theory. Considerable material of Part I has already appeared in print where it attracted attention because of the frankness of Mr. Russell's comments. The fact that he does not believe in the present organization of society in Western Europe, and that he went to Russia a Communist (p. 41), makes his report of actual conditions more convincing. The discussion of Bolshevik theory in Part II is written in the same spirit as his report of facts—fair and very frank. In the opinion of the author "the civilized world seems almost certain, sooner or later, to follow the example of Russia in attempting a Communist organization of society. I believe that the attempt is essential to the progress and happiness of mankind during the next few centuries, but I believe also that the transition has appalling dangers. I believe that, if the Bolshevik theory as to the method of transition is adopted by Communists in Western nations, the result will be a prolonged chaos, leading neither to Communism nor to any other civilized system, but to a relapse in to the barbarism of the Dark Ages. In the interests of Communism, no less than in the interests of civilization, I think it imperative that the Russian failure should be admitted and analyzed." (p. 169). The result of Mr. Russell's analyses is that the purposes of Communism cannot succeed by inaugurating the system in a country where the majority are hostile. Communism to have a fair chance must be inaugurated in a prosperous country, but a prosperous country will not be converted by arguments of hate. The appeal must be to hope. Self-government in industry is an important step toward building a new world.

J. H. T.

THE REVIVAL OF MARXISM. By J. Shield Nicholson, Sc.D., LL.D. London: John Murray, 1920. Pp. vi, 145. Price, 6s. net.

Professor Nicholson's book is the result of re-reading Marx in the light of recent events and to account for the very definite popularity of Marxism to-day, whether interpreted by Lenin or Kautsky. He was prepared to find on re-reading the Marxian critique of capitalism, some ideas that might be of service, some degree of illumination, but was only confirmed in his belief that Marx was a very unscientific economist. Marx was not the Darwin of political economy. If Marx had really made some great original discovery in the most fundamental theory of economics it would have been impossible for his work to have been set aside and neglected. Any impression made by *Capital* was not due to the theory of value expounded

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with such diffuse obscurity in the first part of the book, but to the fervid attack on the capitalistic system. To some extent, Professor Nicholson accounts for the popularity of Marx by the fact that his system holds in solution contradictory aims and methods. *Capital* has become a sacred book, the Koran of opposing sects, at first Loria and Engels, now Lenin and Kautsky, and Professor Nicholson's summary of the divergent interpretations of Kautsky, the German majority socialist, and Lenin are well worth reading.

M. J.

PRINCIPLES OF REVOLUTION. By C. Delisle Burns. London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1920. Pp. 155. Price, 5s. net.

The book is not a revolutionary hand-book, but a study in ideas, which are rightly enough termed revolutionary, those of Rousseau, Marx, Mazzini, Morris, and Tolstoy. The Russian Soviet Republic is barely mentioned; the treatment is detached, academic, and critico-historical, designed, one would imagine, to arrest the general reader rather than for the disciples of his five revolutionaries. With the last chapters, however, we are on higher and other ground; and Mr. Burns, prescient of coming change, looks revolution in the face. He wishes something more complete than a change of power, and disturbance of vested interests—a change in the "inner heart of evil," a real revolution not based on economics or politics, but upon social idealism vaster than can be inspired by the desire for commodities or for laws. In fact, the revolutionary must believe in "another" world in order to establish a world worth having. The attitude is that of a whole-hearted idealist. "We do not yet know what man will be when at last he appears (he writes); there have been hints of it in the past,—there are some persons in every age who are at least at moments, wholly human, but the sacred thing itself is not yet fully achieved, and it cannot be achieved except by the deliberate will and knowledge sufficient to control the unmoral forces of natural evolution." In spite of such large hopes, Mr. Burns is a reasonable revolutionary, looking forward to a constructive and bloodless change, inspired by the complementary ideas of the five men whose work he so ably interprets.

M. J.

FREEDOM OF SPEECH. By Zechariah Chafee, Jr. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920. Pp. 431.

After something over a hundred years of mainly continuous sleeping, with brief interruptions during the slavery controversy and the Civil War, the Bill of Rights has again become a living issue. Professor Chafee has summarized and discussed the various court proceedings and decisions, the legislation against sedition and anarchy, the deportations, and other aspects of the recent revival of the issue, and in appendices has given a bibliography on the freedom of speech, an index of reported cases under the Espionage Acts, the text of the Espionage Act, and list of the State Statutes. It is thus an indispensable guide for anyone who wishes to form an opinion. The author is very decided in his own views. He believes that one important clarification in the situation came when Justice Holmes was able "to announce with the backing of a unanimous court the rule of clear and present danger which should serve as a guiding principle in the future." On the other hand he believes that there has been a great amount of hysteria and ill-advised prosecution with a more than questionable stretching of governmental action.

J. H. T.

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THE RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS. By James B. Pratt. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1920. Pp. 479.

Professor Pratt's book is a notable addition to the rapidly growing literature of the psychology of religion. He is already known to students in this field by his former works on *The Psychology of Religious Belief*, and *India and Its Faiths*. Professor Pratt is a critical realist. After chapters dealing with the definition of religion, the task of the psychology of religion, the concept of the subconscious and the relation of society and the individual, he presents the results of investigations of the religion of childhood and adolescence, of conversion and revivals. Perhaps the freshest chapters are those treating belief in God and the nature of the Cult. Five chapters are given to the subject of mysticism but with no striking novelty in the method of treatment or the conclusions.

The discussion of belief in God and the nature of the Cult offers some very interesting observations. The author shares with most writers on these subjects the lessened emphasis on intellectualism and holds that God is more used than known. He also helps to clear up a certain conflict between the sensuous pictorial representations of God and the more abstract conceptual thinking. Answers to questionnaires show great capacity for holding both imaginative and conceptual elements in mind, though frequently the conceptualist regards himself as an atheist because he has dismissed the imagery. Professor Pratt shows that the sensuous image is often symbolic of the conceptual and that both dogma and pictorial representation may be of value. This is undoubtedly sound psychology. The candid deacon quoted as saying that his idea of God was "a kind of oblong blur" need not be written down as either a fool or a knave. Evidently the *meaning* for him was much more than the image would suggest. A fruitful comparison is made between the cult of the Roman Catholic Church directed to the worship of God and that of Protestantism directed to the salvation of souls. This is seen in the character of the services, in the architecture and decorations of the churches, in the character and manner of the prayers, the music and the sermon, and in the attitudes of the congregation. The sermon has a disproportionate place in Protestantism. The Catholic Churches are therefore more successful with the mystical and devotional experiences while the Protestants contribute more to the intellectual and moral.

E. S. AMES.

SHALL WE STAND BY THE CHURCH? A Dispassionate Inquiry. By Durant Drake. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1920. Pp. 181. Price, $2.00.

In this volume Professor Drake has brought together a number of essays and addresses, most of which have already appeared in various journals. They have, however, a considerable unity in their thought. Their aim is to awaken churches to the crisis which, the author believes, confronts the church because of the large amount of defection or indifference on the part of the more thoughtful and liberal members of the community. Among the points discussed are the attitude of the churches toward industrial problems, difficulties with historic creeds, needless multiplication of churches. Naturally there is no guaranteed "solution" offered, but a frank statement of the problem is the first step.

J. H. T.

COLLECTED ESSAYS AND REVIEWS. By William James. Edited by Ralph Barton Perry. New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1920. Pp. 516. Price, $3.75.

Professor Perry has opportunely gathered together some forty articles written by James through a period of as many years; some of which were

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published anonymously, others in such a form as to make them difficult of access. Most important among the latter is the Berkeley address of 1898, "Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results," marking the advent of Pragmatism. One point in "The Feeling of Effort," 1880, might be cited to-day as indicating the issue between the two main wings of Pragmatism: "To single out the sense of muscular resistance as the 'force sense' which alone can make us acquainted with the reality of an outward world is an error. . . . If the other senses are too anthropomorphic to be true, so is it also."

One finds in these essays James's repeated insistence on the value of Renouvier's work, whose definition of volition, "the stable survival of one representation," enters into James's conception of the freedom of the will. Thus in the essay on "The Feeling of Effort," "to sustain a representation, to think, is what requires the effort, and is the true moral act." As for the determinism in Spencer's *Data of Ethics*, "until it has been revealed what shall succeed, we are all free to 'go in' for our preferences and try to make them victorious." The original statement of the "James-Lange theory" of the emotions, as given in "What is an Emotion?" 1884, contains much material not included in later reprints and references. Its elaboration, "The Physical Basis of Emotion," 1894, is included in this book.

Coming together with the *Letters of William James* and Professor Perry's *List of the Published Writings of William James*, this volume—to quote the editor—"when added to those already published will render easily accessible nearly all of the author's significant writings."

C. F. T.

MIND ENERGY. By Henri Bergson. Translated by H. Wildon Carr. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1920. Pp. 255.

A collection of seven papers which were published separately during the past twenty years, among them being "Dreams," 1901, "Memory of the Present and False Recognition," 1908, "Soul and Body," 1912, and "Phantasms of the Living and Psychical Research," 1913. "Brain and Thought," 1904, presents the thesis that Realism and Idealism should be treated as two different notation systems, for either of which parallelism implies a self-contradiction. The question occurs to the reader, What does the difference amount to after we have disposed of the issue between the projects or constructs of the kinæsthetic and visual experiences respectively? "Intellectual Effort," 1902, suggests a fruitful mode of psychological experimentation: the feeling of effort in intellection is produced when the schema of fused experience *is being* resolved into the juxtaposed parts of idea. In "Life and Consciousness," the Huxley Lecture of 1911, consciousness is declared to be in part the control over the duration span in the future; the faculty of choice is unforseen response. But the transition from "unforeseen" to "unforeseeable"—necessary to make the point cogent—is surreptitious, which vitiates the whole argument. Bergson, Royce, and James have recently been brought to our attention in much the same way, by the publication of fragments that hitherto have been difficult to procure.

C. F. T.

THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF RELATIVITY IN ITS PHILOSOPHICAL AND HISTORICAL ASPECT. By H. Wildon Carr, D.Litt. London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1920. Pp. x, 165. Price, 7s. 6d. net.

Professor Carr's treatise is an able interpretation and historical exposition of Einstein's theory of relativity. The greater part of the book is a

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study of the problem from its origin, from early Greek philosophers to the position of Leibniz (p. 116). The principle of Leibniz was rejected while Newton's principle has seemed to be confirmed by the advance of science during the last two centuries. But,—if the general principle of relativity be accepted—we are proposing in mathematical and physical science to abandon Newton's philosophy and adopt that of Leibniz. The book, as its title explains, is not for the mathematician; it does not indicate or explain, even in non-mathematical terms, Einstein's formulæ; but the historical and philosophical aspect of the new concepts of space, time and movement have profound and far-reaching implications. The introduction into pure mathematics or pure physics of a subjective element seems certainly a downright abandonment of the principle in which science is based. The essence of the general principle of relativity now proposed by Einstein is to introduce subjectivism into the arena of physical science. The said principle is that every observer is himself the absolute and not, as has hitherto been supposed, the relative centre of the universe; there is no universe "common to all observers and private to none"; and the reign of what Professor Eddington terms the Newtonion "super-observer" is at an end, challenged by Einstein the leader of the democratic movement.

J. E.

THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA. By John Holladay Latané, New York: Doubleday, Page and Co., 1920. Pp. 346. Price, $2.50.

A frank discussion of our international morality on this continent, definite as to details and unsparing in criticism.

Much of the diplomatic procedure with Great Britain on the Panama question is condemned, not only because of our failure to measure up to our supposedly high moral standards, but also because of the evident lack of technical ability, especially in the case of Mr. Blaine. In our relations with Colombia there is discovered the inconsistency in our refusal to arbitrate a dispute arising out of the interpretation of a treaty. "The Panama episode . . . made a very bad impression throughout Latin America, where we are still viewed with suspicion." The failure on our part to recognize that moral, as well as physical and financial, losses can be sustained by a nation—particularly where proud Spanish blood is involved—qualifies the much vaunted acumen of the American business man, whose support of the more aggressive policies toward Latin America has just the opposite effect on trade relations from what is directly intended.

The whole problem of the Monroe Doctrine and Pan-Americanism is found to centre about the Caribbean. The heart of the difficulty is in the weakness of certain states in this zone; while from the standpoint of military necessity, particularly a policy of defense through naval strategy, the control of this sea and the Gulf of Mexico answers better than a sentimental or nominal control of the rest of South America. President Wilson's acceptance of the mediation of the A B C Powers in his Mexican policy was "received with enthusiasm and has placed our Latin American relations on a better footing than they have been for years."

C. F. T.

INTERNATIONAL LABOUR LEGISLATION. By H. J. W. Hetherington. London: Methuen & Co., 1920. Pp. xii, 194. Price, 6s. net.

Professor Hetherington has in this compact and useful book summarised the activity of the International Labour Organisation which entered into active and not unhopeful life as the result of the Peace Conference of 1919. That the first international body (planned as part of the League of Nations)

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to come into effective operation was concerned not with political questions of the old order, but with problems of industry is significant of the new estimate of the views of requirements of the working population. The organisation is so new and its activity so incomplete that it is difficult to come to any estimate of its significance. The broadest and most profound aspect of the work of the Organisation has been in problems of the adjustment of the flow of workers from one country to another and the equitable distribution of raw materials among the industrial nations. The beginning of international labour organisation was the International Association for Labour Legislation, which did valuable pioneer work; the present Labour Organisation, following on these lines can effect many things in the way of a "removal of hindrances," and whatever reform is achieved is of especial value from its opening to the organised good-will of men a new field for expression.

E. F.

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AMES, FISHER, JR. American Red Cross Work Among the French People. New York: Macmillan Co., 1921. Pp. xiv, 178. Price, $2.00.

BAX, E. BELFORT. The Real, the Rational and the Alogical. London: Grant Richards, Ltd., 1920. Pp. 264. Price, 10s. 6d. net.

BERGSON, H. Mind-Energy: Lectures and Essays. Translated by H. Wildon Carr. London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1920. Pp. x, 212. Price, 10s. net.

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BOSANQUET, B. What Religion Is. London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1920. Pp. xii, 81. Price, 3s. 6d. net.

BURNS, C. D. Principles of Revolution. London: G. Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1920. Pp. 155. Price, 5s. net.

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ROBERTSON, J. M. A Short History of Morals. London: Watts & Co., 1920. Pp. viii, 460. Price, 18s. net.

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THE INTERNATIONAL
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JULY, 1921

CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN RADICALISM.[1]

VICTOR S. YARROS.

OLD, historic parties die hard, and old labels or tags long outlive their significance. For example, and not to go too far afield, take the American political parties. What does the Republican party stand for to-day, or the Democratic? What definite set of ideas and tendencies does an intelligent student of our history associate with the Republicanism or the Democracy of to-day? There are, as we know, Reactionary Republicans, Conservative Republicans, Liberal Republicans, and Progressive Republicans. There are Individualistic Republicans and Socialistic Republicans. The same bewildering "embarrassment of riches" characterizes the Democratic party. Mere accident often determines the position of party leaders on a vital question. What the party in power favors, the party in opposition is tempted to condemn. Consistency is not the besetting sin of any political party; but during a period of transition and realignment parties shift their ground and reverse themselves with astounding disregard of tradition and professed principles.

Now, if the American people could start afresh with a clean slate, politically speaking; if we could regroup and reclassify ourselves with reference to the major and vital issue of our time, there is hardly room for doubt that three

[1] An address delivered before the Sociology Club of the University of Chicago and the Chicago Literary Club.

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great parties would emerge—the Conservative party, the Liberal, and the Radical. Within each of these there would be subdivisions, of course. But there would be no Reactionary party, since no rational person cares to describe himself seriously as a Reactionary.

The classification and nomenclature suggested is familiar in Europe, and would be natural, intelligible and scientific in the United States. It is a fact that when we become politically conscious; when we settle down, as it were, and begin to think for ourselves, and to play an active part in life, we find that we are either conservative, liberal or radical in our ideas and sympathies. We take sides and know "where we belong."

As realists in politics, as careful thinkers, let us ask ourselves what constitutes American radicalism at this juncture. What distinguishes an American Radical from an American Liberal, or from an American Conservative? Is there an actual basis for radicalism in America, or is our radicalism essentially exotic, alien, artificial, and therefore negligible?

It may be worth while to pause for a moment to consider the notion that there is really no such thing as American radicalism, and that all our Radicals are "invaders" and strangers, as their foreign names indicate. What, one wonders, would happen to American radicalism if most of the unnaturalized or unassimilated foreign Radicals were deported or imprisoned? Would the whole radical movement collapse? As a matter of fact, there would be a radical movement in the country to-day if immigration had been totally suspended fifty years ago. America has always had her Radicals. Jefferson and Paine were Radicals in their day. Emerson and Thoreau were Radicals of a later period. The Brook Farm idealists were Radicals. Henry George was a Radical. So was Edward Bellamy. The leading Communists and Socialists and Syndicalists in America to-day are natives, not aliens. Glance at the names: Debs, Haywood, Eastman, Russell, Sinclair, Nearing, Lloyd, Walling, Steadman, Laidler. The editors and

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chief contributors of the radical weeklies and monthlies of America are Americans, not aliens. Our advanced "Liberal" organs of opinion would be called radical in Europe, where philosophical radicalism has never been a byword or reproach, and the name would not be repudiated, but proudly borne.

A little inquiry would show that the American Radicals have never been greatly influenced by alien agitators living among us. American thinkers have been influenced, naturally and inevitably, by the great schools of radical thought in Europe—Fourierism, Christian Socialism, Scientific Socialism of the Marx type, Fabian and Opportunist Socialism, Guild Socialism. America's problems are different in degree, not in kind, from European and Old World problems. Situations that are critical and acute in Europe are comparatively mild with us, but the drift is unmistakable, and coming events have been casting their shadows before them. We may still be able to prevent evils which Europe must remedy, but we enjoy no permanent or even lasting immunity from those evils.

Now, to start with a definition of a much-abused term. The newspapers have vulgarized the word "Radical." To them the Radical is a "Red," a violent and irrational enemy of the present social and economic order, a destructive element to be resisted and fought. I consult the dictionary and find a fairly satisfactory definition. Radical, says the dictionary, means pertaining to the root, fundamental, and, hence, in politics a Radical is he who advocates extreme measures. I beg to amend the second half of the sentence. A Radical is he who proposes fundamental, far-reaching measures.

We may object to the temper of certain Radicals, or to their methods, whether employed or merely favored in theory, but radicalism is not a matter of temper or even of method. There are Conservatives, or Reactionaries, whose temper and methods are offensive and dangerous. On the other hand, there are Radicals who personify sweet reasonableness itself in disposition and temper. Radicalism is a

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matter of opinion, of doctrine, of outlook, philosophy, *Weltanschauung*.

In one sense, those who think at all on problems of moment tacitly claim to be Radicals. For who would admit that he is shallow, indolent, unwilling to go to the root of a situation and to favor a reform shown to be necessary and wise in the light of a searching study of that situation? We differ in our conclusions, in our formulas, in our remedies, but we do not, if we think earnestly and deeply, differ in our views concerning the approach to a difficult problem, the necessity of going to its root and satisfying ourselves that our solution is adequate, fundamental and as far-reaching as the problem itself.

The thoughtful Conservative stoutly denies that he is superficial or timid. He asserts that he *has* gone to the root of things, *has* carefully studied the problems of the time, and has satisfied himself that his solutions are the wisest and best. The Liberal will make like claims for his school or party. Both are sincere. It is only when we compare the respective positions of the Conservative, the Liberal and the Radical that we perceive that only the radical position is truly fundamental and far-reaching. The Conservative proposes one set of measures, the Liberal another, the Radical a third. If the Radical is right in his diagnosis and in his prescription, then the Conservative and the Liberal proposals are indeed insufficient and impotent—mere palliatives, if not quack remedies.

What, we may now ask, are the precise issues with reference to which we are called upon to take up definite positions, to make a choice of remedies? What are the problems for which we are bound to find solutions?

It will hardly be denied that the chief problem of our time is concerned with our economic system—with the production, distribution and exchange of commodities—while the problem next in importance and "burning" interest has to do with the political organization of society, or government in its several aspects. In other words, the institutions under special attack to-day are: Capitalism,

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Competitive Industry, Private Property in the Means of Production, and the modern State, with its basic principles, its instrumentalities, its checks and balances, its methods of ascertaining and giving expression to the popular will, etc.

Let us take the economic question first. The essential features of the present system are well known. It is called capitalistic, because of the dominant rôle played in it by capital; because of the share of the product that goes to capital in the forms of rent, interest, dividends and profits, and because of the subordinate position occupied in it by the laborers and salaried persons who receive wages from their employers, the owners of the means of production. Is this system in the main just, socially beneficial, morally defensible? Is it practical? Does it work? Is the product of the united efforts of the capitalists, the managers and the employes fairly distributed? Is any one of the parties exploited, despoiled, oppressed, and, if so, which party? Is the present system better than that which it superseded and better than any alternative system now proposed? Does it need great, vital and fundamental changes, or only slight improvements?

The Conservative holds that the economic system is on the whole sound, just, workable and beneficial. He admits that it has defects, but argues that any human institution has defects, and that progress is largely a process of remedying defects in human institutions. Why urge radical changes when moderate improvements will answer—nay, when only moderate improvements are compatible with the perpetuity of the system? The Conservative does not defend the evils of the system; he merely declines to accept the cures recommended by the Radical. He has his own cures, and he believes them to be sufficient, not from any selfish point of view, but from the viewpoint of equity, reason and the common good.

The Liberal agrees with the Conservative in essentials, though he favors more important reforms than are found in the Conservative platform. Among conservative and

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liberal remedies we may mention vocational training, good housing of the workers, thrift, profit-sharing, distributive co-operation, industrial councils, frank and cordial relations between employers and employed, prevention of profiteering, conciliation and arbitration, insurance against involuntary idleness, collective bargaining, and so on.

The American Radical is not opposed to such palliatives as these, but his attitude toward them is profoundly affected by his philosophical view of the economic problem. He claims to have first or guiding principles; he does not live from hand to mouth. He is an evolutionist, and is aware that the present system must change in response to altered and altering conditions of life and work, because *all* human institutions are the product of slow development, and nothing in them is necessarily permanent. He is satisfied that the economic system is becoming obsolete; that it answers less and less to the needs of society, alike from the standpoint of production and that of distribution. He believes that the system has become *fundamentally defective.*

To be concrete and specific, the Radical holds that competition must be largely replaced by co-operation; that the wage system must be replaced by co-partnership. These ideas do not make him a Socialist, nor a Communist, nor a Syndicalist. They do not, in other words, commit him to any particular *plan* of co-operation, and least of all to a plan that he can unhesitatingly declare to be worse than the present system. State or bureaucratic socialism, for example, is abhorrent to the sane and educated radical of independent views. State socialism is what Herbert Spencer called it, Slavery. It means industrial conscription, as Lenin and Trotzky have admitted and demonstrated, though they have the excuse of a war emergency. State socialism spells inefficiency, decreased production, want and all the conflicts and miseries that such conditions entail. But it is entirely possible to look forward to a co-operative commonwealth without accepting state socialism, the class struggle, the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Co-operation may clearly be voluntary instead of com-

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pulsory. It is conceivable that employers and managers may be persuaded, not by books, but by facts, that co-operation is more efficient than competition, and that more and better goods will be produced under co-partnership than the wage relation is capable of producing.

To the Radical it is clear that, in a scientific sense, the present industrial system is rapidly becoming impossible. The relations between employers and managers, on the one hand, and the wage-workers, on the other, and not in a few cases, the relations between the employers and the managers, are strained and unsatisfactory. Strikes and lockouts are wasteful even when they are justifiable. Many strikes are accompanied by violence and the destruction of property. Some labor unions believe in and practice sabotage in one form and another. Even moderate labor, when strongly organized, gives as little as it can for the wage received. Under the best circumstances labor is notoriously indifferent to the success of the enterprise which pays its wage. This strife and discord, moreover, in the industrial field are certain to increase instead of diminishing. For the propagandists of revolution are active, and it is certain that the working masses will be more and more disposed to follow the extreme faction among their leaders.

Can society afford the terrific waste that results from this strife? Many years ago Spencer, stanch individualist though he was, contrasted co-operative with capitalistic establishments and predicted the growth of the former at the expense of the latter under the law of the survival of the fittest. Other vigorous and uncompromising individualists have championed co-operation in the interest, not alone of the workers, but of the managers, and employers, and society at large. Can we wonder at this? We all talk about the magic of property. We realize the value of a stake in the country. We know that the ownership of a home, a farm, a bank account, makes, as a rule, for stability and conservatism. We point to the millions of independent cultivators of the soil in America, or in France,

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and rightly say that these sturdy and thrifty men are not likely to fall under the influence of destructive radicalism. But what of the wage-workers who have no homes and no property? What of those who have little or nothing to lose from a social upheaval? Ferdinand Lassalle told the German proletariat that under capitalism "Eigenthum ist Fremdthum geworden." That is, what should have been the property of millions has been alienated and transferred to the few. It is among the have-nots, the men and women who are without prospects, that revolutionary propaganda is most effective.

For the ills of industrial society there is no genuine remedy except the elimination of those features that make for antagonism, distrust, suspicion and apprehension. The employee must become his own master; he must be given a direct, immediate interest in the industry to which he gives his time and his physical and mental energy. In a world of big, consolidated establishments, of gigantic corporations this cannot be accomplished save by co-partnership and co-operation.

Now, if we recognize that natural evolution is tending to transform competitive industry into co-operative, a flood of light is at once thrown on a thousand and one burning questions. We cannot successfully fight the stream of evolution; we cannot resist the inevitable. Our plain interest and duty is to work with, instead of against, the forces of constructive progress. We must welcome the coming social order and facilitate its advent. We should not quarrel with trade unions as such, though we may object to gratuitous abuses by them. We should not oppose collective bargaining. We should encourage all rational experiments in profit-sharing, and in what has been called the peopleization of industry. We should rejoice in industrial councils, direct and harmonious dealing between employers and employes, and all the suggested agencies for the redress of grievances and the prevention of strife, as steps in the right direction.

Even when labor is unreasonable, or, on the other hand,

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when a group of employers is too rigid and stubborn, failing to meet labor half-way, those who comprehend the real nature of the great conflict are neither astonished nor disheartened. They are able to take a long, a historic view of the situation. They know that feudalism was not superseded by capitalism without struggles, losses and suffering. They will not expect the impossible of human nature in a period of difficult transition. They will be patient, for a social order is not transformed in a decade or even in a century. In the opinion of scientific economists, including Socialists, the process of establishing capitalism on the foundations of feudalism required about five hundred years, although even now capitalism is by no means in complete possession of the field. There are many feudal survivals in industry, as in government, even at this late day. There will be capitalist survivals long after the definitive establishment of a co-operative régime. What we are concerned with is the prevailing, the dominant principle, and this principle must be changed, is being changed.

In the co-operative régime, as in the capitalistic, three factors will, of course, be necessary to production—capital, labor and management. Yet the element of what is called by the Socialists and others exploitation—the Marxian "surplus value"—will disappear. Why? In the first place, there will be no such independent category as profits. To-day profits are, primarily, the wages of the employers who directly or indirectly run the industries. When the profit is moderate and reasonable, and the person who receives it really performs an important function in the enterprise that yields it, no objection can be raised against it on the score of justice even from the socialist point of view, though it is open to the Socialist to argue that co-operation would be more *efficient* than competition. Where the profit is inordinate, the objection to it is that it is not earned, and that he who gets it enjoys some anti-social monopoly or artificial advantage to which he is not entitled, and which enables him to plunder either the consumers, or his employes, or both. Under a co-operative system the

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employes would also be the employers, and they could not rob themselves. (They might, of course, collectively plunder the consumers, and against this danger safeguards will have to be adopted by the Commonwealth as a whole, as Mr. Bertrand Russell, in his controversy with the Syndicalists and Guild Socialists, fully recognizes.)

In the second place, under a co-operative régime, Rent other than economic—that is, rent not due to natural inequalities in soil or location, but monopoly rent in its various forms—would disappear. No person or group would be permitted to own more land than he or it could cultivate or use industrially. The underlying principle of land tenure would be occupying ownership and use. Rent as a form of exploitation or tribute for the use of the soil would be abolished.

Lastly, there is interest on capital, paid as such to holders of bonds, notes and mortgages, or in the form of dividends to persons who invest in corporate stocks and become, in a sense, passive partners of the active owners and managers of the corporations. The mediaeval notion that interest is sinful because money is barren has long since been abandoned. Not even the socialistic schools contend that all interest is robbery, though, of course, if the state were the only employer of labor and the only owner of capital, there would be no room for interest—certainly not in the long run. Informed Radicals of the individualist schools distinguish between legitimate interest and monopoly-begotten interest. Under free conditions interest would continue to be paid, but only as compensation for risk and as a sort of premium to equalize the value of present goods and future goods. Rates of interest would still vary, but the factor of monopoly, of artificial stringency, would be eliminated. The decentralization and democratization of credit, exemplified by the federal reserve system and by the system of land banks, would be carried far enough to destroy the element of monopoly in the present system. Co-operative banks and other credit institutions would be encouraged by well-devised legislation. The metallic standard, a

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relic of barbarism, would be supplanted by a multiple standard of value based on a variety of staple and essential commodities.

So much for the economic aspect of the radical movement. Turning to the political, what is the radical idea of proper social organization for the manifold purposes now served by the familiar forms of government?

It must be admitted that most radical schools have not faced the problem of government, or of the relation of the individual to the community, with any degree of candor or intelligence. The Utopian Socialists drew fanciful pictures of society and government, but avoided a discussion of first principles. The revolutionary Socialists, following Karl Marx, talked vaguely about overthrowing the capitalistic state, the tool of the dominant class, and establishing a genuinely popular and democratic government. The Syndicalists, realizing that the Marxian democratic commonwealth would be another state, with all the possibilities of tyranny and bigotry involved in the conception of the state, favor local, district and general federations of syndicates. Committees of workers would exercise all the powers of government, and in a great federal commonwealth there would be, presumably, a federal committee of workers to carry on the functions of a federal government. It is hardly necessary to point out the inadequacy of this formula. It does not contain any really definite idea. The writers who imagine that it does do not think; they only think that they think, to use a Spencerian expression. As to the Guild Socialists, they appear to contemplate two governments instead of one. They would retain some sort of a political government for certain purposes—defence, protection of consumers against extortion, etc.—and they would supplement it by a government of persons representing, not geographical areas, but industrial, vocational and professional groups. A joint committee of delegates from these two governing bodies would settle such differences as might arise between the political state and the industrial state. This joint committee would be a super-

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legislature and perhaps also a super-executive and super-judiciary.

I do not think that there is any considerable group of educated American Radicals who have committed themselves seriously to any of these schemes of government. Yet there is widespread and growing dissatisfaction with the present political system, and the dissatisfaction would be keener and even more general than it is were not all political questions eclipsed by the economic and social issues of the period. It is assumed by many that a proper solution of the economic problems would necessarily embody a satisfactory solution of the political problem. The Marxian doctrine of Historic Materialism, or the economic interpretation of all history, is largely responsible for this notion. It is, however, superficial and baseless. Under *any* economic system the relations that are to exist between the individual and the community have to be carefully regulated and defined. Is the individual to be supreme, or the community, and if neither, as common sense at once suggests, then limits must be set to the respective spheres of both, compromises must be evolved, and ways of determining controversies over the boundaries of these spheres devised and provided.

The American Radical knows that the constitution of the United States was designed, as were the state constitutions, to limit the authority of the state, to guarantee to the individual certain basic rights—inalienable is the familiar term, though any sound student of history is aware that the term is part of obsolete political metaphysics—and to protect him against the tyranny and the intolerance of accidental majorities. The majority rules in the United States only within prescribed limits, and outside of these the individual is sovereign. The non-Socialist American Radical has no sympathy with the advocates of pure democracy or complete democracy who, either ignorantly or deliberately, would extend the control of the majority over minorities and individuals. Majority rule may be a necessary and expedient device, but the majority has no divine right to

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govern. The aim and tendency of enlightened political radicalism should be to enlarge the sphere of the sovereign individual and further curtail that of the majority. The functions of government should be steadily reduced, rather than increased. As we advance toward a just and intelligent economic system the demand of the oppressed for governmental intervention in their behalf will grow fainter and fainter, while voluntary co-operation in a thousand directions will teach men and women to depend on themselves rather than on the state.

These propositions are, of course, general. Let us now apply them to concrete questions and ask which of the political tendencies of the day are in line with constructive radicalism.

The demand for proportional representation in all legislative bodies is a progressive demand. The cruder forms of democracy must make room for improved and refined forms. If we are to have government by discussion and mutual accommodation, all schools and shades of opinion —excepting only manifestly subversive or criminal opinions—must be represented in the legislative branch of the government. Every side should be assured of a hearing on every question of public policy. This is not only just to the groups that are now denied a hearing and representation, but it is necessary and useful to all other sides. Controversy often seems futile, but every thoughtful person of experience knows that free, honest and searching discussion helps him to clarify his own thoughts, and perceive flaws in his arguments, or weak spots in his position. There is not a school of any consequence that does not owe quite as much to its opponents and critics as it does to its own teachers and exponents. Hence, the more progressive and complex a community, the greater is its need for proportional representation.

The demand for the referendum and the initiative is progressive and constructive. The system of representative government has been tried long enough to demonstrate the need of safeguards, of checks and balances, suited to modern

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conditions. Too often representatives fail to represent their constituencies, and democratic government breaks down. We cannot revert to the New England Town Meeting, of which philosophical historians like Fiske were so proud, but we can consult the electorate on important questions and thus preserve the benefits of the Town Meeting principle. It is the more important to adopt the new safeguards since, by common consent, some of the old and familiar checks and balances have ceased to work. The doctrine of the division of governmental powers is being abandoned. In city, in county, in state and even in federal affairs the recognized need is concentration of authority and responsibility. Commission government, city manager and commission government, executive budgets, consolidation of departments, are among the conspicuous reforms of the day. It is not an accident that these tendencies in government are accompanied by democratic tendencies exemplified by the referendum and initiative. Concentration in government is essential to efficiency and economy, but it has dangers of its own. We cannot allow small city commissions to grant franchises, for example, or incur bonded indebtedness without consulting the electorate. We submit constitutional amendments to the people. We submit charters to the people. Clearly, a general principle underlies these practices, but the application of the principle is haphazard and requires extension and systematization.

The demand for the recall, if limited to political and administrative officials, is sound and progressive. Public servants should be as amenable to discipline and correction, as subject to dismissal, as employes of private and semi-public corporations. It is idle to urge the application of business principles to public affairs, and then turn around and oppose the recall. It is idle to condemn spoils and graft in general terms and then refuse to enable the majority of the electorate to dismiss an official who practices these things for selfish, personal or factional aggrandizement. Private business, if well-managed, does not tol-

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erate waste, inefficiency and disloyalty for a moment. Why should public business be compelled to wait years, or until the next election, to get rid of unfit and unfaithful servants?

The demand for modernization and reorganization of our second chambers, or senates, is at bottom a sound and progressive one. The Republican governor of Kansas who, some years ago, vigorously advocated commission rule for states, found little support for his idea, and we cannot wonder at this. The commission idea is dangerous in the field of general legislation. In this field more complicated machinery is requisite than in the administrative, if civil liberty is to be preserved and the popular will given adequate expression. Nor would it be wise to abolish the second or revising chamber. But to make it merely a smaller house of representatives, to deprive it of every distinctive feature, is to secure no advantage to the people save that of further delay, and delay is not always an advantage. The democratic spirit of the age is divesting the second chambers of the early attributes that made them different from the popular chambers. The hereditary principle is, of course, doomed. In America we have substituted direct for indirect election of United States senators, though we have not improved that chamber thereby, but, on the contrary, have made it easier for windbags and glib, plausible demagogues to get themselves elected to it. Now, there is a vital and useful idea in the Russian soviet system which, rationally applied, is capable of rehabilitating second chambers and assigning to them a really important part in the scheme of government. That idea—by no means Russian, by no means revolutionary, by no means even new—is that of what is called by radical organs functional or vocational democracy—a foolish, inept phrase, by the way—and which is merely representation of industrial and professional groups instead of representation of geographical units. The enthusiasm for the soviet idea—which, of course, is not necessarily bound up with communism—is rather childish, for it is certain to develop difficulties and weaknesses, but judiciously and fairly

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applied, the soviet idea has possibilities of good. For example, one or two small nations, or some of our American states, might by suitable constitutional amendments provide that the second chamber, or Senate, shall be composed of representatives of definite social groups, occupations, industries and professions. A second chamber composed of farmers, manual workers, manufacturers, bankers, merchants, professional men, scientists and artists would be a soviet, but a soviet without the objectionable features of bolshevism. And it would afford instructive and interesting material for political science. Would such a chamber be more intelligent, more methodical, more efficient, more honest than one composed of representatives of geographical areas? Would it play politics, or would it do business in a businesslike way? Would it become an arena for open conflicts of interest, or would it learn to subordinate special interests to the common welfare?

The experiment certainly ought to be tried. It will be tried, I think. In France, President Millerand is said to favor a short step in the direction of sovietism. He has hinted at the desirability of having delegates from industrial and occupational groups participate in the election of senators as well as of the president of the republic. Why, indeed, should these duties be intrusted solely to officials?

In England, the land of sane compromise *par excellence*, it is proposed to organize local, regional and national industrial councils, which shall represent employers, managers and workmen alike, for the purpose of aiding Parliament in successfully solving economic and industrial problems. Such organizations would be advisory, but they would embody the soviet idea. Indeed, writers have called these industrial councils "Soviets, British style." Again, it has been proposed that the British House of Lords, a body largely shorn of power and bereft of all moral prestige, should be converted into a chamber composed of functional and occupational representatives. Would this not be an improvement on a purely political or anachronistic second chamber?

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Here in America business men have often complained bitterly of the ignorance of business principles displayed by legislators. Has it not been said that we need more men of affairs, men who produce, transport, finance the wealth of the nation, men who have to think constructively and plan progressively, in our legislative assemblies?

All this is unquestionably true, but what the average business man fails to perceive is that the political system we are working under is, so to speak, stacked against him; that the professional politician, the good mixer, has a decided advantage over any other candidate, and that this advantage cannot be removed except by a change in the machinery and scheme of government.

Lack of time prevents the discussion of other political reforms, though the list is far from being exhausted. I come, finally, to the question of Public Utilities, or the services that are quasi-public in character and have been justly held to be subject to control and regulation by reason of the special privileges, or franchises, conferred upon them. Here is a question that is partly economic and partly political. How is it to be settled with justice to all interests? If the solution is to be neither socialistic nor reactionary, we have no choice but to adopt some form of the Trustee and Service at Cost Plan. We have heard of the Plumb Plan. It was offensively presented to the public, and accompanied by idle threats and ludicrous claims of overwhelming farmer-labor support which sensible persons knew to be false. Details of the plan, too, were justly criticised. But its distilled essence is simply this—management of public utilities by a body composed in equal parts of representatives of the managers, of the inferior employees and of the government or the general public. This body would have no police power. It would be guided by statutes. It would operate the utility not for profit, but for service, and at cost, capital receiving a fair return and labor a standard wage plus a reward of superior efficiency and fidelity.

The plan is not revolutionary, but evolutionary. It is

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preferable to public operation and political management, which we are faced with, or to short-sighted speculative stock-jobbing management, which happily cannot be restored.

We know that we have not solved the Public Utilities problem. The Esch-Cummins Act is a makeshift—an intelligent makeshift, in my opinion, but still a makeshift. The moderate return allowed—5½ per cent on the aggregate value of railroad property—is limited to two years. The Interstate Commerce Commission is the real master of the railroads, and in addition there are forty-eight little masters, each powerful within its field. These masters are affected by political considerations. They may or they may not grant living rates. If they do not, serious embarrassment, if not insolvency, must follow. The issue of new or refunding railroad securities must be approved by a federal or state commission. Even the amount to be paid by a railroad to a banking firm for placing an issue has to be approved by an official body. Without control there is no real ownership; our railroads have lost control of their properties, and the tendency is toward even more and stricter regulation of them. Private ownership "on trial"? No. A mixed plan is on trial. In these circumstances the individualist Radical must cast about for an alternative to government ownership and control. The Trustee Plan, control by a directorate representative of the public, the investors, the managers and the employes, would seem to offer such an alternative.

Thus I submit that American conditions, American actualities, American problems pressing for solutions, have produced a species of radicalism that is genuinely American and that is at once scientific and practical. We have every reason to reject ideas that are Utopian, or alien, devoid of vital connection with American life. But to say that America needs no radical teaching at all is to imagine a vain thing. I am not one of those who complain that America is behind Europe in social legislation. We are better off than Europe. We have not the appalling misery,

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the caste and class distinctions, the deep-rooted misunderstandings, the ancient abuses of Europe. But we are developing the same kinds of social and economic evils as have led to war and revolution in Europe. We are developing a tenant farmer class, a class of homeless and casual laborers. Another half century, with immigration at any liberal rate, with the development of a proletariat, with the exhaustion of cheap land, with the intensification of discontent and the spread of destructive radicalism, always the fruit of hatred and bitterness and pessimism, and our conditions may not differ perceptibly from those of Europe. Europe is dying, said Anatole France recently,—dying of spiritual and moral ills, for she is selfish, greedy, imperialistic and militarist, despite all the bitter lessons of the World War. I do not believe that Europe is dying, and if she were, the remedy would not be that which M. France prescribes, a sentimental, nebulous socialism. But certain it is that the civilization of Europe is sick, and that the same malady is attacking our American civilization, which is at bottom European. Certain it is that the remedy in Europe, and the preventive or ultimate remedy here, will be found in a sane, constructive, evolutionary radicalism based on the twin principles of civil individual liberty and equality of economic opportunity, good, healthy American principles, which, however, must be applied in the light of a philosophical interpretation of the facts and conditions of our own time.

VICTOR S. YARROS.

HULL-HOUSE, CHICAGO.

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THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE.

EMILE BOUTROUX.

WERE we to listen to the suggestions of our physical body, wearied by the almost superhuman efforts of over four years, as we dwelt on the victory which crowned those efforts we might think we had only to rest on our oars, feeling that our future was assured and that the questions still at issue would solve themselves. This is by no means the case, for though the War has settled one terrible problem, it has created others. It would seem to have made more powerful, and even more threatening, certain formidable developments which have long been showing themselves in society.

Undoubtedly it is well to dwell on the enormous benefits which peace brings with it. And it is just as well to think of the difficulties still with us, difficulties which, it may be, will endanger the very existence of human civilisation unless we face them boldly. They are many and varied; consequently, we shall endeavour to point out two or three of the more important ones and see how we may meet them.

The War establishes the triumph of the principle of nationality. Henceforward it is an acknowledged thing that states must coincide with nations, and that each nation, worthy of the name, must be mistress of her own destinies. But this principle of political morality is not an infallible pledge of peace and harmony in the world. The fact that it has been proclaimed as the charter of future humanity does not mean that the nations have changed their nature and temperament.

The principle of nationality is the application to the nations of the first principle formulated by the Declaration of '91: "All men are born free and equal in rights." Nations endowed with a national consciousness are really moral individuals and so possess the prerogatives inherent in individuals. This is what the Powers declared when they

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affirmed the principle of nationality. As a matter of actual fact, however, nations are very unequal both in extent and in power. Strictly speaking, the principle of nationality is the affirmation of the independence of right over against might, and of spirit over against matter. Now, we must take into account the part played by matter in the affairs of this world. Nations are interrelated in both the physical and the moral order of things. Our problem, therefore, is to keep inviolable the equality of right, dignity and independence in all nations in spite of their irreparable material inequality. A theoretically simple though practically arduous problem, one that requires from what are called the great Powers not only a noble moderation, but also a fine sense of human equity and fraternity, and from the smaller nations a constant and genuine concern for their dignity and liberty. The great Powers must know how to rule themselves; the lesser ones must pay but little heed to the advantages that might accrue to them from being reduced to a state of servitude.

A second principle effected by the War is the emancipation of individuals. Now, man everywhere has become himself once more, a self-possessing entity, whom no one has the right to reduce to the condition of an instrument.

This emancipatory development is at the present time leading up to a crisis which had begun to emerge even previous to the War: the crisis of authority. Formerly, liberty and authority were set over against each other as two contraries; the establishment of their mutual relations was sought for in the three following directions: either a stand was made for authority and the restriction of liberty, or a stand was made for liberty and the restriction of authority, or else an attempt was made to find a compromise between these two principles.

There is now showing itself more and more in society a doctrine that is distinct from all three: liberty is set up as sole principle. There is no intention, however, of excluding authority. Authority, however, regarded as having a separate existence and as possessing any autonomy what-

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soever, is indeed wholly rejected. But the existence and the necessity of authority, intended and instituted as an immediate and ever renewed emanation of liberty itself, are upheld. The governing masses appoint leaders whom they constantly keep in hand; upon these leaders they confer absolute authority. Instead of condemning, they extol discipline, and undertake to submit blindly to it. But they acknowledge the right to be ruled only by those whom they have themselves directly invested with this function. Instead, therefore, of denying the legitimacy of authority and the necessity of obedience, these apostles of absolute liberty whole-heartedly advocate both, though they regard authority as an immediate and continuous product of liberty.

A remarkable doctrine, capable of being enthusiastically upheld by a professor prepossessed in favour of logic, of paradox and the absolute; but still a doctrine which, the more inexorably it is applied, undermines and overthrows the loftiest creations of mankind and finally destroys itself. This conception results in the out-and-out condemnation of what is called the State. For whereas the State, as it exists conformably to ancient tradition and in accordance with the principles of the French Revolution, is based on the sovereignty of the nation, none the less has it an existence of its own, in so far as it incarnates the permanent and world-wide interests of the nation. The State is founded on the will of the citizens; it represents, however, their essential and fundamental will, which is to live in a state of peace and at the same time to retain and increase the national acquisitions bequeathed by their predecessors. Consequently the State should be in a position to act without its existence being constantly called in question as regards each of its acts. It is in this sense that it appoints its own agents, who thus only indirectly hold their authority from the people.

Such being the nature of the State, its maintenance is clearly incompatible with the realisation of government as emanating from the governed, in a strictly and constantly

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immediate way. Nor can those who uphold this system admit that the idea of patriotism is to continue. The mother-land is the surviving soul of our beloved dead; it is the witness and the maker of our history; it is our past, our common glory, the ideal after which we aspire and which we mean to bequeath to those who follow us. The mother-land, therefore, is more than a simply existing and ever-decaying creation, the offspring of wills which think of nothing but their individual independence. The mother-land is the mystic self of a nation in its past, present and future existence; it is the life principle whereby it rises above time and creates endless destinies for itself. The mother-land cannot find favour among the partisans of direct government; indeed, these men generally call themselves internationalists, perverting the true meaning of the word, which etymologically implies the preservation of those nations which have set up relations with one another, whereas it is improperly taken to involve the abolition of national frontiers.

Nor is this all. The doctrine under consideration tends increasingly to assimilate, almost to identify authority with liberty, the rulers with the ruled, capital with work, employers with employes. Now, the more this doctrine is understood, the more the masses feel driven to rise in insurrection against all authority which retains any degree whatsoever of autonomy or of existence of its own. Thus, private groups refuse obedience to their own superior and central committees; and, within the private groups themselves, the tendency is for each one to obey only the man chosen as a result of the most elementary grouping.

The logical consequence, therefore, of the doctrine of authority as the immediate emanation of liberty, or the doctrine of strictly direct government, is increasing disintegration and progressive inefficiency, ending in absolute anarchy, each individual coming finally to have no other ruler than himself.

As the War has magnified the principle of nationality as well as that of individual liberty, so it has also con-

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siderably emphasised a third principle, the might and dignity of work. Undoubtedly, we cannot be too well pleased with such a result, on condition we give this third principle its true and salutary meaning. Now, in certain centres of activity which claim to represent the totality of the workers, we find in process of development a conception of the law of work that is calculated to cause uneasiness.

In the first place, it is alleged that only those occupations which tend immediately to the production of material results should be regarded as deserving the name of work. In the second place, it is claimed that, in a normal state of society, every citizen must be compelled to undertake work as thus defined.

The consequence of these doctrines is that all the members of a given community must be specialised in the various branches of practical activity. No one of them has the right to remain a complete organism, self-sufficing, as it were; but all must be reduced to the state of organs, each one appropriated to some determinate function. No one remains a whole, a person: all are transformed into parts, into instruments that exist solely in view of the collective whole. Henceforth division of work is the only law of society, whose ideal it is to imitate the perfection of a beehive or of an ant-hill. Such is the claim.

Doubtless material production is capable of being greatly furthered by this conception of human life. All the same, we may be permitted to enquire whether, in the blind pursuit after the maximum of industrial production, mankind does not risk sacrificing some of the most precious advantages and blessings it had won throughout the ages.

The strict specialisation of all individuals without exception is nothing more than the very annihilation of that being, superior to the limitations of matter and instinct, whom, under the name of man, the sages of all times have striven to create and develop.

Man, *qua* man, the philosophers tell us, is a being whose essence is reason, not instinct; and reason is the power to think and act properly and suitably, in numberless and

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varied circumstances, in accordance with those ideas of truth and justice, beauty and goodness, which prevail over all particular rules. The whole of human education—more especially what is called classical education—has tended to set man free from that specialisation in aptitudes, which is the province of the lower animals. It is this education which is declared to be wrong and whose fruits are rejected by the doctrine that manual work is alone worthy of the name of work, and obligatory upon all, without any distinction whatsoever.

We ought to reflect seriously on the dangers here mentioned, as well as on others of equal importance, so that we may oppose them by the best defensive methods at our disposal.

The principle of nationality is henceforth inevitable; the problems it sets us cannot be eluded. The particular problem we are here considering is the following: how can we maintain, on a footing of equality, the rights of nations which are inevitably most unequal both in extent and in power? How are we to keep up that autonomous development of various nationalities which constitutes the beauty and the greatness of the human race, in spite of the enormous differences in resource and influence which assuredly will continue indefinitely among the peoples?

No doubt prudent legal settlements and skilful economic combinations are eminently calculated to facilitate and bring about the free development of the various nations. The League of Nations, instituted for the very purpose of securing the strict concord of order and liberty throughout the world, will be most useful in furthering the true realisation of the principle of nationality. All the same, the practical difficulties appear to be so great that we sometimes ask ourselves if the effective application of this great principle is not somewhat utopian.

As regards the social bond, the ancients put forth a doctrine, apparently quite simple, though one which, even at the present time, maybe, merits consideration. We read in Cicero: *Ratio vinculum societatis*, "the bond of society

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is reason." That is to say, human societies are not a result of blind instinct alone, or of the pressure of external conditions, or of institutions: they are based on the faculty which is peculiar to man, and which exists, identical in essence, in every human being—the faculty of conceiving and of carrying out ends superior to the results capable of being created by material forces, viz., such incorporeal objects as truth and justice, harmony and happiness and beauty. It is from within man, from his spirit, that comes the force which produces truly human societies. A nation is a spiritual being.

Again, when men pursue higher ends in common, they are united by bonds of friendship, a friendship all the more generous, pure and true as the tasks in which they collaborate are themselves lofty and beneficent. Thus reason is the principle of love, as well as of social union. Now, love possesses a wonderful property, one, too, which the ancients greatly emphasised: it produces equality between those it unites: *amicitia pares aut invenit aut facit*, "friendship either finds or makes equals."

The solution of the problem before us: moral equality in material inequality, thus lies in the development, within the League of Nations, of the spiritual principles of human society: reason, the common mark and common nobility of all men, aspiration towards ideal things, harmony of soul, and friendship. The League of Nations should include the perfect blending of minds and hearts.

The problem of the relation between authority and liberty may also manifestly have light thrown upon it, if we go back to certain classic teaching of the great thinkers.

It is important to maintain the inevitable distinction between authority and liberty, *i.e.*, between the community and the individual. The community is not a mass of individuals. A city, said Aristotle, is not an aggregate of citizens. Society aims at ends and uses means which are beyond the capacity of individuals. It tends to produce a form of humanity which neither conceives of nor desires the individual as such. Not that society coerces the in-

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dividual. Deep within the soul of the latter are tendencies towards supra-individual ends. Left to himself, however, the individual would let these tendencies slumber, he would pay no heed to them. If he is to apply himself to the conception and the fulfilling of his higher destinies, society must send forth the summons.

Accordingly we must maintain the fundamental irreducibility of authority, as an attribute of the community, and liberty, as a right of the individual. But what relation is to exist between the two?

In Plato there is a doctrine dealing with the relations of the one and the multitude, which would seem to throw light on the present question. He first proves the irreducibility both of the one to the many and of the many to the one, as well as the necessity of maintaining both principles alike. Then, seeking under what conditions these two principles may be attained and developed, he finds that the one remains abstract so long as it does not consent to share in the many and that the multitude is but an incoherent, inert and impotent mass unless provided with that co-ordination which participation in the one can alone give to it. Thus, though radically distinct, the one and the many can exist and show forth their virtues only by a process of interpenetration.

This doctrine, as applied to our problem, means that, while the duality of rulers and ruled, State and citizens, employers and employes, is a necessary and well-founded one, these two powers must all the same not remain external to each other. Neither must authority rule despotically, nor must liberty claim its rights arbitrarily and violently. Rather must liberty and authority, ruled and rulers, in a spirit of close and cordial sincerity understand and permeate each other, collaborate and unite in the attainment of the loftiest form of humanity possible for the nation. As a matter of fact, in a well-organised society, neither does the one really command nor does the other obey. High above them, rulers and ruled see the common ideal: the honour and greatness of the mother-land.

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Both are alike the servants of one and the same master: duty.

Universal and exclusive specialisation as the sole law of society in the immediate future is evidently the third danger to be confronted. How is this to be done?

It concerns in the highest degree both the dignity and the future of mankind that there should be maintained and developed that human type, aiming after ideal ends, enamoured of reason, intelligence and beauty, which the work of centuries has produced and fashioned. The creation of this being, capable of surmounting the limits of his organism and of his special capacities in order to form one with the universal, is the masterpiece of the universe. Were humanity to renounce this form of existence, it would mean self-abjuration, self-mutilation and suicide. It would also mean the draining of the very spring of that material progress after which alone we claim to be striving. For, though the skilled workman, who is that and nothing more, may effect improvements in detail, he is incapable of those great theoretical conceptions which alone radically transform practical life and open up new perspectives to human activity. It is from the free and untrammeled reflections of an intellect devoted to pure science that new and fruitful ideas spring. Who discovered the marvellous law of universal attraction? Newton. And what method did he employ? Incessant meditation.

If humanity is not to decline, it is its duty to maintain the existence of man, akin to the universal, by the side of and above those specialised artisans necessitated in practical life by the law of the division of work. Now, to bring about this needed end, there is one means, perhaps one only: education. Education is capable of moulding the interior man, of developing his powers, disciplining his tendencies and directing his aspirations. It is the business of education to vindicate and increasingly to dignify this characteristically human being whom the centuries have fashioned. Not every kind of education, however, will be able to do this. The education needed is that which shapes

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the mind in those things that transcend the limitations of matter. It must develop judgment, the moral consciousness, the sense of the ideal, rather than bring out special and immediately utilisable capacities. In other words, what is needed is classical education, as it is called. In reality, classical education and education are synonymous terms. If education is not classical it is nothing more than a purely mechanical drilling, the training applied to a horse. Consequently, the finest instruments of education are now, as ever, the works of those wonderful writers of antiquity who expressed the truest and sanest ideas on man and his vocation in the most complete and memorable form. In default of these models, we may, of course, find lofty principles of education in the great writers of all countries. All the same, we must maintain the cult of those Greek and Latin writers who are, so to speak, the living and eternal fount of a true and noble human civilization.

Education, *i.e.*, classical education as just defined, should not be the privilege of the few. In various and appropriate forms, it should be liberally apportioned to all without exception during the early years of childhood, when mental impressions are ineffaceable. However necessary specialisation may be, every man has the right to be a man in the full sense of the word. A solid classical education will most completely fit him for maintaining his essentially human dignity.

The educational period is pre-eminently childhood and youth. All the same, he who is truly a man will retain throughout life a certain flexibility, a capacity for progress, which distinguishes him from the animal; he advances at every age. The education of the adult is effected by society, which, like the child's tutor, has power to act upon the interior capabilities of the man and to modify his inmost nature. It is thus advisable that every man, quite apart from his professional and his family life, should live a social life. And it is the same with this social life as with the education supplied by the tutor. In order to be as effica-

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cious as we expect it to be, it must not be the mere juxtaposition of individuals given up to their respective professional tasks. Above all, it must be characterised by a spirit of broad and large-hearted humanity, of politeness, good sense and elevation of soul, of precision and idealism, in a word, one that conforms to the classical ideal.

Now, it is the presence of women and the predominant part played by them that has the best chance of effecting all this in social life. It is woman who has civilised man, ennobled his brute nature, and developed in him a sense of moral delicacy, discretion and pity, the spirit of justice and equity, of conciliation and tolerance. Let women remain women, *i.e.*, let them retain the higher qualities for which they are specially qualified, and the part played by them in the world will be a more useful one than ever. The practice of the essentially feminine virtues will mean the preservation of a moral and spiritual civilisation which is now menaced by the constant progress of industrialism and utilitarianism.

We have touched upon a few of the questions that occupy the mind at the present time. To answer them, they seem to call for the jealous maintenance and the fervent propagation of so-called classical ideas, *i.e.*, of the general and political, moral and religious ideas of which present-day civilisation is the fruit. No material organisation, no external coercion will suffice. It is from within that man lives, from within that he dies. Human civilisation is spiritual in its nature, and only so long as the spirit is active can it be kept alive.

EMILE BOUTROUX.

PARIS.

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PERSONAL AND IMPERSONAL GROUPS.

HENRY NELSON WIEMAN.

FOR the purpose of connecting more closely with current discussion this paper has been put into the form of a criticism of an article by Professor J. E. Boodin, published in THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS for January, 1920, and entitled "The Unit of Civilization."

Professor Boodin maintains that there is one supreme principle of social organization to which everything else in society should be subordinated. This principle we call the principle of personal organization. It is embodied in what may be called the personal group. By personal group we mean any small group of individuals, brought together in face to face converse, between whom natural human sympathy plays spontaneously, and in which the unique personality of each can be recognized by the other members of the group. This group Professor Boodin calls the unit of civilization.

In his article Professor Boodin recognizes two types of social groups; but only one of these is ultimate, according to him, the other being altogether derivative, artificial, instrumental, having no value save as it promotes the first kind of group. Generally this second kind of group, he thinks, is an excrescence upon the social order. These two types of social organization we designate the personal and the impersonal, respectively. In analyzing and defining these two we shall not follow Boodin very closely; but I think we shall be altogether true to his thought.

1. THE TWO GROUPS CONTRASTED.

The personal and impersonal groups may be contrasted with one another on four counts.

1. In the personal group the individual responds to the total personality of the other members of the group. By that we mean that each member adapts himself to the

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thoughts, sentiments, purposes and needs of the other members. Each regards the other as a unique individual to whom he adjusts himself in a special way. Each understands the other. Any association of friends would represent such a group. However, it is quite possible to have a personal group in which there is antagonism and hate, providing only there is this mutual recognition of the unique individuality of each, and special response to such unique individuality.

In the impersonal group, on the other hand, there is no such recognition of personality among the members. Each may respond to some act on the part of the other just as one would respond to some physical object or mechanical signal; each may respond to some function of the other; or it may be merely the spatial position of the other to which one adapts himself. In any case it is not the unique individual purpose, not the shades of feeling, in the other which one recognizes; it is not the more comprehensive thought of the other that one appreciates. The Southern California Edison Company is an example of an impersonal group of which we all are members if we use the electricity which it supplies. The bank in which we have money deposited is one of the impersonal groups, including all the other depositors and borrowers as well as the officials. Our Life Insurance Company is another impersonal group including all the other policy holders and the officials as well as the investors of the deposited funds.

2. The second point of difference between these groups lies in the degree to which one's entire personality is involved in the response. The first point of difference lay in the object of response, which in the personal group was approximately the entire personality of the other. This second point of difference lies in the subject of response, which in the personal group is approximately the entire personality of the self. By entire personality we mean that complete system of instincts, sentiments, purposes, interests, pre-dispositions, wishes, wants, call them what you will, which go to make up the dynamics of the human

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organism. In order to have a comprehensive term with which to designate this dynamic equipment of the human being I shall use the word tendency, meaning by it everything from reflex to life-purpose.[1] The distinctive feature of the personal group is, then, that a great many more tendencies of the individual are simultaneously aroused in the response between its members than is the case in response between members of the impersonal group. It is in the personal group that we find most activity of those deeper sentiments such as love, play, hate, etc., which are nothing else than organized systems of tendency including all or most of the major instincts. In the home, in the association of friends, in the discussion group, we experience that stimulation of all our tendencies, which appears in consciousness either in the form of deep pervasive emotion or else in the form of mental activity, wide, varied, rapid, creative and spontaneous.

In the impersonal group, on the other hand, emotion is at the minimum and mental activity, although at times it may be very strenuous, is effortful rather than spontaneous, instrumental rather than creative, exercised as a means to ultimate satisfaction rather than as satisfying in itself. All response in the impersonal group tends to assume the form of the minor units of behavior which operate automatically. Thus in the impersonal group of motorists on a congested street corner one tends to respond to the signals of the road in an automatic fashion. When the man in front of me holds out his hand, indicating that he intends to turn to the right, I adapt my conduct to his with scarcely any emotion or thought upon the matter. In the bank I sign my name to the check, thus responding to the requirements of the group. But only a very few of the tendencies constituting my personality are involved in the act. In the polite society of the ball room or reception hall my conduct becomes an unemotional, unthinking, mechanical fulfilment of the rules of etiquette just in so far as the group

[1] Cf. Holt, E. B. *The Freudian Wish.* Pp. 3 and 4.

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is an impersonal one. But the moment I meet there an old friend or an old enemy, my response is transformed. My conduct ceases to be a matter of a few reflexes and comes to involve all those tendencies that make up the deeper sentiments and more comprehensive purposes of life.

3. The third point of distinction between these groups lies in the plasticity and the rigidity of their respective types of order. The order of the personal group is highly plastic; that of the impersonal is rigid. The order of the personal group is constantly shaped and reshaped by the changing needs and purposes of its members, because its system of organization is nothing else than the mutual adaptation of its several members to the needs and purposes of each. It adapts itself to every personality that comes into it, just as the personality reciprocally adapts himself to the group. Thus it is in the personal group that one finds maximum social freedom, just as we have already seen that in the personal group mentality is most fully aroused, emotion most deeply stirred and understanding of other persons most complete.

The order of the impersonal group, we have said, manifests rigidity. Its order is prescribed by rules and regulations. It is not maintained by mutual adaptation of persons directly to one another, but rather by adaptation of each person to the impersonal regulations or code that is enforced. This code may be designed and enforced by some dominating personality, or it may be merely the product of accumulating tradition. In any case it constitutes a framework into which each member of the group must fit himself, and in so doing his activities are automatically co-ordinated with those of the other members of the group. The members of an industrial plant, for instance, may act in such a way as to constitute a beautifully co-ordinated system. This system, however, does not arise out of any mutual consideration for one another on the part of the workers. It arises out of the mechanism of regulations by which their activities are co-ordinated.

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4. The fourth point of contrast is in respect to the permanence or change of the personnel of the two groups respectively. The personnel of the personal group is relatively permanent. The personnel of the impersonal group is constantly changing. The employees of the industrial plant come and go, but the members of the home continue their relations to one another throughout a life-time. The political order may seem to be an exception to this, for it may be quite impersonal, and yet its personnel is fairly permanent. This, however, is due to the peculiar position of the political order relative to the other groups. It is supervisory over all the other groups, and hence, wherever we go we are always either actually or potentially under its control. However, it should be borne in mind that the political order is usually less impersonal than the industrial system.

These are the four points of contrast between the personal and the impersonal groups. In the personal group the response of the members to one another involves the entire personality, both as subject and as object of response; its order is highly plastic; and its personnel is permanent. In the impersonal group the response of the members to one another involves the minimum of personality both as subject and as object; its order is rigid and its personnel is transitory.

2. Supplementary Character of the Two Groups.

It should be noted that no actual social group is ever purely personal or purely impersonal. All actual social groups are a mixture of these two types. But we call any group personal rather than the opposite if in it the personal type greatly predominates over the other. There are many actual social groups which are very largely personal; there are others which are very largely impersonal.

Our thesis is that these two types of social order, or, as Plato might say, these two ideas of society, are both indispensable. One cannot be reduced to the other or derived from the other, or made purely instrumental to the other.

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On the contrary each contributes something which is indispensable to the life of society. What is more, each contributes something which is indispensable to the life of humanity, as over against the life of lower animals.[2] This is our point of difference with Professor Boodin.

Lack of space forbids more than briefest reference to the correlative values of these groups; but we must indicate, however sketchily, some of the chief matters with respect to which they are supplementary to one another, and so mutually indispensable.

The personal group provides social freedom by reason of its plasticity and that mutual adaptation and comprehension of personal purpose on the part of its members relative to one another. The impersonal group, on the other hand, provides discipline which is equally requisite for human life in order to stabilize human purpose and bring human endeavor into effective action upon the grim facts of reality.

The personal group stimulates the mind to maximum creative activity; but it is the impersonal group which enables the individual to gather that wealth of data which it requires as material to work upon. The Socratic dialogues show how the mind may be aroused to maximum activity but its efforts rendered largely unproductive because of that lack of data which only the impersonal group can provide. The glory of Greek civilization was its high development of the personal group; the weakness of Greek civilization was the inadequacy of its impersonal organization.

The personal group engenders that progressive evolution of human purpose which is perhaps the most striking characteristic of human life in contrast to the lower orders. Man's purpose ever widens as it advances, like the rolling snowball. It is the personal group that makes it so widen. But it is the impersonal group which alone is able to provide that mechanism of achievement by which such purposes can be executed and so lead on to something larger.

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[2] Cf. Hocking, W. E. *Human Nature and its Remaking.* Chap. 34, 35.

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It is the personal group which causes the human constantly to amplify his environment, *i. e.*, seek response to an ever greater number of different qualities in each object and an ever greater number of different objects to which to respond. But it is the impersonal group which standardizes his response to the given environment in such way as to assure sufficient collective adaptation to it.

It is the personal group that engenders delicacy of response and depth of emotion. But it is the impersonal group which provides that interlocking chain of consequences and that wide field of endeavor by reason of which the results of one human life become a worthy object of deepest emotion and most delicate susceptibility. In a word, it is the impersonal group, with its wide reaching systems of co-ordination and its indestructible institutions, that give world-wide significance and historic efficacy to the work of the individual.

After these very meager statements of the supplementary character of the two types of social order, suffice it to say that these two types together constitute the motor of social evolution. Take away either one and the process of social development comes to an end. That fertility of the historic social process, out of which has arisen all the arts and sciences, is due to the marriage of these two types, in so far as social organization has anything to do with the process. The entire social problem may be resolved ultimately to the matter of adjusting these two systems to one another in such a way as best to promote human welfare. All the evils of the social order at the present time, or at any time, we believe, may be traced back to some maladjustment of these two types to one another. Individualism, for instance, when it is not a meaningless abstraction, can mean nothing else than the personal group. Socialism, meaning by that term not a political party but a certain principle, can be significant only as it represents the principle of impersonal organization. Liberty and law is another antithesis which finds its interpretation in these two contrasting types. Human rights and property rights is an-

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other dyad that springs from this same opposition of principles. All the modern problems of industry, of political science, of the home and family, of education and of institutional church head up into this problem of how to adjust the personal and impersonal groups to one another. Our criticism of Boodin is that he has traced all these problems back to a monadic principle. We maintain on the other hand that the ultimate principle is dyadic.

The details of the adjustment of these two orders to one another and the practical execution of this adjustment lies outside the field of Philosophy; but the analysis of the problem and the general principles of the adjustment are distinctively the work of Philosophy. Furthermore, before the expert and the specialist can approach such a problem with any reasonable hope of success, there is one supreme question for which he must have the answer. And only Philosophy can give the answer.

3. Human Welfare as the Standard for Adjusting the Two.

The problem is how to adjust these two orders to one another in such a way as best to promote human welfare. But what is human welfare? That is the one supreme question. We say that only Philosophy can give the answer. It is true that philosophers are by no means unanimous in their answer. Nevertheless, just as soon as anyone begins to enquire what is the nature of human welfare in general he forthwith becomes a philosopher whether he will or no, for that is a philosophical investigation. We must then endeavor to state what is the nature of human welfare in so far as it bears upon this problem of adjusting the two orders to one another.

Holt, Perry[3] and others have defined human welfare as that organization which will yield maximum fulfilment to the greatest number of tendencies, irrespective of time, place, person, or other quality that may inhere in the tend-

[3] Holt, E. B. *The Freudian Wish;* Perry, R. B. *The Moral Economy.*

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encies concerned. Perhaps our own statement of human welfare may be best presented by contrasting it with this of Holt and Perry, because, while it is closely allied thereto, it is markedly different. We should say that human welfare consists of that organization which yields maximum simultaneous activity (not maximum fulfilment) to the greatest number of tendencies in each individual concerned. The opposition is between the two terms, maximum fulfilment and maximum simultaneous activity.

Maximum fulfilment of the greatest number of tendencies requires a serial co-ordination of them in such manner that each can be fulfilled in succession one after the other. Simultaneous arousal of them, on the other hand, may make impossible the fulfilment of any one of them in the sense of bringing that one to quiescence through satiety.[4] Thus, if in presence of an apple the food-getting impulse is the only one aroused, I shall eat the apple and thus bring the tendency to an end through its fulfilment. But suppose in addition to the food-getting impulse, there is also aroused an æsthetic response to its color and shape, also a sentimental response because of its association with the old home orchard of my boyhood; furthermore, it symbolizes to me the beloved personality of the one who gave it to me. Also, as I contemplete it, many a myth and legend comes to me—the apple of discord cast among the Greek gods, the apples of Hesperides, the apple which Atlantis stooped to pick up, the apple which Eve first ate, etc. These do not by any means come clearly to my focus of consciousness, but waver about the fringe of consciousness, being simultaneously aroused and holding one another in abeyance. Plainly such a response involves the simultaneous activity of a great many tendencies with respect to the apple. The very multiplicity of these prevents any one of them from overt fulfilment in the form of eating the apple, tossing it in the air, fingering it, giving it away, etc. It is maximum simultaneous activity of tendencies, not maximum fulfilment of them.

[4] Cf. Stewart, J. A. *Plato's Doctrine of Ideas.* Part II.

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The sort of response just described may be called total response, because it involves so many tendencies. It approximates response of the total personality, in contrast to that succession of responses wherein each represents merely a fraction of the personality.

We have said that total response does not yield fulfilment of tendency. But here a distinction must be made. There is one type of tendency which does find fulfilment in total response, but it is a type not generally recognized among behaviorists. We must define it.

Human tendencies may be divided into two kinds, central and peripheral; or, if one prefers other language, determining adjustments and units of behavior.[5] Peripheral tendencies or units of behavior seek to attain a certain equilibrium between the organism and the environment; when this equilibrium is attained these tendencies are fulfilled and become quiescent. The central tendencies or determining adjustments, on the other hand, have a very different function. They do not act directly upon the environment, but operate only upon the peripheral tendencies or units of behavior in order to organize these units of behavior into a system, adjust them to one another and to the environment, regulate and direct them in various ways.

Now it is plain that while total response prevents the fulfilment of the peripheral tendencies to some measure, it gives largest possible fulfilment to the central tendencies; for it is only when many different tendencies are aroused simultaneously that it is possible to organize any complex and extensive system of reaction. But this process of organizing is precisely what constitutes fulfilment of the central tendencies. Total response, then, means maximum fulfilment of central tendencies, but not maximum fulfilment of peripheral tendencies. That situation in which central tendencies find largest fulfilment is the one in which

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[5] Tolman, E. C., in *Psychological Review*, May 1920, Vol. 27, p. 217, article entitled, "Instinct and Purpose."

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is required most reorganization of peripheral tendencies, their greatest readjustment and redirection. The situation in which peripheral tendencies find largest fulfilment, on the other hand, is the one in which these tendencies require least readjustment, least reorganization and least redirection.

So we have two kinds of good, two kinds of satisfaction, two kinds of value, which are qualitatively different from one another and altogether incommensurable. It is impossible to measure one against the other to see which is greatest in quantity. The two cannot be quantitatively compared, because there is no common unit with which to measure them. These two kinds of good may be designated spiritual and material, respectively. These two terms, spiritual and material, are often used in a very vague sense; but our analysis, we believe, gives to them a rational and psychologically justified meaning.

These two values constitute the dyadic principle of human life. Both are indispensable. Take away either one and human life would disappear. Take away total response, leaving serial co-ordination, and human life would cease to be human. It would become that of lower animals. Take away serial co-ordination, leaving total response, and the human race would shortly cease to exist in any form whatever. Total response is fertile and creative, ever generating more complex forms of behavior. Serial co-ordination is specific and adaptive, ever sustaining that vital equilibrium which the living organism requires for its existence. Total response continuously amplifies the environment to which the organism responds; serial co-ordination continuously adapts the organism to its given environment.

4. Priority of the Personal Group.

Although these two modes of response are equally indispensable, one may have priority over the other. Which should it be? As said before, we cannot compare the two quantitatively and give priority to the one which yields

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the greatest amount of good, because the two are incommensurable. They cannot be quantitatively compared.

There is only one other method of determining which of the two should have priority. That is to study the two great evolutionary processes which are developing human life. These two are biological evolution and social evolution. If we should discover that these two processes are steadily increasing the one kind of human good while they are scarcely sustaining the other kind even at its ancient level, then our question would be answered. Then we should know that the world process is bent on developing to the maximum one of these, but not the other. Then we should know that the world process had decided the matter for us and given priority to the one. We, as frail humans, could do nothing else than adapt ourselves to this process.

We cannot here take space to outline any such study of evolution. We shall only say in passing that our findings seem to indicate plainly that the good of total response is the one which is being ever enlarged by the processes of evolution.[6]

If this be the nature of human welfare it throws some light on the problem of how to adjust the personal and the impersonal groups. The personal group, as we have seen, represents total response. The impersonal order sustains serial co-ordination. Our criterion indicates that the personal group should be given priority. This, of course, is only the barest introduction to the problem.

Let us say in conclusion that our modern society is plainly suffering from an inordinate development of the impersonal group. There is, however, a very wide recognition of this evil and there are some very interesting social movements on foot to rectify it. The evil is most acute in the industrial world and it is there that the most striking of these movements appear. Note, for instance, the recent development of shop committees, the participation in man-

[6] This theme is developed by L. T. Hobhouse in his books, *Morals in Evolution* and *Development and Purpose*.

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agement on the part of the employees, the organization or proposed organization of all workers in certain industries for the purpose of exercising full powers of management. This last appears in the Building Trades of England and was proposed in the Plumb Plan for the American railroads.

These movements, directed to throw off the crushing yoke of the impersonal system from the neck of the personal order, are not limited to the industrial world alone. There are similar movements, less developed, but nevertheless genuine, in the world of political organization, in education, in ecclesiasticism and the home. Everything seems to indicate that we are on the verge of a vast social transformation in which the personal group shall again regain its dominance. The danger will be that we shall swing to the opposite extreme and ignore the values of the impersonal system altogether. That would be as disastrous as the immediate past has been with its overweening strength of the impersonal order.

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PROGRESS.

CLAUDE C. H. WILLIAMSON.

"Things pass for what they seem, not for what they are. Few see inside; many take to the outside. It is not enough to be right, if right seem false or ill."

BALTHASAR GRACIAN.

THE difficulty of answering the question "What is Truth?" involves a corresponding problem in the definition of what is fiction. A comprehensive judgment of this kind will always be difficult unless the thinker has an ultimate standard of value, which he can apply all along the line,—besides the difficulty of framing a coherent conception of the ultimate value or ideal which is the goal of human development. Many at the present time speak glibly as if progress were a law of human history, but no true study of facts will justify this statement. If civilisations expand and blossom they also decay and dissolve, and visible gains are balanced by obvious losses. It is very rash, therefore, to point to every idea, or every absence of idea, in the modern mind, and contend that it must be in accordance with fact, because it is modern. Development is the product not of laws, but of persons, and it carries within it the witness of spiritual freedom. Progress postulates human capacities and the call to realise them.

Of all modern ideas the belief in progress is perhaps the one which has come nearest to the strength of a religion; and, like a religion, it is exposed to vicissitudes from the moods and circumstances of its believers. It has known, in a short life, the fervours of enthusiasm and the peace of establishment. There could be no livelier proof of its elasticity and motive force as an idea than that its staunchest adherents should have been two such utterly different sets of people as the French Revolutionaries and the Victorians. Yet it was not a mere accident of history which transferred the doctrine from the bloodstained idealism of the first to

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the ideals, with a cash basis, of the second. There is something in its very nature which invites us to embrace it in passionate action, or repose on it comfortably as a fact. Progress means changes estimated in terms of approximation to an end—the end being the principle of unity which harmonises and explains the successive steps. Like most of the ideas which move men, it has two faces. As an ideal it inspires men to give effect to it and make the world of their desire. But it could never have arisen as an ideal unless there were facts to suggest it, and it must wither if they refuse their support. A belief in progress obliges you to accept the test of reality, for it holds up, not a Utopia, but an actual or possible fact.

Modern thinkers, disappointed with the bursting of the extravagant bubbles blown by some of its votaries, either deny the existence of Progress altogether, or so whittle it down as to leave us in a state of more than Christian resignation. "If this is tea, bring me coffee, but if it is coffee, bring me tea," said the passenger to the steward on the old Channel boat: we are resigned to the uninspiring beverage offered us by our recent philosophers on Progress only because they assure us that Providence prohibits the sale of drinks with a greater intoxicating content; but we are not quite sure that what they offer us is Progress.

Wireless telegraphy, for example, had its origin in the work of Clerk Maxwell and Hertz; the telephone depends on the magneto electric induction discovered by Faraday; chloroform was discovered by Liebig and Soubeiran without a thought that millions of hours of agony would be saved to the world by Simpson's application of it; the principle of the antitoxin treatment, which has saved tens of thousands of wounded soldiers from tetanus, was laid down long ago by Pasteur, Roux, and Yersin, and first applied by Behring and Kitasato; spectrum analysis goes back to Newton, though the stars were not analysed by it for two centuries afterwards.

Advance in any knowledge may take place in two directions: it may be either extensive or intensive; it may con-

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sist in a large comprehension of facts, or in a clearer insight into their nature. Progress, we may well agree, there has been in the past, but it has not been the outcome of any iron law; it is the fruit of human wills freely dedicating themselves to the good and accepting for their task the work of making things better.

To write with emphasis the word "utility" does not elucidate much to one desirous of ascertaining by what criterion may be distinguished conduct which is good from that which is not. It is all very well to say that we need "first and last a critical utilitarianism," and that the great task which faces moralists to-day, as in Austin's and Bentham's day, is "to recognise the unalterable validity of the utilitarian test." What is this test? Utility for and to whom? To some one group? To the nation, to the race, to the existing generation, or to future ages? Is there no one criterion, or are there many, and are they conflicting? "All ethical problems turn upon the problem of a perfectly faithful appraisement of truth, the quest of which is the discipline of disciples." Appraisement implies a standard of value; whose conception of utility is to be the standard?

Darwinism is the science of the causes which have made those who are efficient in the struggle for their own interest supreme and omnipotent in the world. Now this doctrine has nothing to do with the science of civilisation. It is the doctrine of the efficiency of the animal. It has absolutely nothing to do with the causes making for collective efficiency in the social and moral world founded on mind which is evolving in civilisation.

"Darwinism represents," wrote Benjamin Kidd, "the very antithesis of the principles of that social integration which is taking place in civilisation. The dividing line, moreover, is fundamental. For the first principle of evolution in the world of the efficient animal of Darwinism is the supremacy and omnipotence therein of individuals or groups of individuals efficient in their own interests. The first principle, on the contrary, in the evolution of the social world of civilisation lies in the subordination of individuals. . . . The story of creation up to and including human savagery is simply the story of the supremacy in the world of physical

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force organised in the life of the efficient individual, or the efficient group, or the efficient State. But the story of evolution above savagery is nothing else than the story of the gradual rise to supremacy in the world of those psychic forces organised in civilisation which are subduing individuals or aggregations efficient in their own interest to those universal principles which are making for the limitless efficiency of civilisation."

As a whole, the world's thought is to-day in one of these negative periods, one of these troughs when the emotional background is black, and the subconscious mind, rationalising about phenomena to suit its mood, proves to its own logical satisfaction the validity of pessimistic doctrines. It is our duty to remind ourselves, however ill our feelings take it, of certain facts which will give us a permanent intellectual *modus vivendi*, a reasonable faith balanced between a fantastic optimism and a wasteful futile pessimism. What we have to remind ourselves of is *the long run*. All reasoned life consists in the subordination of the moods and impulses of the moment to something more permanent, the rational parliament of experience and will. We smile at the enthusiast who knows that to-morrow he will have touched the millennium; the faint-heart who dreams of suicide at each reverse we despise, or pity, or warn. The man whom we admire is he who understands the possibilities of human life and is content, while working towards them, to accept what comes to his personal share—the man whose existence is active, and yet based on the most permanent foundations.

The general idea of power and progress through service has been analysed into four divisions. "There is," says Professor Perry of Harvard, "first the buoyancy and energy of the modern world as this expresses itself in the idea of progress . . . it is not a generalization or inference from the past, so much as one of those beliefs that spring from an act of will. Few moderns could give you very convincing historical evidence that the world is growing better; but virtually all will declare their intention, so far as in them lies, of making it better. The second is the idea that a cause discovered is a cause controlled. . . .

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The third is complementary to the foregoing. It is the idea that only those things which can be controlled by science, the welfare and happiness of men so far as conditioned by nature, really count as good and evil. And fourthly there is man's sense that through science he is the responsible and competent maker of his own destiny." In short, this Baconian faith is man's sense of his own power through natural science to control and better his own external fortunes, these being of paramount importance in life.

Christ's only injunction in the sphere of economics was: "Take heed and beware of all covetousness." He refused pointedly to have anything to do with disputes about the distribution of property; and in the parable of the Prodigal Son the demand, "Give me the portion of goods that falleth to me," is the prelude to a journey in that "far country" which is forgetfulness of God.

An eminent historian of our time has said that the progress of civilisation is a matter of faith rather than of knowledge. For actual facts have but an indirect and sometimes a remote bearing upon the opinion which moulds men's actions; and there are various media through which facts have to be transmitted before they influence conduct. First, there are the facts themselves, about which men seldom agree. Then there is the report of the facts, which varies with the reporter. Thirdly, there are the different impressions which the same facts, and even the same report of them, make upon the recipients; and fourthly, there are the diverse reactions produced by the impressions in different minds. There is not merely the broad distinction between the seed and the soil. The sower comes in as well, and there are infinite varieties in the seeds and the soils themselves.

When we speak of development we make certain postulates: first, a continuity in the process of change within the whole, so that each step in the process is connected with what goes before and what comes after; and secondly, that the movement reveals a growth of value. If either of

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these conditions is absent, the idea of development disappears. The only solid ground upon which we can base the supposition that mankind has moved from a less to a more complete attainment of mind and physical well-being, and will continue to do so, exists in the ascertained facts of the past history of living things upon this Earth. We have no reason to doubt this continuation, while at the same time we must be prepared for and accept the ups and downs, the disasters and triumphs which inevitably characterise the natural process of what is called progress.

In an illuminating passage Professor Bury characterises the two distinct types of theories of progress:

"The one type is that of the constructive idealists and socialists, who can name all the streets and towers of 'the city of gold,' which they imagine is situated just round a promontory. The development of man is a closed system; its term is known and within reach. The other type is that of those who, surveying the gradual ascent of man, believe that by the same interplay of forces which have conducted him so far, and by a further development of the liberty which he has fought to win, he will move slowly towards conditions of increasing harmony and happiness. Here the development is indefinite; its term is unknown and lies in the remote future. Individual liberty is the motive force, and the corresponding theory is liberalism; whereas the first doctrine naturally 'leads to a symmetrical system in which the authority of the State is preponderant, and the individual has little more liberty than a cog in a well-oiled wheel; it is not his right to go his own way.' "

Though Fourier, Saint Simon and Comte attempted to ascertain the causes of the laws of progress, they signally failed. Fourier and Saint Simon dreamt of industrial socialism. It is a dream, an impressive dream, of the importance of Labour in the world. The two types of theories of progress still remain, and we are all familiar with them. There is no need to point out that Darwinism increases the value of the second type. The paradox of life and death, growth and decay, confronts every scheme of evolution alike in the material and the spiritual world.

The half-educated still talk of "Medieval tyranny." It is part and parcel of anti-Catholic legend. In sober fact the Pagan Renaissance, the Protestant Reformation, the

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Industrial Revolution, brought about a real tyranny worse than that of the Emperor Henry V, or the Visconti, whose characters were pagan, not medieval. With genuine civilisation there are mixed up many elements of decadence. Europe is more civilised to-day than it was in the thirteenth century. It would be a paradox to deny that—there is a spurious civilisation which is a real decadence. But not everything that we hear and see around us is an evidence of our advance. We have not among us the architects of the thirteenth century, nor the schoolmen. Edward I would not greatly admire our crowds of paupers and workhouses, nor the turn of mind of many of those who are supposed to be the present leaders of society. There are sounds in the air that may prove to be herald's trumpets proclaiming our last hour and the end of our trumpets.

Lord Macaulay alludes in his essay on Sir William Temple to the curious controversy as to the dispute on the merits of the ancients and the moderns. It raised the whole question of progress, for, if the ancients were profoundly superior to the moderns, the belief in progress falls to the ground. The quarrel lasted over a hundred years, and during its course public attention was keenly directed to the matter at issue, which was nothing less than the question of the degeneracy of Nature. The point was, Can the men of the seventeenth century equal the men of the classical age? This point obviously implied another, Did the succession of greatness stop with the antique world? Has it never been resumed?

These questions go to the very heart of the matter, for an imperative condition of the continuance of progress is a succession of men of genius. The many abhor new ideas, which, when valuable, always come from the few who initiate all movement. As one walks down a street in Florence, one notes the statues to the famous Florentines of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries—Michael Angelo, Boccaccio, Dante, Ghiberti, Giotto, Machiavelli, and Petrarch. There was a larger number of great men then in a city with no more than seventy thousand inhabitants

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than in London to-day with its seven millions. It is obvious that intellectual power has not continuously improved either in Italy or in England. It is usual to say that times of ferment produce great thinkers and writers, and the reign of Elizabeth is invariably adduced as a case in point. Why did we produce no poet of quite the first rank in the two centuries between Chaucer and Shakespeare, or in the century and a half between Milton and Wordsworth? Have we a Shakespeare, a Pascal, a Goethe to-day? True we have not, but, on the other hand, in our own day we possessed simultaneously a Darwin and a Kelvin, a Poincaré, a Helmholtz. Moreover, the efforts of men of genius in the past were largely confined to their own land. The discovery effected in a laboratory in Cambridge to-day is known throughout the world to-morrow. Pasteur conferred no particular benefit on France, because his ideas at once became common property. This internationalisation of knowledge is a mighty impetus to progress.

English thought, as befits it, was harder than French and soberer than German. The great contribution of England, indeed, to the religion of progress was unintended and illegitimate. For it was the biology of Darwin misapplied by students of society. The Darwinian theory was not one of progress, because it had no ethical standard. But it set species flowing, and as progress is a theory of flowing it was easy and irresistible to jump to the conclusion that the flow was upwards, although pessimists like Carlyle growled about Niagara. The conclusion was assisted by the assumption that acquired characters are inherited; for in that case the efforts of men towards Good are passed on biologically to their descendants. That assumption was taken up into Herbert Spencer's system, the most grandiose of all the theologies of Progress; for it swept into its net the starry heavens as well as the destinies of mankind. It would be more easily seen that this philosophy was a work of the imagination, if there were any imagination in the author's style. But poets cannot read it, and scientists will not.

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What we call the Age of Chivalry, succeeding to the barbarism of the Dark Ages, marked a bright milestone on this road. By chivalry we understand the kind of spirit which charmed us as boys in the Black Knight of Ivanhoe or in Quentin Durward, the spirit in which men accept it as their duty to protect women, not because they themselves are to reap any personal reward, but because women are human creatures whose weakness needs defence. This conception was rare in the ancient world, where, for instance, in the time of Cæsar no less than in that of Pericles, whenever a town was captured, the women were spared from slaughter only to be sold as slaves.

Many of those who have done most for the enhancement of life have not been, in the hackneyed sense of the word, progressives. Reformers have worked without a thought of the millennium and even with an indifference to the world's changes. Mystics, philosophers, artists and men of science have passed beyond sense and time to an impalpable world which they found by their insight or creation. Even in the act of living we are frustrated if we enslave ourselves to time. It is a truer wisdom to expand the present than to contract it to a dot before the future. For the same imagination which draws the past and the future into our present, and makes them live there, can lift the present itself above its time-fetters and convey a sense of the eternal. But generally our systems of science, philosophy or theology, our theories of the past and the future (except in the case of a poet like Browning) are the creation of men who scarcely conceive of themselves as developing to old age. But there is just now much concern in many minds, and apparently in all civilised countries, as to whether progress, assumed for some generations to be necessarily continuous, may not one day, and at no distant date, cease where it has been most observable. We had forgotten the objections of many level-headed, solid thinkers to the theories of Condorcet and optimists of the eighteenth century as to the definite approach to perfection of mankind if only left to itself by crafty kings and

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priests. To many, Dean Inge's warning that this was a baseless assumption was novel, and they read with some surprise Professor Bury's proof of that which had often been demonstrated, that the bulk of men, including gifted races, have lived and died without expectation or wish for conditions other than those of their fathers, and that, if they possessed any ideal, they placed their golden age in the past. The anxiety as to the future is not confined to the old, storm-tossed, weary European countries; it is extended to the United States, where thoughtful men, looking ahead, see icebergs dangerously athwart what was once open seaway. And just at this time the entire *intelligentsia* of Germany is discussing and gloomily reflecting upon Spengler's impressive work—a volume ambitious and far from devoid of talent—which proclaims that not only is the belief in continuous progress a naïve delusion, but that "the Decline and Fall of the West" is at hand. It might be described as the Necrology of Western Nations, and its doctrine is that the most civilised will be the first to die. No book since Nietzsche's "Zarathustra" has stirred the German mind more than Oswald Spengler's prediction that the crisis of European civilisation is upon us.

The thought of progress expresses man's determination to perfect his earthly home, and this secular idealism has linked it at every turn with science. Sometimes under compulsion, sometimes with adventurous pride, it has followed the victories of knowledge. The application of science to human needs has been its keenest stimulus, and the belief reached its highest pitch of confidence with the rise of modern industry. But it looks for confirmation beyond applied science to the science which judges and ratifies impartially.

But reality is a relative affair. To the ordinary member of the middle class, who has *The Times* with his breakfast, and to whom a general election is an event of the same order as the Last Judgment, who reads appreciatively of Mr. Asquith's mastery of a political situation, or of the states-

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manlike views of Mr. Austen Chamberlain—a glimpse into the world of wire-pulling and vote-catching is a revelation of reality. Quite obviously a world where one very ordinary man says casually to another, "Let's give him a peerage," is more real than the world where it is gravely stated that "His Majesty the King has been pleased to confer a barony of the United Kingdom upon Sir John Sixtypercent." To be admitted into the inner circle for two hours and a half at the price of half-a-guinea for a stall is cheap enough, and how thrilling! And then to see how a member of the great middle-class butts into this nicely adjusted system of mechanics, refuses the comfortable compromise, and wins the game not only of politics, but of love by his adherence to principle—principle in this context meaning to promise more than your colleagues intend to perform —that is more flattering still.

Most of us to-day are inclined to regard progress as a matter of course. Knowledge expands, we say, and there is no reason why it should not continue to expand indefinitely. This was not the view of the Greeks, who, for the most part, conceived on the contrary the possibility of a process of deterioration, a cycle, or a succession of cycles. The majority thought that there had been a Golden Age, but that was long since past. Moreover, there seems to have been the feeling that the age in which they lived was distinctly dull. Beyond the Pillars of Hercules once existed Plato's Atlantis; it is now lost to the sight of men in the depths of the sea. In it innocence and happiness reached the highest possible stage; the utmost man can expect is to return, however distantly, to this stage. What George Meredith called the rapture of the forward view was denied to the Greek writers.

Unquestionably their faith in progress is open to serious question, and there is no guarantee whatever that a perpetual movement shall be one from good to better. There is a story of a negro who had inadvertently broken into a wasp's nest. As he was rushing headlong down a road he was stopped by a white man, and asked where he was

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going. He replied, "I ain't goin' nowhere, boss. I'se just leavin' the place where I was at."

The temporal goal of progress, like the eternal one of religion, must remain indefinite. For it depends on the blind impulse that urges men towards perfection.

Particular writers, however, stressed the particular points which appealed to them. The French were inspired by the growth of knowledge. It was the Mind that they saw advancing, and that in spite of what most of them regarded as the notable setback of the Christian era. As this view developed, other social facts were co-ordinated with intellectual growth. What men thought, that they did. It was Comte who worked this out most fully, elaborating the genial conceptions of Turgot and Saint Simon. And his *Cours de philosophie positive* remains one of the great achievements of the human mind, though most likely it will never again find more than a handful of readers. The same intellectualism influenced the Germans. Only their *Geist* is something other and more cloudy than the French *esprit*. The Germans too, though they used history, were singularly contemptuous of it. "The philosopher," says Fichte, "follows the *à priori* thread of the world plan, which is clear to him without any history; and if he makes use of history it is not to prove anything, since his theses are already proved, independently of all history." That reminds one of Rousseau, who started an inquiry into the conditions of primitive man with the remark "écartons tous les faits." But that was not the French spirit, as, of course, it has not been that of Germany since the final debauch of Hegel. Writes Mr. John Galsworthy:

> "That Sovran Heart in Harmony!
> Its eyes unseen, its ways unknown.
> 'Tis utter Justice; boundless sea
> Of liberty; and secret Throne
> Of love; a spirit Meeting Place
> Of vital dust and mortal breath,
> That needs no point of time or space
> To bind together life and death."

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It is characteristic of life that it should go on and mount higher. To the sense of life is thus added the sense of a great onward march that is gathering volume and momentum as it goes. The hope of progress lies in the collective effort of humanity, which as yet is hardly conscious of its oneness and has not imagined what it might perform as it worked with one purpose and together. And the test of progress will be whether, in these larger efforts, individual lives are deepened or stultified by the life of the species.

A look at the conflagration in which civilisation has been burning renders it easy for us to hold that development includes retrogression. There are many side-currents as well as the main current in the stream of evolution. There is no scientific reason forbidding a return of the glacial period and a spread of polar climatical conditions over the whole globe again. The man of the ancient world no doubt had reasons other than these. He inherited the natural love of mankind for old associations, and he inherited the sense of reverence. The old, simply because it was old, must be better than the new. If he was obliged to strike out a new path, he diverged as little as he could from the old and tried one. It is impossible for a country, especially a primitive one, to effect an entire break with the past. Perhaps the greatest of all breaks with the past was the French Revolution, and yet in its ideals it entertained a return to Roman republican virtue, or to the simplicity of the natural man.

There can be no progress of the Christian consciousness away from the fundamental facts of vital truth and of Christianity. Progress in doctrine and in ethics proceeds from the initial facts and truths of Christ's life and teaching, but it will not break continuity with them.

It is not a struggle to hark back to old worlds and simpler ways than ours. It is rather an ever-present and deepening sense of what has been lost with so-called "progress and civilisation," a complacent synonym for arrested development; a conviction that there is no going back, and uncertainty as to the end of the journey if we move on.

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It is not rooted distrust of reason. It is rather a growing sense of the limitations of reason and of the mysteries lying behind mysteries that baffle it. It is not so manifestly as Nietzsche's teaching the morbid product of nervosity, the struggle with disease, present and menacing. Rather is it the creed of one over-wearied and disabused.

We may fairly claim the Christian view of progress is more consonant with what we know of human nature, and more useful as a practical creed. Avoiding, on the one hand, the pessimism which would lead us to undervalue the benefits achieved by Christian civilisation, and on the other hand, that delusive optimism so rife in the last century, when so many enthusiastic progressivists wrote and spoke as if progress were automatic process which would inevitably bring betterment to mankind, given sufficient time, the Christian idea of progress concerns itself, not with the race in the abstract, but with the individual in the concrete. It gains its inspiration, not from the hope of benefiting posterity, but from the belief that in some halting, confused way it is co-operating with supreme Beneficence. It affirms that man possesses the germ of perfection, but does not anticipate that this will be brought to fruition at any future time much more easily than to-day. And this development can only take place as the growth itself absorbs the light and vivifying influence which streams from Heaven.

CLAUDE C. H. WILLIAMSON.

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THE PHILOSOPHER AS SOCIAL INTERPRETER.[1]

JOHN M. MECKLIN

CERTAIN difficulties will always beset the philosopher in both teaching and research. As the critic and interpreter of life he must have something of the unshackled imagination of the poet, and yet he must keep philosophy at least a *geistliche Wissenschaft*, or be discredited in a scientific age. He must manipulate abstractions many times removed from the level of factual details, and yet he must never forget that these abstractions are only mental tools for the interpretation of experience. His life is one of high adventure and yet he dare not let himself degenerate into a spiritual buccaneer. He seeks the truth for its own sake, fearlessly and patiently, but the very purity of his purpose and the critical aloofness of his method may easily transform him into the prince of "high-brows."

Great philosophers from Socrates to the present have combined in varying measure two elements, the one speculative, iconoclastic, radical, the other empirical, constructive and profoundly conservative. Socrates was called the "gadfly" of Athens. He was in a deeper sense a social critic, seeking the reformulation of the discredited loyalties of his fellows. Every philosopher must have something of the "gadfly" in his nature. He must be the deadly enemy of outworn tradition and conceited ignorance. He must set free through the severe application of critical method on the one hand, and through the inspiration of the speculative imagination on the other. But these critical and speculative powers must be brought to heel in terms of a sober and reasoned sense of social responsibility. The irresponsible exercise of the critical powers leads to the negation of the intellect itself just as the unchecked in-

[1] Read at the meeting of the American Philosophical Association, December 29, 1920.

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dulgence of the speculative imagination encourages moral obtuseness in matters of daily life.

If we are honest with ourselves we must confess that much of our contemporary philosophy is occasional, fragmentary, negative, even futile. It lacks on the one hand the vitalizing effect of immediate relation to great political, economic or ethical issues, and on the other the clearness of aim and the balance of judgment derived from sympathetic contacts with the past. It often seems esoteric and fails to interest even the members of the philosophical fraternity, not to mention outsiders, because of difficult *termini technici* and the subtle differentiations between the various positions of the disputants. Technical terms and refinements of points of view are, of course, inevitable, even indispensable in many subjects, and especially in one as abstruse as philosophy. But the question may well be asked whether the superb critical abilities that spend themselves in more or less futile efforts to make clear the refinements of one's own point of view, or to grasp the subtleties of an opponent's position, might not be put to better use attacking the problems of the history of thought, or those of the existing social order about whose reality and pressing nature there cannot be the slightest doubt.

There are various ways in which philosophers react to this call sounded by the social issues of the day. It is often contended that the philosopher is neither a social scientist nor a social reformer, but that he sustains much the same relations to the social disciplines that the pure scientist sustains to the applied sciences. He is interested in the search for pure truth and the cultivation of the life of the intellect. The results of his investigations may have value for the educator, preacher, or social reformer, but that is merely incidental to his main task, namely, untrammeled speculative inquiry.

This view which is as old as Plato and eminently respectable has much to commend it. In a democratic age menaced by the tyrannous mediocrity of the average man it insists upon the right of the intellect to live its own life.

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Its noble disinterestedness is a salutary influence in an acquisitive society motivated for the most part by an appeal to selfish impulses. Its academic calm lends itself to a sympathetic appreciation of the great thinkers of the past, too often discounted by the pragmatic appeal of the present. On the other hand, the cultivation of the philosophical impulse in an atmosphere of academic aloofness has its dangers. For the philosopher, no more than any other thinker, can do his best work without the stimulus of real problems, and the nearer his problems lie to life the greater the value as well as the vigor of his thought. We are living, furthermore, in a social order that is becoming more and more self-conscious. As this self-consciousness grows, society will insist that each member share its burdens, enter whole-heartedly into its hopes and fears and make his contribution, though it be ever so small, to the solution of the eternal social question. The training as well as the interests of the philosopher often incline him to resist this social pressure. He naturally seeks aloofness. The eddies and quiet back waters lend themselves to the philosophic mood far better, doubtless, than does the turbulent mid-channel, but it should not be forgotten that eddy and back water are merely by-products of the stream.

Finally this conception of the philosopher as the unprejudiced and academic seeker after truth seems to imply a similarity between the philosopher and the pure scientist that does not exist. Science deals with the *faits accomplis*. The permanence and trustworthiness of its conclusions rest upon the uniform consensus of experience centering around these facts. Philosophy, however, except in the case of the history of thought, does not deal primarily with a body of facts that are given once and for all. For this reason we can hardly point to a growing and unchallenged body of philosophical truth as in the case of the sciences. Professor Lovejoy, in an able presidential address of several years ago, suggested that so far from desiring such a body of scientific truth our philosophers are apparently more interested in maintaining the "unique," and consequently the unscien-

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tific nature of philosophy. They seem to prefer the insights, original ideas or new hypotheses of the individual thinker to any tested body of scientific truth. In this they seem to be abetted by their reading public, for, remarks Professor Lovejoy, "The qualities which the general reader most values in philosophical books are not, as a rule, 'scientific' qualities. The public, for the most part, reads its metaphysics as it reads its poetry—for the moods it awakens, for the personality which it expresses, for the uses of edification to which it may be put, for the sense of being in the presence of the vastnesses and profundities which it affords, often for the mere pleasure of being mystified" (*Philosophical Review*, Vol. XXVI, p. 541). If we admit, as apparently we must, the inapplicability of anything like the co-operative methods of scientific research in philosophy, what right have we to claim for the philosopher a rôle of greater social significance than that of the poet, the essayist, or the romancer? Is philosophy to become merely an adjunct to literature? This seems to be a possibility unless we insist that the philosopher is neither poet nor essayist, nor yet reformer, but a critic and interpreter who seeks to see life clearly and to see it whole.

Opposed to the academic and idealistic conception of the rôle of the metaphysician is the general tendency to seek more social contacts for philosophy. The Syndicalist movement in France as interpreted by Georges Sorel, with its emphasis upon the strike, or a widespread, unpremeditated and violent effort for an immediate gain, has affiliations with the realistic implications of Bergson's intuitionism. Bergson's subordination of the logical continuity and purposefulness of the intellect to the irrational urge of instinct lends itself to a social philosophy that may easily become disintegrating, even revolutionary. The movement in England towards gild socialism has found a philosophical protagonist in Bertrand Russell, who sees in the gild a better instrument for the expression of the free creative impulses of the individual than is furnished by the state and the machinery of capitalism. Russell's glorifica-

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tion of the untrammeled impulses of the individual, however, tends to discredit the disciplinary training of the institution without which impulse and individual initiative are meaningless. Among American thinkers the radical empiricists have gone farthest, perhaps, in their insistence that philosophy should be the hand-maiden of society. The exigencies of the curriculum, not to mention the scarcity of really great teachers, will always handicap our efforts to make philosophy a genuine force in the community. And yet the influence of John Dewey in education and of William James in religion indicates that there are other ways in which this end can be accomplished. How long before the philosophers will do for that valley of dry bones, the prevailing eighteenth century ideas in politics and economics, what James and Dewey have done for religion and education?

If it be asked in what way the philosopher can best play his part as the critic and interpreter of life, the reply is that his rôle in any community will be conditioned by the type of social organization, the needs and the national characteristics of the people concerned. As critic and interpreter he must fit himself into his day and age. What are the characteristics of American life? The American ideal, in so far as it can be said to exist, is neither philosophical nor ethical, nor yet religious. It is an ideal of *action*. The American takes life uncritically as he finds it and precipitates himself with abandon into various lines of endeavor, trusting to the give and take of clashing wills and the dumb compelling logic of the brute facts to show him the meaning of it all and to define the goal. In so far as he has any scheme of values, any thought-out plan, it is conventional and schematic. He yields himself uncritically to any idea that is appealing, or to any hypothesis that is plausible, trusting to the logic of events to set him right. He wastes no tears on shattered ideals; he has no time to correct false hypotheses; his successes are harvested in haste; his blunders are ignored or forgotten; his experiences are hardly evaluated before he must lose himself once more in the hurly

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burly of action. Whatever gains are his are pragmatic, even haphazard in character. Seldom does he seek the *raison d'être* of things. He is not interested in the whole point of view.

The weaknesses of such a way of life are apparent. Being ever at the mercy of the immediately given, being tyrannized over as it were by an eternal and inescapable *Now*, we are seldom able to see the beginning from the end, or grasp the meaning of things. The actor in the drama may easily mistake the mere pleasurable glow of his own strenuous endeavors for progress. The task finished always points to other tasks lying just beyond, and this immediate sequence of act upon act, of event upon event, may be mistaken for growth, but such an assumption is entirely gratuitous. We may be merely the dupes of "the whirligig of time." Finally the ideas, beliefs or happy thoughts, struck out, as it were, white hot in the midst of the struggle may glow and fascinate like the sparks from the anvil, but they are apt to be just as short-lived. They lack the logical sequence, the maturity and the satisfying power that prolonged reflection alone can give. They are casual and crude thereby betraying their adventitious origin.

There are three qualities which the philosopher must possess if he is to make himself of the greatest service in this eminently pragmatic American society. First he must live *en rapport* with his fellows even though he be paying merely a lip homage to the democratic mania for the immediate and the obvious. In the second place he must cultivate the historical attitude. And finally he must strive to supply in a measure, at least, what the average American so desperately needs just at present, a thought-out view of the whole, a socially helpful scale of values.

From the days of Jonathan Edwards and Benjamin Franklin there has existed a curious dualism in the spiritual life of America. Our best minds, devoted to those higher cultural interests we associate with literature, education, and philosophy, have drifted aimlessly in the eddies, or lain

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becalmed in the quiet back waters, while the great central stream of American life has plunged forward under the more or less planless urge of a philosophy of action in business and politics. The inevitable effect of this dualism is moral and spiritual impotence and the pessimism that always dogs the skirts of unreason. The shock of the great war has only brought out in more glaring fashion this lack of national integrity. The philosopher is by training and interests the synthesizer; it is he above all others who should give us the whole point of view. The philosopher, as a leader among our intellectuals, is to no small degree responsible for the present moral bankruptcy, the blatant philistinism, the cynical selfishness, the opportunism and disquieting aimlessness of American life. He who unwisely separates himself from his fellows usually incapacitates himself thereby for serving his fellows.

For the effective discharge of his duty as the critic and interpreter of life it is imperative that the philosopher bring to his task the historical point of view. There will doubtless always be a place for the historical criticism of the German type with its meticulous regard for the more or less unimportant details of the history of thought, its pious records of the stately steppings of the *Weltgeist*. But the history of thought must be emancipated from the aristocratic unreality of Hegelian traditions. If I may be pardoned for using a threadbare term, it must be socialized. American philosophers have as yet failed to give to the average citizen any intelligent interpretation of the spiritual background of our present civilization. We become deeply interested in the social and political *milieu* from which Rousseau's thought sprang. We sketch with enthusiasm the evolution of the England of John Locke. We follow the ethereal stream of romantic idealism as it meandered from Germany to England and thence to this country. But we leave our fellow countrymen to struggle in despair with the mysterious forces of "the Great Society" in which they are living.

It is, of course, an easier and a far more grateful task to

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trace the development of speculative thought than it is to unravel the inchoate mass of ideas, habits, conventions and what not that center around such social phenomena as Protestantism or big business. To understand Hegelianism, for example, we go to the printed page, the academic discussions of the class room, or at most to the traditions of a more or less restricted group of scholars whose very existence is unknown to the great mass of their contemporaries. Yet it will hardly be denied that the influence of Hegelianism upon the life and thought of the average American is small indeed as compared with the *Weltanschauung* that took shape in the legalistic mind of John Calvin and still moulds in countless ways our political, esthetic, economic and moral ideals. Witness the present belated effort to revive the old "blue laws." It is indeed a curious fact that the far-reaching implications of the philosophy of Protestantism of the Reformed type for industry, as well as morals, art and religion were first grasped by Max Weber, a German economist, and found in a German theologian, Ernst Troeltsch, their first philosophical interpreter.

May I be permitted to cite one other illustration of my contention? It is a familiar fact that Adam Smith and David Hume were contemporaries, the dates of their births and deaths lying only a few years apart. The ideas of the former, especially in economics, became ingrained into the life of the English-speaking peoples and, joining forces with the mechanistic implications of the inventions that gave rise to the Industrial Revolution, culminated in our highly mutualized and centralized social order in which the machine-process is harnessed and made to serve the ends of an acquisitive society. The philosophical ideas growing out of this melange of mechanism and egoistic hedonism operate to-day with tremendous force to shape the thought and life of millions of Americans who never heard of David Hume. I should not, of course, make this an argument for dropping Hume and teaching Adam Smith, but it does seem that ideas actually influencing men in present-day society

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ought to enjoy at least equal consideration in our study of the history of thought with ideas more purely academic and speculative in their appeal. There is, for example, no more fascinating task for the philosopher to-day than the critical study of the conflict between the outworn natural rights doctrines embodied in the organic law of the land as well as in business ethics and the world-view slowly taking shape among the workers and other groups under the cultural incidence of the machine-process and big business.

To his sensitiveness to present-day issues and his sympathetic insight into the historical background the philosopher should add the whole point of view. For without this whole point of view his work as interpreter is apt to be lame and impotent. This is the most difficult part of the philosopher's task. It will be contended that the vast complexity of modern life makes any whole point of view impossible. The speculations of our ablest minds, we are told, are at best superficial generalizations, their appearance of finality being due to artificial logical coherence rather than to an actual grasp of the facts. It will be asserted, furthermore, that anything like successful system-building is only possible at the close of an era. But we are apparently entering upon a new era. Experience is crowding in upon us in chaotic and irrational fashion. We are bewildered by an avalanche of opaque brute facts. Our perspective has been seriously distorted if not destroyed. We are hardly far enough along yet to attempt a systematic interpretation of the meaning of things. There seems to be a very general feeling, indeed, that the system-builder is at least temporarily discredited. We can detect a curious decentralization of interests among the philosophers. They are neglecting for the moment the time-honored problems of metaphysics for more immediate and pressing interests largely social in character. Some are moving towards the camp of the political scientist, others towards that of the jurist, and still others towards that of the economist. This seems tacitly to recognize that what men want is not so much a reasoned interpretation of the

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universe as light upon their immediate problems. Perhaps it is just as well to lay the basis for our whole point of view first in the several departments of our highly complex life. In this way, perhaps, by "line upon line and precept upon precept, here a little and there a little," we may hope to accumulate in time the material that will facilitate a satisfactory approximation toward the final synthesis that is always the goal of the philosopher.

Whatever its difficulties the philosopher cannot escape this, his supreme task. His social significance will be measured mainly in terms of the extent to which he enables his fellow men to see life as an intelligible and purposeful whole. Professor Hoernlé, commenting upon the recent Congress of Philosophy at Oxford, says that the debates "left on all its members, who could look beneath the surface, one deep and abiding impression—the impression that philosophy is the one force which amidst the diverse and often centrifugal tendencies of modern thought and life makes for integration. True the task is huge and probably beyond the power of any single thinker. Still the value of philosophy is precisely in this that it alone has the ambition to attempt the task of integration. . . . It stands for the conviction of the unity of civilization. To realize this unity by a survey, and total interpretation, of all the main provinces of man's rational activities is the program of every thinker fully alive to the opportunities and the need" (*The New Republic*, December 15, 1920).

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DEATH CONTROL.

BENJAMIN IVES GILMAN.

I.

SHOULD mankind aim to control death as it is already aiming to control birth?

The two proposals concern the two limits of life—its *terminus a quo* and its *terminus ad quem*—in opposite ways. The practice now termed birth control is a method of prevention. Death cannot be prevented indefinitely, and men already do all in their power to delay it. A further control over death is possible only in the sense of hastening it.

The moral consciousness of man says no. Every human life is inviolable with the single exception of the life that itself violates life. The ancient statute, "*Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed,*" maintains the sanctity of life by proposing to leave alive only those that respect it. Accordingly, moral theory—far removed from the practice of mankind—forbids suicide altogether, and permits homicide only in self-defence, individual or national, as in the execution of criminals or the slaughter of enemies.

Plain facts fully justify the conclusion of morality. Constituted as men now are and are likely long to remain, they are obviously unfitted to decree death *de novo* in the best interest of all concerned. They are even reluctant to allow their minds to dwell upon death at all.

This is a humiliating situation for a being supposed capable of looking before and after. It was vividly depicted by Addison in his "*Visions of Mirzah.*"[1] The dreamer sees human life as a bridge, lost in impenetrable cloud at either end, crowded with travellers, and full of concealed openings upon the tide of Eternity rolling beneath.

". . . my Heart was filled with a deep Melancholy to see several dropping unexpectedly in the midst of Mirth and Jollity, and catching at everything that stood by them to save themselves. Some were looking

[1] Spectator No. 159.

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up toward the Heavens in a thoughtful Posture and in the midst of a Speculation stumbled and fell out of sight. Multitudes were very busy in the pursuit of Bubbles that glittered in their Eyes and danced before them; but often when they thought themselves within the reach of them, their Footing failed and down they sunk."

Yet the behavior of Mirzah's travellers, unworthy as it seems of rational beings conscious that an inevitable end awaits them, was in reality their wisest course as symbols of humanity. The insuperable obstacles to any other appear in contrasting death control with birth control. Birth and death may be likened to the weaving of new meshes and the rupture of old meshes in a web representing mankind. The weaving of a new mesh is of first concern to those by whom it is woven; but once the new mesh has taken up its share of the strain on the web, its rupture sends a thrill far and wide through the others. In deciding upon the wisdom or unwisdom of a birth, the interests of the mother are the first to be considered. Subordinate to these are the threefold interests of the community: that its numbers should at least be maintained, that they should not outrun the available means of subsistence, and that the newcomer should be well-born. Of these interests the last two, economic and eugenic, coincide with those of the mother and are advanced by birth control. But the first, the interest of the community in race fertility, may conflict with the mother's interests and be defeated by birth control. Race fertility has accordingly been invested with the dignity of duty. Orientals have bowed before the right of ancestors to honor from descendants; and Occidentals have blindly followed the precept, "*Be fruitful and multiply.*" Both have exalted the right of the community above its real superior, the right of the mother; whence birth control receives its unjust flavor of impiety.

By comparison with the wisdom or unwisdom of a birth, the wisdom or unwisdom of a death is an incalculable thing. The question involves at once the inward nature and the outward responsibilities of the life whose end it debates—at once the make of the mesh and its share in the strain col-

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lectively borne by the web. Weighing the inward facts and outward claims together, do the interests of all concerned, some of them invariably passionate, require that the mesh should hold, or were it better severed? Manifestly, the inquiry is wholly beyond the powers of the dense and selfish race that man still is. There is ample ground for the universal ban upon the taking of human life.

Nevertheless, in frequent instances the most exceptionally intelligent and sympathetic persons agree that death in anticipation of the course of nature would be a blessing. One or other natural or accidental death is often spoken of as a release. Life, then, either the superannuated, the exhausted, the diseased, the ill-begotten or the ill-starred life was an evil while it lasted. It might better have ended earlier in the interest not alone of the senile, the worn-out, the moribund, the defective or the disgraced himself, but of valid companions whose lives were temporarily devastated or permanently crippled by the effort of his maintenance. Such instances are familiar in every personal experience; and abound in the asylums and prisons where the incapacitated and the criminal beyond any human aid are supported for years and decades at the cost of hopeful lives without.

Can nothing at all be done to remedy so great an evil? A humane instinct prompts men to put wounded animals out of their misery. Shall the one animal be spared whose misery may be the profoundest of all? Sir Thomas More relates that in Utopia the suicide of helpless and hopeless sufferers, if by allowance of priests and magistrates, is accounted an honorable death. The Utopias of the poets go further. Kent veils his loyal purpose in the closing rhymes of Lear—like the gleam of invisible lightning from a departing storm—

> "I have a journey, sir, that I must go,
> My master calls me, I must not say no."

and Othello dramatizes his impulse of remorse:

> "I took by the throat the circumcisèd dog
> And smote him, thus."

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In real life the poet Landor, after writing at seventy-five, in the Dying Speech of an old Philosopher

> "I warm'd both hands before the fire of Life,
> It sinks, and I am ready to depart."

and after proposing eight years later to sign a new book "by the late W. S. Landor," was fain to wait six other years for the bronchial spasm in which he died. Which attitude, the imagined or the real, better befits a man?

Homicide beyond the statutory limits of self-defence is permitted by various unwritten laws in communities law-abiding otherwise. The criminal against a woman is pursued and slain, and juries acquit the slayer. The brothers-in-arms of an officer who has disgraced his rank do not hesitate to lay the means of death before him. England and America have in recent years been willing at least to discuss, if only to condemn, two other types of homicide. The suggestion that the superannuated should be put to death painlessly was a grim jest whose source of publicity proved its flavor of earnest. The refusal of a surgeon to save a malformed infant for a life of misery boldly revealed an open secret.

By these acts and proposals some of the best of men deny the sanctity of human life, and affirm a limited competence of reason to determine its duration. In certain cases it may be right to take a human life *de novo*. The new opinion nevertheless remains an undercurrent. The overshadowing hindrance to death control has already been noted. Whatever the competence of mankind to administer death, in exceptional cases, to the best interest of all, men do not dare to look death in the face.

II.

Scientifically regarded, what is death? I find that any organism I call living is liable sooner or later suddenly to exchange its habitual characteristics for certain others progressively dissimilar, and eventually to crumble into dust. The moment of this sudden change I call its death.

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But when the organism that dies is a human being, something else happens. From that moment I can no longer carry on what I call communication with something that I call the mind of the human being in question. The supposition that this something that I call its mind exists is the supposition that there exist sensations, emotions and thoughts I never can have nor ever could have had. The supposition that I can communicate with this mind is the supposition that through the body in question I can inspire sensations, emotions and thoughts like mine among the inaccessible stream I postulate and that elements of this may likewise be inspired among mine. By these definitions the two suppositions are totally incapable of verification. Otherwise expressed, the existence of a mind companionable with mine in connection with the body I call another human being is a fundamentally non-scientific hypothesis. It is worth while to make this matter plain even at the cost of a further excursion among the aridities of logic.

The logical theory known as scientific method is capable of two interpretations which may be called respectively the egoistic and the alternistic.

According to the egoistic interpretation, science demands that I believe nothing which *I* could not directly observe, given proper conditions. This personal observation is what on this interpretation is called verification. The speculations of physics, however recondite their modern forms, are still scientific hypotheses because still possibly verifiable. It is imaginable that the future may provide aids to my perception which would show me the vicissitudes of molecules or the whirl of vortices. Likewise the conclusions of history are scientific hypotheses because not impossibly verifiable. For example, it is imaginable, and has been imagined, that just as the light from a distant star reveals its past and not its present, so the reflected light rays from the earth, could I outstrip them and reveal their secrets, would present to my sight the events of the past of this planet as they actually occurred. But the hypothesis of the existence of another person is literally impossible of

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verification. To conceive that I should observe that which, should it be observed, not I but another would observe it, is irrational.

According to the alternistic interpretation, science demands that we believe nothing which *some one* could not directly observe given proper conditions. This conception of alternative observation gives another sense to verification in which the existence of other persons is assumed. Accordingly the existence of other persons cannot be verified or falsified; because an assertion cannot be proved or disproved by a method which implies it.

Hence the belief in the existence of other persons is either contra-scientific or infra-scientific, and in either case is beyond the scope of either scientific sanction or scientific interdict. It is unscientific on the egoistic theory of scientific method; and on the alternistic theory is a part of the faith of science, on which evidence pro or con is built, but to which it does not apply.

It is of the deepest importance to recognize this logical situation. Any philosophizing which begins with Mind, the Self, or the pronoun We, as much philosophizing does, neglects to lay the foundation, set the axis, touch the *primum mobile* of philosophy. When clearly apprehended, the fact that the existence of other persons is a pure unsupported faith in each of us reduces the question of death for each of us to its proper status, secondary to the question of life. In advance of the question "*Do I lose my friends at death?*" stands the question "*Have I ever had them in life?*" In advance of the question "*Can the soul die?*" stands the question "*Does the soul live?*"

"*Does the soul live?*" Does this universe really contain a congeries of things unknowable not merely to me but each to every other? All of us, scientific and unscientific alike, profess this preposterous creed, impossible of any scientific proof or disproof. Moreover, our greatest happiness is bound up in the fact that we do so believe. Our greatest unhappiness also. For these creations of our fancy and our faith which we call "others" are at any moment liable

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to leave us without grounds for either fancy or faith concerning them. The pain of final parting from those we love is the one evil that no reforms will ever banish from among men, that no Utopias have ever done more than gloss over or pass by.

Moreover, there is one body upon whose fate my whole experience seems to depend. My own body will sooner or later suffer the great change; and what then is to happen I cannot begin to conceive. Others will doubtless survive and with them, as I foresee, that part of my experience which I fancy is duplicated in them and which we all call the world about us; but what of that side of my experience which they never share?

Death is not only the King of Terrors, the possible thief of all the other selves that are my dearest treasures; but the unavoidably advancing Mystery of Mysteries about my own self. What wonder that I dare not look it in the face?

This shrinking attitude, be it noted, is not pure cowardice. Notwithstanding the destructions upon destructions of which everyone's experience is full, the Universe is always with us to prove, as Job long ago learned, that the forces of construction are in the ascendant. The smile of Buddha, changeless if pitying, expresses the bias toward cheer that we should always nourish, in the interest as well of truth as of good courage. We should beware, then, of letting our minds dwell upon the idea of death, lest the idea of life lose its rightful primacy. "*Homo liber*," wrote Spinoza, "*de nulla re minus quam de morte cogitat*,"[1] having in mind those "*who through fear of death were all their lifetime subject to bondage.*" We may not dwell upon death; but let us face it.

To science strictly so-called, death presents no problem but that of its causation; in truth an intensely interesting and baffling problem. But to the un- or pre-scientific faith of all of us it presents the problem of problems. What is

[1] Ethics IV, 67. "Of nothing does the free man think so little as of death."

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the fate of the suppositious soul beyond the moment of what we call the death of the body it inhabits?

III.

Those bold enough to consider death deliberately have reached five main attitudes in regard to the fortunes of spirits disembodied.

One is the doctrine of half a century ago which Huxley named Agnosticism. We not only do not know, we cannot know what happens to the soul after death. The reason is that we cannot verify any hypothesis which we may make upon the subject. The scepticism begins too late. We also cannot verify any hypothesis we may make about the soul before death. Confucius' excuse for his inattention to the hereafter was similarly a lapse in logic. "*While you do not know life, what can you know about death?*" Pursued to its implication this attitude doubts also the mundane existence of others; yet Confucius based his secularistic morals upon affirming it.

A second attitude is equally inconsistent but less cautious. We do know what happens to the soul after death. Nothing happens. Annihilation is its fate. Dying in the days of Huxley, the brilliant mathematical philosopher Clifford is said to have had the words "*I am not and grieve not*" carved upon his tomb. It was a lapidary phrase of illogic which asked us to believe on scientific evidence that something had ceased which scientific evidence is unable to show had ever begun.

One form of this attitude responds to the universal human desire for a share in the future by replacing permanence of existence by permanence of influence. The "Choir Invisible," of whom George Eliot wrote, still live in "*minds made better by their presence.*" Let two pictures bring before us at once the pure dogma of the impermanence of the soul and its natural sequel, the belief in a vicarious future.

"Myra sat at the piano playing the *Berceuse* of Chopin. It begins like tolling bells, and then becomes a mingled chime, and then a fairy carillon

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such as no belfry in the world could yield, and then a rippling confusion of diaphanous harmonies, tangled and sleepy and wonderful, issuing at length to hesitate and break off in the same pealing melody that first led us toward the land of dreams.

"Laura thought of Jean Paul's wanderer, condemned never to die, who cried to Music: '*Away, away; thou tellest me of things that never have been mine and never shall be.*' Then there came to her a strange hope, like starlight at nightfall: Were it not well, after all, that the fancy should one day cease holding up to us its magic mirror of lands inaccessible; were it not well that the soul should not feel its prison bars forever, even that which regrets having itself an end at last."

* * * * *

"It was early dawn and Laura was awake. The sky was barred with heavy gray clouds just softening the least into tints of rose. A rough wind was blowing. It had lately rained and the neighboring roofs were wet. The city lay silent as the tomb. While Laura waited for the day her thoughts took on the troubled temper of the morning. The sky was the world and raindrops were its tears. Soon a clear-toned bell from a tower nearby began to ring. Laura's thoughts followed the solemn sound across the city—to those who work while others sleep, to those who wake to ponder again the round of their anxieties, to sufferers and those who care for them, and to watchers by the dead.

"'Be still, my soul,' said Laura to herself. 'This call to others is a call to thee. Thy troubles to their myriad woes are as a raindrop to the burden of the clouds. Not what thy little life brings thee, but what it may bring them, makes it worth living. Thy joys and pains will not concern the world a few days hence; but that which thou hast done will not be lost even in the stardust of the farthest future.'

"As dawn grew to daylight the wind died down and the clouds began to break away, until, when Laura rose and stood at the window to listen again to the bell of the Cathedral, but few were left in the calm blue arch of the sky."

Such reflections reconcile and inspire, but do not satisfy. The problem of problems is the question, What befalls the soul after death? and to this question it is no rational answer to say with the first of the two moods, Nothing; and no answer at all to say with the second, Something other than the soul, namely, the influence it exerts through the body, has a glorious fate after death, namely, that of literal deathlessness. The claim may be true, but it is not germane to the problem of problems.

The remaining three main attitudes of mankind toward

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death base themselves logically upon the faith held alike by alternistic science and by common sense. The soul exists, but we must seek elsewhere than in verifiable hypothesis for light upon its fate when disembodied. Or, we may add—when not yet embodied. Less thrilling, but no less inevitable than the question whither we go, is the question whence we come.

A third attitude upon our final fate attributes to the soul after death a tepid half-existence. In Heine's last days his careless muse, irreverent and clear-sighted as ever, strummed out a pungent sketch of this alternative:

> "Er hatte Recht, der edle Heros
> Der weiland sprach im Buch Homeros
> Der kleinste lebendige Philister
> Zu Stukkert am Nekkar, viel glücklicher ist er
> Als ich, Pelides, der todte Held
> Der Schattenfürst in der Unterwelt."[3]

In a word the soul's fate is hopeless ennui. Our last sight of those who die gives a certain verisimilitude to this attitude, which the reappearance of the dead in dreams serves to strengthen. A dead body is a pale reflex of the living being we have known, and dreams are mostly more or less flat histories. In a confused way we conceive of the departed as inhabiting the sepulchre or the statue that commemorates it and sharing in an existence in which nothing in particular happens. It is a childish obsession that identifies death with close confinement in a tomb, but without its terror the idea is an abiding possession of mankind. The grave was man's "long home" to the ancient poet, and to the modern poet there "Claribel low lieth." Keats felt the daisies growing over him; a charming comradeship but far too limited for an ultimate experience. "*How sleep*

[3] Approximately in English:

> "He told the truth, that noble hero
> Who spake of old in Homer's book,
> The least Philistine on the Neckar
> In Stuttgart, living, far happier is he
> Than I, Pelides, a warrior dead
> The prince of shades in the underworld."

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the brave"; but somnolence, delightful as its indulgence may be, is a meagre substitute for waking activities. Not relying seriously on scientific fact, the fancy is impervious to the scientific observation that the corpse on whose last appearance it was based does not persist. The idle spirit is somehow supposed to emerge from the ashes or the dust of the departed, yet not into upper air, as the Greek lament and its German echo prove.

A fourth mental attitude toward the problem of problems is based upon both fear and hope. From the idea of sleep it is easy to pass to dreams:

> "To die—to sleep
> To sleep, perchance to dream;—ay, there's the rub
> * * * * *
> Thus conscience doth make cowards of us all."

We are persuaded that our sins—our wilful interferences with the rights of others—will set in motion causes whose fearful effects will appear after death—in a place of torment elsewhere, as Europe has believed, or the hell upon earth of a lower incarnation, as Asia has believed. Yet the dark picture conceals a ray of hope unlimited in promise. There is a force in the universe stronger even than justice, and that is mercy. To those who invoke this power with a will to right, the life after death has no shadows that may not disappear. The *naïveté* with which the attainable beatitude of the other world has been fancied in the terms of the dreamer's own conditions is a reminder of the limits of the life of each of us. To the Hebrew exile by a parched Mesopotamian river-bed heaven was a city like his lost capital on the Judean hills, but with never-failing floods of water pouring through its gate. The magnificent imagery of the Revelation of St. John drawn from the pomp of eastern ceremonial dwindled in the atrophied fancy of hard-worked Anglo-Saxon churchgoers of a century ago to a scene where crowns are flung indeed and harps played; but also

> "Where congregations ne'er break up
> And Sabbaths never end."

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The immunities of island life from the aggression of enemies gave to the Greco-Roman world their *Fortunatæ Insulæ* and, to the Far East of many centuries before, the Happy Islands found imaged in the ancient burial jars of China. It is because the sun is the source of all life and its setting the most beautiful event of every day that the heaven of ancient Egypt, like that of Japan, was a Western Paradise, and the soldiers of the last war went West when they died.

If we clear away all the elaborate scenery by which man has attempted to depict to himself the possible misery or bliss of a disembodied future, the cosmic stage appears set with a picture of imposing simplicity. The final mental attitude here to be described is its acceptance.

The Universe, although peopled with innumerable souls, is also one Being whose initial for that reason may be written large. The life of each embodied soul lies within Its life; the life of a finally disembodied soul is identified with Its life. Because there are bars which keep us asunder and do not exist for It, we live in trouble, It in happiness. Yet death may but prolong our pain. The sole pathway to Its beatitude is the will to live here as if we were already one, as through the Being we may become one.

To this point the picture is reflected in the main currents of thought in both Europe and Asia. But here the West parts company with the East. To the mind of Christendom the idea of bliss which is no one's bliss, the idea of being which is neither perceived nor perceiver, are not ideas in fact, but recipes for thought that cannot be compounded. To satisfy our reason the picture must present the figure of a person. The essence of the universal Being is not Law or Chance, but Will. He is all-powerful in the sense that all means other than our own individual wills are at His command. He is all-good, because what goodness means is the capacity to be moved by the desires of all and not by those of any one or many; and being the co-subject of all He is so moved.

At the bottom of our minds the one Companion reveals Himself. The so-called transcendental Ego is a double

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star. This is the great discovery immortalized for Europe in ancient Hebrew literature; and its necessary corollary, the possible inversion of the mundane relation between the components of the binary, is the message of the Christian canon which completes it. The universal Person is co-subject to the embodied spirit; the disembodied spirit is co-subject to the universal Person. "*Thou God seest me*" is the teaching of the Old Testament; "*in heaven their angels do always behold the face of my Father*" is the teaching of the New. There are no bars between the souls in heaven. The experience of each is the experience of all. Its blessedness is a secure hope because His will is our peace and because all powers apart from our own are at His hand for its accomplishment.

Were such an attitude toward the problem of problems to become a vital faith among us, the overshadowing hindrance to a rational control of death would vanish. Citizens of the world no longer, but of the universe, men would look with equanimity, in hopeful expectancy, upon its capital event as upon a problem solved.

In the particular of death, mankind has not yet emerged from the condition of a primeval forest where nothing is cut down and every plant and tree lives as long as it can. An enlightened control over death would not therefore transform the race into a formal plantation. The fancy must picture the woods freed from their thoughtless battle, passive murder and slow death, yet not disposed according to an alien geometry or other need external to their own; but such as they might be were the arbiters of life and death among them a senate of gray-haired oaks or parliament of wrinkled pines, alive to all the pains and joys of all their cousins, far and near, of the plant world. These would dismiss a hopeless shoot as soon as it had budded, yet grant a weazen sprout space to disclose its modest powers; would destroy forthwith a fatally blighted stem, yet second the gallant struggle of another ringed to a hairbreadth by the field mice of a hard winter. The ancient landmark of the

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wilderness should disappear ere the nourishment and protection owed its offspring turned into dark starvation, yet a lowly growth be undisturbed in keeping moist the last rootlets of the dying trunk whose thinning shade it clung to with affection requited.

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PRESENT-DAY TENDENCIES IN ETHICAL THEORY.

EDWIN A. BURTT.

THE problem as to how far ethical judgments and standards are relative and how far absolute seems unusually acute to many present-day writers on ethics. Not a few feel that the settlement of this problem conditions one's answer to every other ethical question, and even controls one's response to every call for an ethical judgment.

As a matter of fact we live in a world where there are both things relative and things absolute, the flowing and the fixed, the temporal and the timeless. The first type is sufficiently revealed in the ordinary facts of sense and of human actions which are never twice the same. The second type appears in the realms of logic and mathematics, where entities and relations are always the same. Can we definitely make a home for ethical standards in either one of these types? Do we find them in the flux or among the abiding forms of things? Or do they partake of elements which belong to both types of being, and if so, how much of each?

With reference to this point, it has not been sufficiently observed that authors whose sole or principal interest is in ethics or sociology almost uniformly flock to the side of the relativity of ethical standards, while those whose primary taste is for metaphysics are never quite satisfied with relativity. The reason is not far to seek. Moralists tend to isolate the moral data of experience and study them in their own terms—then if they be concerned to enter other realms of enquiry it is inevitable that they should subordinate the latter to ethics or at least attack them with rather definite presuppositions. Hume, keen and frank thinker that he was, frankly confessed this bias. His deepest interest was in morals; finding things quite relative there, he was predisposed to see relativity everywhere. This is natural to all students of morals. Some have little metaphysical

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curiosity; those who cannot quench their cravings for a more comprehensive philosophy easily read their metaphysics in the light of their moral investigations.

Such an interest and method, however, pledges them in advance to relativity, for the history of ethics, so far, at least, shows little that is fixed and changeless, little that is apparently akin to the static principles of logic and geometry. However one may desire unity and standardization, the plain facts of human history cannot be blinked—motives have been various, aims and purposes have been contradictory, values have been shifting, ideals have been flexible to the point of total transformation. Those who apply themselves first to such facts as these are apt to be strongly prejudiced by them in all their thinking. It is not to be marvelled at that thinkers like Sumner, Westermarck, Nietzsche, and others, emerge from their studies confirmed relativists. How can they escape relativity if they seek to interpret ethics in its own terms, without an equal and parallel interest in other fields of experience? The ideal scientist would begin his investigations with no preference for one realm of enquiry above another, and but one presupposition, namely, that all realms would yield truth. This would save him from partiality, though perhaps he would pay for it by achieving nothing.

However, it is among those who do try to read the whole universe at one sweep that we meet with a conscious effort to transcend ethical relativism. Believing a unified interpretation of all things possible, such men refuse to leave ethics disconnected; they insist on getting some common measuring concept to apply to all experience. Seeing in this concept something structural, something inherently characteristic of all existences, they naturally make of it the conditioning factor of ethical judgments. It becomes for them an absolute determiner of right and wrong. Ethics is brought into harmonious connection with science and logic. How far are they successful in this attempt to find fixed norms which shall apply to ethics in common with other types of subject-matter?

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It seems to me that each of the outstanding groups of philosophers has hit upon something that is truly structural in this respect, something that saves moral experience from the shaky hand of the relativist and gives it a certain degree of fixity. But most of them try in vain to pursue the philosophic game of stretching a single concept over all things. Absorbed in the heroic effort to pack the universe into one lone trunk, they forget that it is quite possible to travel with many.

Take the materialists,[1] for example. Adaptation is the word that seems to them the key to the mystery of things. All life seeks adaptation to its environment. It strives to fit into the situation in which it must live, in order that it may continue to live. Ethics, says Spencer, is just the final stage in this whole process. It is life's adaptation to a human social environment. The right act is that act which secures the best adjustment—the act which best ensures continuing existence and prosperity for the social unit. This theory neglects many important facts. But at least it forces certain indubitable facts upon our attention. Ethical activity at any moment is certainly conditioned by its environment. It does not start off *de novo*, but grows out of a past, and the past is around it still in a solidified form. Activity is impossible without a large degree of adaptation to the material situation. Living beings can do nothing without taking adequate account of the material basis of life. Still less can they act, ethically at least, without consideration of the other lives with which they are in social continuity. This continuity with the material basis of things and with the social environment conditions any ethical act or judgment so far forth. In whatever degree this determination operates, to that degree we have a constant element in the ethical situation, a part of its fixed structure that is independent of flux and change.

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[1] By "materialism" in this paper I mean the theory that would reduce all terms to physical or chemical units and all relations to formulæ of a mechanistic sort.

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Or take the idealists. For them the magic word is the absolute, or the universal. The fitness of a thing to enter the realm of logical harmony is their criterion or standard. The real world is the world of logic, the world of concepts, tied down by their definitions to a trustworthy immovability. Among these concepts are those of ethical values, which are caught up in the logical system and take their place in the abiding hierarchy of reality. Ideas such as justice, reverence, truth, love, represent groups of relations in which ethical beings are connected, all having their analogues wherever there is plurality in connectedness. It is fruitless to enquire after their origin; they are fixed types of continuity, quite independent of time. The idealist is thus concerned to maintain the conditioning of ethical conduct by the ultimate environment of all existence (the ideal), as the materialist its conditioning by the immediate environment of physical and social facts. G. P. Adams is right when he insists that ethical values are thoroughly objective. We do not project them outward from the welter of our own uneasinesses, and call them values because we create them by our wants; they are already there in their beauty and attracting power; we become uneasy because we see them, and seeing them in all their charm we come to want them. This relationship to that which is absolute actuality, that which awakens desire in us by its magnetic beauty, is a constant feature of the ethical life, and being constant, is a part of the fixed structure of things. Ethical values are themselves creative and effective, as Hocking and Bosanquet so forcefully declare; they make a difference; they produce results. They descend upon us in a very real sense, they seize us, they entice us, they draw us away into a pursuit of the good. One hears it said to-day that values exist as a means to further life. But why live? Is not life itself a value, the very summation of values? If so, there is no possibility of escaping objectivity sooner or later. Value as such is no mere means, but exists and is effective in its own right.

The idealist, too, finds mathematics in human conduct.

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I must do justice to my neighbor, says Rashdall, because he is one and I am one, and one equals one. This argument on its face seems specious, because one of its presuppositions is left out. That is the paradox that in the ethical realm my neighbor is as large a part of my life as I am myself, and is to be dealt with accordingly. I have expanded to become one with the social self, and as such I estimate my own individuality in the same light with which I regard my neighbor's. By a *coup de force* of self-transcendence I have *taken* as great an interest in my friend as in myself—I have raised conduct so far as I am concerned, into the mathematical realm—I have given my judgments Kantian universality. In these different ways idealism in its turn has discovered the abiding amid the flowing. It has glimpsed elements in the relational structure without which ethical acts and judgments are impossible.

Other schools of writers who essay to treat of ethics, the new realists, the vitalists, the individualists, and the pragmatists, hardly do more than present minor variations on one or another of these aspects of the ethical problem. Most of them try to transcend relativity and reduce ethics to something like a science, and they all move pretty definitely in one of three directions. Some treat the good as the fundamental concept, describe it in terms of human wants, and regard right or duty as simply a matter of choosing the means. This leans to the side of a materialistic view of ethical situations, though not confessedly mechanistic. It is the position of most of the new realists. Russell began in this group, but his pessimistic outlook upon the universe gradually transformed his melioristic ethics into a rather passive, mystical fellowship with the indestructible entities of logic and pure mathematics. Others lean to the side of Kantian idealism. Croce is an example of this group. Right, or duty, he insists, is always something universal and objectively valid, while human interests and wants are quite inferior, matters economic rather than ethical. In the third group are our present-day pragmatists, who maintain that both good and duty are

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fundamental ethical concepts, neither wholly reducible to the other. An attempt is made to strike a compromise between materialism and idealism on the one hand, and relativism and universality on the other. The former compromise is sought in the consideration that the ethical life is creative, not only adapting itself to the present environment, but continually making, in each of its choices, a new environment with new conditions of adaptation. This means that not only the consequences in terms of happiness determine the rightness or wrongness of an act, but also the character produced by it in the persons ethically related. This character, they would insist, has little connection with the wider effects, but depends primarily on the present motive and purpose. The latter compromise is felt after in the notion of a moving objectivity. The standard is truly objective, says Professor Tufts, but the objectivity is nothing fixed and static. It moves from generation to generation as its content changes. The fixed element is purely formal, it is merely the purposed ordering of all the factors of the situation.

This idea of a moving objectivity reveals the pragmatic interest in the mobile and changing. Of course all concrete existences are in time, and therefore moving. Are they not for that reason unsuited to be a standard, since a standard is used for purposes of measurement and must be something stable? And there is, besides concrete existences, a stable structure of reality which does afford a certain objectivity quite above time—above time because it is a system of continuities of which time is one. It would seem that an ethical standard, if it be possible at all, must be something of this sort—not a moving individual existence but a type of continuity inherent in the structure of things. Why must we fall in love, either with the flux or with the eternal? Why insist, either that existences can be reduced to structure or that structure is a mere implement for the sake of securing more existence? The connectedness and relatedness of things is neither the super-real nor the infra-real; it is, it seems to me, as real as things themselves and no more.

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In order to make a true synthesis of these various factors pragmatism needs to broaden out into a more comprehensive philosophy. It needs a deeper metaphysical interest. It needs for example to work out the larger implications of the idea of sympathy, which pragmatic writers insist must be a factor in the rational aspect of an ethical decision. Whether it can do this without abandoning the very assumptions and method which have formed the heart of pragmatism so far, will be doubted by many. It was just this idea of sympathy that led Bergson into a quite unpragmatic logic and a semi-idealistic cosmology.

EDWIN A. BURTT.

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DISCUSSION.

Mysticism and Group-Feeling.

A passage in Dr. T. H. Procter's article on "The Motives of the Soldier" in this JOURNAL of October last—an article more enlightening than anything else I have seen on the subject—moves me to a word of comment. "The curious fact," he says, "is that this hatred (of everything German) was not an individual but an army emotion. I am aware that this is the language of mysticism but I know no other to report the fact as it presents itself to me." (P. 42.) Mystical, I suppose, is something unintelligible, incomprehensible (though real), the usual experiences being in the religious field. One feels united with the object of his worship, loses his self-identity, is rapt. "It is no longer I that live, but Christ that liveth in me" is a classic statement of it. The individual is ordinarily thought of as one thing and his God another—how then can they be united? It seems mysterious when they are. Saint Paul even speaks of two becoming one in marriage as a mystery. The essential thought is that of a loss of separate being.

The interesting thing, as Dr. Procter brings home to us, is that war furnishes a parallel phenomenon. "As an individual," he says, "the British soldier had not it in him to be vindictive. But in the mass it was quite different. The British army hated the German army with a blind, furious, killing hatred." That is, the individual merged himself in his group, was practically lost in it, became its voice, hand or organ. This was also the experience more or less (sometimes more) of civilians at home. Caught up by the national spirit, they were for the time being Englishmen or Americans or Germans first, and individual human beings only secondarily. And they hated individuals of enemy groups not as individual human beings, but as Germans or Englishmen or Americans (as the case might be). There might be no personal ill-will, there might be even friendliness, and yet as *enemies* (members of the enemy groups), they hated them and were ready to kill them. Under these circumstances they could have said with literal truth, "not I, but my group lives in me," and of the enemy, "not *he*, but his group lives in him." Nietzsche, straight-seeing psychologist as he was, speaks of the "impersonal hate,"

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the "cold-blooded killing with good conscience," normally belonging to war. He remarks in general that one hates more, more violently, more innocently as a patriot than as an individual —and war, of course, is one of the manifestations of patriotism, a group-phenomenon altogether (private killing is murder, not war).

And there is another ordinary experience in which self-transcendence appears—morality, which is the antithesis of the violence and hate characteristic of war. Morality, as it originally developed, and in the main still exists, is conformity to the *mores* of the group to which one belongs. It has its meaning only within a group. In moral action and sentiment one in principle takes the side of the group and its requirements (*mores*) as against any inconsistent impulses that arise within one—one judges from the group's standpoint, becomes, as Nietzsche observes, a "collective individual." Morality is, in his terse definition, "the group (Heerde) instinct in the individual"—that is, ruling in him. In it one becomes one with the group, its function, organ.

But if "mysticism" has these very ordinary, commonplace exemplifications, is it really mysticism any longer? Is it not so far something intelligible, comprehensible, natural, even necessary—could war or morality exist without it? And do we perhaps only *speak* of mysticism (at least in these non-religious connections) as we have made an unnatural, or at least unhistorical, severance of the individual from his group in the first place? Indeed, is it possible that individuals in any proper and high sense are the end of the social process rather than present at the beginning? So Nietzsche thought, and we once find him saying accordingly that individuals are less likely to lose their balance and be insane than groups, parties, peoples, periods. And this leads to the question whether there may not be a going *down* as well as a going *up* in mystical feeling.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

STUDIES IN CONTEMPORARY METAPHYSICS. By R. F. Alfred Hoernlé. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Howe, 1920. Pp. viii, 314.

The subjects discussed in these "Studies" are: The Philosopher's Quest; The Idol of Scientific Method in Philosophy; Philosophy of Nature at the Crossroads; On Doubting the Reality of the World of Sense; "Saving the Appearances" in the Physical World; Mechanism and Vitalism; Theories of Mind; The Self in Self-Consciousness; Religion and Philosophy of Religion.

Professor Hoernlé refers to these "Studies" as "chips or blocks from a Metaphysician's workshop" and as "sketches" and "rough modellings" which precede finished work. And he promises a second volume which "will expand and defend" some of the positions taken in this volume.

In these days of numerous "schools" of philosophy, it means something to have at the outset a statement of the author's point of view. This Professor Hoernlé frankly avows as the standpoint of "Idealism," particularly the edition of it represented by Bosanquet, to whom, he says, "more than to any other single writer," he owes "the essential framework" of his own philosophical thinking. From this announcement some might expect to encounter what James called the "Barbaric Hegelian style" in these *Studies*. In this he will be pleasantly disappointed. Professor Hoernlé's writing is clear, stimulating, and graceful. One might expect also to meet "The Absolute" frequently in these pages. But not once from cover to cover, so far as I can recall, does it appear. It does not get even a perfunctory recognition in the statement of the general standpoint. Still good absolutists will be consoled for this lack of explicit recognition of the absolute when they find that by "Idealism" Professor Hoernlé means "The point of view of the whole."

A philosophy committed to this point of view has its main job cut out for it, or, viz., "the saving of appearance." As a salvager Professor Hoernlé is perhaps more successful than most perfectionists. Yet he too "has his troubles," as who has not.

The ordered harmonious whole as the object of philosophy

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must meet the demands of logic (p. 18), yet as the basis of religion it is an object of immediate experience, against doubts of which proofs of God's existence are powerless (p. 305). Again, this ordered, harmonious world, which is the object and ideal of both philosophy and religion, becomes, as the alleged goal of pragmatic moral reformers, not only impossible, but undesirable. "It may well be asked whether any world in which it is fundamentally worth while to live can be really conceived as 'Safe,' . . . because the forces which would endanger and overthrow these values are once for all destroyed?" (p. 46). But is not just this "safety" supposed to be the state of affairs in a completely unified and harmonious world?

Professor Hoernlé's presentation of the positions he criticises is most admirably objective and sympathetic. In his discussion of Instrumentalism and Pragmatism, however, he, in common with most critics, assumes that instrumentalism ignores contemplation, because it does not recognize it in its theory of *knowledge*. This assumption overlooks the fact that instrumentalism gives no place to contemplation in *knowledge* precisely because it gives it a place of honor in immediate, æsthetic and social experience. Bring it into knowledge and you have on your hands two independent and unrelated species of knowledge, each with its own standard and method, and at once trouble begins with the conflicts and confusions of the rival claims.

The limits assigned to these comments allow no indication of the discriminating analyses and defining of issues which make up the body of the *Studies*. The treatment of the mind-body problem, of mechanism and telology, of the weaknesses of traditional science and of Neo-Realism deserve special mention.

The title page of the volume reads: "R. F. Alfred Hoernlé, Harvard University." I am sure I speak for all "on this side" who have known Professor Hoernlé either by "acquaintance," with his genial and stimulating personality, or by "knowledge about" him through his writings, when I say that it is with deepest regret that we are obliged to say that the words "Harvard University" have now only an historical reference. Professor Hoernlé's return to England leaves a big gap in the ranks of the American division of philosophers. But I think every student of contemporary philosophy will agree that however it may be in politics, in philosophy, the difference in longitude between England and America counts for very little—and we may hope

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through Professor Hoernlé's international experience it will count for even less.

A. W. Moore.

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The Control of Parenthood. By various writers, edited by James Marchant. London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1921. Pp. xii, 203. Price, 7s. 6d. net.

The point of view of the contributors to this collection is so varied that the general public seeking for enlightenment may "come out by that same door wherein it went." There is no editing, in the strict sense of the word; and we look without guidance from one fact of the subject to another, and from the utterance of convinced Malthusians to ardent propaganda of rigid theologians; but the level of some of the contributions is high, and the earnestness and high purpose of all contributors is self-evident.

Though it cannot be said that the world is at present overpopulated, the problem of population and food supply is a burning one. The most diverse views are expressed as to the possibility of increasing the world's food supply; and optimists, such as Prince Kropotkin, have seen the solution of the problem in intensive culture. The natural checks of the past have been infanticide, famine, epidemics, and frequent wars; and the infant mortality of the middle ages was enormous. Parents, as Dean Inge observes, bore lightly the dismal procession of cradles and coffins as a dispensation of Providence; in many cases the mother also died early, worn out. Luther in a brutal passage says, "What matter? It is what she is there for."

During the industrial revolution in England the population increased with extraordinary rapidity. The most widespread prosperity was in the middle of the Victorian period, when the birth rate reached the maximum of 36.3 per thousand. But, as Mr. Havelock Ellis says, "the significance of this epoch was built over a Hell to which the imagination of Dante never attained." Children were sent out in tender years to increase their parents' income, and the employers said "Amen." "Those who have gone deeply into natural history," adds Professor J. A. Thomson, "say that foxes approve of large families among rabbits." In the middle years of the Victorian period there were "overpopu-

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lation" meetings, and while men were arguing how to stem the torrent of babies, the birth rate began to fall in 1877 and the movement of decreasing birth rate is now common to all highly civilised nations. Leaving on one side contributory causes of this decline, the Registrar General for England has made the statement that nearly 70 per cent of the drop must be ascribed to voluntary restriction.

This existing voluntary restriction is the subject of the present symposium. Ecclesiastical teaching regards restriction by contraceptives and modern preventives as a grave evil. In the *Report of the Declining Birth-rate* (1916), certain ecclesiastical authorities recommend that where husband and wife for any cause desire to limit their family they should confine their intercourse to the period in the month when conception is improbable, this method of birth control (pp. 358 and 403) is declared to be "natural," while on pages 386 and 401 it is plainly stated that this method is legitimate because its success is uncertain. In other words (as Mr. Harold Cox observes) no sin is committed in trying to dodge the Divine ordinance which connects sexual intercourse with procreation, provided only an off-chance is left for the will of God to operate (!) (p. 85).

The whole problem is created by the fact that in the reproductive instinct we have the strongest instance of what Metchnikoff calls the maladaptations caused by civilisation. Turning to Dean Inge's interesting paper on the economic aspects, there is no overt condemnation of artificial restriction of the birth rate. He indicates, however, that there may "easily be a great outbreak of outwardly decent licentiousness, protected by the new methods of avoiding its consequences, and perhaps even a toleration of abnormal practices which Christian ethics greatly diminished or drove undergound" (p. 65). Dr. Mary Scharleib, though with no theological bias, protests against the limitation of families as "wrong and dangerous," and not "really in the interest of overburdened mothers." But she is inclined to rely too much upon the beneficial action of an Utopian and omnipotent state and vague talk about "intensive cultivation, chemical and electrical." The Bishop of Birmingham, also, is content to throw the burden upon the State, which is to see to it that every child shall be cared for so that inefficients shall be almost unknown (p. viii). The economists and biologists regard, on the other hand, the restriction of the birth rate as the beneficial result of the application of

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human reason to the problem of overpopulation; parents practising birth control are, as it were, "conducting" lightning to the ground. Professor Arthur Thomson shares the view of Mr. Havelock Ellis that birth control within limits makes for progress and is likely to continue to do so, being not race suicide, but race saving, and suggests that the dangers associated with birth control are in a process of being reduced, "though the substitution of mechanical control for moral control can never be regarded with *entire* equanimity." It will be clear that antagonistic as are the conclusions of the various contributors, this little book, representing all schools of opinion, deserves to be widely read.

F. B.

THE LETTERS OF WILLIAM JAMES. Edited by his son, Henry James. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1920. In two volumes, Vol. I, pp. xvi, 348; Vol. II, pp. 382. Price, 42s. net.

These letters, which are chiefly informal and intimate, and cover the activity of William James from his boyhood to his death, are prefaced by an introduction which gives indispensable information about his ancestry and upbringing. There is no doubt that James's native mobility and detachment of mind were strengthened by the influences of his home and early travel, though his fresh and inquiring intelligence could not have been permanently confined by any schooling. His early education was a matter of shreds and patches picked up in New York, Boulogne and Geneva. His father, the elder William James, was an enemy to priggishness; "I had rather," he declared, "have a son of mine corroded with all the sins of the decalogue than have him perfect," and his peculiar temperament stimulated the intelligence and individuality of his sons. William James could not for a time find his vocation, and knocked at the doors of art and medicine. According to Mr. Santyana, he retained in these a professional touch and an unconscious ease which he hardly acquired in metaphysics; "I suspect" (Santyana adds), "he had heartily admired some of his masters in those other subjects, but had never seen a philosopher whom he would have cared to resemble. His excursions into philosophy were of the nature of raids." To some of his brother philosophers, especially to those of absolutist and rationalistic camps, James always remained an enigma and an amateur. The fact that James began by teaching

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anatomy and physiology, and passed on to psychology and at last to philosophy, was cited as if his interest in each subject had been the fruit of his experience in teaching the preceding subject, and as if philosophy was, as it were, a new hobby when he turned to it in later life. As Mr. Henry James points out, however, the centre of his interest was always religious and philosophical. He called psychology "a nasty little subject," and added, "all one cares to know lies outside." In later life, he became more and more irritated at being addressed as a psychologist; though it was through his *Principles of Psychology* (1890) that he at once stepped into the front rank of psychologists, and into full prominence among the lay public.

James then turned to his central religious and metaphysical preoccupations. His view of religion is well expressed in the popular *Varieties of Religious Experience*. His aim in this, as he sums it up in a letter, was to "defend (against all the prejudices of my 'class') 'experience' against 'philosophy' as being the real backbone of the world's religious life—I mean prayer, guidance, and all that sort of thing immediately and privately felt." He rejected Monism totally: "May not the notion of a world already saved *in toto* anyhow be too saccharine to stand? Doesn't the very 'seriousness' that we attribute to life mean that ineluctable noes and losses form a part of it, that there are genuine sacrifices somewhere, and that something permanently drastic and bitter always remains at the bottom of its cup?"

At the age of sixty-three he turned to the formulation of his empiric philosophy, with (as Mr. Henry James writes) all the eagerness of a school boy let out to play. The results were partly embodied in *Pragmatism*—a new name for some old ways of thinking, in *A Pluralistic Universe*, and in numerous essays since published in book form, but when he died, the systematic statement of his philosophy had not been rounded out, and he knew that he was leaving it "too much like an arch built only on one side." This informal biography is not, however, concerned in a systematic study of James the philosopher, but rounds off the picture for the outer world of a most individual and living personality, a man to whom life spoke in even more ways than to most men, and to whose superabundant confusion he responded with passion and insatiable curiosity.

M. JOURDAIN.

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THE FINANCIAL ORGANISATION OF SOCIETY. By Harold G. Moulton. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1921. Pp. 789.

Not until a college student is well advanced in the study of finance does he begin to fully appreciate the closely interwoven financial structure of modern society. This is not so often the fault of the student, as of the curriculum under which he receives his training. Professor Moulton has attempted to meet this problem in his most recent book, in which he presents a general survey of the characteristics and functions of financial institutions and the instruments used in their operation. By presenting the material in this form to the beginning student in finance, he purposes not only to give a better appreciation of the interrelationships of all private financial institutions, but a more effective background for the student's advanced work in finance. This is an aim certainly to be commended.

The subject matter of the book can be roughly classified under eight divisions. The first of these divisions involves a study of the characteristics of money, regulation of money systems, foreign exchanges and their rôle in modern society. The second division treats of the nature and functions of credit, the general mechanism of financial institutions together with the credit instruments used in raising both fixed and current capital. Division three covers the general problem of marking securities, while division four describes the institutions and the methods by which securities are handled. Division five, which comprises nearly half the book, discusses commercial banking. Consequently, the author has been able in this part of the book to make a more complete analysis of banking operations along with his description of banking systems, including the Federal Reserve System. Division six describes the instrument of agricultural credit, and division seven, such institutions as pawnbroking, loan sharks, co-operative credit unions, Morris Plan banks, etc., which are termed consumptive credit institutions. In division eight the author gives a general discussion on financial integration and the relation of financial organizations to society. As the book is devoted to the institutions of private finance, no consideration is given to public finance.

Each chapter is followed by an unusually complete set of questions which should be of great value to both teacher and student. The financial organization charts, while very useful in setting forth

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the financial structure of society in its entirety, should not be used except with the limitations given in the text.

A book which is written, as Professor Moulton states, "for the purpose of giving the beginning student a general background of the whole financial structure" must necessarily be more descriptive than analytical. Despite this, the author has succeeded in weaving into the structure of the book the basic principles underlying the financial structure of society as well as pointing out its important defects. The outstanding contribution of the book, of course, is embodied in the concept of the book as a whole, namely to correlate the whole financial structure of society (*i.e.*, of private finance).

While the author has anticipated the criticism that will generally be made of his lack of treatment of the relation of credit and money to prices, the reviewer cannot help but refer to the very brief recognition of this subject in Chapter Two. After all, one of the most important considerations of the monetary problem to-day is this relationship. Briefer treatment might well have been given to the earlier chapters on money, making a more extended consideration of this subject possible. While the text is clearly devoted to private finance, a complete treatment of the financial organization of society should include public finance as well. This would, of course, make the subject matter impossible of treatment in an elementary textbook.

Professor Moulton is, however, to be commended in his success in handling a very difficult task. This book should be of very large service to the beginning student of finance.

WALTER E. LAGERQUIST.

SHORTER NOTICES.

A SHORT HISTORY OF MORALS. By J. M. Robertson. London: Watts & Co., 1920. Pp. viii, 460. Price, 18s. net.

There is room for a survey of this great field, especially as Mr. Robertson has chosen to speak plainly to the plain man. The admirable ethical algebra of Mr. G. E. Moore is put aside by the mass of men, who will not attempt that gymnastic. A distinguished philosopher claimed that *no one* understood Mr. Moore, but precisely because it is about the last word in perfectly candid logical analysis it will remain the possession of the special student. Though what Bentham called the "pleasure of malevolence" have no part in Mr. Robertson's keen direct and outspoken attacks, the book is stronger upon the critical and destructive side. This method is deliberately chosen as being the likeliest—at least in its author's hands—to promote reconsideration. The chapter on Theological Ethics is well

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worth reading. But the chapter on Greek Ethics practically begins with the Socratic movement; and the references to early Greek Philosophers is summary in the extreme (p. 110). Similarly the treatment of English ethical writers from Hobbes to John Stuart Mill is thorough, well documented and detailed; but disproportionate to the single chapter devoted to Kant and later German Ethics. With such a strong partisan as Mr. Robertson this alternation of omissions and fully detailed treatment is perhaps natural. The criticism of John Stuart Mill is acute. "Whenever Mill," he writes, "has ground in the mills of the Philistines, he is still industriously pictured in that attitude, and then himself disparaged in the same" (p. 374). The great technical and logical progress made since Mill in ethical argument and statement has meant much rectification, much widening of survey, but no really new ethical conceptions, and in this sense "morality makes no discoveries." The fundamental issues had all been faced in the evolution from Hobbes to the point at which Darwinism began to impose on scientific ethics the evolutionary conception. But the cumulative process involves gradually as much change in thought as is effected in life by discoveries commonly so called. Mr. Robertson's book is valuable and interesting; a colourless impartial manual it certainly is not, but it may fulfil his expressed aim, and as "another attempt to go over the ground with an eye on evolution and sociology, studying ethics as a phenomenon no less than a science may help a little to promote the democratisation of moral culture in this country."

M. J.

ENGLISH POLITICAL THEORY. By Ivor Brown. London: Methuen & Co., 1920. Pp. 177. Price, 5s. 6d. net.

Mr. Ivor Brown, who has shown in his *Meaning of Democracy* his talent for clear and trenchant criticism of the theories of the State, treats English political theory in this present work historically. The book, however, has the temper of a pamphlet, not a historical study; and is expressive of his personal horror of jingoism and crowd-psychology, his democratic bias, his leaning toward guild socialism.

Political theory, regarded in some quarters as an abstract and barren subject, appears to verge upon political history, and sociology and at another time encroaches upon the sphere of economics or ethics; it has also suffered from the refinements and legal complications brought into it by lawyers who have narrowed it down to the academic question as to the nature of sovereignty. It is, however, a subject not limited, but too difficult to limit. It should certainly be classed with ethics, as philosophy, not with sociology as a science (p. 3), and "must make use of history only to transcend it."

The development of English political ideas is traced from the middle ages to the present day. In the chapters dealing with the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries the author is somewhat harsh to Hobbes and Locke, while his sympathies seem only to go out to a few chosen spirits, Tom Paine—one of freedom's noblest servants—and Bentham. His treatment of John Stuart Mill is interesting, and, speaking of the *Essay on Liberty*, he is of the opinion that though the Oxford School of Hegelian thinkers have made every effort to discredit the views contained in it, "mankind will probably be reading Mill long after the tortuous ethics of state absolutism have been forgotten." Mill saw that the real danger of democracy was the power it would confer on those who moulded public opinion, which he wished critical, individual and self-reliant; he dreaded

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the uniformity of outlook created by an unified, bureaucratic system of education. "Can we say," Mr. Brown concludes, "that his fears were all ungrounded? We talk blithely of making the world safe for democracy, but Mill wanted to make democracy safe for the world, and he knew that, so long as the mob-mind was only receptive and not creative, a most tremendous power would be with authority, a power that would altogether stultify the democratic idea." The pendulum of political thought seems to be swinging back to Mill—the gospel of our grandfathers, which our fathers rejected for the collectivist ideal. This capable, well-written and critical study, enlivened by many flashes of irony, should be read by men of Mr. Brown's camp and the wide public, before whom the evolution of political theory has never been so attractively presented.

J. E.

LIBERALISM AND INDUSTRY. TOWARDS A BETTER SOCIAL ORDER. By Ramsay Muir. London: Constable & Co., 1921. Pp. 208. Price, 7s. 6d. net.

Mr. Muir's book is addressed to those who ask whether the Liberal Party is dead or a helpless and bemused remnant of a great group that once stood for great ideals. In his view, the Liberal policy (which he ably indicates) has still light and leading, and as the Labour Party as a whole lacks any clear and tenable body of agreed principles, it may still head the van of progress. Mr. Muir is a firm believer in the freedom of liberalism, which believes in giving play to all sorts of experiments so long as they are not injurious, rather than in doctrinaire plans for the total reconstruction of Society from top to bottom, which is and was peculiarly attractive to a certain type of mind. He is not attracted by Bolshevism or Socialism. He indicates, but with no detail or pressing insistence, the weakness of two distinct incompatible solutions, socialism and guild socialism. His objection to socialism (p. 32), based on the fact that during the war, when the state had to assume such powers of control over the most important industries of the country we "were given in some degree a practical demonstration of how the socialist state would work," does not seem very cogent, when we remember how hastily improvised was that control. Mr. Muir's treatment of the problem of unemployment is of considerable interest, as is his comparison between the rigidity of industrial caste in England, and the fluidity in America where men move freely from one occupation to another, enriching their experience and individuality, and by so doing, save themselves from being the slaves of a changeless routine, as in England. The book disregards the complexities of detail which often form the main difficulty of industrial problems, but this attitude is conscious and deliberate, dealing as it does with the spirit not the letter of Liberalism.

F. B.

LABOUR AND INDUSTRY: a series of lectures. By P. Alden, J. B. Baillie, J. R. Clynes, G. D. H. Cole, Sir Malcolm Delevingne, J. H. Whitley and others. Manchester: University Press; London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1920. Pp. viii, 294. Price, 12s. 6d. net.

A collection of contributors such as the above, representing antagonistic interests and opposing schools of opinion is always stimulative. Here Mr. Cole upholds Guild Socialism, while Mr. J. B. Baillie is up against it; Mr. Whitley speaks of the beneficial working of the well-known Industrial Councils that bear his name, while Mr. Tawney includes them among other palliative devices as "harmless, well-intentioned, *even* useful in detail,"

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but allows little influence to the structure he condemns. Mr. Tawney is somewhat academic in his dictum that "Labour consists of persons; capital consists of things; things should be employed in the service of persons, not persons in the service of the owner of things" (p. 198). The centre of industry, he therefore concludes, should not be the owners of capital, or their agents, but the working *personnel*. Mr. Cole, always worth reading, emphasises the international character of the movement towards industrial self-government, and makes it clear that the workers in Great Britain, in Germany, in the United States, in Italy and in France, to say nothing of smaller countries, are all propounding solutions which possess a great number of common features, and that the workers' demand for a share in the control of industry is world-wide.

M. J.

WHILE EUROPE WAITS FOR PEACE. By Pierrepont B. Noyes. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1921. Pp. 99. Price, $1.50.

The author was the American member of the Rhineland Commission to which the Allies gave supreme authority in the occupied regions of Germany, hence speaks from first-hand information. He is attempting to overcome the "dangerous optimism" in America and our indifference to and ignorance of the "impending tragedy" in Europe. We seem to be swinging away from our pre-war conservatism to the opposite extreme of regarding the larger economic problems of reconstruction as mere matters of financial miracles. "Little progress has been made toward European restoration . . . nor can any be made without our help." Even Britain cannot take anyone else into her boat without sinking it; while France is unwilling to let Germany become economically strong, she is losing the only chance she has of receiving an indemnity. The proposed fifteen-year "hostile occupation" of the Rhineland is "certain to prove a curse to the world," largely because of the temptation to organize "revolutions" which have no popular support. The Continent is due for a social or political débâcle, which will eventuate in a general economic crash. France, Belgium, Poland, and Italy are launched into a set of militaristic programs that restore Europe to the old-fashioned bargainings that have ever proved her undoing. If we persist in refusing to enter the League of Nations, we "commit a crime against the peace of the world." The author urges the cancellation of France's debt to us, but does not agree with Keynes that a similar procedure should be adopted toward Great Britain.

C. F. T.

SPIRITUALISM AND THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY. By Millais Culpin. London: E. Arnold, Ltd., 1921. Pp. xvi, 159. Price, 6s. net.

A careful and trenchant study of the phenomena of occultism by a doctor, to whom belief in spiritistic revelations is "a form of materialism as gross as the ju-ju superstition of the Benin native." Dr. Culpin admits a graduated scale among mediums, from the lowest, the simple cheat, to the complete dissociate (a subject who has been led away by his unconscious and has deceived himself from the beginning); and turns for a solution of so-called occult phenomena to the psychological conception of dissociation, in which certain actions are the result of a "splitting-off" of a stream of consciousness. By this trick of splitting-off of consciousness the operator is able to allow ideas and memories from the unconscious to rise

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to the surface freed from the control of consciousness. Hence the product of the automatism is odd, fantastic, and surprising to the operator. If the operator is unaware of the peculiar features of dissociation, a systematic delusion is built up and accepted as proof of the supernatural communication. The identity of psychological condition between the medium and the hysteric and somnambule is well established, and Dr. Culpin traces the source of many "revelations" to the psychological condition of the medium who (like the hysteric patient) watches the doctor to learn what symptoms he expects to find.

J. E.

CHAPTERS IN GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY. By Stevenson Smith and Edwin Guthrie. University of Washington Press, Seattle, 1921. Pp. 181.

Like most other texts on Psychology, this book is almost exclusively confined to Behaviorism, only about one-tenth of the space being devoted to introspection. This is interesting in view of the concession in the first few pages that "thinking means practically the same thing as consciousness," and that "a man's thoughts as such are known only to himself." In the chapter on Instinct we learn that European Psychology is responsible for the uncritical description of this term as the behavior which is common to all men. Certain unsupported statements as to "instinctive endowment" and the inheritance of acquired characteristics call for evidence. Another serious error of omission is the faillure to give due prominence to the work of Pawlow and Bechterew on the Conditioned Reflex. Perception is defined as "a reaction tendency more or less completely expressed," while judgments are "perceptions of situations which contain a novel combination of stimuli with a comparatively long reaction time." As for Consciousness, there is "another language" than the description of mind in terms of stimulation, neural action, and responses, "which includes terms that are useless in a description of behavior." The behavioristic analysis of introspection begets terms which are only "*indicative* of what is taking place in the body." If the science of consciousness is merely less exact and less useful that the science of behavior, this might also be said of behavior and biology respectively. The point is that every stage in the series has its own value and cogency; the sooner this recognition is given introspective psychology, the better.

C. F. TAEUSCH.

THE BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF BELIEF. By Wesley R. Wells.

A behavioristic study of religion. The persistence of beliefs is held to establish a presumption in favor of their biological value, although the author attacks the "pragmatic fallacy" of confusing this survival value with the truth of these beliefs. Chapter 2 is much clearer in stating *that* a distinction exists between truth and value than in telling just *what* it is. The author seems later to fall back on the "correspondence" theory, although he is willing to exclude "metaphysical" beliefs from this test. Later we are led to conclude that the distinction between truth and value is that between independent and instrumental value. The "fallacy of false attribution" consists in regarding as inadequate the physiological explanation of religious activity; value is here defined in terms of organic acts and attitudes. When we are told, however, that "for behaviorism, beliefs are not subjective entities, but objective processes," we must remember the author's previous warning: "For behaviorism the term

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'subjective' loses its usual connotation . . . and refers to one phase of the objective mental process." A concluding chapter suggests "recapitulation" as a method of religious and moral instruction.

C. F. TAEUSCH.

ONE HUNDRED PER CENT, THE STORY OF A PATRIOT. By Upton Sinclair. Published by the Author.

A good many years ago the reviewer read a novel of Upton Sinclair's entitled "Manassas," a story of the Civil War. He thought it at the time one of the best Civil War stories he had read. Since that date he has read other of Mr. Sinclair's writings, but no novel until this "Hundred Per Cent, The Story of a Patriot." It is not, as a novel, comparable to the earlier book. It has little story illusion, little convincing characterization. It is, in short, not art, but propaganda.

Mr. Sinclair probably knows better than anyone that his book is propaganda only. But he has come to believe that it is more important to tell unpleasant truths about society than to write artistic stories. Certainly the persecution of liberals, radicals, and labor agitators under the guise of patriotism forms a recent disgraceful chapter in our history which should not be forgotten. "One Hundred Per Cent" will keep these facts in memory for a time, will serve to strengthen the current of liberalism in its contest with the flood of reaction. Everything in the book is based on fact, from the Mooney frameup with which it opens, to the I. W. W. deportations with which it concludes.

Yet the general impression it leaves is of hectic exaggeration and melodrama. Knowing it to be essentially fact, one yet does not accept the story as true, true in the artistic sense that it convinces the imagination. Were Mr. Sinclair here more the artist that he once had it in him to be, his book would have a deeper and more permanent effect than it is likely to. The educated reader will not, in most instances, read to the end. It is unfortunate that this is so. America needs a novelist like Nexö to tell the story of the industrially oppressed as it is told for Denmark in "Pelle, the Conqueror," a story which is not only a social document, but a work of art. We should like to see Mr. Sinclair set himself such an ideal, and, without sacrificing the cause of social justice, endeavor to present his facts with that imaginative coloring which would make them seem universal truths.

CARL HENRY GRABO.

HANDBOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. Edited by G. Lowes Dickinson. London: The Swarthmore Press, Ltd. New York: Harcourt Brace & Co. Price, $1.00 each. By mail, $1.10.

This series thus far includes: Causes of International War, by the Editor; Patriotism and the Super-State, by J. L. Stocks; Nationalism, by G. P. Gooch; Economic Imperialism, by L. S. Woolf; The Workers' International, by R. W. Postgate. "The object of this series is to disseminate the facts of international relations and so to develop what H. G. Wells has called the 'international mind.'" Despite the recent ante-election protests against any part in European affairs, the logic of facts is already working in the contrary direction. Trade is likely to prove a firmer argument than sentiment. The volumes in this series are all brief and the special student will need to look further. But the series is pro-

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duced primarily for the general reader. "The world cannot be saved by governments and governing classes." Many may be tempted by a book that can be read in an evening and the style is well adapted for the purpose.

J. H. T.

DENMARK: A CO-OPERATIVE COMMONWEALTH. By Frederic C. Howe. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1921. Pp. IX, 203. Price, $2.00.

Dr. Howe shows how Denmark has risen from a desperate condition in 1870 to a prosperous and contented condition at the present time, largely through co-operation and self-help on the part of farmers. The United States, which combines extraordinary resources in production with extraordinary expense and waste in marketing, may well consider what Denmark has done to bring producer and consumer together and eliminate the enormous expenses now levied upon both by our system.

J. H. T.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF WOMEN PHYSICIANS. New York: The Woman's Press, 1920. In 6 Vols. Price $3.00, or 75 cents each.

The six volumes of these Proceedings (for separate titles see under *Books Received*) contain material important not only for the physician but for all interested in the health and well-being of women and children. The modern psychological point of view is brought to bear upon sex life and sex education. Representatives from many countries report upon the legislation and public opinion of their peoples upon such matters as illegitimacy, prostitution, control of venereal disease, protection to the health of women and children in industry. Many shades of opinion are represented in dealing with different subjects, but the volumes afford an impressive view of the more intelligent and deep-going attitude. Parents will here find much that is suggestive for dealing with difficult children.

J. H. T.

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